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ABSTRACT 
In this thesis, red flags for dangerousness/lethality established from domestic violence and homicide 
research provided the social framework for an examination of legal responses to violence in 
intimate heterosexual relationships.  The research investigated these gendered, structural patterns of 
violence and the effectiveness of criminal justice interventions in keeping victims safe.  Agency 
interactions with offenders and victims prior to women's deaths were reviewed in selected cases.  
Criminal law constructions of violence in intimate relationships were evaluated for their recognition 
and understanding of primary risk factors for dangerousness/lethality.   
 
The research found major red flags remain invisible in criminal law stereotypes of violence between 
intimates.  The significance of these risk factors for dangerousness/lethality is therefore overlooked, 
misunderstood and even misrepresented in defence of violent offenders.   Although the aim of the 
Domestic Violence Act 1995 is to ensure effective protection for victims, the study found a 
significant number of women (and sometimes other family members and children) experience 
further sub-lethal and lethal violence following legal interventions with perpetrators.  Lacking a 
principled policy foundation, central focus on victim safety and clear framework for interventions, 
legal responses are internally incoherent and inconsistent with New Zealand Family Violence 
Prevention Strategy.    
 
The New Zealand government has committed to principled domestic violence intervention and 
consistency in law and policy.  This will require:  a) legislative reform; b) public and professional 
education on the dynamics of violent relationships, including the interrelationship between sub-
lethal and lethal assaults; and c) monitoring of criminal justice interventions to improve 
accountability.  Until this is accomplished, stories of abused women and their children, including 
informal attempts to seek help and contact with state and community agencies will continue to be 
dishonoured by a legal system which silences their voices and fails to learn lessons from their 
injuries and deaths. 
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CENTRALISING VICTIM SAFETY 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
A great many people now agree that men who beat up their wives or girlfriends do a 
bad thing.  Many understand that children who witness such violence against their 
mothers can only be harmed by the experience.  Many sympathize with battered 
women, and hardly anyone any more - apart from religious fundamentalists - seem 
to think that women should put up with abuse…But no matter how you interpret the 
numbers it's clear that male violence is not going down…Why, when things seem to 
have changed so much for the better, do they seem so much the same?  Why, when 
we actually keep score, do they seem worse?1 
 
I   INTRODUCTION: THE RESEARCH CONTEXT 
There is widespread agreement that domestic violence has now reached epidemic proportions.2  
The increasing toll of disability and death recently prompted the New Zealand Prime Minister and 
Principal Family Court Judge to denounce abuse in the home as a blight on the country and an 
issue confronting all New Zealanders.3  Since underreporting creates uncertainty about rates of 
offending,4 the following figures are subject to evidence indicating that government agencies may 
be responding to only around 10 per cent of domestic violence incidents.5 
 
Police point to a growing rate of call-outs to domestic violence incidents.  The figure of 24,700 in 
2002-2003 increased to 30,692 in the period 2004-2005.6  Around half of murders in New Zealand 
are the result of domestic violence.7  New Zealand women are more likely to be killed by a person 
who is 'well known' to them than by anyone else.8  Studies indicate that about ninety percent of 
                                                 
1   Diane Shoos, 'Representing Domestic Violence: Ambivalence and Difference in What's Love Got to Do with It' 
(2003) 15 National Women's Studies Association Journal 57, 59, citing Ann Jones, Next Time She'll Be Dead (1994) 6-
7 (emphasis in original). 
2    See, eg, The Country's Top Family Court Judge Says New Zealand's High Rate of Domestic Violence Means We 
Can No Longer Boast of Being the Best Country in the World to Bring Up Children, New Zealand Herald, 28 March 
2006; Clark Backs Judge's Domestic Violence Comments, New Zealand Press Association 28 March 2006. 
3     Ibid. 
4    Ministry of Justice, Responses to Crime: Annual Review 1999 (1999) 29.  Allison Morris, Women's Safety Survey 
1996 (1997) 60, found only 8% of women who disclosed abuse by current partners had contacted the police about the 
most recent violent incident and only 21% who disclosed abuse by recent partners had informed the police. 
5     Ministry of Health, Family Violence Intervention Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse (2002) 23, 38. 
6   The Country's Top Family Court Judge Says New Zealand's High Rate of Domestic Violence Means We Can No 
Longer Boast of Being the Best Country in the World to Bring Up Children, New Zealand Herald, 28 March 2006. 
7     Ibid. 
8    Ian Miller and Nestar Russell, Homicide in New Zealand 1988-94: Patterns and Relationships (Paper presented at 
the 11th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 29 January-1 February 1996) 14. 
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intimate partner homicides are perpetrated by men against current or estranged women partners.9  
Between 20 November 2005 and 3 January 2006, six women, one child, and the new partner of one 
of the female victims were killed.  Three of the six women had protection orders in force against 
their killers.  One was granted a temporary order just two days before she was killed.  One woman 
had recently applied for her order to be discharged in the hope her child's father would take a more 
active role in the child's life.  One of the men involved, but none of the women, had attended a 
court-funded domestic violence programme.10 
 
Although a raft of domestic violence reforms over the past three decades have challenged cultural 
attitudes and criminal justice responses, outcomes have proved disappointing.  Following the 
introduction in 1981 of legislation intended to inculcate public attitudes that domestic violence is 
not a matter for 'good-natured tolerance' or a 'hand-washing' attitude,11 a Ministerial Committee of 
Inquiry reported in 1987 that traditional beliefs about women as the chattels of their husbands 
apparently remained operative in New Zealand.12  Research on repeated breaches of protection 
orders commissioned by the Victims Task Force in the early 1990s described 'a gap' between 
women's experiences of violence and legal responses.13  Recommendations from this research, and 
a report by Sir Ronald Davison, the former Chief Justice of New Zealand,14 were largely 
incorporated in the Domestic Violence Act 1995.   While the Act and related legislative reforms 
were regarded as having the potential to create a legal culture more sympathetic to battered women 
and children,15 there is evidence of a decline in effective implementation of the legislation, 
coinciding with a period of intense activity by, and publicity for, the Fathers' Rights movement.16 
                                                 
9    Ministry of Health, above n 5, 37.  The Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report  (2006) 
32, notes that between 2000 and 2004 (inclusive), 54 women were murdered by men and three men were murdered by 
women.  As discussed in the following chapter, these statistics on women's family-violence related deaths may 
significantly underestimate the actual death toll. 
10   The Country's Top Judge Says New Zealand's High Rate of Domestic Violence Means We Can No Longer Boast of 
Being the Best Country in the World to Bring Up Children, New Zealand Herald, 28 March 2006. 
11   New Zealand, Parliamentary Debates (1981) 442 NZPD 4228.  
12   Committee of Inquiry into Violence, Report of Ministerial Committee of Inquiry into Violence (1987) 30, 96. 
13   Ruth Busch, Neville Robertson and Hilary Lapsley, Domestic Violence and the Justice System: A Study of Breaches 
of Protection Orders (1992). 
14   Sir Ronald Davison, Report of Inquiry Into Family Court Proceedings Involving Christine Madeline Marion Bristol 
and Alan Robert Bristol (1994) 41. 
15  Although researchers expressed concern regarding under-resourcing.  See, eg, Ruth Busch, 'Editorial' (1996) 4 
Waikato L.Rev. i, vi.    
16    New Zealand Has High Female Murder Rate, New Zealand Herald, 20 April 2002; Wendy Davis, 'Gender Bias, 
Fathers' Rights, Domestic Violence and the Family Court' [2004] BFLJ 299.  
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Of particular concern is a report by the National Collective of Women's Refuges indicating that 
abused women are losing confidence in the legal and justice system.17 
 
Feminists who broke the silence surrounding violence in the home conceptualised the problem as 
one of male violence toward women and children.  However, despite decades of research there is 
still no consensus among researchers, advocates and academics over the nature of intimate partner 
violence, the gender of persons who typically inflict and sustain it, or how society should respond 
to it.   Studies focusing upon male violence investigate interventions that may decrease the risk that 
intimate women partners will be seriously injured or killed.18  Those who argue that females are 
just as physically aggressive as males, even at the most severe end of the violence continuum, 
suggest the task is to account for the perplexing reality that men are overwhelmingly the 
perpetrators of serious violence outside the home, but the sexes converge in their rates of 
perpetration within it.19  Complaints by advocates for battered women that courts are too lenient on 
domestic violence offenders are disputed by judges,20 and a recent controversial decision to 
discharge without conviction, a husband who assaulted his pregnant wife, was defended by the 
judge in question, who acknowledged that other members of the judiciary might adopt a different 
approach.21 
 
In 2002, the New Zealand government published its national Family Violence Prevention Strategy.  
The strategy calls for a consistent, coherent response to family violence across state sectors and 
consistency in relevant law, policy and service delivery.22  Although the document refers to 
'appropriate' intervention,23 no detail is provided on the form that legal intervention should take.  
This vacuum is currently occupied by conflicting theoretical analyses, research, and related 
recommendations that compete for the attention of policymakers.  While the policy also gives 
                                                 
17    Davis, above n 16, 299, citing Sheryl Hann, The Implementation of the Domestic Violence Act 1995: A Report from 
the National Collective of Independent Women's Refuges Inc (2004).  See also, Faith in Protection Orders Wanes, New 
Zealand Herald, 20 October 2005. 
18   See, eg, Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite 
Case Control Study' (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 1089.  Desmond Ellis and Walter De Keseredy , 
'Rethinking Estrangement, Interventions and Intimate Femicide' (1997) 3 Violence Against Women 590. 
19    Terrie Moffit, et al, Sex Differences in AntiSocial Behaviour (2001) 69. 
20  Courts Cop Flak Over Domestic Violence, Waikato Times, 4 July 2000; Judge Disputes Claims on Domestic 
Violence, Waikato Times, 12 July 2000. 
21    Jail 'Not For All Violent Husbands', Hawkes Bay Today, 12 October 2005. 
22    Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002). 
23    Ibid 11. 
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paramountcy to the principle of victim safety,24 best practice guidelines and standards refer to 
internal agency, or institutional accountability, as opposed to accountability to battered victims.25  
Since, as discussed below, research shows abused women who turn to the legal system for help are 
at increased risk of further violence; this approach may underestimate the need for systematic 
monitoring of legal responses to evaluate their effectiveness in keeping victims safe.26  
 
II   THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission notes that rather than base legal responses on abstract 
philosophical principles, law should reflect the social context in which family violence typically 
occurs.  Social framework evidence enables an individual accused's actions to be located 'within 
the broader framework of the experiences of victims of family violence more generally'.27  By 
reorienting the analysis from a study of individual cases in isolation, to structural patterns of 
offending, members of the public and professionals gain a better understanding of 'the social 
realities of family and relationship violence'.  This evidence is therefore invaluable in countering 
misconceptions about domestic violence and assisting individuals to identify their own 
unconscious assumptions and biases.28   
 
The social reality of intimate partner violence is reflected in domestic violence and homicide 
research which identifies patterns of behaviour associated with risk of further serious and lethal 
violence.  These red flags for dangerousness/lethality offer a means of standardising domestic 
violence risk assessment instruments and providing greater protection for victims of violence and 
their children.   
 
III   THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK:  RED FLAGS FOR DANGEROUSNESS/LETHALITY 
New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy notes the need to review and evaluate existing 
domestic violence screening and risk assessment tools, guidelines and procedures.29  Risk 
assessment, defined as 'an assessment of the dangerousness as well as lethality potential of the 
                                                 
24    Ibid 12. 
25    Ibid 38. 
26    Monitoring and evaluation is expressed in reference to '[e]nsuring that legal sanctions under the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995 (DVA) are effectively monitored and enforced': at 22. 
27    Victorian Law Reform Commission, 'Reinterpreting "Reasonable"' (2004) 78 LIJ 99. 
28    Ibid.   See, also, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report, (2004) [1.39]-[1.45]. 
29    Ministry of Social Development, above n 22, 36. 
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offender in order to provide adequate protection to past and future victims',30 provides 
professionals dealing with domestic violence and individual battered women with a sense of the 
risk they may face.  To avoid becoming embroiled in controversy over use of the term 'lethality' on 
its own, research in this area is careful to define risk assessment as synonymous with 
dangerousness assessment (which encompasses lethality assessment).31  Neil Websdale cautions 
that 
 
the absolute distinction between lethal and non lethal cases is a false dichotomy; rather there is a 
range or continuum of violence and entrapment that underpins abusive intimate relationships.  
Indeed, it would be far more appropriate and useful to employ the term 'dangerousness' rather than 
'lethality' assessment.32 
 
While assessments of risk will never be foolproof, 'to the extent risk assessment tools provide a 
common or shared language for talking about battered women's victimization, they are both helpful 
and powerful'.33  Given increasing public demands that criminal justice agencies justify acts or 
omissions in high profile cases, risk assessment can also facilitate consistent, standardised, 
transparent interventions.34   
  
Lesley Laing divides rapidly proliferating domestic violence risk assessment instruments into three 
groups according to validity studies.  That is, those where no attempt has been made to establish 
validity; those where validity has been evaluated, but no results reported in the scientific literature; 
and instruments for which published validity data is available.35  The 'Danger Assessment Tool' 
developed by Jacquelyn Campbell in 1985 and revised in 1988 following reliability and validity 
studies was recently investigated by a team of researchers who found that 'despite certain 
limitations, the tool can with some reliability identify women who may be at risk of being killed by 
                                                 
30   Standards New Zealand, Screening, Risk Assessment and Interventions for Family Violence Including Child Abuse 
and Neglect (2006) 71. 
31 Lesley Laing, Risk Assessment in Domestic Violence (2004) 11, Australian Domestic and Family Violence 
Clearinghouse www.austdvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au at 15 November 2005.  
32   Neil Websdale, Lethality Assessment Tools: A Critical Analysis (2000) 1, National Electronic Network on Violence 
Against Women, Applied Research Forum, www.vaw.umn.edu/Vawnet/lethality.htm at 15 November 2005. 
33   Neil Websdale, 'Battered Women at Risk' (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 1214, 1217. 
34  Metropolitan Police Service, Findings from the Multi-agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in London: 
Prepared for the ACPO Homicide Working Group, (2003) Appendix III 'MPS Risk Assessment Model for Domestic 
Violence Cases', 2. 
35   Laing, above n 31, 11.  
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an intimate partner'.36   Key risk factors included:  access to or ownership of guns; prior use of a 
weapon; threats to kill, especially those involving use of a weapon; prior serious injury; threats of 
suicide; drug or alcohol abuse; forced sex against a female partner; obsessiveness/extreme 
jealousy/ dominance. 
 
A number of jurisdictions have incorporated the following elements in domestic violence risk 
assessment instruments to be utilised by criminal justice and other agencies to identify situations of 
high risk and take appropriate steps to ensure victims' safety.37  
 
A   Repeat Victimisation 
There is general agreement that an act of violence is the strongest risk factor for future violence.38 
Research in the United States (US) found rates of repeat victimisation in domestic violence cases 
exceed those for other types of offences.  One in five domestic violence victims reported they had 
experienced a series of three or more assaults in the previous six months that were so similar they 
could not distinguish one from another.  For assaults in general, fewer than one in ten involved this 
type of victimisation.39  New Zealand research examining police records of domestic violence call-
outs found that in nearly half (45.2%) of the sample of 166 offences and incidents, police had 
attended previously.  In one in five of the incidents police had attended three to five times 
previously and in six per cent of cases police had attended ten or more times previously.  Nearly 
half of offenders had criminal court histories (46.4%) and nearly one in three (30%) of offenders 
had a domestic protection order against them.40  This pattern of recidivism indicates that '[o]ne of 
the most robust, simple and straightforward risk factors for domestic violence is that of a previous 
assault'.41 
 
                                                 
36   Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide' [2003] NIJ Journal 14, 14.  See, 
also, Ministry of Health, above n 5, 45, which includes a 'Danger Assessment Scale' for use by health professionals. 
37     See, eg, Appendix IV.  See, also, Ministry of Health, above n 5. 
38    Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton, 'Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A 20-Year Review' in 
M Dwayne Smith and Margaret Zahn (eds), Homicide: A Source Book of Social Research (1999) 149; Sylvia Walby 
and Andrew Myhill, 'Assessing and Managing Risk' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in Reducing Domestic 
Violence? A Comprehensive Guide for Professionals (2001) 307.    
39    US Department of Justice, Violence Between Intimates (1994) 1.  See, also, Nicole Hunter, 'Protecting Survivors, 
Holding Perpetrators Accountable' (Paper presented at the Women's Legal Service, Conference on Women, Feminism 
and the Law, Brisbane, October 2004) 3. 
40     J J Taylor, 'Child Witness Pilot Project' Presentation to Children and Family Violence: Effective Interventions 
Now Conference,  4-5 July 1999.  Ministry of Justice website: 
http://www.justice.govt.nz/pubs/reports/family_conference/author_8.html Retrieved 24 February 2003.   
41   Walby and Myhill, above n 38, 307, 314. 
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Physical abuse of the female by the male before the lethal event is also a well established feature of 
domestic homicide, no matter which of the partners is killed.42 
 
Studies of homicide cases…indicate that a substantial majority of homicides committed by women 
occur in response to male aggression and threat…Similarly, clinical and research studies document 
a history of physical abuse and threat by men who eventually kill their victims.43 
 
Estimates indicate that between 67 and 80 per cent of women who are killed by current or 
estranged male partners have previously been battered by their killers.44  Carolyn Block, the 
principle researcher with the Chicago Women's Health Risk Study, a comprehensive, collaborative 
study of lethal and sub-lethal intimate partner violence, notes almost half of the abused women in 
the study had experienced at least one prior 'severe or life threatening' injury, defined as: 
permanent injury; being severely 'beaten up'; being choked; or burned; internal injury; head injury; 
broken bones; or a threat or attack with a weapon.45  The frequency of abuse, as opposed to 
severity of last incident increased the risk of the woman being killed, or of the woman killing her 
abusive partner.46  These studies demonstrate that domestic violence and domestic homicide cannot 
be conceptualised and studied as distinct, unrelated phenomena or events.47 
 
                                                 
42   See, eg, Browne, Williams and Dutton, above n 38;   Byron Johnson, De Li and Neil Websdale, 'Florida Mortality 
Review Project: Executive Summary' in National Institute of Justice and American Bar Association, Legal 
Interventions in Family Violence: Research Findings and Policy Implications (1998). Ministry of Health, above n 5, 
45, 'Danger Assessment Scale' acknowledges the strong association between prior abuse and later homicide for 
intimate female partners.  Gerris Serran and Philip Firestone, 'Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the Male 
Proprietariness and the Self-Defense Theories' (2004) 9 Aggression and Violent Behaviour 1; Kenneth Polk, When Men 
Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994).   See, also, research cited in Myrna Dawson, 'The Cost of "Lost" 
Intimacy: The Effect of Relationship Status on Criminal Justice Decision Making' (2003) 43 Brit.J.Criminol. 689, 692.  
Peter Jaffe and Myrna Dawson, 'Domestic Homicide: Critical Issues in the Development of Death Review Committees, 
A Literature Review and Discussion Paper' in Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, Annual Report to the 
Chief Coroner: Case Reviews of Domestic Violence Deaths, 2002 (2004) Appendix B 59.   
43   Browne, Williams and Dutton, above n 38, 150-151. 
44   Amy Karan and Lauren Lazarus, 'A Lawyer's Guide to Assessing Dangerousness for Domestic Violence' (2004) 78 
F.B.J 55.   Patricia Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (1993) 179, notes 'the most 
recurrent theme in the killings by both men and women was the antecedents of physical and emotional violence toward 
the woman'.   
45    Carolyn Block, 'How Can Practitioners Help an Abused Woman Lower Her Risk of Death' [2003] NIJ Journal, 4, 
5. 
46    Ibid. 
47  See, eg, Metropolitan Police Service, Findings from the Multi-agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in 
London: Prepared for the ACPO Homicide Working Group, (2003) 16, noting that '[d]omestic homicide cannot be 
separated from domestic violence'.  See, also, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 28, [4.154], noting the need 
for better understanding by criminal justice personnel of the interrelationship between domestic violence and the use of 
fatal force. 
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As discussed above, in the absence of appropriate intervention, acts of violence appear likely to 
increase in frequency and intensity over time.48  The US National Institute of Justice sponsored 
research conducted by the National Center for State Courts which 
 
confirmed previous research showing a strong correlation between the severity and duration of 
abuse - the longer women experience abuse, the more intense the behaviour is likely to become and 
the more likely women are to be severely injured by their abusers.49 
 
However, Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman note considerable variation in abusive style among 
men who exercise a pattern of coercive control in their relationships.  'This pattern of control and 
intimidation may be predominantly psychological, economic, or sexual in nature or may rely 
primarily on the use of physical violence'.50  While tactics short of physical violence may be 
sufficient to maintain control once dominance is established, the abuser's resort to physical 
violence when necessary to retain or regain control constitutes an ongoing threat.  Therefore, the 
potential for escalating violence appears inherent in the battering relationship. 
 
B   Separation 
Contrary to cultural discourses which focus on the battered woman's 'failure' to leave, '[m]ost 
women try to leave abusive relationships.'51  Although women who kill male intimates are likely to 
be responding to physical aggression by the male; separation from a controlling male partner is a 
risk factor for serious/lethal violence against women.52  The scientific status of separation as a red 
                                                 
48   Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings 
from the National Violence Against Women Survey (2000); Metropolitan Police Service, above n 34, 10. 
49    Jeremy Travis, Research Preview (1998) citing research by Susan Keilitz, et al, Civil Protection Orders: Victims' 
Views on Effectiveness, National Center for State Courts (1998).  See, also, Cheryl Hanna, 'No Right to Choose: 
Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' (1996) 109 Harv.L.Rev. 1849,1895;  Walby and 
Myhill, above n 38, 315;  Campbell, et al, above n 18, 1089; Lisa Sanctis, 'Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of 
Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence' (1996) 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 359, 388-389.  Johnson, Li 
and Websdale, above n 42.  R Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash, 'The Politics and Policies of Responding to 
Violence Against Women' in Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzen (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: 
Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice A Reader (2000) 187, 195-196, note this common pattern of repeat and 
escalating violence by male offenders prior to the final lethal assault has been known in the United States since the 
1950s although it is often ignored.  Myrna Raeder, 'The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson 
and Beyond' (1996) 69 1463, 1468 cites a number of studies revealing this pattern.  Cf Morris, above n 4, 51, finding 
repeat victimisation was not always characterised by a pattern of increasing frequency and severity. 
50   Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on Family 
Dynamics (2002) 3. 
51    Block, above n 45. 
52   Marvin Wolfgang, 'Victim-Precipitated Criminal Homicide' in Marvin Wolfgang (ed), Studies in Homicide (1967) 
72; George Barnard, et al, 'Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spouse Murder' (1982) 10 Bull.Am.Acad.Psychiatry & 
L. 271, 274, 278 found the wife's departure from the relationship was perceived by males in the sample as a 'rejection 
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flag is now well established.53  One study found a common explanation given by men for killing 
estranged women partners was 'inability to accept what they perceived to be a rejection of them or 
their role of dominance over their eventual victim'.  Actual departure or the threat of separation was 
especially provoking, representing 'intolerable desertion, rejection, or abandonment'.  When killing 
the women, male offenders believed they were reacting to a previous offence on the part of their 
wives (the woman's leaving).54  New Zealand research has also revealed high rates of abusive 
behaviours toward women post-separation.55   
 
The US National Violence Against Women Survey found married women who lived apart from 
their husbands were nearly four times more likely to report that their husbands had raped, 
physically assaulted and/or stalked them than were women who lived with their husbands.56  The 
Chicago Study also found '[t]hree-fourths of homicide victims and 85 per cent of women who had 
experienced severe but nonfatal violence had left or tried to leave in the past year'.57  Women who 
asked their partners to leave, but the men refused were at especially high risk, as were women 
whose partners threatened to kill them if they left.58   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
[by the wife] of them or of their role of dominance over their eventual victim'.  These men were described as killing in 
response to 'the culturally prescribed image of what it is to be [a] man'.  Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 'Who Kills 
Whom in Spouse Killings?  On the Exceptional Sex Ratio of Spousal Homicides in the United States' (1992) 30 
Criminology 189, 206. cite a comprehensive list of sources showing self-defence or escape from oppression and 
violence is the usual motive when women kill men.  Studies of intimate partner homicides in Canada, in New South 
Wales and in Chicago illustrate the same gendered pattern of offending:  Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 'Spousal 
Homicide Risk and Estrangement' (1993) 8 Violence and Victims 3; Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 'Spousal 
Homicide' 14 Juristat (Statistics Canada, Ottawa: Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, March 1994); C R Block and 
A Christakos, 'Intimate Partner Homicide in Chicago Over 29 Years' (1995) 41 J.Res.Crime & Delinq. 496. Aileen 
McColgan, 'In Defence of Battered Women who Kill' (1993) 13 OJLS 508, n 46, cites one study showing that in 99 out 
of 100 cases in which men killed intimate partners, the woman was attempting to break out of the relationship.  In a 
further study of 42 women from 15 American states who were charged with the murder or attempted murder of 
partners many of the women had left and been followed and forced to return.  Many continued to be intimidated long 
after leaving and found police protection ineffective.  
53   The Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 28, [4.117] cites a recent review of the scientific status of 
research on domestic violence which found a number of areas of agreement among researchers, including agreement 
concerning the potential for use of fatal force when women attempt to exit abusive relationships. 
54     Browne, Williams and Dutton, above n 38, 159. 
55    Morris, above n 4, 54, found just over half (51%) of women who had recently separated had experienced abuse 
since the separation.  
56     Tjaden and Thoennes, above n 48, iv.     
57     Block, above n 45, 6. 
58    Carolyn Block, et al, The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study: Risk of Serious Injury or Death in Intimate 
Violence A Collaborative Research Project (2000) 272. 
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C   Threats to Kill 
Vengeance threats against intimate female partners are established risk markers for 
dangerousness/lethality.59  Websdale and his colleagues found situations in which the '[p]erpetrator 
makes threats to kill the victim; often providing details of intended modus operandi and 
communicating those details in some form or other, however subtle, to the victim herself, family 
members, friends, colleagues at work, or others' were a frequent antecedent of both multiple and 
single domestic violence killings.60  The Chicago research found women whose partners threatened 
them with murder were 15 times more likely than other women to be killed.  When those threats 
were accompanied by use of a weapon, women were 20 times more likely to be killed.61  
Consequently, domestic homicide researchers warn threats to kill must be taken seriously.62 
 
D   Possessive Behaviours and the Theme of Control 
A recent review of international research and literature notes the major themes to emerge from 
research on domestic homicide are masculine control and possessiveness.  Male accusations of 
sexual infidelity, women's unilateral decisions to leave an intimate relationship, or a more 
generalised inability to control an intimate female partner precipitate a large majority of women's 
deaths.63  Male, but rarely female sexual rivals are also vulnerable to lethal violence perpetrated by 
jealous and sexually possessive partners.  The themes of control and possessiveness are also 
apparent in the tendency for men who kill intimate partners to take their own lives as well, '[a]s if 
they might, in this way, achieve an indissoluble union in death'.64 
 
Kenneth Polk found jealousy and allegations of sexual misconduct (which family and friends of the 
victim frequently described as delusional) drove male perpetrators to extraordinary efforts to 
monitor and control the behaviour of female partners.  This theme of masculine control was 
encapsulated in cases where men informed their partners and the world: 'If I can't have you, no one 
will'.65  Patricia Easteal's study also describes an obsessive possessiveness in relation to which the 
                                                 
59   See, eg, Ministry of Health, above n 5, Appendix L. 
60   Websdale, above n 32, 3.   See, also, Metropolitan Police Service, above n 34, 11. 
61   Campbell, et al, above n 36, 16.   
62   Johnson, Li, and Websdale, above n 42, 40.  C/f  Do the Crime, Do the Time, ACT Says, Evening Post, 6 July 1999, 
noting that less than one in four offenders convicted of threatening to kill or cause grievous bodily harm are sent to 
prison.  Those imprisoned served an average of less than eight months' jail. 
63   Serran and Firestone, above n 42, 12. 
64  Ian Leader-Elliott, 'Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation' in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary 
Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997) 149, 150. 
65   Polk, above n 42, 189. 
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term 'jealousy' seemed insufficiently strong enough to encompass.  Cases in this category often 
revealed elements of severe emotional and/or psychological abuse with the woman's behaviour 
closely monitored, including preventing attempts to leave the house.66 
 
E   Stalking 
Studies consistently report stalking and harassment as very strongly associated with severity of past 
violence and continued severe violence in the future, even when other risk and protective factors 
are taken into account.67 
 
Stalking commonly occurs after the relationship but can also occur before the relationship ends. 
Stalkers are more likely to be violent if they have had an intimate relationship with the victim. 
Furthermore, stalking is revealed to be related to lethal and near lethal violence against women and 
coupled with physical assault, is significantly associated with murder and attempted murder. 
Stalkers…are a potentially very dangerous group.  Stalking behaviour and obsessive thinking are 
highly related behaviours.  Stalking must be considered a high risk factor for both femicide and 
attempted femicide, and abused women should be advised accordingly.68 
 
F   Prior Violence toward Previous Partners 
The London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Risk Assessment Model for Domestic Violence 
indicates that rather than a 'special problem' arising from the dynamics of the particular intimate 
relationship, domestic violence 'tends to be part of a perpetrator's pattern of repeated aggression 
toward other persons persisting over the life course'.69  There is strong evidence that men who are 
abusive in one relationship are likely to abuse again in the next relationship.70  Men who are 
motivated by jealousy and possessiveness to commit crimes against intimate partners apparently 
constitute a particular category of recidivist offenders.71 
 
                                                 
66   Easteal, above n 44.  
67  See, eg, Block, et al, above n 58, 271; The Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2003 Wisconsin 
Domestic Violence Homicide Report (2005); Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review: Every Life Lost is a Call for Change  
(2004). 
68     Metropolitan Police Service, above n 34, 11 (citations omitted). 
69     Ibid. 
70    See, eg, research and discussion in Donna Coker, 'Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who 
Kill' (1992) 2 S.Cal.Rev.L.& Women's Stud. 71, 112-113. 
71    See, eg, Lana Muzinic, et al, 'Forensic Importance of Jealousy' (2003) 27 Coll. Antropol. 293.  Cf  R v Wilson  
[1996] 1 NZLR 147, 152.     
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The danger of pathological jealousy is seen in its possibility of repeating.  It can occur by entering a 
new relationship during which violence can mostly repeat…jealousy is often a motive in murders by 
 offenders released from prison or hospital, who had a previous history of a crime due to jealousy.72 
 
G   Forced Sex 
Research indicates intimate partners who are sexually assaulted are subjected to more serious 
injury.  Victims who report a domestic sexual assault also tend to have a history of domestic abuse, 
whether or not it has been reported previously.73 
 
H   Suicide Threats 
Suicide threats and attempts are also established risk factors for violence against current or former 
women partners.74  'The coupling of homicide with suicide is a frequent occurrence with men who 
kill family members.'75  Although 'some murder-suicides [in intimate partner relationships] occur 
shortly after the onset of "malignant jealousy", more often there has been a chronically chaotic 
relationship fraught with jealous suspicions, verbal abuse, and sub-lethal violence.'76   
 
Research also suggests a pattern of so-called 'suicide pacts' or 'mercy killings' by older men. 
 
Usually the elderly male partner, who may be suffering ill-health himself, kills the ailing female 
with a gun and then commits suicide.  The motive for the homicide allegedly is to end her suffering. 
His own subsequent suicide is attributed to his loss of his love object, the prospect of impending 
helplessness, and more rarely, guilt.  However, suicide pacts and so called mercy killings are not as 
simple as they might first appear.  In Florida, Byron Johnson and I have found it necessary to 
                                                 
72    Muzinec, et al, above n 71, 298 citing PD Scott, (1977) 131 Br.J.Psychiatry, 127.  See also, Victoria Nourse, 
'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense' (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 1373-1374 citing 
statistics; Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, Annual Report to the Chief Coroner: Case Reviews of 
Domestic Violence Deaths, 2002 (2004) 31-32, recommends resources be directed to increasing awareness that abusive 
men pose a danger to future as well as current partners. 
73    Metropolitan Police Service, above n 34, 5. 
74    Ibid 12. 
75    Barbara Hart, 'Beyond the "Duty to Warn": A Therapist's "Duty to Protect" Battered Women and Children' in 
Kersti Yllo and Michele Bograd (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse (1988) 241.  See, also, Kerry Healey, 
Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal Justice Strategies 
(1998) 41, noting suicide threats feature in ongoing lethality assessments of batterers who are undergoing treatment.   
76    Neil Websdale, Maureen Sheeran and Byron Johnson, Reviewing Domestic Violence Fatalities: Summarizing 
National Developments (1998) 32, Violence Against Women Online Resources, http://www.vaw.umn.edu at 15 
November 2005. 
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explore the possibility that some of these killings in fact constitute murder and may have been 
preceded by abuse.77 
 
Although killings of elderly, ailing women by their male partners generally receive a sympathetic 
response from the public and courts, Polk's research found the theme of masculine control was also 
evident in these cases.78  
 
I   Seeking Help from Formal and Informal Sources 
It is clear from Australian,79 UK80 and US81 research, that many battered women are in contact 
with the criminal justice system before they are killed.   Research also indicates that women often 
seek help from the criminal justice sector only after fairly extensive periods of abuse, and often 
when other sources of help seeking have failed.82  The Chicago research found '[a]bused women 
who were killed, and especially those abused women who killed their partners, were much more 
likely to have sought help, compared to severely abused women not involved in homicide.'83  
Women who had experienced severe violence in the past year, who were making active efforts to 
obtain formal interventions to stop the violence, such as seeking help from a counsellor or agency; 
contacting the police; going to court; or obtaining an order of protection, were at higher risk for 
continuing severe violence.84 
 
Research also suggests that protection orders are not as effective against abusers with a history of 
violence.85  The MPS Risk Assessment Model cites violation of civil or criminal court orders as 
associated with an increased risk of further violence.  Consequently, prior arrests for violation of 
protection orders must be taken seriously.86 
 
 
                                                 
77    Ibid 33. 
78    Polk, above n 42, 44. 
79    Easteal, above n 44, 182. 
80    Metropolitan Police Service, above n 47. 
81    Block, et al, above n 58. 
82   See, eg, Karla Fischer and Mary Rose, 'When "Enough is Enough": Battered Women's Decision Making Around 
Court Orders of Protection' (1995) 41 Crime and Delinquency 414. 
83    Block, above n 45, 5. 
84    Block, et al, above n 58, 277. 
85   Susan Keilitz, et al, Civil Protection Orders: Victims' Views on Effectiveness (1998); Anna Stewart, 'Who are the 
Respondents of Domestic Violence Protection Orders?' (2000) 33 ANZJ Crim 77, 86. 
86    Metropolitan Police Service, above n 34, 16.  See, also, Websdale, above n 32, 3. 
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J   Victim's Fear of Abuser and Premonitions of Death 
A woman's level of fear of her partner is a reliable predictor of his future violence.87  The grim 
reality that many women predict their own demise at the hands of violent men is reflected in the 
present research.  Accordingly, risk assessment can never be a substitute for careful consideration 
of the victim's perception of the batterer's potential for future violence and lethality. 
 
Although the science and practice of risk assessment in the domestic violence field is in its infancy, 
the above risk factors have been incorporated in risk assessment guidelines for lawyers, domestic 
violence programme providers, police, probation officers and health professionals.88  Websdale 
notes that  
 
 [f]or all the concerns about lethality prediction instruments among the advocacy community,…there 
are elements in a number of instruments that perceptively capture the kinds of relationship 
characteristics, batterer behaviors, and various system responses that researchers have documented 
across the country…As such, the instruments expose players like police officers to issues that they 
may not otherwise consider or have been trained to think through. 
 
Risk assessment instruments…may also provide a touchstone for victims themselves as they seek to 
strategize about their futures and those of their children.  This is not to say that battered women 
always minimize their victimization, or that they do not have the wherewithal to work things out for 
themselves.  Rather, risk assessment scores and dangerousness predictions may provide another 
(and perhaps very different) lens through which to see themselves, their batterers, and their overall 
predicaments.89 
 
Since it is impossible to foretell with certainty which batterer will attempt to kill a battered woman 
and/or her children, there may also 'be value in women understanding that any battering 
relationship might end in homicide'.90 
                                                 
87  Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 28, 162, citing Office for Women, Department of Premier and 
Cabinet, Queensland Government (2000) 133.  See, also, Laing, above n 31, citing inter alia, Edward Gondolf, Batterer 
Intervention Systems: Issues, Outcomes and Recommendations (2002) 174.  However, Jacquelyn Campbell, 
'Commentary on Websdale' (2005) 11 Violence Against Women 1206, 1207, notes that 'in our study of IP homicide and 
attempted homicide, only about half of the women who died or almost died recognized that their partner was capable of 
killing them'.   
88   See, eg, Karan and Lazarus, above n 44; Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 75, 41; Ministry of Health, above n 
5.  See also, Appendix IV. 
89   Websdale, above n 32, 6. 
90    Ibid 4. 
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IV   THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
Research showing that as the violence becomes increasingly serious women are especially likely to 
turn to the legal system for help demonstrates the centrality of criminal justice interventions to 
victim safety.  Campbell, a leading risk assessment researcher and commentator, notes that in 
addition to the red flag behaviours discussed above, determinations of risk must 'start taking into 
account the protective actions of the victim and the quality of safety provided by the system, when 
for instance, she calls the police or obtains a protective order'.91  Safety Audits in overseas 
jurisdictions aim to improve institutional responses to domestic violence.  These are premised on 
the assumption 'that an opportunity for centralizing victim safety…exists at every point of 
interaction within those institutions.'92   
 
Mary Ann Dutton, a writer and researcher on violence against women, recently commented that, 
while most risk assessment methods look at risks posed by batterers, safety audits examine risks 
posed by the criminal justice system.93 
 
Accordingly, the present research combines an examination of red flags for dangerousness/lethality 
in domestic violence cases with an investigation of criminal justice responses to these structural 
patterns of offending. 
 
To gain a comprehensive understanding of domestic violence that is subject to legal intervention, 
an online collection of New Zealand newspaper reports was searched for all domestic violence 
cases on the database.  In the absence of systematic indexing of legal judgments in domestic 
violence cases, this method provided the information necessary to track down legal reports.  
Although domestic violence cases are generally perceived as turning on their own particular 
facts,94 the data collected facilitated a study of structural patterns of offending and legal responses.  
                                                
 
 
91    Campbell, above n 18, 1210.  
92    Ellen Pence and Dorothy Smith, 'The Safety and Accountability Audit' (2004) 5, prepared for the National Institute 
of Justice and Office on Violence Against Women 26 October 2004.  
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/wawprog/safety_audit_background.pdf at 6 December 2006 
93    Amanda McCormick, 'Domestic Violence Safety and Accountability Audit' 
www.data.ipharos.com/praxis/documents/auditdescription.pdf at 6 December 2006. 
94  See, eg, Geoff Hall, 'Sentencing (II): Matters of Aggravation and Mitigation [1985] NZLJ 184, noting that '[i]n 
domestic disputes the level of culpability varies greatly, preventing sensible preconceptions as to an appropriate 
sentence based for example on some kind of tariff: R v Lavea 11 December 1979 (CA197/79)'. 
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The research is organised in three parts.  Part I examines the relevance of the above red flags in the 
New Zealand context.  The findings are compared with Australian research revealing masculine 
control to be the overriding theme in domestic homicide cases.  Criminal justice responses to sub-
lethal assaults are examined from the standpoint of victim safety.  Given that the quality of the 
legal response may have a direct bearing on whether a pattern of violence culminates in 
homicide,95 the research also selected cases of lethal assaults to review agency interventions with 
victims and offenders prior to the women's deaths.   
 
While legal acknowledgement of risk factors for dangerousness/lethality is central to victim safety, 
such recognition is also essential to achieve justice for victims who are killed.  Therefore, case 
studies in Part II follow male perpetrators of lethal violence into the courtroom to examine 
constructions of red flags at trial and at sentencing.  Part III examines contemporary divisions and 
debates which obstruct principled domestic violence intervention.  This Part also presents a 
summary of the research findings and related recommendations. 
 
V   AIMS AND BENEFITS OF THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
Although violence against women has been recognised as a significant public health problem96  
'little is known about the most effective ways of reducing the consequent mortality, morbidity and 
disability.'97  The present research aims: 
 
• To explore the relevance in New Zealand of risk markers for dangerousness/lethality 
established from social science research; 
 
• To contextualise intimate partner homicides through examination of these structural 
patterns of offending; 
 
• To investigate legal responses to sub-lethal assaults from the standpoint of victim safety;  
 
• To review agency interventions with victims and offenders prior to the killings of current or 
former women partners; 
                                                 
95    See, eg, Metropolitan Police Service, above n 47, 16. 
96   Janet Fanslow, 'Violence Against Women: Priorities for Public Health Research in New Zealand' (1994) 107 New 
Zealand Medical Journal 63, 63. 
97    Ibid. 
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• To examine constructions of red flags for dangerousness/lethality at trial and at sentencing; 
 
• To identify areas in which responses might be improved. 
 
Benefits envisaged include 
 
• Improved frameworks for assessing culpability; greater offender accountability; internal 
consistency in legal responses to domestic violence; external consistency with national 
domestic violence intervention strategy; better targeting and management of high risk 
situations; with the associated potential to save women's lives. 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
Risk markers for dangerousness/lethality have increasingly been integrated in overseas domestic 
violence interventions.98  However, the present research found these red flags remain hidden within 
legal stereotypes of male violence against female intimates.  The 'crime of passion' analysis 
camouflages a structural pattern of violence against women in the context of separation and the 
dangerousness/lethality potential of masculine control and obsessive jealousy/possessiveness.  The 
red flag of repeat victimisation is also rendered invisible in legal analyses which construct the final 
lethal event in a history of battering as an unintentional, almost accidental by-product of a violent 
relationship.  These stereotypes, which share a conception of male violence against current or 
estranged intimate partners as typically spontaneous, unpredictable offending,99 are inconsistent 
with social science research.  Homicide research has chillingly revealed that many women seek 
help and protection before they are killed.  Since many homicides are preceded by a history of 
battering, and many victims seek formal and informal assistance prior to the final lethal event,100 
experts suggest that 'domestic homicides are the single most preventable types of homicides'.101   
 
                                                 
98    Campbell, above n 18, 1212.  See, also, Ministry of Health, above n 5. 
99   Myrna Dawson, 'Intimate Femicide Followed by Suicide: Examining the Role of Premeditation' (2005) 35 Suicide 
and Life-Threatening Behavior 76, 87, citing authorities for this 'archetype of anger-driven or expressive crime'.   
100  See, eg, Polk, above n 42, 193, noting constructions of spousal homicide as typically involving a rapid and 
spontaneous shift from humiliation to uncontrollable rage are not supported by empirical data.  'It has been found that a 
majority of men who kill their wives have given careful thought to the murder they are going to perform (although 
often the accounts display an exceptional level of rage)…Many husbands who kill their wives know exactly what they 
are doing, and if anything express a sense of relief once the goal, the wife's death, has been attained.'   
101    Karan and Lazarus, above n 44, 55. 
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In the absence of a social framework to ground legal responses, 'common sense' understandings of 
violence in intimate relationships maintain and perpetuate old patriarchal values of male 
dominance and female submission.  These legal norms of relationship undermine the ability of the 
legal system to assess and manage risk.  An artificially compartmentalised response also isolates 
the policy implications of interventions with battered victims from their consequences for battered 
defendants and children living with violence.  This fragmented approach both produces and masks 
internally incoherent, contradictory legal analyses.  The perception of law as a closed, autonomous 
system of rules also facilitates the application of legal principles without reference to New Zealand 
Family Violence Prevention Strategy.  Consequently, law and national domestic violence policy 
are profoundly inconsistent. 
 
Although the Domestic Violence Act 1995 aims to ensure effective legal protection for victims102  
the study found women (and sometimes other family members and children) continue to 
experience further, even lethal violence following criminal justice interventions with batterers.  
Accordingly, principled intervention grounded in the social reality of domestic violence victims; 
improved data collection systems; and monitoring to ensure consistency and accountability is 
recommended.103  Legislative reform is also essential to ensure that the goals of victim safety and 
batterer accountability in New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy104 are not routinely 
undermined by competing attitudes, policies, and practices in the courts. 
 
                                                 
102    Under s 5, this object is also to be achieved by recognition that all forms of domestic violence are unacceptable.  
103  The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women Monitoring 
Committee, Fifth Periodic Report of New Zealand, CEDAW/C/NZL/5, 625th and 626th sess, (CEDAW/C/SR.625 and 
626) 14 July 2003 [415] expressed concern at the lack of systematic collection of data on violence against women in 
New Zealand. 
104    Ministry of Social Development, above n 22, 20. 
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CHAPTER TWO: THEORY, METHOD, AND OVERVIEW OF DATA 
   "Where there are no names, there are no deaths, in every country of the world."   
 
Laura Bonaparte, one of the Mothers of the Plaza Del Mayo of Argentina, 
speaking at the Couchiching Institute on Public Affairs in Ottawa, Canada, 
September 1995.1 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews methodological issues and difficulties associated with domestic violence 
research.  A system of classification which captures the human cost of domestic homicide and its 
interrelationship with sub-lethal domestic assaults is analysed and adopted.  The research design, 
including data sources and method of data collection is discussed, and the reliability of this method 
is tested by comparing the general homicide sample with official homicide statistics.  An overview 
of the data collected is provided.     
 
Since most serious violence and homicide between adult sexual intimates is perpetrated by men 
against women, male pronouns are generally used to refer to batterers and female pronouns to refer 
to victims.  Rather than subsume women-killing within the gender neutral category of homicide, or 
even less appropriately, within the gender specific category of manslaughter, the term intimate 
femicide is used throughout the research to denote the killing of female sexual intimates.2  
Uxoricide is the term used to signify wife killing, and femicide technically refers to the killing of 
any woman.  However, Myrna Raeder notes that because the term intimate femicide addresses 
public denial about the extent of intimate partner violence and its links to woman killing, it is 
particularly appropriate to killings arising from women's relationships with batterers.3  Its use also 
 
                                                 
1  Cited in Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Honouring their Lives, Learning from their 
Deaths: Findings and Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2000) 3 
(emphasis in original). 
2   Karen Stout, '"Intimate Femicide": Effect of Legislation and Social Services' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell 
(eds), Femicide: The Politics of Women Killing (1992)133, 133, states the term 'intimate femicide' was introduced at 
the 1976 International Tribunal on Crimes against Women to emphasise that 'when women are killed, it is not 
accidental that they are women' (citations omitted).  Jill Radford, 'Introduction' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell (eds), 
Femicide:The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 3, defines femicide as a form of sexual violence which focuses on the 
man's desire for power, dominance and control.  The term 'gives women's experiences and understandings 
priority…and as such is consistent with one of the basic tenets of feminism - women's right to name our experience'.      
3  Myrna Raeder, 'The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond' (1996) 69 
S.Cal.L.Rev. 1463, 1466. 
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'explodes one of the most pervasive myths of patriarchal culture - that the home provides a safe 
haven for women'.4   
 
II   BARRIERS TO RESEARCH ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 
A   Inadequate Data Collection and Monitoring of Violence against Women 
1.   Sub-Lethal Intimate Partner Violence 
The Ministry of Justice advises it extracts data on all finalised criminal prosecutions from the Case 
Monitoring Subsystem of the Law Enforcement System (the former Wanganui computer).  This 
system is operated by Courts, Police and Corrections.  Information is offender-related and does not 
specify the nature of the relationship between the offender and victim.  For this reason official 
statistics utilise the offence category of male assaults female under s 194 of the Crimes Act 1961 
as a proxy code for violence against intimate female partners.  Police offence codes relating to 
common assault under the Crimes Act and Summary Offences Act 1981 can also indicate the 
assault was 'domestic'.   
 
Since the relevant legislation does not stipulate that offending must take place in the context of a 
past or present intimate relationship, victims and offenders could be neighbours, close associates, 
or extended family members.  If the seriousness of offending is categorised according to maximum 
statutory penalty, these offences represent a low level of crime seriousness.  Violence toward 
female intimates may result in different and/or more serious charges, and these are not recorded.  
Since this system of data collection lacks information on the context and nature of offending it 
cannot shed light on structural patterns of violence in intimate relationships. 
 
Gaps in recording and monitoring of sub-lethal assaults give rise to conflicting views on the extent 
of the problem.  The resulting confusion is illustrated by Police and Women's Refuges reports in 
December 2000 that they were dealing with record levels of domestic violence.5  Two months 
later, the Principal Family Court judge was widely reported as advising attendees at a law seminar 
that there was strong evidence to suggest rates of domestic violence in New Zealand were 
                                                 
4    Diana Russell, 'Preface' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 
xi. 
5    Record Domestic Violence Mars Christmas, Dominion, 27 December 2000; Refuges Crowded as Women say 
'Enough', Press, 27 December 2000. 
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declining.6  Although the judge cited a fall in applications for protection orders as evidence for this 
contention, a spokesperson for Women's Refuge responded that protection order applications are a 
poor gauge of levels of violence.  Rather, Refuge was dealing with high numbers of women and 
children and 'family violence was still rife in the community'.7  Following media reports in 2002 
of a woman paying $12,000 to obtain protection from a violent partner, the National Coordinator 
for Women's Refuge blamed legal costs for a decline in the number of women seeking protection 
orders.8 
 
2.   Lethal Intimate Partner Violence 
Surprisingly, the present study found it difficult to access reliable information regarding rates of 
intimate femicide and the contexts in which these killings take place.  Unlike sub-lethal 
relationship violence which has an extremely low reporting rate,9 homicide has a high reporting 
rate.  Ian Miller and Nestar Russell note the public also has an expectation that these killings will 
be rigorously investigated.  Consequently, homicide data has the potential to enhance 
understanding of the nature and context of violent offending in New Zealand: 
 
Homicide rates…provide a measure of violent crime (even if other offences are under-reported or 
disguised, eg. assault, sexual offences, and domestic violence).  The gravity of murder and the 
nature of homicide investigations provides detailed information about these offences, and provides 
insight into the complex relationships that contribute to such offences, and to some extent to their 
putative motivations.10 
 
However, the classification system used by Miller and Russell fails to pinpoint homicides 
occurring in the context of sexual intimacy.  That is, the nominated degrees of relationship: 'well 
known'; 'known'; 'not known'; and 'not established'11 are too vague.  The closest degree of 
relationship 'well known' is defined to include 'intimates' and relationships between 'residential or 
                                                 
6   Domestic Violence 'on the wane' - Family Court, Press, 28 February 2001; Domestic Violence in NZ 'falling', Press 
28 February 2001. 
7   Domestic Violence 'on the wane' - Family Court, Press, 28 February 2001. 
8    Legal Costs Hit Women Seeking Safety, New Zealand Herald, 4 June 2002. 
9    Ministry of Justice, Responses to Crime: Annual Review 1999 (1999) 29. 
10  Ian Miller and Nestar Russell, Homicide in New Zealand 1988-94: Patterns and Relationships (Paper presented at 
the 11th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 29 January-1 February 1996) 1. 
11  Ibid 14, citing examples of the 'well known' degree of relationship as including 'family members, intimates, 
relatives, work colleagues, social contacts, residential or other contacts (where a good degree of prior knowledge is 
established)'.  
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other contacts (where a good degree of prior knowledge is established)'.12  This could encompass 
incidents as disparate as neighbours arguing over money, and a fatal wife beating as the 
culminating event in a history of violence in the relationship.  While the study also nominates 
'domestic disputes' as the single greatest cause of murders between 1988 and 1994,13 this 
description of motive fails to acknowledge, much less explain, the different circumstances in 
which men and women in intimate relationships kill, and are killed.   
 
Although the state collects data on intimate femicide, this information does not appear to be 
routinely extracted and published.  The police have collected homicide data since 198814 but the 
term 'domestically related' employed by the National Homicide Monitoring Programme is not 
confined to intimate relationships.15  Simply knowing that 'between 1993 and 1998 inclusive, 
42.8% of murders and 36.8% of manslaughters were domestically related'16 sheds little light on 
intimate partner deaths or the contexts in which they occur.  The New Zealand Health Information 
Service (NZHIS) identifies homicides and records cause of death according to information 
received from the Coroner (in conjunction with any other available information).  Mortality 
statistics are coded according to information about the victim and the method of killing.  However, 
the NZHIS separately records only those homicides by a spouse or partner that do not fit within 
one of its established assault codes.  Thus the NZHIS advises use of its data as a guide to 
homicides between adult sexual intimates would be highly misleading.17  Information from this 
source is in the form of computer generated data rather than narrative summaries which precludes 
in-depth analyses of the cases. 
 
Disturbing research from Harvard University indicates that New Zealand women are killed at one 
of the highest rates in the industrialised world.18  However, the dearth of meaningful, accessible 
                                                 
12    Ibid.  
13   Ibid 15, finding 39.22 per cent of homicides arose from a 'domestic dispute' and a further 28.44 per cent from a 
'personal dispute'.   
14    Ibid 4. 
15  The Ministry of Justice, above n 9, 29 fn 25, observes that '[d]omestically related homicides are those where a 
domestic relationship exists between the offender and victim.  A domestic relationship includes: husbands and wives, 
de facto or ex-de facto husbands and wives, parents, custodial parents, non-custodial parents, de facto parents, their 
children, adult children, grandparents and grandchildren, siblings, step-siblings, relatives, girlfriends and ex-
boyfriends'. 
16    Ibid 29. 
17   Email to the author from Chris Lewis, Information Analyst, New Zealand Health Information Services, 12 January 
2005. 
18   NZ Has High Female Murder Rate, New Zealand Herald, 20 April, 2002.  The US, Finland, Switzerland and 
Belgium were the only countries whose rates of femicide were higher than New Zealand's.   
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data produces the same confusion about intimate femicide rates that characterises the non-lethal 
domestic violence debate.  In 1997, police reported that campaigns to raise awareness of domestic 
violence and changes to police policy - which now requires active intervention and deterrence - 
had resulted in halving the numbers of women in New Zealand murdered by an intimate partner.  
Rates of murder had fallen from an average of 14 per year prior to the launch of the campaigns in 
1993, to seven murders in 1996.19  This highly publicised account of declining intimate femicide 
rates may have produced a false sense of complacency.  Although the present study found no 
media reports of subsequent trends through time, in fact, the year following the reported reduction 
in intimate femicide rates, numbers returned to the pre-1996 figure and remained at or near this 
figure in following years.  In 2002 - the final year for which homicide data was collected - the 
highest annual rate for the research period was recorded.   
 
The New Zealand Court of Appeal has also remarked on an increase in homicides in intimate 
partner relationships.20  Although the Court's comment was cast in gender neutral terms, New 
Zealand women have always been far more likely to be killed by men with whom they have a 
sexual relationship than to kill them.  There is also alarming empirical evidence (at least in 
Australia), that while the rate of domestic homicides may have remained fairly constant, the gross 
disparity between the homicidal conduct of men and women may be worsening.21   
 
B   Difficulties Accessing Legal Reports and Court Records 
Gaps in official data on violence in intimate relationships are compounded by the absence of any 
systematic method for accessing relevant court judgments.  Many of these cases are not reported, 
and without a systematic means of searching, cases are difficult to find.  Domestic violence 
researchers have remarked upon the difficulty of finding cases involving battered woman 
                                                 
19   Sergeant J J Taylor, 'Intervention Into Family Violence by New Zealand Police' in J Patrick, H Foster and B 
Tapper (eds), Successful Practice in Domestic Violence in New Zealand (1997) 99, 105; Policy on Home Violence 
Paying Off, say Police, Dominion, 2 September 1997.  
20    R v Maru [2001] CA 449/00 (Unreported, McGrath, Robertson and Randerson JJ, 26 July 2001) [24].  
21   Ian Leader-Elliott, 'Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation' in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary 
Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997) 149, 150, cites New South Wales statistics which he suggests are 
probably the best indicator of Australian trends showing that despite a constant rate of domestic homicide over the last 
quarter century, as the proportion of killings by women has declined, the proportion of killings by men has steadily 
risen.  Callie Rennison and Sarah Welchans, Intimate Partner Violence (2000) note that although the number of 
intimate partner homicides in the US decreased over the period 1976 to 1998, white females represent the only 
category of victims for whom intimate partner homicide has not decreased substantially since 1976.   
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syndrome evidence.22  Julia Tolmie observes that this situation raises 'serious issues about the 
manner in which legal cases are selected for reporting and the impact that this has on judicial 
consciousness and on women'.23  While this criticism is addressed toward difficulties in accessing 
information regarding battered women defendants, it is equally applicable to research on battered 
women who are killed.  Without a complete picture of how courts are analysing and responding to 
patterns of violence in intimate relationships it is difficult to ascertain the quality of the legal 
response. 
 
The present research embarked on a study of the interrelationship between mother and child abuse.  
Permission to conduct a pilot study of court files was obtained from the Department for Courts.  
The conditions imposed required the researcher to travel to Wellington to physically search for 
files in the District Court and to obtain file numbers for cases in the High Court.  When these tasks 
were accomplished, the researcher was required to seek leave from the Wellington High Court 
judge to examine the files.  After complying with the travel and search conditions, further 
conditions were imposed by the judge.  These included establishing the whereabouts of every 
offender to inform the men about the research, the contact details of the researcher, and requesting 
their views, as well as those of the Crown in relation to the application for access.  The judge also 
determined to read each file before granting leave.  The resulting time delays prevented 
completion of the pilot study and the research project, as originally envisaged, collapsed.24   
Research on domestic violence offending against children could not be conducted and a great deal 
of time spent on data collection, research and analysis was wasted.  Following a change of 
research topic, the conditions relating to consent, contact with the Crown and prior judicial perusal 
of the data were applied to a request to access trial transcripts, raising insurmountable difficulties 
in some cases.   
 
Inadequate legal reporting of child abuse and neglect cases and insubstantial coverage in the media 
necessitates resort to court records.  Inability to access this data therefore leads to a lack of 
accountability for the way domestic violence cases are processed.  The new framework for 
                                                 
22   Rebecca Bradfield, 'Is Near Enough Good Enough?  Why Isn't Self-defence Appropriate for the Battered Woman?' 
(1998) 5 Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 71, 81 n 2 citing Kearney J in Secretary, Unreported, Supreme Court, NT, 
12 December 1995.  
23    Julia Tolmie, 'Case and Comment Secretary' (1996) 20 Crim LJ 185, 227-228. 
24   Samantha Jeffries, Gender Judgments: Investigation of Gender Differentiation in Sentencing and Remand in New 
Zealand (D Phil Thesis, University of Canterbury, 2001) examined Christchurch District and High Court files.  
Jeffries notes 'the implausibility of obtaining the written informed consent of participants, due to transitory life styles 
and the low probability of response'.  In the present study, the nature of offending also made personal contact difficult. 
 26
accessing court information proposed by the New Zealand Law Commission should go some way 
toward ameliorating problems with access.  However, as noted by the Commission, the 
presumption that court information will be made available unless there is a good reason to 
withhold it will require 'a culture change in courts in favour of this presumption of accessibility'.25 
 
C   The Nature of the Material and its Cultural Consumption 
Jane Caputi has drawn attention to the ways state institutions legitimised and propagated femicide 
in its various forms across time and place.  For three centuries, witch killing was institutionalised 
by church and state.  Elite and popular art graphically depicted the torture, drowning and burning 
of women:      
 
Some feminists might feel these popular press images were the snuff films and Penthouse 
magazines of their day.  They purported to be on-the-spot depictions of tortures and burnings, with 
naked and half-naked female bodies screaming and writhing in endless postures of agony, 
surrounded by well-dressed male judges, religious accusers, 'prickers', and other righteous 
gentlemen of the time.26   
  
Caputi notes that when the state apparatus upholding the witch-craze collapsed by the mid-
eighteenth century, a new mode of femicide (beyond the ongoing murder of wives) with a new 
manner of execution, a new type of perpetrator, and a new form of propaganda emerged.  The 
explicitly eroticized murder of women heralded in the early nineteenth century by the writings of 
the Marquis de Sade - was first enacted by an unknown man named 'Jack the Ripper' who killed 
and mutilated prostitutes in London in 1888.  The names of de Sade and the Ripper have become 
household words and sexual killings - both in fact and in fiction - are an hourly occurrence.  Serial 
killers of women can achieve the status of cult heroes27 and in the new millennium, images of 
women being beaten, stabbed, eviscerated, tortured and set on fire are regarded as 'entertainment', 
and available for popular consumption due to their legal designation as 'speech'.   
                                                 
25    New Zealand Law Commission, Access to Court Records, Report 93 (2006) [9]. 
26   Jane Caputi, 'Advertising Femicide: Lethal Violence against Women in Pornography and Gorenography' in Jill 
Radford and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 203, 205 (citations omitted). 
27    See, eg, Deborah Cameron, '"That's Entertainment"?: Jack the Ripper and the Selling of Sexual Violence' in Jill 
Radford and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 184-185, noting that 
'Ripperologists' as they laughingly call themselves, produce pseudo-intellectual, romanticised versions of Victorian 
London and Jack the Ripper in 'scholarly' publications, hotels are named after this serial killer of women and in 1988 
the Ripper Centenary spawned a fresh outbreak of male writing which 'apart from wilful ignorance and complacent 
male stupidity (for all the Ripperologists I know of are men) is a barely suppressed erotic excitement with the idea of 
killing for sexual pleasure - and in the case of Jack the Ripper, of getting away with it'. (emphasis in original.)   
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Correspondingly, if you simulate a woman's stabbing death it can be rapturously applauded as 
cinematic genius (the shower scene in Alfred Hitchcock's Psycho) or it can be hailed as a seductive  
sculptural masterpiece (Alberto Giacommetti's Woman with Her Throat Cut).  Though modern 
femicide is officially disowned, only covertly propagated, and nominally illegal, its artistic and 
entertainment value would suggest that it, like the witch-craze, is ultimately sponsored by the 
masculinist state.28 
 
A pernicious aspect of representations of femicide as 'entertainment' is the normalisation of male 
violence against women in popular culture.  As Dame Silvia Cartwright has observed, the fact that 
violence against women is so much a part of our culture can operate to diminish its topicality.29   
 
While feminist outrage and acts of protest may occasionally be triggered by killings of individual 
women, Jill Radford notes femicide has rarely been the subject of feminist analysis.  Most feminist 
writing focuses on the survivors of male violence, rather than on its perpetrators, and there are few 
feminist texts on men who kill women. 
  
One reason for the reluctance to acknowledge femicide is its finality.  This finality puts it outside 
traditional feminist modes of working.  When a woman is killed, there may be no survivor to tell 
her story.  There is no way of sharing the experience of violent death; all that can be shared are the 
pain and anger of those who have known such a loss.  And this pain, far from being a basis for 
unity and strength - as it is in support groups for women who have survived sexual violence - can 
be undermining and silencing.  In many cultures coming to terms with death is considered a private 
matter.  Women who do speak out have to be mindful of the impact their words may have on those 
close to the dead woman.  There is also the danger of being faced with the accusation of making 
'political capital' out of grief.  For these reasons femicide is perhaps one of the most harrowing and 
sensitive dimensions of male violence for feminists to address.  Unfortunately, feminist silence on 
this important subject, however understandable, leaves it open to justification or denial by the 
larger culture.30   
 
                                                 
28    Caputi, above n 26, 206. 
29    Dame Silvia Cartwright, 'Thoughts on Women and Violence, and Women and the Law' [1993] (4) CJQ 2. 
30    Radford, above n 2, 4. 
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Compounding the above difficulties is the sadism and excessive violence associated with intimate 
femicide.31  In their review of the research, Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton 
found a pattern of overkill to be characteristic of many partner homicides with female victims.  
'Often these assaults involved lengthy and excessive violence far beyond what would have been 
necessary to cause death.'32  The present study also found Court of Appeal judgments - often the 
only available/accessible legal record of the offending - are sanitised accounts of the violence 
involved.  Many cases also exhibited elements of sexualised savagery, which, if noticed, went 
unremarked.    
 
Investigating this extreme form of violence and criminal justice responses causes considerable 
pain, anger and despair to those who work in this area.33  Without appropriate support, the work is 
potentially self destructive. Consequently, Jane Caputi and Diana Russell emphasise the 
importance of facing the horror involved in ways that do not destroy, but save us.34  Researchers in 
this field also report experiencing challenges from family, friends and acquaintances, who believe 
there must be something 'wrong' with a person who spends so much time and energy on the subject 
of woman killing.35  Since it remains 'unspeakably painful for most women to think about men's 
violence against us, whether individually or collectively, when we do attempt to think about the 
unthinkable, speak about the unspeakable, as we must, the violence, disbelief, and contempt we 
encounter is often so overwhelming that we retreat, denying or repressing our experiences'.36   
Nevertheless, when the stories of intimate femicide remain untold, individuals and systems may 
continue to operate in ways that produce injustice for deceased victims and risk further 
unnecessary female suffering and death.   
 
 
 
                                                 
31    See, eg, Jacquelyn Campbell, '"If I Can't Have You, No One Can": Power and Control in Homicide of Female 
Partners' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 99, 103 detailing 
acts of extreme violence by male offenders and noting none of the cases involving adult women killing men displayed 
sadistic behaviour. 
32    Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton, 'Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A 20-Year Review' in 
M Dwayne Smith and Margaret Zahn (eds), Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research (1999) 149, 161. 
33    Jill Radford, 'Preface' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) xi, 
xii. 
34   Jane Caputi and Diana Russell, 'Femicide: Sexist Terrorism against Women' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell 
(eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 13, 21. 
35   Diana Russell, 'Acknowledgments' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman 
Killing (1992). 
36    Caputi and Russell, above n 34, 20. 
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III   THE PRESENT RESEARCH 
A   Issues of Naming and Confidentiality 
The Washington State Fatality Review Panel has a tradition of naming those who were killed as a 
result of domestic violence 'in order to draw attention to the institutional and systemic problems 
which allowed their deaths'.37   The present research adopts this policy and the names of women in 
the intimate femicide case studies have not been altered.  However, except in cases of 
homicide/suicide, the names of male perpetrators of intimate femicide have been altered for 
reasons of confidentiality.  To avoid exposing women to the risk of retaliatory violence, or 
otherwise causing distress, the names of offenders and victims and any other identifying 
information have been omitted from the case studies of sub-lethal assaults.    
 
B   Domestic Violence Homicide: Issues of Classification and Definition 
1.   Classification: Control versus Victim/Offender Relationship 
Kenneth Polk notes that virtually all sociological studies since 1958 have classified homicides 
according to particular forms of relationship existing between the victim and the offender prior to 
the homicide.  Consequently, it is a commonplace criminological observation that most victims of 
homicides knew the person who took their life.  While this system of classification is empirically 
verifiable, it is sorely lacking in explanatory value.38  For example, simply knowing that most 
homicides involve some form of close relationship does not explain why males predominate by a 
factor of approximately 9:1 as perpetrators of homicide; or why New Zealand women should be at 
most risk from persons well known to them.39   
 
The theme of masculine control identified in domestic homicide research and studies relating to 
sub-lethal assaults40 is also central to the Washington Domestic Violence Fatality Review Panel 
definition of domestic violence fatalities as: 'those fatalities which arise from an abuser's efforts to 
seek power and control over his intimate partner'.41  This focus on control rather than the 
victim/perpetrator relationship allows research to capture more fully the human cost of domestic 
violence.   Domestic violence fatalities under this classification system include: 
 
                                                 
37    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 1, 3. 
38    Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 4. 
39    Miller and Russell, above n 10, 14. 
40    Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Homicide (1988). 
41  Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Every Life Lost is a Call for Change: Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2004) 86 (emphasis in original). 
 30
 
 1.  All homicides in which the victim was a current or former intimate partner of the perpetrator. 
 2. Homicides of people other than the intimate partner which occur in the context of domestic 
violence or in the context of attempting to kill the intimate partner.  For example, situations in 
which an abuser kills his current/former partner's friend, family or new intimate partner, or 
those in which a law enforcement officer is killed while intervening in domestic violence. 
               3.   Homicides occurring as an extension of or in response to ongoing abuse between intimate                       
partners.  For example, when an individual kills children in order to exact revenge on his 
partner. 
  4.  Suicides which may be a response to abuse.42 
 
The Panel notes this classification system is wider than the one used by most criminal justice 
reporting agencies as it takes into account that abusers sometimes kill non-family members.  It is 
narrower as it excludes cases in which family members kill one another, but the death does not 
take place in the context of intimate partner violence.43   
 
Since research which relies on degrees of relationship may result in killings that are integrally 
linked to the intimate partner relationship not being classified as domestic violence deaths at all, 
the present study adopts Polk's and David Ranson's definition of intimate homicide and related 
killings as those cases in which 'sexual, marital or romantic intimacy link the central actors'.44  
This definition, which encompasses homicides of non-family members such as police officers 
attempting to intervene, and persons who were perceived by the perpetrator to be sexual rivals, 
captures the theme of violence as a mechanism of control.  All reported homicides in which the 
central actors were linked by sexual, marital or romantic intimacy were classified as 'domestic 
violence homicides', whether or not a prior history of violence could be established.   
 
2   The Definition of 'Homicide'    
Section 158 of the Crimes Act 1961 defines homicide as 'the killing of a human being by another, 
directly or indirectly, by any means whatsoever'.  Polk observes that such 'common sense' 
definitions can be misleading as it has long been recognised that some killings, such as those 
during war are lawful, and others, such as those in self defence, are justifiable.  For this reason, 
                                                 
42    Ibid. 
43    Ibid. 
44    Kenneth Polk and David Ranson, 'The Role of Gender in Intimate Homicide' (1991) 24 ANZJ Crim 15, 23. 
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some homicide studies focus exclusively upon killings that are deemed unlawful.  However, it is 
difficult to ascertain as an empirical matter how or why such determinations are made by courts 
and juries.  Moreover, since the aim is to study the context of the offending, rather than decisions 
made at some later point in the criminal justice system, it is necessary to approach the problem at 
the earliest juncture: at the point where police identify a case in which a victim or victims have 
been killed by another person or persons.45   
 
New Zealand homicide research illustrates how distortions can arise when selected charges are the 
focus of investigation.  Miller and Russell defined homicide to include persons charged with 
murder irrespective of the eventual court outcome, but excluded persons charged with 
manslaughter.46  However, this definition excludes killings by habitual batterers whose final lethal 
act of violence results in a manslaughter rather than murder charge.  Many intimate femicides are 
followed by suicide of the perpetrator and these cases would also remain invisible if homicide 
research was restricted to charges or convictions of offenders.   
 
Polk notes that relying on police and coronial conclusions as to whether a homicide took place will 
mean that some cases will be treated as homicide where the preponderance of evidence led the 
police or Coroner to conclude that a homicide had occurred, but the perpetrator could not be 
identified, or insufficient evidence existed to charge the primary suspect.  He argues that the few 
inaccuracies that might result from defining homicide according to police and coronial decisions 
are much to be preferred to the 'gross distortions that would result if convicted killers were the 
only focal point of the investigations'.47    
 
Police and coronial findings determined the classification of a death as homicide in the present 
study.  Since this definition of homicide did not rely upon murder/manslaughter convictions it 
included the few cases in which court proceedings were stayed.  Cases that were deemed by police 
and/or coroners as suspicious, but for which no finding of homicide could be made, were recorded 
and analysed separately.  Although neither charges nor convictions were necessary in order to 
classify a death as homicide (for example, in cases of homicide/suicide), outcomes for all reported 
cases were collected and analysed.  
                                                 
45    Polk, above n 38, 9. 
46   Miller and Russell, above n 10, 1.  Cases of murder/suicide and cases where the death was deemed to be 'murder' 
but no person was charged were included in the study: at 1. 
47    Polk, above n 38, 10. 
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IV   THE RESEARCH METHOD 
After consultation with library staff at the University of Canterbury, the Newztext INL data base 
was chosen as the most user friendly method of accessing media reports of domestic violence 
cases.  The provincial and metropolitan newspapers listed below were the source from which the 
data were collected.  These newspapers also reported cases from other geographical areas in New 
Zealand. 
  
Waikato Times 
 Sunday Star Times 
 Sunday News  
 The Dominion  
 The New Zealand Herald 
 The Evening Post  
 The Press  
 The Timaru Herald  
 Evening Standard 
 The Daily News  
 Truth  
 The Southland Times  
 Nelson Mail  
 
Domestic violence related cases were extracted from this pool of reports.  The database was cross 
searched using a number of search terms.  Reports dated back to 1974 and cases from that year to 
the end of 2002 were collected.  A large amount of information was collected including violence 
between siblings, parents/children, and other family members.  Following the collapse of the 
original research project, data collected under some categories became superfluous to the present 
study.   
 
As demonstrated below, time periods needed to be narrowly defined to ensure that all cases were 
retrieved.  A record was kept of each time period searched, under each search term.  The search 
term ‘assault’ found reported cases involving offenders who were charged with common assault, 
assault against a female/child, and other assault charges, as well as reports classified in the 
database under the category of 'assault'.  
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Period:  3/2/2000 - 3/3/2000; Category ‘assault’: 
                  Total  
3/2/2000 -   7/2/2000 4 pages    @ 25 per page = 100  
 1 page @  2    “    “ =     2  = 102   
 8/2/2000 - 11/2/2000 4 pages @ 25 per page = 100 
 1 page @  9    “     “  =     9  = 109    
12/2/2000 -15/2/2000 2 pages @ 25 per page =   50 
 1 page @    7   “     “ =     7  =  57 
16/2/2000 -22/2/2000 5 pages @ 25 per page = 125 
 1 page @   6   “     “ =     6  = 131 
23/2/2000 -27/2/2000 3 pages @ 25 per page =   75 
  1 page @ 19   “     “ =   19  =  94 
28/2/2000 -  3/3/2000 4 pages @ 25 per page = 100 
  1 page @   8   “     “ =     8  = 108 
                     ____ 
               Total Reports examined under ‘assault’ category      
                   for the month of February 2000:      601   
 
The Domestic Violence Act 1995 changed the legal response to violence in intimate 
relationships.48 Courts and others acting under the legislation are required to be guided by the 
Act's object to reduce and prevent domestic violence and ensure effective legal protection for 
victims.49  Since the Act created a new regime for dealing with relationship violence and media 
reports were not comprehensive in earlier years,50 case study analyses, charts and figures relate to 
offending perpetrated between 1995 and 2002.51  Due to time constraints, data collected for the 
year 2002 was restricted to homicides only.   
                                                
 
Cases were tracked, and (where this information was available), the prosecution of offenders was 
followed from the preliminary hearing, through the trial, to the sentencing and any subsequent 
appeal.  Newspaper reports document the preliminary appearance of the defendant in court, the 
 
48    See, eg, Dick Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand (11th ed, 2003) vol 2, 1429, noting inter alia that the 
definition of violence was extended to include psychological abuse.  Relationships coming within the Act's protective 
powers were widened. 
49    Section 5. 
50    Some newspapers came on line earlier than others.  
51  With the exception of Case Study W/94/1 discussed below, at p 241, which demonstrates the application of s 80 
Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
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outcome of the hearing and subsequent sentencing - often following the preparation of reports such 
as pre-sentence, reparation and psychological reports.  Information typically includes: name of 
defendant; offence charged; nature of the relationship between defendant and victim; age of victim 
and defendant; circumstances of offending; extent of physical injury inflicted (for example 
whether hospitalisation or medical treatment was required) and sentencing outcome.  Reports 
could also indicate whether the parties were living together or separated, provide information 
regarding criminal history - including any prior violence against the victim, and alert the 
researcher to the fact that the defendant had appealed the conviction and/or sentence.   
 
Hard copies of all reports were downloaded and filed.  Information in the reports was analysed in 
depth and narrative summaries produced.  Spreadsheets were compiled to provide a statistical 
overview of the research findings.  Where possible, cases identified from the database were 
matched with relevant legal judgments. 
 
V   CAVEATS & QUALIFICATIONS 
A   Missing Data 
Where the terminology used to describe the relationship between victim and offender did not 
clearly point to sexual, marital or romantic intimacy, the case was excluded.  For example, a male 
'boarder' killed the three year old daughter of a woman after the child's mother demanded that he 
leave her home.  Another offender described as a 'boarder', moved into the home of a woman and 
her 12 year-old daughter and murdered the woman shortly thereafter.  After waking the girl, the 
offender showed her the axe used to kill her mother, wrapped a telephone cord around her neck, 
and during an ordeal lasting two and one half hours, sexually violated and attempted to rape the 
child.  Since no intimate relationship was revealed between the offenders and the children's 
mothers, these cases were excluded.  In some femicide cases, women victims were described as 
the 'friends' of perpetrators, although other factors pointed to an intimate relationship.  Absent 
further clarification these cases were also excluded.   
 
Reports of offences involving breaches of protection orders and assaulting a female were often 
limited in details to the name of the offender and the sentence.  These cases could not be counted.  
Even when an assault case was clearly identified as involving an intimate partner relationship it 
could nevertheless be excluded.  For example, where an alleged offender made no plea at the 
preliminary hearing, or entered a not guilty plea, and no other reports on the case could be found, 
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the case was excluded.  A number of women died shortly after being assaulted by a male partner 
against whom only assault charges were laid.  These cases were recorded as assaults, but excluded 
from both the general homicide analysis, and the subset of intimate partner homicides.   
 
Not every New Zealand newspaper was included in the database.  Thus assaults in geographical 
locations not covered by the reports will have been missed unless reported elsewhere.  In homicide 
cases, this is more likely to have occurred where no trial was involved, for example, if a guilty 
plea was entered.  When both partners died in circumstances pointing to homicide/suicide, family 
requests for privacy may have resulted in under-counting of these cases.   
 
B   The Newspaper Reports 
A number of studies of violence against women have utilised media reports in combination with 
other data sources.  Sue Lees' study of the operation of the provocation defence in homicide trials 
at the Old Bailey (the Central Criminal Court in London) was based on analysis of press reports 
and attendance at homicide trials.52   Jacquelyn Campbell's research on homicide cases in the US 
city of Dayton, Ohio, combined a search of police files with a study of the city's two major 
newspapers for the same time period of five years.  Domestic violence fatality reviews in the US 
also use newspapers reports to identify and provide information on domestic homicides.53  
 
Elliot Slotnick notes that because the media serve as the primary link between the government and 
the governed, it is difficult to overestimate the importance of journalistic coverage of judicial 
decision making.54  It is also a fundamental principle of the English legal system that the process 
of ruling must be undertaken in public. 
 
 Lord Diplock in a later decision of that Court [House of Lords] suggested that this principle has 
two aspects.  First, that the proceedings be held in open Court with all evidence communicated to 
                                                 
52   Sue Lees, 'Naggers, Whores and Libbers: Provoking Men to Kill' in Jill Radford and Diana Russell (eds), 
Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 267. 
53   The Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2003 Wisconsin Domestic Violence Homicide Report (2005) 
conducted an Internet search for newspaper accounts of homicides.  If there were gaps in what the Panel could learn 
about a homicide from newspaper accounts it had access to a number of official and community sources of data. 
54  Elliot Slotnick, 'Media Coverage of Supreme Court Decision Making: Problems and Prospects' (1991) 75 
Judicature 128. 
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the Court being communicated publicly.  Secondly that there be publication to a wider public of 
fair and accurate reports of the proceedings.55   
 
However, it is doubtful whether all or indeed many legal commentators would endorse the ability 
of journalists to unerringly convey the legal import of what is said and heard at trials.  Slotnick 
discusses the contrasting views of two US Supreme Court judges on this issue.  Justice Brennan 
portrays the role of the press in reporting judicial decision making as crucial to a democratic 
society.  Justice Scalia disparages the instructional and inspirational role of the press as portrayed 
by Justice Brennan, asserting instead that 'law is a specialized field, fully comprehensible only to 
the expert': 
 
For Justices Brennan and Scalia the media-Court link appears to offer uniquely different 
possibilities and prospects.  For Brennan, the media can be the vehicle through which a democratic 
polity is informed and energized and through which the Court learns about the public it serves.  For 
Scalia, the media cannot fulfil effectively an informative function.  Consequently, its task need not 
be facilitated by judges and media (and public) criticism are treated as generally irrelevant to the 
pursuit of the judicial function.56 
 
Anticipating objections by legal professionals who might endorse Justice Scalia's view that legal 
issues are too complicated for lay journalists to understand,57 when media reports concerned a 
legal issue or some controversial aspect of the trial and/or sentencing, an attempt was made to 
confirm the reported details by examining legal judgments or trial transcripts.  However, these 
often proved disappointing sources of information.  This was mainly due to gaps in reporting, 
including issues of evidence highlighted by the media not being discussed in the judgments, 
prosecution and defence summaries not made available with trial transcripts, and difficulties 
accessing data.   
 
Although it is certainly the case that the opinions of courts as a source of news 'are only as 
informative as the reporter's lay comprehension of them',58 when information in the body of the 
article was compared with the relevant legal report (where available), the contents were generally 
                                                 
55    Geoff Hall, Sentencing Law and Practice (2004) 693, citing Scott v Scott [1913] AC 417 (HL). 
56    Slotnick, above n 54, 130-131. 
57    Ibid 130. 
58    Ibid 132. 
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consistent.  A recent study found widespread concern regarding sensationalistic reporting of 
scientific research to be exaggerated.  Although headlines were twice as likely as newspaper 
stories to moderately or highly exaggerate claims, in the majority of cases, the substantive reports 
reasonably reflected the scientific information.59    
 
In addition to scepticism from legal professionals, the print media has not been valued as a source 
of objective and unbiased reporting by feminists.  Lisa Evan found media coverage of domestic 
violence appeared to be presented as a warning to women rather than to their male assailants.60  
The Wisconsin Fatality Review Panel also found media stories of intimate femicide reinforced 
myths about domestic violence by victim-blaming or perpetrator excusing attitudes, and by 
constructions of the fatal violence as coming 'out of the blue, as opposed to being the culmination 
of a history of violence and controlling behaviors'.61   The present research supports feminist 
criticism that male violence against women enters the media through 'strategies of recuperation' 
which reinscribe the feminist critique within a hegemonic narrative.62  However, as discussed in 
Part II, media narratives also reflect stories of intimate femicide that are endorsed by the courts.   
 
C   The Legal Reports 
While objectivity is often posited as a central requisite of legal discourse, law promotes a 
fundamentally masculinist view of society.63 
 
Generations of legal thought have been devoted to and by those who have been dominant in the 
legal culture: the men.  Gradually we are beginning to understand that a male view is not all 
encompassing.  No matter that generally speaking male legal scholarship and judicial thought has 
                                                 
59  Timothy Caulfield and Tania Bubela, 'Media Representations of Genetic Discoveries: Hype in the Headlines?' 
(2004) 12 Health Review 53. 
60   Lisa Evan, 'Desperate Lovers and Wanton Women: Press Representations of Domestic Violence' (2001) 27 Hecate 
147, 156. 
61   Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 53, 12. 
62  Wendy Kozol, 'Fracturing Domesticity: Media, Nationalism, and the Question of Feminist Influence' (1995) 20 
Signs 646, 647.  See, also, Jenny Rankine, 'How Newspapers Construct Lesbian Lives' (1989) 19 Sites 64. 
63   Catharine MacKinnon,  'Feminism, Marxism, Method, and the State: Toward Feminist Jurisprudence' in D Kelly 
Weisberg, Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (1993) 427, 432, 435, argues:  'Substantively, the way the male point 
of view frames an experience is the way it is framed by state policy.'  Therefore, when law 'is most ruthlessly neutral it 
will be most male; when it is most sex blind it will be most blind to the sex of the standard being applied.  When it 
most closely conforms to precedent, to "facts" to legislative intent, it will most closely enforce socially male norms 
and most thoroughly preclude questioning their content as having a point of view at all'.   Stephen Schulhofer, The 
Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law (1995) 143 U.Pa.L.Rev. 2151, 2161, also observes that 'criminal law is, from top 
to bottom, preoccupied with male concerns and male perspectives'.  Therefore, 'even handed inaction is nonetheless an 
affirmative policy that contributes to the subordination of women'. 
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been benign, unconsciously its focus has been on what those scholars and judges knew best: the 
male view of life.64 
 
Laurie Taylor points out that well before legal arguments begin, a number of unconscious 
decisions are made about how to shape consideration of the facts and the actors: whether to adopt 
a narrow or broad time frame; which factors are 'legally' relevant; whether to define intent broadly 
or narrowly; and whether to take a narrow or broad view of the defendant.  'These decisions, 
whether conscious or unconscious, are political decisions.'65   
 
Legal research also involves consideration of legal precedents (cases previously decided) and the 
highest (or strongest) authority, such as a Court of Appeal decision, usually prevails.66  However, 
appellate courts are obliged to take a view of the facts that is most favourable to the accused: 
 
 This means, of course, that students who only read appellate judgments receive a particular version 
of 'what happened', often with little, if any, of the factual doubts and possible inconsistencies that 
would be most obvious in the trial transcript or the trial judge's summing up.  And not only do they 
get a view of the facts 'most favourable to the accused', they of course get a judicial construction of 
those 'facts'.67 
 
Given that persons facing a sentence of imprisonment may attempt to rationalise or justify their 
actions, an accused's version of events can be confused, inaccurate or even deliberately 
misleading.68  When the victim is not available to provide her interpretation of what transpired; 
statements by persons close to the victim provide a much needed counterpoint to stories of 
homicide told by defendants.  Consequently, newspaper reports of conversations with the victim's 
family or friends helped fill the gap left by the missing voice of the victim in legal reports.   
 
A potential objection to incorporating the voice of the victim through the observations of her 
family and close friends may be that such evidence is untested and biased.  This issue was recently 
examined in US research on intimate femicide which used proxy informants who were 
                                                 
64    Dame Silvia Cartwright, above n 29, 3.  
65   Laurie Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-Defense' 
(1986) UCLA L.Rev. 1679, 1730 (emphasis in original). 
66    'Feminist Legal Research' [1999] (2) Feminist Law Bulletin 3.  
67   Jenny Morgan, 'Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them' (1997) 21 
MULR 237, 239. 
68    Polk, above n 38, 18, 172. 
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knowledgeable about the victim's relationship with the perpetrator.  A pilot study found no 
tendency for such persons to under or over report the deceased victims' exposure to established 
risk factors and a good correspondence between proxy reports and police records of previous 
domestic incidents.  '[I]f anything, we found more knowledge of previous physical abuse among 
proxies than among police'.69   
 
VI   THE GENERAL FEMICIDE SAMPLE 
The absence of systematic monitoring and reporting of domestic homicide prohibited a 
comparison between NZHIS data and information on lethal violence in intimate relationships 
collected for the present study.  However, since all female homicide deaths reported during the 
period of the current research were recorded, it was possible to compare the present research 
findings on rates of femicide with data recorded by the NZHIS.   NZHIS data was only available 
up to the year 2000.70  By comparison, media reports became more comprehensive as more 
sources came on line and by 1997 it appeared that full coverage had been achieved.  Therefore 
comparisons between the present findings and NZHIS data are limited to the years 1997-2000.   
 
         
 
          
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
                                                 
69   Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case 
Control Study' (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 1089, 1094. 
70    Provisional 2001 data awaited a number of outstanding Coroner's cases. 
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As illustrated in Figure One, the present study recorded three less child homicides than those in 
official data.  For reasons discussed above, the research was also expected to underestimate rates 
of femicide.  So it is unclear why seven additional homicides with adult female victims were 
identified in the present research.  The perpetrators in two homicide/suicide cases could not be 
identified.  If these cases conform to other homicide/suicide events, females were also the likely 
victims.  Since the study revealed higher rates of femicide than official data, Table One provides 
outcomes for cases involving adult female victims.  
 
Table One:  Outcomes for Homicides of Female Victims Age 15-84+ Years 
Homicide of Female Victims Age 15-84+ Years 
          
Outcome                                     2000                     1999                 1998                   1997            Total 
Murder Conviction                       10                  5                      10               11 36 
Manslaughter Conviction  5 4  3  5 17 
Insanity Verdict  1   1  4  6 
Homicide/Suicide  2   4  2  871 
Lesser Conviction   2    2 
Murder Charges Only*    2   2 
Accused Died Before Trial  1     1 
Unidentified Perpetrator**    3   3 
TOTAL                                        19 11 23 22 75 
*   Trials failed following Court rulings that certain Crown evidence was inadmissible. 
**  Police offers of reward for information leading to conviction of the women's killers remained unclaimed 
in three cases.   
 
The researcher sought an explanation for the disparate homicide data.  NZHIS personnel advised 
they publish data before receiving every Coroner's Report as some cases may take a number of 
years to resolve.  These cases will generally have a provisional code (based on other information) 
but in the absence of a final Coroner's Report a small number of cases may be classified as 'Injury 
Undetermined Whether Accidentally or Purposely Inflicted' (E980-E989; 1997-1999) or as 'Event 
of Undetermined Intent' (Y10-Y34; 2000).  Further, if the homicide involved negligence, the death 
may not have been recorded as 'Homicide and Injury Purposely Inflicted' (1997-1999 coding) or as 
                                                 
71  The identity of the perpetrator could not be established in two homicide-suicide cases. 
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'Assault' (2000 coding).  This might account for a total of four adult female deaths in the present 
sample; two negligent manslaughter deaths and two deaths resulting in lesser charges.  
 
A recent report by the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families also appears to 
significantly underestimate rates of women who are killed in the context of family violence.  The 
Taskforce reports a total of 56 female family violence-related deaths between 2000 and 2004 
inclusive.72   However, the present study found a total of 43 confirmed family violence-related 
femicides over the period 2000 to 2002 inclusive.73  The official figure of 56 deaths would 
therefore require a dramatic fall in femicide rates over the period 2003 to 2004.  No such decline 
was reported.   
 
The present study identified a further 17 cases in which women died in suspicious circumstances 
and police launched a homicide investigation.  Cases in which the actual killing is not observed 
and the alleged offender denies any involvement create a significant obstacle to accurate 
assessments of the number of female deaths arising from domestic homicides.   In almost all of the 
suspicious death cases in which a homicide could not be confirmed, a current or estranged male 
partner was a primary suspect.  Since most homicides of women occur in private homes, often 
without witnesses to the killing, NZHIS data on female deaths classified as 'Event of 
Undetermined Intent' may be significantly correlated with deaths occurring in domestic settings.  
Further research on this issue is necessary. 
 
VII   THE INTIMATE PARTNER HOMICIDE SAMPLE: BASIC INCIDENT AND 
RELATIONSHIP DATA 
The following data in relation to intimate partner homicide (excluding killings of sexual rivals or 
other third parties) for the period 1995 to 2002 emerged: 
 
 
 
                                                 
72  Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report (2006) 32.  Although these deaths are 
described as 'family violence-related murders', the Report notes this figure was obtained from data relating to cases 
investigated as homicide. 
73   This figure includes 38 intimate partner homicides, plus four cases in which the mother of the offender was killed 
and one case involving the aunt of the offender as victim.  During this period, two further women were killed by men 
with whom they were living at the time and another woman's death was investigated as an intimate femicide by police.  
The Coroner returned an open verdict. 
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Table Two: Homicides between Intimate Partners 1995-2002 
                                                                                   Homicide Rate                        
Male Perpetrators                                                              87                                                  
Female Perpetrators                                                       12                                               
 
Studies do not always indicate whether de facto partners and homosexual partners are included in 
the 'spousal' category.74   In the present research, one gay male killed his estranged partner.  Eighty 
six male-perpetrated homicides and 12 female-perpetrated homicides occurred in the context of a 
married or de facto heterosexual relationship.  (Table Two excludes the two homicide/suicide 
cases involving intimate partners in which the identity of the perpetrator could not be established.)   
 
Some homicide studies count victims rather than incidents.  For example, if one assailant kills 
three victims that would count as three homicides.75   However, the present study counted 
homicide incidents and not the number of victims killed.  Therefore, a scenario in which husband 
kills estranged wife and two children would be counted as one homicide.   
 
A   Gender 
New Zealand studies report between 83 and 90 per cent of partner homicides are committed by 
men against women partners or ex partners.76  This pattern is reflected in the present research 
finding approximately 88 per cent of perpetrators of intimate homicides were men.  
 
B   Race and Income 
Data on race and ethnicity could not be gathered due to insufficient information in the reports.  A 
number of studies suggest socio-economic as opposed to racial variations offer a better 
explanation for variations in homicide rates.  New Zealand research indicates that poor women are 
around eight times more likely to be murdered than wealthier women.77  US studies also indicate 
                                                 
74    Patricia Easteal, 'Homicide Between Adult Sexual Intimates: A Research Agenda' (1993) 26 ANZJ Crim 3, 13. 
75  Jenny Morgan, Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond the Legal Categories, Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Occasional Paper No 1 (2002) 12, fn 46. 
76  Janet Fanslow, David Chalmers and John Langley, 'Homicide in New Zealand: An Increasing Public Health 
Problem' (1995) 19 Australian Journal of Public Health 50.  Ministry of Health, Family Violence Intervention 
Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse (2002) 37, citing Janet Fanslow, J Kotch and David Chalmers, Partner 
Homicide in New Zealand 1978-1987, Unpublished. 
77   Tony Blakely, et al, 'Socio-economic factors and mortality among 25-64 year olds followed from 1991-1994: The 
New Zealand Census-Mortality Study' (2002) 115 New Zealand Medical Journal 93. 
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that once socio-economic status is controlled, blacks are no more likely than whites to perpetrate 
domestic homicide.78   
 
Polk observes that while gender stands out as a persistent feature of homicide, privileged males 
appear much less likely to resort to lethal violence against women partners or sexual rivals.  He 
suggests that the mature male with wealth, an established class position, and recognised status in 
the community, has more access to political power and less need to resort to physical violence 
either to subdue the competition, or to control a female partner.  By contrast, violence may become 
the mechanism through which marginalised men express and defend their masculinity. 
 
The real winners in the male world of class, wealth, status and power are able to establish their 
dominance by virtue of their economic and social position in the market place, in the world of 
work, on bureaucratic ladders, in corridors of power, or perhaps in extreme forms of rational 
conflict, in the courts.  Those at the bottom of the economic heap however will have fewer such 
resources available.  For them, a major vector along which masculinity can be defined 
and…negotiated, is that of physical prowess and violence.79  
 
C   Employment Status 
Recent US research found unemployment was the most important demographic risk factor for 
intimate femicide.  After controlling for a comprehensive list of more proximate risk factors, only 
the abuser's lack of employment significantly predicted risk, increasing risk four-fold relative to 
the employed abusers.  'Unemployment appears to underlie increased risks often attributed to 
race/ethnicity, as has been found and reported in other analyses related to violence.'80  
 
Where employment status was known, 55.1 per cent of male offenders and 44.5 per cent of female 
offenders were unemployed.81  Of those offenders employed at the time of the homicide 41.9 per 
cent were in unskilled occupations and 25.8 per cent were in skilled or semi-skilled positions.  Of 
the remainder, 16.1 per cent owned or managed a business, 12.9 per cent were farmers and one 
male was a medical professional who was employed as head of psychological medicine at a New 
                                                 
78  Neil Websdale, Maureen Sheeran and Byron Johnson, Reviewing Domestic Violence Fatalities: Summarizing 
National Developments (1998) 32, Violence Against Women Online Resources, http://www.vaw.umn.edu at 15 
November 2005, citing studies. 
79    Polk, above n 38, 205-206. 
80    Campbell, et al, above n 69, 1093. 
81    The employment status of 18 males and three females could not be determined.  
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Zealand University.  A further retired male offender had headed two major New Zealand 
psychiatric hospitals.  The nurses in the sample were also psychiatric nurses: one female employed 
at the time, one male listed as a registered psychiatric nurse and a further male general and 
psychiatric nurse whose experience included service in hospital intensive care wards.  Five male 
offenders were retired and two were University students. 
 
D   Geographical Area 
The distribution of homicides is shown in Figure 2.  Geographical area is defined as the court of 
initial appearance.  In seventeen homicide/suicide cases the place the incident occurred is 
substituted for court of initial appearance.  
 
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
E   Nature of Offender/Victim Relationship 
Sixty three per cent of male perpetrators killed women de facto partners or girlfriends and 67 per 
cent of female offenders killed unmarried partners.  This increased risk to unmarried adult 
intimates is also noted in Canadian and Australian research.82  One intimate partner homicide was 
identified as arising from a same gender intimate relationship.  The gay male killed his estranged 
partner.   
 
                                                 
82   Christopher O'Donnell, Angie Smith and Jeanne Madison, 'Using Demographic Risk Factors to Explain Variations 
in the Incidence of Violence Against Women (2002) 17 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1239. 
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F    Age of Victims and Offenders 
Female perpetrators of homicides tended to be younger than males (mean age for women 35.3 
years and 37.1 years for men).83   Although younger women in this study were at most risk of 
lethal violence by an intimate partner, and women aged 20-29 were at greatest risk, a significant 
number of older women (aged 60 or more years) were also victims of intimate femicide.84  Two 
women were in their 70s and the oldest was aged eighty-six.  The two male victims who were aged 
over 60 years were both killed by men:  one male victim was killed by a male associate of the 
female offender, and another male victim, aged 62 years, was killed by an estranged male partner.    
 
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
Total Homicides = 98
 
Figure 3 shows gender differences in age of offenders were most apparent at both ends of the age 
range.85  Two male offenders were under age 20.  No female offenders were under age 20 and 
none were aged 60 or more years. 
 
A Canadian study suggests an even greater risk may be incurred by young women whose husbands 
are much older (10 or more years) than themselves.86  In the present study, nine men killed female 
partners who were 10 or more years their junior.  Three men killed women who were 10 or more 
years older than themselves.  The male associate of one female offender killed her partner who 
                                                 
83    This data excludes two homicide/suicide cases. 
84     Ages for five female victims and one male victim could not be determined. 
85    Age of one male perpetrator could not be determined. 
86   Margo Wilson, Martin Daly and Christine Wright, 'Uxoricide in Canada: Demographic Risk Patterns (1993) 35 
Can.J.Crim. 263. 
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was more than 10 years her senior.  No females killed male partners who were 10 or more years 
younger than themselves.   
 
G   Method of Killing 
Homicides by use of weapon are represented in Figure 4.  
 
 
         
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
        
 
Research by Carolyn Block and her colleagues found a significant number of women (18%) died 
by strangulation and this issue may be especially important for elderly or disabled women.  The 
researchers note the importance of collecting and publishing information on strangulation in 
criminal justice and public health epidemiological datasets.87  
 
H   Homicide Location 
Consistent with overseas research finding the majority of intimate partner homicides take place in 
or around the home,88 84 per cent of homicides in the present study occurred in private homes.  
Eighty-six per cent occurred in or around the home of the victim.  Sixteen homicides took place in 
public areas.  Settings for these killings varied as shown in Table Three. 
                                                 
87   Carolyn Block, et al, The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study: Risk of Serious Injury or Death in Intimate 
Violence A Collaborative Research Project (2000) 277. 
88     See, eg, US Department of Justice, Violence Between Intimates (1994) reporting around 86% of victims who were 
killed by spouses were killed at home.  See also, Patricia Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual 
Intimates (1993) 33, finding two-thirds of the killings between adult sexual intimates occurred in the victim's home in 
contrast to 40 per cent of other homicides.  
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Table Three: Public Settings of Intimate Partner Homicides by Gender                        
 Setting                                       Male Perpetrators                                    Female Perpetrators 
Streets                 7                                        1 
Rivers 1 1 
Car Park 1 
Hospital  1 
Courthouse                                                  1      
Beach  1 
Park 1 
School grounds 1                                                     
 
Total             12  4 
 
I   Prior History of Violence 
It is now well established that many victims of intimate femicide are beaten before they are 
killed.89  Recent research found a prior act of choking and/or threat to kill may be especially 
highly correlated with lethality.90  However, notwithstanding empirical evidence of the 
interrelationship between domestic violence and intimate femicide information on perpetrators' 
histories of violence in newspaper and legal reports was sketchy.   
                                                
 
Legal commentators observe that it is difficult to argue domestic violence is sufficiently serious to 
warrant the use of lethal force by battered women when past violence in the relationship is 
trivialised 'as a symptom of a turbulent relationship...[or] described variously as "marital discord", 
"disputes not amenable to logic", "matrimonial discord", or "domestic problems"'.91  The present 
study found euphemisms for violence such as 'domestic dispute', references by legal actors to male 
offenders who could 'turn very nasty', or who had 'nasty tempers', and descriptions of intimate 
relationships as 'volatile', 'turbulent', or 'tempestuous' provided strong hints of a history of violence 
in the relationship that could not be verified.  Depictions of 'mutual' violence and warring parties 
who could 'give as good as they got' also appeared curiously inapt given that the women victims 
had been seriously injured or killed.   
 
89    See, eg, Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide' [2003] NIJ Journal 14, 
18. 
90    Block, et al, above n 87, 277. 
91    Bradfield, above n 22, 79. 
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Based on evidence of past convictions, court orders of protection against the offender, and reports 
of witnesses, family and friends, a history of violence was established in 45 per cent of intimate 
femicide cases.  This is very likely to under-estimate rates of prior violence due to inadequate 
recording/reporting of these incidents.  Although prior violence toward female partners played a 
significant role in the deaths of male partners, no male victims were reported as seeking court 
assistance to protect themselves from the violence of female partners and no cases conformed to 
descriptions of a 'battered husband syndrome'.92  
 
J    Separation/Estrangement 
Information on this issue could not be ascertained in some cases, particularly in earlier years of the 
research.  Women victims of lethal and non-lethal assaults were frequently described as living in 
'on-again off-again' relationships.  This term was employed to signify a dysfunctional relationship, 
and sometimes by defence counsel to imply fickleness on the part of a female victim, as opposed 
to a relationship disrupted by outbursts of violence. 
 
At least 49 per cent of women who died were either separated from their partners, or had 
expressed an intention to end the relationship before they were killed.  One female killed an 
estranged partner and the male associate of another female offender killed her partner shortly after 
he announced his intention to end the relationship.  As discussed in the following chapter, the 
motives and circumstances of estrangement killings differed according to the gender of 
perpetrators.  
 
K    Involvement of Third Parties 
When women are the targets of lethal and sub-lethal violence third parties can also become 
victims.  
 
 We cannot understand the true death toll of domestic violence unless we also examine the many 
other homicides which take place as abusers seek to control their intimate partners.  The children, 
friends and families of victims of domestic violence are at risk when abusers become homicidal.93  
                                                 
92   Suzanne Steinmetz, 'Family Violence: Past, Present and Future' in Marvin Sussman and Suzanne Steinmetz (eds), 
Handbook of Marriage and the Family (1987). 
93  Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 'Tell the World What Happened to Me': Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2002) 11. 
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Familicide, or the killing of an intimate partner and children in the same incident is a rare but 
recurring variety of intimate femicide.94  Six intimate femicides were accompanied by the killing 
of a third party in addition to the female victim.  In two cases, three children aged seven, five, and 
two years were killed at the same time as their mothers. Research also indicates unborn children 
are at risk from domestic violence.95  Two pregnant women were killed in the present study, one 
of whom was said by the Crown to have miscarried three times due to assaults by her partner.  In 
two further incidents, the female victim's new male partner was killed.   
                                                
 
In seven further incidents, the female partner or ex-partner was abused and a third party killed.  
Two children aged 3 years and 11 months and a 'good Samaritan' neighbour who intervened in the 
violence were killed in one incident.  In three further cases, children aged 10 years, 16 months and 
ten months were killed.  The female victim's father who attempted to intervene, and the female 
victim's new male partner were killed in the fifth and sixth cases.  An estranged partner and her 
family were held hostage and one of two police officers attempting to intervene was killed in the 
seventh.   
 
In five more cases, the male perpetrator killed his partner or ex-partner and injured a third party.   
In one incident the perpetrator was subsequently charged with the attempted murder of his three 
children, and in a further incident a child aged four months, a 'good Samaritan' and a female friend 
of the victim were injured.  Female friends of the victim were injured in two additional incidents 
and a mother was badly burned trying to save her daughter in the fifth case.  
 
Violence or threats to hurt or kill children by the male also played a major role in the homicides of 
one male and one female victim.  As shown in Figure 5, children comprised the major category of 
victims, followed by new partners.  In one case a lesbian killed her partner's male lover.  No 
children were injured or killed during assaults by women on male intimates.    
 
 
 
94    Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 'Spousal Homicide' (1994) 14 Juristat 1. 
95  Audrey Mullender, 'Meeting the Needs of Children' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in Reducing 
Domestic Violence? A Comprehensive Guide for Professionals (2001) 35, 37.  Richard Gelles, 'Violence and 
Pregnancy: Are Pregnant Women at Greater Risk of Abuse?' (1988) 50 Journal of Marriage and the Family 841, 
noting that women under 25 years are both more likely to be pregnant and to be abused by husbands and partners. 
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L   Child Witnesses 
Although children were present as witnesses, and were killed or injured both accidentally and 
deliberately in the course of violence aimed at the mother, child advocates point out that violence 
toward or in the presence of children often goes unremarked by the adults in their world.96  This 
may explain the lack of information on this issue in both the legal and newspaper reports.  While 
female victims of violence and the few female perpetrators were described as 'mothers', and 
newspaper reports occasionally noted that women were killed in houses they shared with their 
children, often no reference was made to the whereabouts of children during the lethal assault.  
Consequently, the following findings are likely to significantly underestimate the nature and 
extent of child involvement in intimate partner homicides.   
 
In three incidents involving female offenders, children were present as witnesses (one case) or in 
the house at the time the homicide occurred.  Children were present as witnesses, or at least in the 
house at the time the killing occurred in 37 per cent of homicides committed by male offenders.  
Small children ran for help while their mother was being killed; were splattered with their 
mother's blood during the homicide; left alone with the body for extended periods after the 
homicide; or discovered their dead parent upon arriving home.  After witnessing her struggling 
                                                 
96  David Fergusson and L John Horwood, 'Exposure to Interparental Violence in Childhood and Psychosocial 
Adjustment in Young Adulthood' (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 339. 
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mother being doused with petrol and set alight, one 13 year-old girl led her six brothers and 
sisters to safety from the burning home.   
 
VIII   THE SUB-LETHAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SAMPLE 
In recognition of the interrelationship between domestic violence and domestic homicide the 
research examined patterns of sub-lethal violence toward intimate partners. 
 
Table Four: Sub-Lethal Violence against Intimate Partners 1995-2001 
                                                                                                      Sub-Lethal Assaults 
Male Perpetrators                                                                                        769 
Female Perpetrators                                                                          59 
 
The above table represents verified cases of sub-lethal violence toward intimate partners.  A case 
was treated as verified if the perpetrator pleaded guilty to an offence(s) of violence, or was 
convicted following a not guilty plea.  Non-lethal cases which involved more than one victim were 
counted as a single incident.   Cases in which a defendant was convicted of multiple assaults were 
also counted as a single case.  That is, it was number of defendants and not number of assaults that 
were counted.  No cases of sub-lethal violence between gay males were identified.  Five cases of 
non-lethal violence involved lesbian partners. 
 
A   Gender 
Table Four demonstrates that men predominate as perpetrators of intimate partner violence that is 
subject to criminal justice intervention. 
 
B   Race and Ethnicity 
Lack of information prevented an analysis of this issue.  Diane Shoos suggests feelings of 
humiliation and fear of exposure, which compound the problem of underreporting, may be 
especially acute for women in middle class professional households who believe they should be 
'above' the abuse or able to control it, and whose careers and professional reputations may also be 
at risk.97  However, while no category of women is immune from intimate partner violence, there 
is clear evidence that certain conditions which may catalyse abuse are more likely to be 
                                                 
97    Diane Shoos, 'Representing Domestic Violence: Ambivalence and Difference in What's Love Got to Do with It' 
(2003) 15 NWSA Journal 57, 64. 
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experienced by lower socioeconomic classes, resulting in a higher frequency of domestic violence 
in these groups.98   
 
Maori women appear significantly more likely to report experiencing controlling behaviour and 
acts of physical or sexual abuse by their partners than non-Maori women.99  Research also 
indicates that Maori women experience 'the dominance of colonial values and lack of Maori 
personnel in the legal system as major barriers to justice'.100  Inadequate social support structures 
which affect Maori women can also create a climate in which Pacific Island women feel trapped, 
leading to acceptance of the violence.101  '[M]igrant women face additional barriers…such as fear 
of implications for their immigration status, social isolation and bringing dishonour and shame to 
the family; a lack of understanding of the New Zealand social system; language barriers; and 
cultural insensitivity to their specific needs'.102  It is therefore concerning that recent research 
found Maori initiatives were inadequately resourced, and the needs of Pacific, migrant and women 
from other minority communities were particularly poorly met.103   
 
C    Separation/Estrangement 
This information was not always available.  Almost half (44%) of male perpetrated assaults were 
committed against a separated or separating partner.  Thirty nine per cent of cases relating to 
female perpetrators involved separated or separating partners.  As discussed below, gender 
differences were apparent in the type of abuse that occurred in the context of separation.  
 
D   Protection Orders 
In at least 26 per cent of cases, the female victim of a male partner or ex-partner had obtained a 
protection or trespass order.  Some women were badly injured trying to serve trespass orders on 
estranged partners without assistance from the police.  In four cases involving female offenders, 
male victims had obtained a protection order.  In one case both parties had taken out protection 
orders and at the time of the female offender's conviction for breach of a protection order, the male 
                                                 
98    Vito Ciraco, 'Fighting Domestic Violence with Mandatory Arrest, Are We Winning?: An Analysis in New Jersey' 
(2001) 22 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 169, 178, citing studies. 
99    Allison Morris, Women's Safety Survey 1996 (1997) 16, 28. 
100  New Zealand Law Commission, Justice: The Experiences of Maori Women: Te Tikanga o Te Ture: Te 
Matauranga o nga Wahine Maori e pa ana ki tenei, Report 53 (1999) [26]. 
101   Jo Cribb, '"Being Bashed is Just Something I Have to Accept": Western Samoan Women's Attitudes Towards 
Domestic Violence in Christchurch' [1997] Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 164. 
102    Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) 40.   
103    Jennifer Hand, et al, Free From Abuse: What Women Say and What Can Be Done (2002) 169. 
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victim acknowledged that he was serving a sentence of imprisonment for his sixth breach of the 
protection order that the woman had taken out against him. 
 
E    Comparison of Charges with Official Data 
Only thirty-nine per cent of sub-lethal assault cases involved a charge of assaulting a female under 
s 194 of the Crimes Act 1961.  While this figure would certainly have been much higher if all 
reported cases could have been confirmed, use of the section as the proxy denominator of intimate 
partner assaults clearly fails to capture rates of violence against women in the home and the 
serious nature of many assaults.   
 
IX   TYPES OF VIOLENCE BY GENDER 
In 2004, the Principal Family Court Judge was reported as stating that the public should become 
more aware of the 'at times unbelievable things that New Zealanders do to other New 
Zealanders'.104  Although the judge's comment is framed in gender neutral terms, as noted by the 
New Zealand Law Commission, studies reveal important differences between acts of violence 
perpetrated by men and women in the context of sexual intimacy.  One study found:   
 
No wife directed punches so injuries would not show; nor did wives say this what they would 
do…No husband was threatened with a gun, or chased with guns, knives, axes, broken 
bottles…Husbands were not kicked or stamped on with steel capped boots or heavy work boots; no 
husband was 'driven furiously' in the family car, nor was any tossed out at traffic 
lights….Strangling and choking were not used.  No wife attempted suffocation with a pillow. 
Husbands were not…isolated from friends, nor were any given ultimatums about time spent away 
from home shopping…No husband had arms twisted and fingers bent, none was frog marched out 
to the garden to hose, dig or mow the lawn.  None was ordered to weed the garden whilst being 
kicked from the rear.105 
 
The present study also found violent tactics used by men which had no parallel in female 
offending.  For example, no male was seriously injured after attempting to escape the violence of a 
female partner by jumping through a closed glass window.  No men were injured when they leapt 
                                                 
104   That Would Enable the Public to See the 'at Times Unbelievable Things That New…, New Zealand Press 
Association, 1 September 2004. 
105    New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, 
Report 73 (2001) x-xi citing J Scutt, Even in the Best of Homes (Penguin, Victoria, 1983). 
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out of speeding cars to escape the violence.  No men were pushed out of moving cars.  No men 
were choked to the point of unconsciousness, revived, and then choked again.  No men were 
beaten for hours at a time.  No female offenders admitted to deliberately directing beatings to a 
male partner's face in order to damage his appearance.  No women stubbed live cigarettes out on 
men's bodies, or admitted to cutting off men's hair in order to lower their morale.  No women bit 
male partners in their genitals.  No woman beat her male partner for five hours, punching him 
about the head and body, pulling out clumps of his hair leaving bare patches on his scalp, choking 
him until he blacked out, and after attempting to rape him, cut her own face with a scalpel and 
dripped blood on him saying she would tell others that he attacked her.    
 
Although both men and women damaged the property of estranged partners, women were rarely 
involved in home invasions and retaliatory violence against men from whom they were estranged.  
Women had blood smeared over their faces, were handcuffed, tied up, beaten and forced to watch 
apparent suicide attempts by estranged male partners.  It was women, and not men, who were 
forced to give up their employment and go into hiding with their children following threats to kill, 
or cause grievous bodily harm from estranged male partners.  Men also physically and sexually 
assaulted children to punish estranged partners.  One offender who raped a woman friend of his 
estranged wife when she attempted to collect the wife's clothes was described by the judge as 
having done so in order to 'hit back at his wife'.   
 
X   CONCLUSION 
Official systems of data collection appear to significantly underestimate rates of lethal and sub-
lethal assaults against women sexual intimates.  The research found no evidence of systematic 
indexing/monitoring of legal interventions.  In the absence of meaningful, accessible data and 
monitoring to ensure accountability it is impossible to examine patterns of violence in intimate 
relationships, evaluate the quality of legal responses, or improve interventions based on this 
concrete reality.  
 
As discussed above, common classification schemes are of limited usefulness in describing the 
dynamics of offending in the context of an intimate relationship.  To capture the true human cost 
of domestic violence, the definition of a domestic violence fatality should be based on the theme 
of masculine control.  This theme of control, which is central to patterns of offending associated 
with dangerousness/lethality, is further examined in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  THE SOCIAL FRAMEWORK -  
RED FLAGS & THE THEME OF CONTROL 
Women are killed by intimate partners - husbands, lovers, ex-husbands, 
or ex-lovers- more often than by any other category of killer…In 70 to 80 
per cent of intimate partner homicides, no matter which partner was 
killed, the man physically abused the woman before the murder.  Thus 
one of the primary ways to decrease intimate partner homicide is to 
identify and intervene promptly with abused women at risk.1 
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
A theoretical schism between law and the social sciences can inhibit law's responsiveness to the 
social reality of crime.  Accordingly, it is necessary to examine the social context when assessing 
the effect of current laws and making recommendations for change.2   Taking 'reality as a starting 
point…helps to ensure that we do not take for granted abstract legal categories that may obfuscate 
rather than clarify the resolution of a legal problem'.3  This methodology contrasts with the 
specialised methodology employed in law, which is generally referred to as legal formalism.  The 
latter approach principally measures the internal consistency of legal rules and their sources.  As a 
result, there may be little cognisance of their substantive content and social effect.4  Therefore, 
empirical evidence from the social sciences is essential to avoid the subordination of women's 
concrete experiences to legal abstractions, and ensure that law responds to social reality rather than 
its own internal imperatives.5   
 
This chapter explores the social context of intimate femicide in New Zealand.  Kenneth Polk's 
study of homicides in Victoria, Australia, which builds on the influential sexual proprietariness 
thesis,6 found the overriding theme to emerge from intimate femicide cases was 'masculine 
control, where women become viewed as possessions of men'.7  The theme of masculine control 
                                                 
1  Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide' [2003] NIJ Journal 14, 18 
(citations omitted). 
2  Jenny Morgan, Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond the Legal Categories, Victorian Law Reform 
Commission, Occasional Paper No 1 (2002) v. 
3   Ibid 1, citing Nathalie Des Rosiers, 'Reforming or Rethinking the Law? Canada's Experience of Law Reform' 
(Notes for a speech delivered at the Rencontre internationale des jurists d'expression francaise 29 June to 2 July 2000). 
4   Margo Stubbs, 'Feminism and Legal Positivism' in D Kelly Weisberg (ed) Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations 
(1993) 454, 461, noting cognition is controlled 'by employing devices such as specialized legal logic, hierarchical and 
procedural rules, dichotomous definitions, and an entrenched analytical focus on appellate court decisions'. 
5    Carol Smart, Feminism and the Power of Law (1989) 23-24. 
6   See, eg, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Homicide (1988); Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 'Spousal Homicide 
Risk and Estrangement' (1993) 8 Violence and Victims 3.     
7    Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 56. 
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also dominated in female-perpetrated killings, most of which 'resulted from the attempt of the male 
to assert control over the behaviour of his partner through the use of violence'.8  Polk's typology of 
homicides was utilised by the Victorian Law Reform Commission,9 along with data from two 
other Australian studies,10 to provide the social context for the Commission's Report on defences 
to homicide.11   
 
Since problems of comparability arise when analysing different data sets due to the different aims 
of the studies,12 the research adopts Polk's methodology and system of classification, albeit with 
some modifications to reflect the circumstances in which New Zealand homicides took place.  
Where relevant, the analysis also draws on Patricia Easteal's Australian study of homicide between 
adult sexual intimates.13  
 
II   THE SAMPLES: A PRELIMINARY COMPARISON 
A   Polk's Research 
One hundred and one homicides in Polk's sample were committed in the context of sexual 
intimacy.  In 73 of these cases, males took the lives of female sexual intimates.  Twelve cases 
involved women killing male intimates.  Men killed real or imagined male sexual rivals in 13 
cases.  Two female offenders killed female sexual rivals and the killing of another woman by a 
female offender arose in the context of a lesbian relationship.   
 
Polk found the overriding theme of homicide in the context of sexual intimacy, no matter which of 
the parties was killed, was that of masculine control.14  This theme had two distinct sub-patterns.  
The first involved masculine possessiveness, with violence used as a control strategy generally 
aimed at controlling the reproductive capabilities of younger women.  Approximately 80 per cent 
of intimate femicides were perpetrated in this context of masculine possessiveness/control.  The 
second sub-pattern, which concerned a smaller number of cases, exhibited a pattern of suicidal 
male depression.  The male plans his own death and the (usually elderly) woman partner is seen as 
a commodity or possession which the male must dispose of prior to his suicide.  The theme of 
                                                 
8    Ibid 24. 
9    Morgan, above n 2, v. 
10  Ibid, citing Jenny Mouzos, Femicide: The Killing of Women in Australia 1989-1998 (1999); Alison Wallace, 
Homicide: The Social Reality (1986). 
11   Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report (2004) [2.37-2.43]. 
12    Morgan, above n 2, 11. 
13    Patricia Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (1993). 
14    Polk, above n 7, 56-57. 
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control was manifest 'in the husband's view (not shared by the wife) that the couple should "both 
go together"'.15   
 
 The male is going through some form of depressive crisis which is severe enough to lead him to 
consider suicide.  These events revolve, then, around the decision of the male to take his own life, 
with the killing of the woman being a secondary consequence of this decision.  These males are not 
primarily focused on the destruction of their partner, but reach the point of insisting, after they have 
concluded that their own lives must end, that their partner should be a part of this decision as 
well.16 
 
Fifteen homicide/suicide cases were classified by Polk as falling within the second 
depression/suicide sub-pattern of offending.  A breakdown in the physical and/or mental health of 
the parties was a major contributing factor.  In some cases in which masculine depression appeared 
to be brought on by various effects of the ageing process, Polk found hints that the decision to end 
life was a joint one.  The decisions of younger depressed males to commit suicide were generally 
fuelled by their precarious economic circumstances.  Men whose economic dreams had been 
shattered saw no option but to commit suicide and to 'protect' their wives from the fate that would 
subsequently befall them by killing them.  Polk found no cases of a depressed woman killing her 
partner as part of her suicide plan.  In the majority of cases in which women killed men, women 
were responding to the violent behaviour of a male partner.  
 
B   The Present Research 
Of one hundred and six homicides in the context of sexual intimacy, eighty-six homicides were 
perpetrated by male offenders with females as victims.  Five males killed male victims.  Thirteen 
females killed male victims.  The identity of the perpetrator could not be established in two 
homicide/suicide cases.  In all other homicide/suicide cases the perpetrator was a male.  Contrary 
to assertions that 'the sexes are similar on partner violence perpetration even at the most severe end 
of the violence continuum',17 these findings are consistent with a large body of evidence that men 
are the typical perpetrators of violent deaths in the context of sexual intimacy.   
 
                                                 
15    Ibid 45. 
16    Ibid 44. 
17    See, eg, Terrie Moffitt, et al, Sex Differences in Anti Social Behaviour: Conduct Disorder, Delinquency, and 
Violence in the Dunedin Longitudinal Study (2001) 69  
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To minimise difficulties with comparability, the present study classified homicides according to 
examples provided by Polk.  However, the categories of 'economic gain' and 'killing intoxicated 
women' are particular to the present research.  The former cases appear to have been classified by 
Polk under the control theme of 'discarding an unwanted partner'.   The latter cases, as discussed 
below, are also appropriately categorised as control cases.  The combined totals of these two 
categories, when added to cases in the jealousy/control category, produce a total of 72 cases (84 
per cent of intimate femicides) which conformed to the theme of masculine 
possessiveness/control.  The circumstances of offending could not be established in 10 cases 
involving male perpetrators due to insufficient information.  In five of these cases men killed 
women partners and committed suicide.   
 
Table Five presents a slightly modified version of Polk's system of classification.  As discussed 
below, the present research does not reflect Polk's depression/suicide sub-pattern of offending.   
 
Table Five:  Circumstances of Homicide between Intimate Heterosexual Partners 
Intimate Partner Homicides 
(N=98) 
 
Female Victim/Male Offender                                            86 
Jealousy/Control                                                                             67 
Economic Gain   2 
Killing Intoxicated Women   3 
Insufficient Evidence re Motive  10 
Special Cases    4 
 
Male Victim/Female Offender 12 
Precipitated by victim's violence    7 
Jealousy/Control    1 
Economic Gain   2 
Other    1 
Insufficient Evidence re Motive    1 
 
Two intimate femicide scenarios which were included in Polk's research were excluded from the 
present study.  First, Polk cites a case in which the male 'struck up a sexual relationship' with a 
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child and the homicide was 'a crude attempt on the part of the male to fend off the consequences of 
public disclosure of the relationship'.18  Although such cases were found in the present study, they 
were classified under the category 'child abuse' and excluded from the sample of intimate partner 
homicide cases.  In Polk's second homicide scenario, a young woman who rejected the continued 
sexual attentions of a male associate was killed as a result.  While 'technically' no relationship 
between the pair had been established, Polk included the case because 'the two had known each 
other, the early moves toward a sexual relationship had been made, and it appears that it was the 
young woman's resistance to the male's sexual advances which resulted in her death'.19  An almost 
identical scenario was revealed in the present research.  However, the case was excluded from the 
intimate partner homicide sample as the deceased woman rejected the existence of a romantic 
relationship.  
 
Two women killed following male threats of departure.20   One woman had been subjected to an 
appalling history of violence by her husband.  The one gay male who killed his estranged partner 
cited a number of reasons for his actions, including feelings of rejection after his partner ended the 
relationship.  Four men killed a known or suspected male sexual rival.  No women killed female 
sexual rivals. One lesbian killed a male sexual rival.   Consistent with Polk's research, there were 
no cases of depressed women killing partners, elderly or otherwise, as part of a suicide plan.   
Women who killed men most often did so in response to violence by the male victim.  
 
III   THE MALE PROPRIETARINESS THESIS 
The male proprietariness thesis emerged from the work of Martin Daly and Margo Wilson.21  
These researchers posit men's use of lethal and sub-lethal violence toward female intimates as a 
cross-culturally ubiquitous outcome of marital conflict over female autonomy.  Male 
possessiveness and the need to control an intimate partner are manifestations of a struggle by men 
for control over the productive and reproductive capacities of their female partners.22  Proprietary 
                                                 
18    Polk, above n 7, 51. 
19    Ibid 50. 
20   Polk found two cases where women killed male partners in response to the threat of the male to leave.  In a further 
case, the woman and her male lover contracted with another male to kill the husband so the couple could be free to 
start a new life together.  
21   Polk, above n 7, 211, suggests that the value of this thesis is that it reaches across the major forms of homicide.  
'By entering the argument first with the proposition that much of homicide is dominated by gender, and then branching 
outward from that to discuss situations of masculine control over the sexuality of women, masculine competition for 
status among themselves, and masculine competition for scarce resources, a conceptual framework follows which 
embraces the scenarios of homicide which have emerged from the case studies'.   
22     See, eg, Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Homicide (1988). 
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men not only view their partners as theirs exclusively, but also experience feelings of entitlement 
signified by the recurring declaration: 'If I can't have her, no one else can!'23        
 
Although sexual jealousy and obsessive/possessiveness are well established risk factors for 
dangerousness/lethality, the proprietariness thesis conceptualises masculine possessiveness in 
wider terms than the obvious sexual jealousy which is frequently present in these cases: 
 
'Jealous' and 'possessive' are the terms most often used to describe the mindset of men who have 
beaten or killed wives, but we prefer to describe such men as 'proprietary'.  Proprietariness implies 
a more encompassing mindset, referring not just to the emotional force of one's desire for 
exclusivity, but also to feelings of entitlement.  Proprietary entitlements in people have been 
conceived and institutionalised as identical to proprietary entitlements in land and chattels.24   
 
For Daly and Wilson, spousal homicide is a dysfunctionally extreme manifestation of conflicts 
over control in heterosexual relationships.25  'Control is attained through the use of violence, with 
sublethal assaults and threats of homicide being effective control mechanisms.'26  Recent research 
also found excessive jealousy and possessiveness to be an important factor both in cases where 
women were killed, and those where abuse did not result in fatality.27   Geris Serran and Philip 
Firestone cite a number of authorities for the proposition that male proprietariness is best 
conceptualised along a continuum of proprietariness and female partners on a continuum of 
resistance in order to effectively determine risk.28  Desmond Ellis and Walter DeKeseredy have 
integrated the male proprietariness thesis with a theory of interventions based on variations in 
battering men's responses to women's decisions to exit an abusive relationship.29   
 
The theme of male proprietariness and violence as a tactic of control is also apparent in the 
following risk assessment instrument in use by legal professionals in the US:  
                                                 
23    Geris Serran and Philip Firestone, 'Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the Male Proprietariness and the Self-
Defense Theories' (2004) 9 Aggression and Violent Behavior 1, 2-3. 
24   Margo Wilson, Martin Daly and Christine Wright, 'Uxoricide in Canada: Demographic Risk Patterns' (1993) 35 
Can.J.Crim 263, 264. 
25     Daly and Wilson, above n 22. 
26     Serran and Firestone, above n 23, 4 (citations omitted). 
27     Carolyn Block, et al, The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study: Risk of Serious Injury or Death in Intimate 
Violence A Collaborative Research Project (2000). 
28     Serran and Firestone, above n 23, 6. 
29    Desmond Ellis and Walter DeKeseredy, 'Rethinking Estrangement, Intervention, and Intimate Femicide' (1997) 3 
Violence Against Women 590. 
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The presence of 'morbid, obsessive possessiveness', extreme jealousy, rage and/or depression over 
separation, increase in frequency of violence, stalking behaviors, death threats, and perceived 
betrayal, especially coinciding with changes in life stressors in the life of the abuser, has emerged 
as a recipe for lethality.  The time of attempted or actual separation from the relationship has been 
universally recognized as the most dangerous period…Other indicators, which some may consider 
as more obscure, including the presence of a stepchild in the home, and an abuser's job status, have 
emerged in recent leading studies.  An abuser's unemployment status has consistently emerged as 
the single most important life stressor factor, which has far-reaching implications for society.30 
 
The proprietariness thesis is an evolutionary theory.  Evolutionary psychologists posit legal 
prohibitions against adultery which traditionally excused men (but not women) who retaliated with 
lethal violence in response to spousal adultery as part of a process aimed at increasing male 
reproductive success, and the survival of descendants.  Unless the male consistently monitors his 
partner, or isolates her from other men, he may be cuckolded into investing in and caring for a 
child who is not related to him.  Consequently, 'the return on his investment of time and resources 
in terms of his genetic representation is zero'.31   
 
Serran and Firestone note that it would appear to follow from theories which posit the human 
species as evolving psychological mechanisms to defend confidence of paternity that men would 
be especially likely to kill expendable postmenopausal wives.  However, Daly and Wilson suggest 
that 'jealous, proprietary motives would be particularly prevalent among men with younger wives 
for various reasons.  First, younger women are more attractive to men, being a younger wife is 
associated with a greater probability that she will end an unsatisfactory marriage, attract the 
attention of other men, and become remarried'.32   
 
However, critics of evolutionary explanations for male sexual proprietariness note that to function 
adaptively, sexual jealousy requires a sufficient degree of reality testing.  By contrast, obsessive 
jealousy is a maladaptive survival strategy characterised by consistent and pervasive misreading of 
social cues of the spouse.  The inordinate amount of time spent monitoring and surveilling the 
                                                 
30   Amy Karan and Lauren Lazarus, 'A Lawyer's Guide to Assessing Dangerousness for Domestic Violence' (2004) 78 
F.B.J. 55, 61-62. 
31    Rebecca Burch and Gordon Gallup Jr, 'Pregnancy as a Stimulus for Domestic Violence' (2004) 19 Journal of 
Family Violence 243, 244. 
32    Serran and Firestone, above n 23, 3. 
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activities of the female partner is also undertaken at the expense of family survival activities such 
as procuring nourishment and shelter.  Nor is obsessive jealousy and possessiveness confined to 
females of child bearing age.  It can occur across a wide age range including the geriatric age for 
both male individuals and their spouses.33    
 
While the sexual proprietariness thesis offers valuable insights into the phenomenon of intimate 
partner violence, evolutionary explanations overlook important ways themes related to violence 
are embedded in cultures.34  Culture 'plays a causal role by providing the scripts for the ways in 
which males and females are to behave.'35  For most feminists, placing power at the centre of 
theories of men and masculinity reflects the reality that discourses of male dominance are 
political.36  When themes of male control and female subordination are associated with innate 
biological mechanisms which are not susceptible to conditioning or learning, unequal gender 
relations may be institutionalised as timeless, inevitable, natural, and even 'normal'.37  Attention is 
thereby deflected from cultural discourses and practices which endorse and perpetuate male 
dominion over women. 
 
IV   MEN KILLING WOMEN AND MALE SEXUAL RIVALS 
A   Sub-Pattern One: Masculine Possessiveness/Control 
Polk found male killers alleged sexual misconduct in one-third of the male jealousy cases.  The 
decision to destroy a woman rather than allow her to fall into the hands of a competitor was also 
captured in cases where men informed their partners and the world: 'If I can't have you, no one 
will'.38   Patricia Easteal notes that   
 
 [t]his can be labelled as jealousy, or an inability to accept separation, or obsessiveness, or 
pathological possessiveness, or any of another hundred terms...The derivation of such attitudes 
                                                 
33    J Arturo Silva, et al, 'The Dangerousness of Persons with Delusional Jealousy' (1998) 26 J Am Acad Psychiatry 
Law 607, 619-620. 
34   Joseph Vandello and Dov Cohen, ' Male Honor and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts That Perpetuate 
Domestic Violence' (2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 997, 1008. 
35     Ibid. 
36    Nigel Edley and Margaret Wetherell, 'Masculinity, Power and Identity' in Paula Gilbert and Kimberly Eby (eds), 
Violence and Gender: An Interdisciplinary Reader (2003) 106, 110. 
37    Donatella Marazziti, et al, 'Normal and Obsessional Jealousy: A Study of a Population of Young Adults' (2003) 18 
European Psychiatry 106, 107, note that '[t]he boundary between "normal" and "pathological" jealousy is extremely 
difficult to define and this represents a formidable problem for clinicians.   Where the line is drawn between normal 
and morbid jealousy depends largely upon the social customs of the society in question.  Thus jealousy is considered 
morbid when it exceeds that level of possessiveness which is regarded as the norm for that society or culture'.   
38    Polk, above n 7, 32. 
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toward a female partner are not difficult to locate: a society where women have been long regarded 
as the property or possession of man.  This ownership attitude is exemplified in [a case in which] 
the estranged de facto husband had 'belted the victim on many occasions' and had said 'If I can't 
have you, nobody will'.  He also threatened, 'If you do (have an affair), I'll shoot your kid'.  And, he 
did: he shot the ten-year-old boy, the woman, and himself.39 
 
In the present research, this pattern of masculine possessiveness/control encompassed a variety of 
scenarios:  
 
1   Scenario One: Jealousy/Possessiveness 
Cases studies in the present research support Polk's finding that considerable planning and 
calculation is not inconsistent with killings fuelled by jealous rage.   
 
The Jealousy Scenario: Case Study M/00/1 
Gerald, the 37 year-old male offender, told police he killed Natasha, his 23 year-old partner, who was 
around 12 weeks pregnant at the time of her death, because she had been 'fooling around' on him.  (Natasha 
had repeatedly denied accusations that she was unfaithful.)  Prior to the homicide, Gerald lured Natasha to a 
shed by asking her to help him fix the seat of a car.  Gerald said he did this as he did not want anything 
'going down' inside the house.  He stated there was no argument between the pair and he gave Natasha no 
warning before attacking her and beating her in the head with a knuckle-duster.  At some stage a noose was 
placed around Natasha's neck - which resulted in a number of abrasions - and a jacket was thrown over her 
head.  A claw hammer was used to cause skull fractures and brain damage.  Natasha was placed in the car 
with the rope still around her neck and the car doused with petrol and set alight.   
 
Gerald, who was injured in the fire, told police he believed Natasha had been sleeping with his friends:  'I'm 
a useless prick.  I should have killed myself and not her', he said.  However, at trial, defence counsel 
claimed Gerald had become angry and lost his self-control due to his belief that Natasha was unfaithful.  
'Provocation can be the tiniest little trigger.  There is a cumulative effect where things said and things done 
mount and mount…' 
 
The woman victim in the following case study successfully negotiated a temporary respite from 
what amounted to extreme and terrifying violence by the jealous male.  However despite an 
apparently mutual agreement to separate she was murdered shortly thereafter.       
                                                 
39    Easteal, above n 13, 108-109 (emphasis in original). 
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The Jealousy/Separation Scenario: Case Study W/02/10 
Robert, the 52 year-old offender, who had a history of violence against women, pleaded guilty to a charge 
of murdering Wendy, his 56 year-old estranged partner, and to a further charge of wounding her with intent 
to injure which related to an assault on Wendy two weeks before the murder.  Following Robert's guilty 
plea, seven other charges including unlawfully discharging a firearm at Wendy with intent to do grievous 
bodily harm, kidnapping, threatening to kill, wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and 
assault relating to an attack on Wendy around 16 months before the murder, were withdrawn.   
 
The prosecution stated details relating to the assault charge were recorded in a written statement Wendy 
delivered to her lawyer the day before she was killed.  The letter revealed the couple were attending a 
function and Robert became angry and jealous when a male associate made an 'off-hand remark' to Wendy.  
Robert accused Wendy of having 'sexual aspirations' towards the male and when the couple returned home 
he repeatedly knocked her to the floor, dragged her by the hair to the kitchen and held a knife to her throat.  
At this stage Wendy's hands were badly injured when she tried to fend off the knife attack and she was cut 
on her nose with the knife, on the side of her face, and on her stomach.  After repeatedly threatening to kill 
her, Robert told Wendy: 'I'm going to watch you bleed to death'.   
 
A third party arrived at the house, and, while holding the knife to Wendy's throat, Robert informed the 
visitor that Wendy was out.  He then smashed and slashed various household items, cut an electric cord and 
placed it around Wendy's neck.  After telling her he would die before going to jail, and would kill her in the 
process, Robert was dissuaded from tying Wendy up with belts from a drawer after she promised she would 
not leave him.  Later, Robert cleaned up 'some of the destruction' and the following day Wendy received 
medical attention which included 14 stitches to her hands.   
 
After expressing his remorse, Robert agreed the relationship should end.  Accordingly, he collected his 
property and left to live in another North Island city. The Court was told Robert lived with one of his sons, 
registered with several dating agencies, and placed personal advertisements in newspapers.  The day before 
the murder Robert sought medical attention saying he was depressed and could not sleep.  He was placed 
on a three-day monitoring and contact plan.  That same day he borrowed a .22 rifle and ammunition from 
his son, who heard Robert make two telephone calls to Wendy in which he appeared to be pleading with 
her and making explanations.  The next morning, after telephoning the mental health unit to advise he was 
now feeling well, Robert travelled to the city where Wendy lived. 
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Later that day, Robert presented at a police station, produced bullets from his pocket, and told police that he 
had just shot 'his lady' with a rifle, and had left the weapon beside her on the bed.  Police and ambulance 
staff found Wendy lying dead on her bed, shot twice in the chest, and once in the head. 
 
2   Scenario Two:  Separation Homicides 
Polk notes that in separation homicide cases, there is often no hint of any involvement by the 
female victim with a sexual rival. The issue is sheer masculine possessiveness.  Separation serves 
to escalate the violent anger of the male who kills in response to the woman's attempts to move out 
of his sphere of power and control.  'The power of the male to control is demonstrated by the very 
act of destruction of his "possession"'.40          
 
The following case from the present research starkly illustrates this theme: 
 
The Separation Scenario:  Case Study W/96/1 
David, the 27 year-old offender, who was a tattooist by occupation, tattooed the words: 'Property of David' 
on the face of Leonie, his 26 year-old girlfriend.  Leonie's mother stated her daughter hated the tattoo and 
was ashamed and embarrassed to go out in public.  David had a history of violence and was convicted for 
assaulting Leonie the year before he killed her.  Leonie 'ran away' from the relationship, but met up with 
David by chance, and was persuaded to accompany him to the home of his relative for a 'talk'.  Later she 
tried to leave, telling David that a friend had told her not to talk to him.  David responded by punching 
Leonie's tooth out.  David subsequently told police that he decided then: 'If I can't have her no one will'.  
He said he knew he was in trouble given his past conviction for assaulting Leonie, and resolved to 'continue 
with his mission'.  David strangled Leonie with such force that he broke his thumb.  He then beat her in the 
head with a pickaxe handle, strangled her with a karate belt and stabbed her 28 times.  Leonie died with her 
status as the offender's property tattooed across her face.  
    
In his discussion of the estrangement scenario, Polk cites a case in which the deceased woman 
'made the unfortunate mistake' of returning home to collect some belongings and died as a result.41  
As in the following case study, some women in the present research were killed when they 
returned to their homes.  While the suggestion that these women were mistaken could be construed 
as implying some element of fault on the part of deceased victims, it is crucial to recognise that it 
                                                 
40    Polk, above n 7, 44. 
41    Ibid 22. 
 66
is the abuser's decision whether to use violence, and not the victim's decision to return home to 
collect personal belongings, or to fetch a protection order, or to meet with the offender, that 
determines whether the woman survives.    
 
The Separation Scenario: Case Study L/00/4 
Alison, a 32 year-old chef, told friends she was leaving Keith, her 41 year-old de facto partner, 'for a new 
life'.  Alison packed her belongings and organised a moving truck to transport her furniture.  After leaving 
her two-year old child in the care of her parents, Alison returned to the house to collect some remaining 
items.  She was shot and killed by Keith who then fled to the bush. Fearing for the safety of Alison's parents 
and her child, police placed all three in hiding as they searched for Keith, whom they described as 'an 
alcoholic and in poor physical shape''.  Around six months later, Keith's body was discovered in the bush by 
a tramper.  The rifle and empty beer cans were with the body. 
   
While the decision of the woman in the following case to meet with her killer might also be 
interpreted as a 'mistake'; had the meeting ended amicably rather than in the woman's death, her 
decision would doubtless have been regarded as rational and appropriate. 
 
The Separation Scenario: Case Study A/02/3  
The police summary of facts stated 28 year-old Lyndon, and Langaola, his 23 year-old wife, had a 'stormy 
and violent relationship'.  The court heard that upon being told by his wife of her intention to end the 
relationship, Lyndon responded that he would 'hunt her down and kill her' if she left.  Despite this threat, 
Langaola left the couple's home, but was so terrified of her estranged husband that until her death four days 
later she made sure she was never alone.  Following her departure, Lyndon 'became more possessive and 
obsessed, following and stalking [his wife]'.  After repeated telephone calls from Lyndon, Langaola finally 
agreed to meet him, but only in a public place and only if a friend could also be present.   
 
Langaola and a female friend met with Lyndon, who, against their protests, insisted that they drive to his 
home to collect some belongings.  The two women made a pact not to split up.  However, after assuring 
Langaola's friend that he would not harm his wife, Lyndon prevailed on the woman to leave the scene to 
purchase cigarettes.  Once alone, he smashed a chopping board over Langaola's head, stabbed her 42 times, 
and slashed her throat.  Lyndon then stabbed himself and attempted to cut his own throat.   
 
Lyndon later told police he was angry and jealous, and after deciding to kill his wife, he arranged to meet 
her and persuaded her friend to leave to give him the opportunity.  In mitigation, defence counsel cited the 
offender's belief that his wife was 'carrying on with another man'. 
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When a separated or separating woman is attempting to weigh the dangers involved in staying or 
returning home, the property at the centre of the dilemma is often her own.  As discussed below, 
rather than focus upon women's lawful decisions to remain in or return to their homes, the inquiry 
is more usefully directed toward cultural and legal norms which equate male proprietariness and 
the theme of control with romantic love.   
 
3   Scenario Three:  Homicide and Suicide of Perpetrator: The Estrangement Connection 
Table Six: Suicide and Attempted Suicide of Perpetrator 
Accompanying Offence                     Suicide of Perpetrator           Attempted Suicide of Perpetrator 
Homicide of female partner by male 
offender 14 13 
 
Homicide of male partner by female 
offender  1 
 
Homicide of male associate 
of female partner  1 
 
Assault on female partner  7 
 
Assault on police officers  1 
 
Total* 23 14 
Unconfirmed 'Domestic Disputes'** 
Suicide in prison  3 
Suicide while on bail  2 
 
Total 28 14 
 
*     Excludes two intimate partner homicide/suicides - gender of perpetrator unknown. 
**   Excludes one male shot dead by police following a 'domestic dispute'.  This scenario is sometimes  
       described as 'suicide by cop'.42 
 
No woman in the present study committed suicide following the killing of her male partner or 
rival.  One female perpetrator attempted suicide after killing her current male partner.  In 
comparison, as shown in Table Six, fourteen male offenders took their own lives after killing their 
partners.  One male killed himself following the murder of his estranged partner's new male 
                                                 
42    The Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Every Life Lost is a Call for Change: Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2004) 22, 'included the deaths of 
abusers killed by law enforcement in counts of suicidal abusers.  In all of these cases, abusers acted consciously with 
life-threatening force that compelled law enforcement officers to respond with deadly force.  This behavior has been 
defined by researchers as "suicide by cop" or "law enforcement officer-assisted suicide"'. (citations omitted.) 
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partner.  Males also committed suicide in the context of assaults on female partners, on a police 
officer, and following 'domestic disputes'.  Death may have been the intention in a further 13 cases 
in which male offenders tried unsuccessfully to kill themselves after killing their partners or ex-
partners.  
 
In Polk's study, no women killed their male partners prior to their own suicide, and Easteal reports 
only one female perpetrated homicide/suicide.  Easteal posits intimate femicide followed by 
suicide of the perpetrator as the manifestation of an almost uniquely masculine inability to separate 
one's own identity from that of one's partner. 
 
 If a principle theme in homicide-suicides between adult sexual intimates was the inability to see 
oneself as a separate entity from one's partner with consequent obsessive possessiveness, then we 
would expect to find that the suicide of offenders was more common when the couple was 
estranged.  [The following data] affirms that hypothesis.43 
 
Consistent with Easteal's observation, of the nine homicide/suicide cases in the present study in 
which the gender of the perpetrator and the situational context could be established, all involved 
male offenders killing an estranged female partner or a woman attempting to extricate herself from 
the relationship.  (In five of the fourteen cases, the context of the offending could not be 
established.)   
 
Estrangement Killings by Men Followed by Suicide: Case Study G/01/1 
The relationship between Chanel the 21-year-old female victim and Lee the 23-year-old male offender 
'deteriorated' and the young woman broke off the association.  The Coroner heard that Lee contacted his 
estranged girlfriend and proposed marriage two days before the murder/suicide.  Chanel refused his 
marriage proposal and the following day told a friend that she feared her ex-boyfriend would kill her.  At 
this time she asked advice about obtaining court orders and changing her telephone number.   
 
On the night of the killing, Chanel had been out socially with her two flatmates.  A female flatmate returned 
home to find Lee naked in Chanel's bedroom.  When confronted, Lee attacked her.  Arriving home around 3 
am, Chanel heard her flatmate's screams and smashed in the glass door of the flat to go to her aid.  Another 
flatmate called the police.  Lee then attacked his ex-girlfriend, stabbing her in the chest and throat.  After 
mortally wounding Chanel, Lee then stabbed himself twice.  Both died at the scene of the homicide.  A note 
                                                 
43    Easteal, above n 13, 102. 
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found in Lee's jeans confirmed his plan to commit the murder-suicide.  Approximately four months later, 
Chanel, a police clerk, was remembered at an annual Remembrance Day service for police personnel who 
died while in service and in retirement.  A senior police officer told reporters that persons who knew the 
couple described Lee as 'just a regular guy' and Chanel as a 'beautiful woman'. The killings were 'just a 
tragedy', he said.   
 
The apparent acceptance by the police officer in the above case that an offender who invaded his 
estranged partner's home, injured her flatmate, and killed the woman who rejected him, could 
reasonably be described as 'a regular guy' indicates that the cultural association of separation 
violence with romantic love has rendered this red flag for dangerousness/lethality benign.  
Domestic violence fatality reviews typically emphasise the importance of educating professionals 
and the public, including victims and their families, about the red flag of male sexual 
proprietariness.  In the absence of such education, obsessive jealousy and possessiveness may be 
misconstrued by victims and those close to them as indicative of a deep level of romantic 
affection.   
 
Estrangement Killings by Men Followed by Suicide: Case Study L/98/6 
Bertram, the 22 year-old offender and Lauren, the 19 year-old woman victim were living together in the 
home of Lauren's parents.  The night before she was killed, Lauren informed Bertram that the relationship 
was over.  Approximately 24 hours later, Bertram poured petrol throughout Lauren's bedroom and a flame 
ignited the vaporised petrol fumes while Bertram was standing at the door of the bedroom.  Lauren died in 
the fire and dental records were required to formally identify her body.  Lauren's brother escaped from the 
house unharmed.  Lauren's mother was taken to hospital with extensive burns to her legs which she suffered 
while trying to save her daughter.  Bertram also escaped from the house but later died in hospital.   
 
Lauren's father, who told reporters that his daughter had ended her relationship with Bertram the night 
before she was killed, said he had no ill-feelings towards Bertram who was 'madly in love' with his 
daughter.  'It was just insane jealousy' he said. 
 
Polk and Easteal observe that although mental illness may distort the motives of male offenders 
who kill estranged partners, these cases frequently exhibit the same themes of proprietariness and 
male control that are a dominant feature of homicides committed by offenders who are not 
mentally unwell.  The following case study reinforces this insight.   
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Estrangement Killings by Men Followed by Suicide: Case Study G/01/3 
Family and friends of 21 year-old Lauren and 30 year-old Danny described the couple's relationship as 
characterised by Danny's obsessively controlling behaviour and abuse.  The inquest heard Danny had a 
history of violence towards women and drug abuse.  The year before the killing, police found him naked in 
the street, making threats to kill, and claiming he was the 'anti-Christ'.  Danny was diagnosed as having a 
mental illness, exacerbated by heavy cannabis use, and spent four weeks as a compulsory patient in secure 
care at a psychiatric institution. After satisfying health professionals he was no longer a danger, Danny was 
released into the care of the community mental health service.  However, he refused to take prescribed 
medication, and failed to attend his follow-up appointments with a psychiatrist.  When he missed his 
second appointment, no check was made to ascertain whether Danny should come off the medication.  
Instead, he was discharged from the mental health service altogether.   
 
After extracting a promise from Lauren to join him there, Danny flew to Australia.  However, Lauren and 
her family viewed his departure as an opportunity to successfully end the abusive relationship.  Lauren's 
mother told journalists that her daughter 'plucked up courage' to telephone Danny and inform him the 
relationship was over, and she would not be joining him in Australia.  The following day, Danny flew back 
to New Zealand, obtained a temporary driver's licence, hired a car, and travelled to Hamilton, where he 
stole a gun.  He then drove to Lauren's home, broke into the house and shot the young woman in the head 
as she lay in her bed.  After leaving the murder scene, Danny crashed the vehicle he was driving and then 
shot and fatally wounded himself, leaving a suicide note in the car.  Police found empty cans from two six-
packs of beer in the car.   
 
An independent psychiatrist told the inquest that when searching for answers to this murder/suicide, people 
should look at Danny's history of violence and drug abuse.  However, the Coroner criticised a mental health 
system that allowed Danny to leave the country unnoticed after refusing to take anti-psychotic medication 
and failing to attend medical appointments.  His refusals to take injections and failure to keep his 
appointments should have been seen as 'major red flag signals'.   
 
Lauren's uncle, a serving police officer, told reporters that Danny was quite well known for saying 'you can 
get away with anything if you act nuts'.  He said 'the system, politicians and mental health experts' were out 
of touch with reality.  'They seem to get this idea of superiority, that their ideas are somehow more 
important than our ideas'.  Lauren's mother said her daughter was 'the sort of business-minded person the 
country needs'.  The young woman designed most of her own furniture and loved rimu. 'The dearest rimu 
coffin you could have, that's what I got her', her mother said.  
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Since the 'major red flag signals' identified by the Coroner in this case related to shortcomings in 
the offender's mental health care, a crucial opportunity to educate society about structural patterns 
of violence in intimate relationships, in particular the 'red flags' associated with male sexual 
proprietariness, was missed.  
 
4   Scenario Four:  Killing to Conclude an Argument 
The need to control some behaviour of the woman is central to the proprietariness thesis.  Rebecca 
and Russell Dobash note that many violent men do not believe women partners have the right to 
argue, negotiate, or debate with them.  In these circumstances, violence is used to silence debate 
and to reassert male authority.44   The following are examples from the 10 cases classified under 
this scenario of violence as a tactic of control.   
 
Homicide as the Ultimate Method of Concluding an Argument: Case Study H/00/2 
Mark, the 31 year-old male offender, had a history of assaults against Trina, his 31 year old woman partner.  
Police were called to a 'domestic incident' at the home the couple shared with Mark's parents and three 
children.  The Court later heard that Mark arrived home after drinking and the couple argued.  Mark 
launched an assault on Trina during which both his mother and his father attempted to intervene.  In 
response to his mother's attempt to telephone the police, Mark pulled the telephone from the wall.  Mark's 
mother then helped the children to escape through a window to the home of a neighbour to call the police.  
Before police arrived, Mark stabbed Trina in the neck and chest with a kitchen knife.  The children of the 
mortally injured woman watched as police and emergency services personnel unsuccessfully attempted to 
save her life.   
 
When police inquired of Mark how Trina had sustained her injuries, Mark, whose hands and wrists were 
covered in blood, responded: 'I don't know.  I didn't do nothing'.45  Police officers later gave evidence that 
as he was being driven to the police station, Mark remarked: 'Good job, the bitch is dead' and began to 
laugh.46 
 
Homicide as the Ultimate Method of Concluding an Argument: Case Study D/96/5 
Brian, the 24 year-old male offender and Marilyn, his 52 year-old partner were being driven in a car when 
they argued about a hotel Marilyn wanted to visit.  The driver, who was a friend of the offender, later told 
                                                 
44   Rebecca E Dobash and Russell Dobash, 'Men's Violence and Programs Focused on Change' (1997) 8 CICJ 243, 
250. 
45    Transcript of Proceedings, R v H (High Court, Gisborne, Williams J, 6 August 2001) 85. 
46    Ibid 128. 
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police that Brian made a racial comment to which Marilyn took exception.  He said Marilyn kicked Brian, 
who responded by 'pounding her on the head' for about ten minutes.  He said there was blood on Marilyn's 
face and blood on the back seat and he told the pair to get out of the car.  The last time he saw the couple, 
they were sitting together on the side of the road 'just hugging each other'.    
 
Another male witness told the Court he heard shouting outside his home late in the evening and went 
outside to his front fence.  He saw Brian kicking Marilyn who was lying on the ground.  The kicks were 
aimed at Marilyn's head and the only movement of her body was from the force of the kicks.  Brian was 
'just raving basically, yelling' the witness said.  At one stage he heard a crunching sound 'like eggshell 
breaking'.  When he walked out of his gate and on to the street Brian approached him 'quite aggressively' 
and stated: 'Me and my mate are having a fight.  We've been on the piss.  What's it to you, mate?'  The 
witness went back into the house and called the police.  When he went back to the road, Brian was less 
agitated and Marilyn, whose face was 'quite contorted', was still lying on the ground, with a dark stain on 
her head.  The witness said he went back inside to tell the police to send an ambulance and found a blanket 
to cover Marilyn.  When he returned and placed the blanket over Marilyn, Brian remarked 'It's cold isn't it?  
This is my wife.'  Brian then lay on the ground and pulled the blanket over both of them.  When police 
arrived, Brian, who was covered with blood, appeared from under the blanket and stood up.   
 
A post-mortem revealed Marilyn 'died from brain injuries and airway obstruction caused by multiple kicks 
to her face and head'.  Brian told police the pair had 'a domestic' about his drug habit and drinking.  Police 
officers later gave evidence that Brian 'made derogatory and violent comments towards women' as he was 
being driven to the police station. At one point Brian was heard to say:  'This is what happens to women 
when they annoy you.  You throw them on the heap'.    
 
While many intimate partner homicides sit comfortably within categories of killings arising from 
sexual proprietariness, the types sometimes 'blur at the edges' or one or two cases in a particular 
category may stand out from the rest.47  For example, the following case was categorised as killing 
to conclude an argument.  However, it might also have been classified as a manifestation of male 
possessiveness and sexual jealousy. 
 
Homicide as the Ultimate Method of Concluding an Argument: Case Study V/02/13 
Gary, the 25 year-old offender and Cheyanne, his 18 year-old girlfriend went out to a movie.  The couple 
argued and the young woman went home by herself.  Gary stayed in town drinking, and then visited a strip 
club.  The sentencing judge noted that during the night Gary appeared to have 'fuelled some form of 
                                                 
47    Kenneth Polk and David Ranson, 'The Role of Gender in Intimate Femicide' (1991) 24 ANZJ Crim 15, 23. 
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jealousy that was raging within him'.  Gary arrived home at about 6 am, awoke his sleeping girlfriend, and 
argued with her over his belief that she had been cheating on him.  Defence counsel stated: 'The conflict 
escalated with her being on the bed and him holding her down and ripping off her pyjamas and underpants, 
holding her neck and banging her head on to the concrete wall of the flat'.  Gary did not alert the police and 
when they arrived he refused to grant them immediate access.  Cheyanne was subsequently found lying 
naked on a double bed with head injuries.  She died in hospital as a result of severe brain injury.   
 
Gary admitted he had previously been violent towards Cheyanne, but told police: 'I have never been that 
vicious before'.  Defence counsel claimed Gary was guilty of manslaughter, and not murder: 'You can be 
vicious but not kill somebody' he said.  
 
Cheyanne's mother stated Gary had been violent towards her daughter in the past, but despite pleas from the 
family Cheyanne always went back to him.  She said the family had forgiven Gary.  Cheyanne's father said 
Gary, with tears 'streaming down his face', had told him that he loved Cheyanne 'very very much'.   
 
5   Scenario Five:  Discarding an Unwanted Partner  
In a further control theme, the offender initiates a new sexual relationship and the killing is a 
means of discarding an unwanted partner: 
 
The case might be made…that in the eyes of the husband his wife was a disposable possession, to 
be cast away when a new love entered his life.  In such a scenario, the wife is still viewed as 
property, but property which can be cast off when so willed by the male, and thus the killing is an 
ultimate expression of control.48 
  
In the present study, this theme was identified in three cases involving male offenders who were 
living with their partners at the time of the homicide while pursuing a sexual relationship with a 
third party.49   
 
In a variant of the 'discarding an unwanted partner' theme, two further killings were classified as 
motivated by economic gain.  The deeply indebted male perpetrator in one case was the 
beneficiary of his wife's substantial life insurance policy.  He had previously called upon the 
services of women in the sex industry and had spent time with a sex worker on the night he killed 
                                                 
48     Polk, above n 7, 50. 
49    In two cases, following the convictions of offenders, their new female partners announced their intention to marry 
the men.   
 74
his wife and daughter.  His attempt to found an alibi upon this liaison was unsuccessful.  The male 
in the second case also stood to gain a significant amount of money from his wife's life insurance 
policy.  His wife's jewellery and other items were found in the offender's car after a delaying 
device was used to burn down the house in which the woman was apparently sleeping.   She was 
badly burned and later died in hospital. 
 
6   Scenario Six:  Killing Intoxicated Women 
When killings were preceded by an argument they were included in 'Scenario Four' above.  
However, in three cases, no evidence was found that the couple argued before the offender 
launched the lethal assault.  The mere fact that the women were intoxicated, without more, 
apparently infuriated their male partners, who were themselves intoxicated.   
 
Homicide of Intoxicated Woman: Case Study K/98/1 
James, the 21 year-old male offender pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter.  The Court was told that 
James and his 15 year-old girlfriend Wynell were walking home after drinking at a local Pool Club.  
Wynell 'kept falling over' and James 'became frustrated'.  He proceeded to punch the girl in the head and 
face and kick her as she lay on the ground.  After Wynell lost consciousness, James dragged her to a van 
where they stayed the night before he drove her home the following day.  Wynell was flown by rescue 
helicopter to hospital but died on life support four days later.  Family members stated that there were 'no 
signs of trouble in the relationship', and it had never occurred to them that James was capable of hurting 
Wynell.   
 
In response to James' sentence of four years' imprisonment, family members noted that with good 
behaviour, together with the four months' imprisonment already served, James could be released after 
spending 18 months in jail.  Calling for judges to impose tougher sentences, the family disagreed with the 
judge's assessment of James as 'remorseful', describing him as 'emotionless' throughout the whole ordeal.  
An aunt of the young victim described her niece as 'a loving, caring girl', who loved children and art. 
 
7   Scenario Seven: 'Killing the Competition' 
Polk notes that in a variant of the estrangement scenario 'the action shifts to encompass the male 
competition in the sexual triangle' and the male takes the life of the man he perceives to be his 
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'sexual competition'.50  As illustrated below, lethal male violence in this context is sometimes 
directed at both parties, and sometimes aimed exclusively at the male sexual competitor. 
 
'Killing the Competition' in the Context of Estrangement: Case Study T/01/2 
In a double homicide described by the Crown as motivated by 'obsessive jealousy', Richard, the 57 year-old 
male offender shot and killed Helen, his 43 year-old ex partner and Paul, her 42 year-old new male partner.  
Helen's brother gave evidence that Richard told him shortly before the killings that his association with 
Helen was 'far from over' and: 'If I can't have her, no one else will'.  A former lodger and friend of Richard 
told the court that prior to the double homicide, Richard announced that he wanted Helen back and would 
'fight to the bitter end'.  At this time he threatened to kill both Helen and Paul.    
 
A 111 call from Helen which documented the last moments of her life was replayed in court.  Helen named 
her ex-partner as the person who had shot both herself and her new male partner.  Richard's voice could be 
heard in the background, repeatedly saying: 'I love you...I wanted you to be my best friend and my partner 
for the rest of my life.'  The tape continued for more than 40 minutes with Helen struggling for breath and 
repeatedly dropping the telephone.  The operator kept reassuring Helen that 'help was on the way' while 
Helen continued to plead for assistance: 'Help me please…I can't hang on much longer…I'm going to die'.  
When police arrived they found Paul dead on the front lawn.  He had been shot twice in the chest.  Helen 
lay dead in the kitchen, the telephone beside her.  Richard had left the scene to give himself up at the local 
police station.  When police searched Richard's property they found 'obsessive' notes and diary items 
written by him about his 'love and rejection'.  The writings included a note to Helen warning her that she 
would have 'two male deaths on [her] conscience'.  Police also found a painting 'of a woman and bullets had 
been fired at it'.   
 
An emergency services worker went public with concerns over the 40 minute delay in the police response 
to Helen's 111 call.  The matter was referred to the Police Complaints Authority.  The sentencing judge 
described this double murder as 'a crime of passion in "the eternal triangle of love and jealousy"'. 
 
Neil Websdale notes that rather than assume red flags culminate in, or indeed cause death, it may 
be better to assert that these risk factors are associative or correlative; with the clear understanding 
that correlation is not proof of causation.  
 
[I]t is clear from other research that lethal outcomes may also depend upon the availability of 
emergency medical services, especially in the first hour after the shooting or stabbing…Clearly, 
                                                 
50    Polk, above n 7, 57. 
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battered women in rural areas may be at a distinct disadvantage insofar as it may be more difficult 
to summon emergency medical assistance for them in cases of serious assaults that produce life-
threatening injuries.  Put differently, cases that appear to exhibit more classic and intense signs of 
lethality may not culminate in death because better emergency medical services are available to 
avert death.  These cases would then only be coded as aggravated assaults and would not end up 
among the population of lethal cases used to generate predictive matrices.51 
 
As demonstrated in Case Study T/01/2 above, risk assessment instruments should acknowledge the 
increased risk to rural women who are encountering red flag behaviours associated with increased 
risk of serious violence/lethality.   
 
Polk describes a case of 'killing the competition' which differed from other cases in that the male 
offender had apparently never been violent towards his estranged wife, or towards her new male 
partner prior to the homicide.  The offender also confined his lethal violence to his sexual rival.52  
Although Polk theorises the perpetrator's anger in such cases as aimed at the sexual rival, the male 
offender in the following case clearly placed the blame for the victim's death on the female 
survivor.  Thus 'killing the competition' may operate as a form of punishment of the woman.   
 
'Killing the Competition' in the Context of Estrangement: Case Study B/96/4 
Bradley's mother stated her son had been deeply disturbed by the death of a close family friend.  Bradley 
'cracked' at that point and told her he was 'sick of being stolen from and shit on'.  Bradley shot and killed 
the male lover of his former fiancée in the hallway of the victim's home.  Bradley's former partner, who 
witnessed the shooting, stated that after killing the male, Bradley told her: 'This is all your fault.  I blame 
you'.  Bradley then shot and killed himself. 
 
A feature of homicides motivated by jealousy and beliefs of sexual betrayal was the savagery of 
the violence involved.  Easteal also found that '[o]ne aspect of many of these homicides which 
cannot be perceived through…tables and numbers is the degree of brutality involved in a number 
of these killings.  This ferocity was particularly present in situations where a knife was used by a 
male'.53  The present research found this aspect of male violence toward women generally passed 
without media or public commentary.    
                                                 
51    Neil Websdale, Lethality Assessment Tools: A Critical Analysis (2000) 4 (citations omitted). 
52    Polk, above n 7, 55. 
53    Easteal, above n 13, 40. 
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The killings of women who are beyond child bearing age by elderly, jealous, possessive men 
challenge evolutionary explanations of male proprietariness.  As discussed in Part II, the jealous 
66 year-old offender in Case Study P/02/6 killed his 65 year-old wife after the couple had lived 
apart for 11 years.  This killing was motivated by the offender's jealous, apparently delusional 
belief, that his elderly estranged wife was romantically involved with another man.54   
 
B  Sub-Pattern Two: Masculine Depression and Homicide Followed by Suicide 
Polk distinguishes this theme of male depression/suicide from that in sub-pattern one as men in the 
first category are primarily focused upon the destruction of their partners.  He suggests that careful 
reading is required to distinguish the male depression/suicide cases from those in which men kill 
their partners out of a sense of possessiveness or jealousy and then take their own lives: 
 
 The key element of the [second] sub-pattern identified here is that a reading of the case narrative 
indicates that it is profound depression which has pushed these males to the point where they 
contemplate the step of committing suicide.  Their primary goal is self destruction.  In a way 
analogous to that of jealous males, these husbands view their wives as possessions which should be 
carried along in this final journey…In contrast, most of the masculine killings of women in the 
context of sexual intimacy are primarily about the destruction of the women, then when that goal is 
accomplished some of the males (14 in all) took their own life.55 
 
This second sub-pattern of offending was not supported in the present research.  Polk suggests that 
unlike cases in sub-pattern one, the primary goal of offenders in the second sub-category is their 
own self-destruction and not the killing of the women.56   However, in the nine cases in the present 
study, which on first inspection fell within the depression/suicide sub-pattern, no offender who 
took the life of a female partner was successful in also taking his own life.  
 
Five elderly, and a younger offender whose wife was chronically ill, killed their ailing wives.  
Another younger depressed male who was burdened by his gambling debts, took the life of his 
wife and two young children. These seven offenders were unsuccessful in their attempts to kill 
                                                 
54    See, below, at p 260. 
55    Polk, above n 7, 49. 
56    Ibid 47-48. 
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themselves.57   The murder prosecution of a further 70 year-old male who had previously headed 
two mental health hospitals was stayed after the offender was held mentally unfit to stand trial.  It 
could not be ascertained whether the offender's 65 year-old wife was chronically ill at the time she 
was killed.  There was no evidence that this male attempted suicide.  In the following case study, 
the younger depressed male in financial difficulties took the life of his wife, but made no attempt 
on his own.  Rather than conforming to Polk's second sub pattern, this homicide might better be 
categorised in the control theme of discarding an unwanted partner.   
 
Discarding an Unwanted Partner: Case Study E/99/4 
Warren, the 37 year-old male offender, attacked Sandra, his 38 year-old wife with a tomahawk as she lay 
asleep in bed.  Sandra was struck 22 times in the back of the head with the hatchet.  During the attack, 
Sandra put her hands to the back of her head to try to protect herself and received extensive injuries to both 
hands.  After killing his wife, Warren dialled 111 and told the police operator he killed Sandra because 'he 
was out of work and owed money'.  Police found Sandra dead in the bedroom and a teenage girl also 
present in the house.  At depositions, the court heard the taped 111 call.  Warren told the operator: 'he had 
just killed his wife with an axe.  He said he loved his wife and had killed her because he owed money and 
because he was out of work'.  Warren also informed the operator that 'he was in financial trouble, had just 
been made redundant from [his place of employment] and had not been able to find work since.  The family 
car had been repossessed, the phone had been cut and the power was about to be cut'.  He said he 'just 
flipped' and did not remember killing Sandra.  The operator noted Warren 'seemed strangely calm for a man 
who had just killed his wife with an axe'.   
 
At sentencing, following Warren's guilty plea to a charge of murder, defence counsel stated that Warren 
loved his wife and was at a loss to explain why he had attacked her.  Warren 'had psychological problems 
that needed treatment, and he hoped that as he gained insight into his condition others would be helped'.  
The Crown made no submissions at sentencing. The judge stated there was only one sentence he could 
pronounce, that of life imprisonment.  Warren replied: 'Thank you, Your Honour'.   
 
While the above offender claimed he could not remember the killing, a clue as to motive may be 
found in cases from the sample of sub-lethal assaults.  In one case, the offender informed an 
undercover police officer posing as a 'hit man' that he wanted his partner killed because she was 
'like a typical bloody woman.  She spends everything'.  In a further case, the judge stated that the 
                                                 
57   An unsuccessful attempt to kill his 84 year-old wife was followed by suicide of the 85 year-old perpetrator in one 
further case.   
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offender, who attacked his de facto partner with a jemmy bar and knife while she slept, 'seemed to 
be blaming the woman for his disastrous financial position'. 
 
If the primary aim of offenders in the second sub-pattern is their own destruction, it seems a 100 
per cent failure rate must negate the hypothesis.  The reality that no offender accomplished what 
Polk posits as the 'primary goal' of killing himself, following the killing of his partner, suggests 
that women partners were the primary targets of these men.   This proposition is supported by 
evidence from the present study that, following the disposition of their cases, offenders frequently 
lost their former inclination to kill themselves.   
 
Although court and media reports generally portray men who kill in this context sympathetically, 
some journalists expressed discomfort at the sight of the elderly male offender in the following 
case, exiting the court with a jubilant smile of triumph, backed up by a thumbs-up gesture at the 
camera. 
 
Homicide of Ailing Elderly Partner: Case Study K/99/3  
The 87 year-old man killed his 86 year-old wife by giving her sleeping pills and then suffocating her by 
wrapping her head in plastic.  The victim who was suffering from a number of medical conditions had 
apparently told others that she 'wished she could go'.  The offender, who had taken a number of sleeping 
pills, was found by nursing home workers in another room with a plastic bag over his forehead.  The 
offender later said that he passed out before he could secure the plastic bag to his head.  He stated he had 
asked his wife 'Do you really want to go?' and she had replied 'Yes please'.  The defence claimed the 
offender was executing an existing suicide pact and the killing was 'a final act of love'.  The offender was 
charged with murder but subsequently agreed to plead guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter.   
 
The sentencing judge held special circumstances existed under s 5 Criminal Justice Act 1985 which 
justified a non-custodial sentence.  Although the offender's support of euthanasia was regarded as an 
aggravating feature of offending, the judge noted that the special circumstances included: his wife's ill 
health; the offender was elderly; had a close relationship with his wife over the years; pleaded guilty; and 
cooperated with the police.  His wife had encouraged the offender to commit the offence which was 
motivated by feelings of love and compassion.58  The offender was sentenced to two years' supervision.  
While accepting that a sentence of imprisonment was inappropriate in this case, the prosecutor emphasised 
                                                 
58    R v K (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Paterson J, 29 April 1999). 
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that 'the Crown is not taking a position on either side of the euthanasia debate.  Nor is it encouraging others 
[to carry out mercy killings]'.   
 
Subsequently, the offender, who is described as 'putting his back out lifting his wife day after day', told 
reporters that he had been stopped by residents in the Rest Home, and by members of the public out on the 
street, and told 'Congratulations on a good job'.  He stated it was his intention not to pursue the alleged 
suicide pact:  'Providing I'm 90 per cent fit, I'm quite happy to stay [alive]. But if I get to the stage where I 
realise I'm on my last legs, I'll take those legs out - I shall find a way of going' he said.  
 
One reporter observed that while the above offender stated that his life was not as much 'fun' since 
his wife died; it certainly was easier, now that the burden of caring for her had been lifted.  'His 
attempt to die with his wife failed.  [The offender], who could see no reason to live without his 
wife, now says he's happy to still be alive.  We just have to take his word for it that [his wife] is 
happier dead'.   
 
The director of the Catholic Bioethics Centre queried whether the same leniency would be shown 
if the killing had involved a younger couple.  He told reporters the legal response to this killing 
revealed 
 
a lack of understanding of how to deal with pain when there is a 'pragmatic response', such as 
death, available that is ultimately acceptable to authorities.  'People look to the law in this very 
secular society for their working source of morality and ethics, so if something is legal, then it's 
also moral and ethical'. 
 
Female victims of so-called 'mercy' killings ranged in age from 64 to 86 years.  However, in Case 
Study D/00/3 a 57 year-old male took the life of his ailing 49 year-old wife.  Although little 
information on this case could be found, the murder conviction is interesting in light of the above 
suggestion that the legal system may adopt a different approach when the couple are younger.   
 
Homicide of Ailing Partner: Case Study D/00/3 
The adult children of the victim and perpetrator found their mother dead and their father seriously wounded 
at the couple's home.  The female victim was suffering from a kidney disorder which had required dialysis 
and three operations.  The last operation to insert a plastic tube was performed two weeks before her death.  
The offender, who was also suffering from health problems, quit his employment a week earlier to care for 
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his ailing wife.  After attacking and killing his wife, the offender then stabbed himself in the abdomen. 
Friends and relatives of the couple stated they were at a loss to explain the murder and attempted suicide.  
Despite both suffering illness, the couple were described as 'loving and happy'.  The first trial of the 
offender was aborted as a result of concerns over the way evidence was translated.  The offender was 
convicted of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment following his second trial.  It is not known what 
defences were run.   
 
Under s 102 of the Sentencing Act 2002, a defendant who is convicted of murder must be 
sentenced to life imprisonment unless, given the circumstances of the offence and the offender, a 
sentence of life imprisonment would be 'manifestly unjust'.  Commenting on this proviso, the 
Select Committee cited inter alia 'what are commonly known as "mercy killings", [and] failed 
suicide pacts' as examples of circumstances which might qualify as manifestly unjust.59  As 
illustrated by the following case study, elderly men who reach 'the end of their tether' and murder 
their physically or mentally ill wives may be regarded as particularly suitable candidates for a 
finding that life imprisonment would be 'manifestly unjust'. 
 
Homicide of Ailing Elderly Partner: Case Study L/02/2 
Frank, the 77 year-old male offender, fed his 73 year-old wife Olga with sleeping tablets and then hit her 
over the head with a mallet, and smothered her with a pillow.  After killing Olga, Frank, who was suffering 
from mild diabetes, attempted to kill himself by cutting his wrists.  While waiting to die, Frank wrote a note 
to his son that read:  'Sorry, I can't take it any more. (She) is getting worse every day.  Sell the house and 
you will get something out of it.  Please cremate us and have a private funeral'.   
 
Frank told the attending police officer:  'I've been married to her for 54 years, and I couldn't take it any 
more.'  After being cautioned, he stated:  'I knew what I was doing, she had bad Alzheimer's.  It's a mercy 
killing.  I've got nothing to live for.  I know it's serious and I knew what I was doing.  I've got nothing to 
hide.  I was going to call you last night when I didn't die but I thought you would be too busy.'  While on 
bail, Frank told reporters: 'It just got too much for me...It doesn't haunt me - I've slept well and never had 
any nightmares.  I'd do it again, I wouldn't hesitate.'  Referring to his unsuccessful suicide attempt, Frank 
stated: 'I shouldn't be here if I'd done the job properly...The police told me how I should have done it - 
they're hard shots'.  Although he wished he had joined his wife, Frank stated he would not attempt to kill 
himself again.   
 
                                                 
59    Geoff Hall, Sentencing Law and Practice (2004) 591. 
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Subsequently, the court was told that Frank decided to kill Olga about three weeks before the murder.  He 
had unsuccessfully attempted to gas the pair two weeks earlier.   Frank refused to consider professional care 
for his wife because: 'I wanted to keep her to myself for as long as I could.'  He believed Olga 'wouldn't 
have wanted to be locked away somewhere.  She would have been violent with the staff, she was bad 
enough with me, let alone a stranger'.  [His wife apparently told others that Frank beat her.]  Defence 
counsel claimed the existence of a suicide pact as ten years earlier the couple had agreed that if either got 
Alzheimer's they would 'do each other in'.  He said Frank had acted out of compassion and could have 
defended the murder charge on the ground of his wife's provocation.   
 
The Crown responded that this was not the 'mercy killing' the accused claimed; but premeditated murder 
which involved violence.  There were other options Frank could have pursued rather than a subjective 
decision that it was best for his wife that he kill her.  The prior unsuccessful attempt indicated a degree of 
premeditation, exacerbated by the 'arrogance' of the accused in deciding that his wife should die.  Olga's 
death had been 'devoid of dignity' and had served the interests of the accused who was struggling to cope 
with his wife's illness.   
 
However, the sentencing judge found Crown submissions that Frank was motivated by a degree of self 
interest unconvincing.  While accepting that there was no 'suicide pact' as defined in the Crimes Act, and 
evidence showed Olga had struggled for her life for some minutes before death occurred,60 the judge cited 
with apparent approval, a psychiatric report which stated Frank's actions 'appeared to be those of a loving 
and devoted husband, who was profoundly distressed at his wife's condition'.61  Frank's refusal to seek help 
for himself or his wife was due to his 'strong feelings of independence and pride' and was 
'understandable'.62  On a 'true' construction of events, Frank had 'reached the end of his tether' following his 
'loyal and continuing efforts to look after [his] wife'.63   
 
It gave the judge no pleasure to conclude that a sentence of 18 months imprisonment should be imposed as 
the taking of a human life was not permitted 'even for the highest and best motives'.64  Frank was granted 
leave to apply for home detention.   
 
Legal constructions of elderly women's deaths as 'merciful', and offenders as 'compassionate', are 
deeply problematic.  The above narrative of a 'mercy killing' perpetrated by a 'loving' offender 
with 'the highest and best motives' can only be sustained by ignoring Olga's clear desire to survive, 
                                                 
60    R v L (Unreported, High Court, Hamilton, Randerson J, 29 August 2002) [7]. 
61    Ibid [16].  
62    Ibid [40]. 
63    Ibid [39]. 
64    Ibid [62] (emphasis added).  
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as evidenced by her desperate struggles to fend off her husband's murderous attack.  This legal 
response to intimate femicide, and associated lenient sentences, may in turn influence 
prosecutorial discretion whether to even lay criminal charges.  (In 2002, the police chose not to 
press charges against two elderly males whose female partners were found dead with plastic bags 
over their heads.)65    
 
Feminist legal commentators point out that there is more than one way to construct the 
circumstances in which men kill their women partners.66  The above case would not be classified 
as a 'mercy killing' under Polk's analysis.  Indeed, Polk argues these killings exhibit the same 
proprietary attitudes towards women found in the jealousy/separation cases.  'In a way analogous 
to that of jealous males, these husbands view their wives as possessions which should be carried 
along in this final journey'.67   
 
Easteal's analysis of the 'elderly offender' cases differs from Polk's, although both researchers 
found the same male 'ownership' motif to be present when older-age perpetrators killed ailing 
female partners.  Eastel suggests that the killing of sick wives by elderly men may reflect rigidity 
in gender roles which precludes the ongoing nurturing and care of the woman by the man.  
 
 The task of dealing with chronic illness, either one's own or one's partner, plunged the sample of 
elderly perpetrators into depression.... Older men who were compelled by circumstances beyond 
their control, to caretake and nurture their sick wives, could not adjust to that role.  It is worth 
noting that there were no homicides committed by older women in similar circumstances.68  
 
Many women nurse elderly, ailing male partners, and many are no doubt so profoundly distressed 
at their partner's physical and mental deterioration that at times, they also 'reach the end of their 
tether'.  However, as Easteal observes, it is noteworthy that these circumstances do not culminate 
in lethal violence by wives.   
 
 
                                                 
65    These cases were not included in the homicide sample. 
66   See, eg, Jenny Morgan, 'Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them' 
(1997) 21 MULR 237. 
67    Polk, above n 7, 49. 
68    Easteal, above n 13, 90-91. 
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V   WOMEN KILLING MEN 
Twelve women in Polk's study killed a current or estranged intimate partner.  In eight of the 
twelve cases this was in direct response to the violence of the male victim.69  Coincidentally, the 
present study also found twelve cases of women who killed a male partner.  Prior violence by the 
male victim was confirmed in seven of these cases.  Of these seven women, four were acquitted 
(three murder charges and one manslaughter charge).  A further woman was one of two defendants 
who successfully raised the sexual provocation defence.70  Defence counsel told the Court of 
Appeal, without objection from the Crown, that the victim's violence toward the female perpetrator 
'involved physical and emotional violence including bashings, cutting with a machete, infliction of 
a venereal disease and continued infidelities'.71  The Court noted that the woman's  
 
 violence and apparent indifference to its results were, as [defence counsel] submitted, more than a 
jealous response by a jealous wife of her husband's transferring his affections elsewhere.  They 
were in our opinion to such extent a consequence of the deceased's treatment of her over two 
decades, and of her limited perception of means by which it might be resisted as not to warrant the 
sentence of 7 ½ years imposed.72 
 
In the sixth case, the woman's defence of self-defence was unsuccessful despite a history of 
violence by the male victim, including a previous assault for which he was convicted and 
sentenced to 6 months' imprisonment.  The defendant told the police in a video interview that the 
male victim had assaulted and threatened to kill her.  However, the Crown maintained the woman 
had stabbed the offender as he was running away.  Summing up, the judge is reported as 
instructing the jury that the male victim weighed more than 16 stone and  
 
there was no evidence supporting the Crown case that [the female offender] pursued [the male 
victim] from the house and struck him from behind.  For myself, I cannot see it…but you are 
perfectly entitled to disagree with me'…[The judge] also questioned whether it would be more 
probable that [the victim] turned to face [the defendant] then (sic) ran away from her. 
                                                 
69    Polk, above n 7, 146. 
70   See, R v S [2002] CA 249/01 (Unreported, Anderson, Williams and Baragwanath JJ, 27 March 2002); R v F (1998) 
16 CRNZ 88.  The cultural backgrounds of the women featured strongly in both cases. 
71    R v S [2002] CA 249/01 (Unreported, Anderson, Williams and Baragwanath JJ,  27 March 2002) [5]. 
72    Ibid [23]. 
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She says that he turned on her: I will kill you, you f***bitch.  What is she expected to do?  Punch 
him?  Kick him?  Put the knife on the ground?  These things happen in a flash'.73   
 
The jury convicted the defendant of manslaughter.  In the seventh case, defence counsel told the 
court that the woman offender had been living in an abusive relationship and was suffering from 
post-traumatic stress disorder.  This woman pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter. 
 
One woman killed a male from whom she had separated.  As illustrated below, the dominant 
theme of sexual jealousy and proprietary ownership/control beliefs found in relation to male 
perpetrators was missing from this case. 
 
Estrangement Killings by Women: Case Study H/02/1/F 
Tammy, the female offender, described as a prostitute, lived with Nicholas for 'about a month'.  Tammy 
told police her estranged partner had promised to give her his black MR2 sports car in return for sexual 
favours for himself and his friends.  However, friends of Nicholas stated the car was his 'pride and joy' and 
he loved it 'very, very much'.  Nicholas refused to hand over the car and Tammy tried to take it.  
Registration records showed the car ownership was changed into her name three times in three weeks.  
Around four months later, Tammy and one male and one female co-offender arranged for Nicholas to meet 
them at a beach.  Defence counsel for the female co-offender stated that she had agreed to take part in a 
'revenge' beating of Nicholas over the disputed ownership of the car.  The group took drugs and sniffed 
solvents and Nicholas, who was 'wasted' on solvents, was set upon by the three offenders.  Police stated he 
was kicked and punched, bound and gagged, and placed in the boot of his sports car.  Tammy drove off 
with Nicholas in the boot of the car to a shopping mall car-park where the police found her. Nicholas had 
suffocated.   
 
The Crown accepted that the three probably had not planned to kill Nicholas, but knew that their actions 
were likely to end in death. The sentencing judge noted Nicholas had been lured to the beach so that his car 
could be taken from him.  Tammy was convicted of murder. 
 
In a further 'separation' case, the woman's male lover stabbed her male partner to death shortly 
after the victim announced his intention to end the relationship.  The woman denied any 
involvement in the killing of her partner.  Again, there is no hint that this homicide was motivated 
by sexual jealousy or proprietary attitudes towards the deceased.  Rather, the killing appeared to be 
                                                 
73    Case Study F/00/1/F. 
 86
motivated by the loss of financial benefits which would ensue from estrangement.  The deceased 
victim had supported the female offender financially and at some time during their 18 month 
relationship made a will naming her as the sole beneficiary.  A clause in the will required the pair 
to be living together at the time of the testator's death.  Prior to the homicide, the female offender 
apparently told a friend that she wanted to see 'the old bastard dead' and that when he died, she 
would inherit his property.  Both male and female accused were convicted of murder.   
 
A further female was convicted on a charge of careless use of a firearm.  The prosecution stated at 
sentencing that while passing the gun to her husband, a child's intervention caused the firearm to 
discharge.  Insufficient data was available to ascertain the context of the homicide in one further 
case. 
 
VI   THE 'SPECIAL' CASES 
Polk defines 'special' cases as  
 
 a special [small] group of cases that will confound any attempt to classify the killing on the basis of  
 the social dynamics which link offender with victim, precisely because these dynamics cannot be  
 determined on the basis of the information available, even when at times that information is vast  
 indeed.74 
 
Four cases in which men killed intimate female partners that appeared not to fall within any of the 
above categories were placed in this category.  One male threw his girlfriend from a bridge into a 
dam.  She drowned.  Although some witnesses claimed the offender knew that his girlfriend could 
not swim, the offender denied this.  Two males injected women partners with an overdose of 
drugs.  In one case, the offender, who had a substantial history of criminal convictions including 
weapons offences, injected his girlfriend who had a 'fear of needles' with morphine.  The court 
accepted that this was at the deceased woman's request.  The offender was convicted of 
manslaughter.  The second woman also died after the offender injected her with morphine.  The 
prosecutor told the court that although it was likely the morphine caused the woman's death, 
pathologists could not rule out the possibility that death was caused by an asthma attack.  
Although other evidence indicated that the couple were separated at the time, defence counsel 
stated they had recently reconciled following a 'volatile' five year marriage.  The offender in this 
                                                 
74    Polk, above n 7, 156. 
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case was convicted on a charge of administering the drug and sentenced to a term of nine months' 
imprisonment.  He was subsequently convicted of a 'terrifying' home invasion involving a woman 
and child.  One further intoxicated male crashed his car killing his estranged girlfriend and her 
new male partner. 
 
VII   ALLEGED VICTIM PRECIPITATION 
While no male defendants alleged a history of battering by the female victim, in two cases male 
perpetrators claimed the homicides were perpetrated in self defence.  These cases are presented 
below: 
 
Alleged Victim Precipitation:  Case Study M/96/2 
 
The 20 year-old male offender killed Stephanie, his 19 year-old partner, in the flat 'the couple shared with 
their infant daughter'.  The offender told police he killed Stephanie after she 'went schizo' over his refusal to 
make her scrambled eggs on Mother's Day.  He stated Stephanie lunged at him with a knife and he 
responded by putting her in a choke hold.  The offender denied he had used an extension cord to 'finish the 
victim off' stating that he thought she was already dead and used the cord to stop her body from twitching.  
Stephanie's body stayed in the flat for 10 days.  [No information on the infant's whereabouts at the time or 
subsequent to the killing was available.]  During this time, Stephanie's body was 'packaged' and with the 
help of a male associate, was placed in the boot of a car where it was discovered about six weeks after she 
died.  The offender was convicted of murder and his appeal subsequently dismissed by the Court of Appeal.   
 
Alleged Victim Precipitation: Case Study M/01/5 
 
The 26 year-old male offender was described as living in an 'on-off' relationship with Helen, the 22 year-old 
victim.  A male witness described the offender as becoming 'paranoid' about Helen and other men.  He said 
he warned the offender to 'chill out' and give Helen some space.  The offender told police the pair argued 
and Helen attacked him.  They fought, and he held her down by the neck.  When he realised she had 
stopped breathing, he tried to resuscitate her.   
 
However, police alleged Helen had been strangled and a cord placed around her neck to make the death 
appear a suicide.  The offender's brother gave evidence that the offender told him Helen had died from an 
overdose of drugs.  Subsequently, his brother confessed to strangling Helen.  Under cross-examination, the 
witness became unclear whether the word 'strangled' had actually been used.  The offender also told a 
female associate that Helen had died from a drug overdose administered by him.  Believing that to be the 
case, the woman assisted the offender to dispose of Helen's body and clean the flat.  When Helen's body 
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was eventually found, it was badly decomposed and the cause of death could not be fully investigated.  The 
offender, who was originally charged with murder, pleaded guilty to manslaughter on the morning the trial 
was to begin.   
 
Helen's family and friends told reporters that justice had not been done in this case.  One friend observed:  
'Surely strangling a person to death does not come under [manslaughter].  Is this the green light for any 
disgruntled ex-boyfriend who does not want the relationship terminated to follow [the offender's] example.  
Helen was accomplished in martial arts…She would have fought him to the last breath - such knowledge 
agonises her friends.'    
 
VIII   CONCLUSION 
The present research found a gendered variation in context and motivations of partner killings 
which appears to hold true internationally.75  While male possessiveness and control is the 
dominant theme in cases of intimate femicide; women who kill men are usually responding to 
violence by the male.  Controlling behaviour; prior use of violence; obsessive-possessiveness and 
excessive jealousy; threats to kill; stalking; suicidal ideations; the status of the relationship - 
whether the parties are separated, or in the process of separating - are red flags for serious violence 
and lethality which should be taken into account along with questions about the batterer's personal 
pathology; use of drugs/alcohol; employment status; history of abuse outside the home; and access 
to weapons when determining risk.  Battered women in rural areas appear at increased risk due to 
difficulties accessing emergency assistance.   
 
The conventional wisdom that the risk of domestic assault declines from the time women reach 
their mid-thirties76 needs rethinking.   Polk identifies killings of elderly women as part of a pattern 
of male proprietariness associated with depression and suicide of the perpetrator.  However, given 
that no elderly male who killed an ailing woman partner or depressed younger male in economic 
straits accomplished this presumed goal of self destruction, these cases may be better categorised 
under the control theme of discarding an unwanted partner.   As Polk acknowledges, regardless of 
which sub-theme they are allocated to, masculine proprietariness is implicated in these killings.  
Accordingly, health professionals and others dealing with domestic violence must be made aware 
of the risk to their partners posed by elderly, depressed/suicidal men.  
                                                 
75     Morgan, above n 2, 28. 
76   Julie People, 'Trends and Patterns in Domestic Violence Assaults' (2005) 89 Crime and Justice Bulletin 1, 6; 
Tamara Burrows, Ross Homel and Cindy Gallois, (2003) 36 ANZJ Crim 192. 
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Since male sexual jealousy and possessiveness claimed the lives of women who were beyond 
child-bearing age, cultural cues appear more deeply implicated in masculine possessiveness than 
biological or evolutionary theories would suggest.  Although evolutionary theorists may be 
pessimistic about the potential of the criminal justice system to protect battered women,77 cultural 
theorists argue it is wrong to assume that men 'are incapable of changing the cultures that define 
them'.78    
 
Men's behaviour and attitudes are learned and sustained within the context of friends, relatives, the 
community, the justice system, the popular media and other arenas that form the overall context of 
individual's daily lives.  The messages from these contexts vary; they may reinforce, support, 
ignore or reject the use of violence towards partners; often they are mixed.79  
 
The following chapter explores the messages the legal system sends when responding to sub-lethal 
violence in intimate relationships.  
 
                                                 
77   See, eg, Polk, above n 7, 37. 
78   Edley and Wetherell, above n 36, 112. 
79   Dobash and Dobash, above n 44, 243. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  SUB-LETHAL ASSAULTS 
THE MISSING FOCUS ON VICTIM SAFETY              
                                     Safety for women must be at the core of all activities in  
responding to situations in which domestic violence has  
occurred.1  
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines contemporary criminal justice responses to violence in intimate 
relationships.  A shift is traced from traditional legal support of a husband's right to beat his wife, 
to current expectations that women will forgive the violence in order to protect and preserve 
family relationships.  Case studies review legal responses to red flags for dangerousness/lethality 
and factors relied on to mitigate this offending.    
 
The research found the present compartmentalised legal response permits rules and principles 
relevant to one domestic violence category to develop inconsistently with policy and practice in 
relation to another.  As a result, legal approaches to battered victims conflict with approaches to 
battered defendants.  Interventions with battered mothers overlook their implications for children 
and create a tension between the roles of battered women as wives and mothers.  This fragmented 
response is inconsistent with New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy requiring 
integrated and comprehensive intervention.2 
  
Red flags for dangerousness/lethality have not been systematically incorporated into domestic 
violence interventions.  Although the provision of effective legal protection for victims of 
domestic violence is a principle aim of the Domestic Violence Act 1995,3 legal responses fail to 
keep women (and sometimes other family members and children) safe.  A disturbing aspect of this 
devastating social reality is the silence surrounding it.  Opportunities to investigate current 
practices, improve risk assessment protocols and enhance protection for victims have therefore 
been lost.  Consequently, the state has become unaccountable to women who risk their financial 
and personal security, and even their lives, by turning to the legal system for help. 
                                                 
1   Dennis Falk and Nancy Helgeson, 'Building Monitoring and Tracking Systems' in Melanie Shepard and Ellen 
Pence (eds), Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond (1999) 89, 
90. 
2    Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) New Zealand 
Family Violence Prevention Strategy 14. 
3     Section 5(1)(b). 
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II   THE CRIMINALISATION OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE 
A   The Police Response 
Prior to 1986, police domestic violence policy encouraged police officers to mediate between the 
parties, rather than arrest offenders.4  A police officer responding to a domestic violence call and 
finding an assault had taken place would take no action other than allowing a 'cooling off' period.  
In 1987, a Report by the New Zealand Committee of Inquiry into Violence observed that the 
concept of family privacy effectively legitimised violence in the home as it failed to indicate to the 
abuser that society disapproved of his actions.  The Committee noted that it was only in 1985 that 
rape within marriage became a criminal offence and domestic assaults were still not routinely 
reported in official statistics.  This social context supported perceptions that constructions of 
women as the chattels of their husbands and the myth that 'an Englishman's home is his castle in 
which he is free to do as he pleases', were still operative in New Zealand.5    
 
Changes in police policy relating to domestic violence were outlined in Commissioner's Circular 
1987/11.  The Circular directed that where possible the victim should not be required to make a 
formal complaint, or give evidence in court, unless such evidence was necessary to avoid collapse 
of the prosecution.6  The first survey of this policy change showed nation wide inconsistencies in 
its application and research commissioned by the Victims Task Force also found gaps in its 
implementation.7  The policy was not articulated in subsequent updates although legal materials 
indicate its ongoing relevance.8  By contrast, legal academics continued to promote the view that 
arresting the batterer would, in many cases, be an unacceptable criminal justice response.  One 
leading family law text observed that '[i]f tempers have already cooled, no matter how serious and 
recent the violence, an arrest may be inappropriate or indeed provocative'.9   
 
                                                 
4  Sergeant JJ Taylor, 'Intervention Into Family Violence by New Zealand Police' in Jon Patrick, Helen Foster and 
Brian Tapper (eds), Successful Practice in Family Violence in New Zealand (1997) 99, 99. 
5   New Zealand Committee of Inquiry into Violence, Report (1987) 96, 101. 
6   Police Commissioner, 'Domestic Dispute Policy Changes', Commissioner's Circular, 1987/11. 
7   Ruth Busch, Neville Robertson, and Hilary Lapsley, Domestic Violence and the Justice System: A Study of  
Breaches of Protection Orders (1992). 
8   Dick Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand (11th ed, 2003) vol 2, 1431, noting that '[u]nder more recent policy, 
the police will arrest and charge the perpetrator without the victim's laying a complaint'.  The authors cite 'Husband 
and Wife' The Laws of New Zealand (para 66) as authority for this proposition. 
9     P R Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand (5th ed, 1992) 7510 (emphasis added). 
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Following recommendations from the 'Bristol Report',10 and the report of the Victims' Task 
Force,11 the Domestic Violence Act 1995 took effect on 1 July 1996.  Police policy was updated to 
coincide with the introduction of the Act.  Except in 'exceptional circumstances' offenders are to 
be arrested, and where action other than arrest is contemplated, the officer's supervisor must be 
consulted.  This policy is described as 'pro-arrest'.12  The discretion whether to arrest has been 
more strictly curtailed in US jurisdictions requiring mandatory arrest of offenders.13  Paula Martin 
observes that when arguing for or against mandatory arrest, it is important to be clear about the 
objectives it is hoped will be achieved.   
 
[D]oes mandatory arrest aim to prevent reoffending by those people arrested or is it more of a 
general deterrent to the population as a whole?  The conference expanded on this by questioning 
whether the policy should be addressing total cessation of violence or time-limited cessation, i.e. 
time to failure should also be built in as an outcome measure.14 
  
However, the Domestic Abuse Intervention Project in Duluth, Minnesota, (DAIP) focuses on 
consistent responses which centralise victim safety.  Ellen Pence and Coral McDonnell point out 
that if success is measured by counting arrests and conviction rates, or a reduction of the repeat 
cases entering the system, rather than on building safety considerations into the infrastructure, the 
system can actually become more harmful to victims.15   
 
A significant change in attitude was necessary for New Zealand police to move from a policy of 
mediation to one of presumptive arrest.16  In 1999, the Ministry of Justice noted that the re-
emphasis in 1993 of police domestic violence policy requiring that where sufficient evidence 
existed, in the absence of exceptional circumstances offenders should be arrested, was likely 
linked to a sharp rise in charges resulting in conviction in 1994.  However, the steady decline in 
                                                 
10   Sir Ronald Davison, Report of Inquiry Into Family Court Proceedings Involving Christine Madeline Marion 
Bristol and Alan Robert Bristol: Report to the Minister of Justice (1994). 
11     Busch, Robertson, and Lapsley, above n 7. 
12   Paula Martin, '4th International Family Violence Research Conference' [1995] Social Policy Journal of New 
Zealand 181, 182. 
13    Vito Ciraco, 'Fighting Domestic Violence With Mandatory Arrest, Are We Winning?:  An Analysis In New 
Jersey' (2001) 22 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 169, 182, notes police still have discretion in determining probable cause.  
Ciraco divides the states with mandatory arrest laws into three categories based on the statutory threshold required for 
arrest. 
14     Martin, above n 12, 182. 
15     Ellen Pence and Coral McDonnell, 'Developing Policies and Protocols in Duluth, Minnesota' in Jalna Hanmer and 
Catherine Itzen (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice A Reader 
(2000) 249, 249. 
16     Sergeant Taylor, above n 4, 100. 
 93
conviction rates for domestic assaults since 1995 may indicate that police have become less 
vigorous in implementing police policy, 'including a greater tendency to document attendances 
without making an arrest'.17  Subsequent research finding variable enforcement of the legislation 
by police personnel who sometimes lacked knowledge of either the remedies available or of how 
best to manage domestic violence complaints, particularly where a culture existed that was 
unsupportive of the 1995 Act,18 provides some support for this observation.  
 
B   The Prosecution 
During the period of the present research, s 5 of the Evidence Act 1908 provided that the spouse of 
a person charged with an offence was not a compellable witness for the prosecution.  In early 
cases, the rationale for upholding a husband's privilege to prevent his wife from testifying against 
him was the biblical concept of 'one mind, one flesh'.  The policy later came to be justified in 
terms of a unity of interest between husband and wife.19  William Blackstone notes husband and 
wife were not permitted to give evidence for or against each other 'partly because it is impossible 
their testimony should be indifferent; but principally because of the union of person'.20   
 
The modern rationale of spousal non-compellability has been described as the need 'to lessen the 
danger of dissension in the home and disturbance of the peace within families'.21  Strong 
condemnation of attempts to punish women who refuse to testify against violent men22 apparently 
produced a de facto policy of non-compellability in relation to unmarried victims.23   Since the 
state has responsibility for prosecutions, and victims of crime are not usually given the choice 
whether to give evidence, this intervention model permits dismissal of charges in the face of 
evidence the defendant committed a crime - but only in domestic violence cases.  
 
                                                 
17    Ministry of Justice, Responses to Crime: Annual Review 1999 (1999) 30.   
18    Helena Barwick, Alison Gray and Roger Macky, Domestic Violence Act 1995: Process Evaluation (2000) 87. 
19    Judge David Harvey, 'Spousal Non-Compellability' [1997] NZLJ 114, 115.  
20    William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (16th ed, 1825) vol 1, 443. 
21    R v M-T [2003] 1 NZLR 63, 65 (CA). 
22   The decision in R v Renshaw, The Times, 23 June 1989, to sentence a young woman complainant to seven days 
imprisonment for refusing to give evidence against her violent partner attracted strong criticism in the UK. 
23   Judge David Harvey, above n 19, 114, citing R v Burgess Unreported, Williamson J, 18 February 1992, where the 
witness was excused as parties had reconciled, were cohabiting, had a family, and were attempting to develop a 
meaningful relationship.  
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The Evidence Act 2006 abolishes spousal non-compellability.24  As it went to the Select 
Committee, the Bill provided a discretion for judges to excuse spouses, de facto partners and civil 
union couples from giving evidence if such evidence would cause undue damage to the 
relationship.  That exception was removed by the Select Committee.  Although the New Zealand 
Law Commission has recognised that the public interest in prosecuting perpetrators of domestic 
violence must be balanced with the need to protect victims who testify from retaliatory violence,25 
the Act promotes the former public interest, but is silent as to the latter.  Given research showing 
an elevated risk to women who seek formal interventions to stop the violence, statutory 
intervention is recommended to ensure that the present emphasis on the duty of the citizen in a 
civilised society to be available to give evidence26 is accompanied by a reciprocal commitment to 
ensuring that this civic duty can be safely discharged.27   
 
C   The Courts 
Contrary to an apparently widespread belief that New Zealand domestic violence policy and 
legislation is punitive in nature,28 legal responses to this social problem are set within a therapeutic 
paradigm.  The Domestic Violence Act 1995 has a strong rehabilitative focus, reflecting a 
preference in society and among the legal community for counselling over incapacitation or 
deterrence through punishment.29   Domestic violence victims may apply for a protection order 
directing the respondent not to engage in further abusive behaviours.  The legislation provides a 
police power of arrest for breach of the injunction, with counselling and treatment as the preferred 
sentencing response.  Offenders are court-mandated into group environments in which new ways 
of dealing with anger and more egalitarian concepts of intimate heterosexual relationships are 
taught.30  
 
                                                 
24   Section 71 provides that any person is eligible to give evidence, and a person who is eligible to give evidence is 
compellable to give that evidence. 
25    New Zealand Law Commission, Evidence, Report 55, Vol 1 (1999) 93.   
26    See, eg, Judge David Harvey, above n 19, 117.  
27    See, discussion below, at p 325. 
28   See, eg, John Braithwaite and Heather Strang, 'Restorative Justice and Family Violence' in Heather Strang and 
John Braithwaite (eds) Restorative Justice and Family Violence (2002) 1, 17 noting that advocates of restorative 
justice frequently caricature the criminal law response to domestic violence offenders as punitive and stigmatizing, 
when the reality is that rehabilitation is a much more predominant response than punishment.  
29    See, eg, Judith Martin, et al, 'Attitudes to Reducing Violence towards Women: Punishment or Prevention?' (1993) 
106 New Zealand Medical Journal 115.  Barwick, Gray and Macky, above n 18, found judges, court staff, lawyers and 
police approved of the rehabilitative focus of the New Zealand legislation. 
30   See, eg, Sally Merry, 'Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women's Human Rights to 
Protection' (2003) 25 Hum.Rts.Q. 343, 365, for discussion of these programmes. 
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However, batterer treatment is also the route by which dangerous men may persuade female 
partners to return to them.31  A temporary separation is a common response to a battering incident 
and if the batterer expresses regret, promises to reform, and enters a treatment programme, his 
partner is likely to decide the relationship is worth another try.32  Consequently, programme 
providers and probation officers in the US note the importance of locating education and treatment 
within the criminal justice sector as this allows for intensive monitoring to ensure abusers 
complete treatment programmes, and sanctions to secure their continuing participation.33  
 
By contrast, research indicates that recognition of the need to promote victim safety through 
monitoring and sanctioning of offenders who fail to attend programmes or who are unremittingly 
disruptive during the programme itself is missing from New Zealand legal interventions.  Research 
found only about a third of offenders referred to programmes actually completed them.  
Prosecutions for non-attendance were not generally pursued with enthusiasm.34  While in some 
cases there were valid reasons for non-attendance, in many cases there was no obvious reason for 
failure to attend, yet no action had been taken by criminal justice agencies.  This was due in part 
because of the time required to prepare a file for prosecution, and in part because staff were 
discouraged from pursuing respondents who failed to attend treatment programmes when they saw 
the sanctions handed down by judges.35   
 
Given overseas evidence that the effectiveness of batterer treatment depends upon the quality of 
force that supports it,36 these findings raise grave concerns regarding the ability of legal 
interventions to enhance victim safety by holding batterers accountable.  Indeed, the decision in 
Police v Tapsell37 supports UK research indicating that the more contact domestic abusers have 
with the criminal justice system, the more sophisticated they become in their offending, and in 
                                                 
31   US programme providers Russell P Dobash, et al, 'Confronting Violent Men' in Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzin 
(eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice (2000) 289, 304, observe 
that men who enter voluntary counselling because they want their partners to return, or because they fear they will 
leave them, drop out once they have secured their partner's 'co-operation'.   
32   Edward Gondolf and Ellen Fisher, Battered Women as Survivors: An Alternative to Treating Learned Helplessness 
(1988) 77-87. 
33    Kerry Healey, Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal 
Justice Strategies (1998) 94. 
34    Barwick, Gray and Macky, above n 18. 
35    Ibid 91-96. 
36    Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 33, 80. 
37    (Unreported, High Court, Dunedin, Hansen J, 25 August 2004).   
 96
getting away with it.38  In Tapsell, the offender was convicted of indecent assault, intentional 
damage, and male assaults a female in relation to offending against his then partner.  He was 
sentenced to 200 hours community work, concurrent on each charge.  The Crown appealed on the 
basis that the sentence was manifestly inadequate and wrong in principle.  The offender had over 
100 prior criminal convictions and the pre-sentence report indicated that he had been discharged 
from a Stopping Violence programme because of his disruptive behaviour.  The report writer held 
little hope for an improvement in the offender's behaviour.39  The judge noted the Crown argument  
 
that the primary focus on sentencing in this case must be the protection of the victim, deterrence 
and denunciation.  He said this is because of the widespread violence and assaults upon females 
and the criticisms of both the police and the Court in having a too lenient approach to sentencing in 
this area.  He said the personal circumstances of the offender and the need for rehabilitation must 
be secondary but submitted that a man with over 100 criminal convictions had no realistic prospect 
of reform.40  
 
Acknowledging that the sentence was 'clearly very lenient'; the judge held it was not manifestly 
unjust.  The appeal was dismissed.  No reference is made to the sanctions, if any, imposed as a 
result of the offender's failure to complete the Stopping Violence programme.   
 
One commentator observes that perceptions of criminality and degrees of blameworthiness may be 
expressed, not through legislation, but in the sentences that judges impose.41  Given evidence that 
batterer treatment programmes are limited in their ability to change batterers,42 especially in the 
case of recidivist offenders,43 in the absence of accountability, a clear framework for interventions, 
                                                 
38    Metropolitan Police Service, Getting Away With It: A Strategic Overview of Domestic Violence Sexual Assault 
and 'Serious' Incident Analysis (2004) 8. 
39   Police v Tapsell (Unreported, High Court, Dunedin, Hansen J, 25 August 2004) [13]. 
40   Ibid [14]. 
41   Helene Carbonatto, 'Dilemmas in the Criminalisation of Spousal Abuse'[1994] Social Policy Journal of New 
Zealand 21, 27. 
42   David Adams, 'The Emerge Program' in Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzin (eds), Home Truths About Domestic 
Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice (2000) 310, 321.   
43  Richard Johnson, 'Intensive Probation for Domestic Violence Offenders' (2001) 65 Federal Probation 36.   
Maryann Syers and Jeffrey Edleson, 'The Combined Effects of Coordinated Criminal Justice Intervention in Woman 
Abuse' in Karen Maschke, The Legal Response to Violence Against Women (1997) 286, 296, note that the most potent 
police visit is the first one - it is the combination of first visit during which an arrest is made, followed by court-
mandated treatment that appears to be the best predictor of lower recidivism rates. 
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and a meaningful response from the courts, the present treatment prescription may simply offer 
another false hope to women, thereby exposing them to further danger.44   
 
III   RETURNING THE FOCUS TO DECRIMINALISATION: THE RULE OF LOVE 
A  The Transition from a Rule of Force to a Rule of Love 
'Far from protecting women from it the law historically sanctioned the abuse of women within 
marriage as an aspect of the husband's ownership of his wife and his "right" to chastise her.'45  
Under the doctrine of coverture, by entering into marriage, the wife's legal status as a married 
woman was reduced to 'either none or no more than halfe a person'.46  Blackstone explained: 
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal existence 
of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into 
that of the husband: under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything; and is 
therefore called in our law - French a feme-covert…and her condition during her marriage is called 
her coverture.47 
 
Frances Dolan notes that coverture, both as the collection of restrictions imposed on married 
women, and as the figurative notion that the wife is 'covered' by her husband, was always 
understood as a strategy designed to overcome, in the husband's favour, the dilemma of who 
should have legal responsibility within the partnership of marriage.  'Lawyers and judges used 
marital unity as a legal fiction, that is, as a set of imaginary "facts" created to achieve a legal 
result.'48  Early male legal theorists expressly justified unequal allocation of legal power between 
husband and wife on the basis of men's greater capacity to use force to achieve dominance over 
women.49  Since the wife's property effectively passed into her husband's hands upon marriage, 
Ngaire Naffine observes that the married woman was deprived of the economic independence 
necessary to effectively challenge her husband's authority.50  This legal subjection of the wife to 
                                                 
44    See, eg, Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 33, 59. 
45    Lavallee v R [1990] 1 SCR 852, 872 per Wilson J. 
46   Francis Dolan, 'Battered Women, Petty Traitors and the Legacy of Coverture' (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 249, 255, 
citing The Lawes Resolutions of Women's Rights: or The Lawes Provision for Woemen, compiled by I.L. and revised 
by T.E. (London, 1632) sigs I7, B2v.  Dolan notes the most thorough discussion of authorship favours Thomas Edgar 
(1602-1692): at 274, n13. 
47    Blackstone, above n 20, (emphasis in original). 
48    Dolan, above n 46, 257. 
49   Ian Leader-Elliott, 'Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation' in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary 
Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997) 149, 165. 
50    Ngaire Naffine, 'Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape' (1994) 57 MLR 10, 19. 
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the rule of her husband conferred a state-sanctioned license upon husbands to beat, rape, and 
terrorise their wives.    
 
English common law adopted an amended version of the Roman doctrine of patria potestas which 
gave a husband the right to 'unrestrained physical chastisement' of his wife.51  Removing the 
power of life and death,52 common law allowed for 'subtle' or 'domestic' chastisement of wives.53  
One of the earliest clear authorities for a husband's right to beat and in some cases imprison his 
wife is set out in a published manual of procedure in 1516.54  In Sir Thomas Seymore's Case the 
majority held that a wife could have no remedy at common law against a husband who beat and 
threatened her for she was sub virga viri, that is, under the rod of her husband.55  The level of 
cruelty required to obtain a magistrate's order was high.  The violence had to be 'persistent' and a 
wife could not complain of assaults she had 'condoned':  'Reaching the end of her tether after a 
long history of assaults, covered up or forgiven in the vain hope of improvement, she would have 
to wait for a fresh incident to give grounds for relief.'56   
 
Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett observe that the most insidious concept of all to emerge from 
the cruelty cases was the doctrine of provocation.  This doctrine prevented a wife from obtaining a 
divorce for cruelty unless it appeared that 'she was a person of good temper and had always 
behaved well and dutifully to her husband'.  In the leading case of its time, Sir William Scott in 
Waring v Waring explained:  
 
                                                 
51  J David Hirschel, et al, 'Review Essay on the Law Enforcement Response to Spouse Abuse: Past, Present, and 
Future' (1992) 9 Just.Q. 247, 250. 
52  G Kristian Miccio, 'With all Due Deliberate Care: Using International Law and the Federal Violence Against 
Women Act to Locate the Contours of State Responsibility for Violence Against Women' [1998] Col.Hum.R.L.Rev. 
641, n 22 explains that under ancient Roman law 'the authority to rule within the familias gave the patriarch complete 
control over wife and children.  The father could sell his children into slavery, withhold or give consent to marriage 
and order divorce.  Additionally, the father was vested with the authority to order his wife put to death if she 
committed adultery'. 
53   Ibid, noting that Blackstone's references to 'subtle chastisement' and 'domestic chastisement' suggest the physical 
force inflicted on wives fell short of beating, but nothing could be further from the truth.  'Husbands were permitted to 
inflict injury upon their wives as long as the resulting harm was not life threatening.  Conduct that resulted in black 
eyes, welts, and split lips constituted no violation of law.  Such beatings were inflicted with impunity and beyond the 
purview of the state'. 
54    Maeve Doggett, Marriage, Wife-Beating and the Law in Victorian England (1992) 4-5, notes a writ of supplicavit 
was available from the Court of Chancery and the King's Bench to the wives of violent husbands which contained the 
proviso that the husband 'should not do, nor procure to be done, any Damage or Evil to her of her Body, otherwise 
than what reasonably belongs to her Husband, for the Sake of Government and Chastisement of his wife lawfully…'.  
This proviso was decisive in Sir Thomas Seymore's Case. 
55    Godb. 215; 72 ER 966. 
56    Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law (1984) 128. 
 99
I do not mean by this that every slight failure on the part of the wife is to be visited with 
intemperate violence on the part of the husband…But if the conduct of the wife is inconsistent with 
the duties of that character, and provokes the just indignation of the husband, and causes danger to 
her person, she must seek the remedy for that evil, so provoked, in the change of her own 
manners.57 
 
Although as Dolan points out, it was only gradually acknowledged that husbands could be tyrants, 
it had long been feared that wives could be traitors.  A statute of 1352 defined husband killing as 
warranting a charge of treason.  Women who killed their husbands were convicted of petit treason 
and burned alive.  Husbands who killed wives were guilty only of murder as 'there is subjection 
due from the wife to the husband, but not e converse'.58  Even a legally separated wife could be 
found guilty of treason and burnt at the stake.59  Dolan notes that many of the documented 
accounts of petit treason narrate a history of domestic violence against the wife.  However a 
history of battering was not taken as justifying, or even explaining, a wife's murder of her 
husband.60   
 
Naffine observes that a further violence was done to the wife that was explicitly sexual.  The law 
of primogeniture, which ensured the passage of property to the eldest son of the marriage upon the 
death of the husband and father, was concerned with 'posterity and the family lineage':   
 
For this law to work…it was vital that the law recognise the male right of control over (the fertility 
of) his wife.  The husband had to have access to her reproductive body as well as the right to 
exclude all others from her body (for he had to know that his sons were his)…The legal fiction 
employed to guarantee this right was to treat a woman's consent to marriage as much the same 
thing as consent to intercourse (with her husband)…Once married, the wife was therefore presumed 
to have consented to every act of intercourse with her husband: a married woman had no right to 
refuse the proposal to be possessed.61  
 
Women's activism threw doubts on the legitimacy of gender status laws and brought pressure to 
bear on lawmakers and legal elites.  Blackstone's commentaries on the doctrine of chastisement 
                                                 
57    Ibid 129 citing (1813) 2 Hagg. Con. 153. 
58   Leader-Elliott, above n 49, 164, citing Mathew Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown (3rd ed, 1800) Vol 1, 
380. 
59    Dolan, above, n 46, 261. 
60    Ibid 269. 
61    Naffine, above n 50, 19.  
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were relegated to an era where society was 'much more rude' and in 1871, a US Court observed 
that a husband's 'privilege, ancient though it be, to beat [his wife] with a stick, to pull her hair, 
choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not 
now acknowledged by our law'.62    
 
Nevertheless, the historian Reva Siegal notes that when gender status laws are challenged,  
 
legal elites may begin to cede status privileges, but they will also defend them.  They will initially 
defend privileges within the traditional rhetoric of the status regime - but because the traditional 
rhetoric of the status regime is now socially contested, they will begin to search for 'new reasons' to 
justify such status privileges as they choose to defend.  As reform of the common law marital status 
rules illustrates, this process of ceding and defending status privileges will result in changes in the 
constitutive rules of the regime and its justificatory rhetoric - with the result that, over time, status 
relationships will be translated from an older, socially contested idiom into a newer more 
acceptable idiom.  In short, civil rights reform …does not simply abolish a status regime; in 
important respects, it modernizes the rules and rhetoric through which status relations are enforced 
and justified.63 
 
Accordingly, when judges stopped insisting upon a husband's legal prerogative to beat his wife, 
they began to declare that criminal law should not intervene in domestic violence in order to 
protect the privacy of marriage and promote domestic harmony.  'Once translated from an 
antiquated to a more contemporary gender idiom, the state's justification for treating wife beating 
differently from other kinds of assault seemed reasonable in ways the law of chastisement did 
not.'64  Although judges often discussed the affective life of marriage as if it were normatively 
'outside' of law, Siegal notes that in practice, judges acted creatively and synthetically to bind 
privacy to violence and so preserve the chastisement prerogative.65   
 
This construction of affective privacy transformed the doctrine of chastisement by preserving the 
husband's marital prerogative in a new juridical form - as legal immunities.  'In 1957 the then 
Master of the Rolls warned of the dangers of intervening between husband and wife: "among 
                                                 
62   Reva Siegel, "'The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy' (1996) 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2135, 
citing Fulgam 46 Ala. 143 (1871). 
63    Ibid 2179. 
64    Ibid 2120. 
65    Ibid 2183. 
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themselves they can claim a kind of sacred protection behind the door of the family home which, 
generally speaking, the civil law may not penetrate".'66  A policy of non-intervention in domestic 
violence persisted far into the twentieth century and was reflected inter alia in the barring of 
married women's tort claims against violent husbands, and the immunity of husbands from 
prosecution for raping their wives.67  If the husband's violence was kept out of the public realm, it 
would properly be forgiven by the altruistic wife.  As one legal scholar explained:  'The rule of 
love has superseded the rule of force'.68 
 
B   The Rule of Love in Contemporary Interventions 
Ian Leader-Elliott observes that society has inherited from the doctrines of marital unity and 
chastisement an unspoken assumption that marriage and equivalent relationships are enclaves 
within which the usual rules relating to violence do not apply.69  Although societal acceptance that 
the infliction of violence by one partner against the other is not inconsistent with a loving 
relationship appears contrary to the focus in national domestic violence policy on 'healthy gender 
roles' and 'non-violent concepts of masculinity',70 as discussed throughout this research, this 
assumption pervades criminal law responses to violence in intimate relationships.  
 
Consistent with national domestic violence policy, a recent world conference on family violence 
also focused on male sex-role stereotypes and cultural images of masculinity.71  However, the 
female counterpart to the domestically violent male is rarely the subject of inquiry.  Naffine notes 
the Romantic ideal of womanhood is that of 'complete devotion…with soul and body' to the man.  
The woman 'who devotes herself completely to a man, "becomes a more perfect woman"'.72  
Interviews with battered women reveal discourses of 'perfect love' can bind women in 
relationships with battering men and impede attempts by others to intervene.73   Since the power 
                                                 
66    Atkins and Hoggett, above n 56, 133. 
67   The Crimes Amendment Act 1985 repealed the former s 128(4) Crimes Act 1961 which contained the immunity 
rule. 
68     Siegel, above n 62, 2170.  
69     Leader-Elliott, above n 49, 165. 
70     Ministry of Social Development, above n 2, 14. 
71   Janine Moss, 'World Conference on Family Violence: Sharing Solutions, Changing the World' [1999] Social 
Policy Journal 172, 175-176.  Since there were probably fewer than 40 males among the 450 conference delegates, it 
may be premature to assume a universal or even widespread acknowledgement of the need to challenge physically and 
sexually aggressive male stereotypes.  
72    Naffine, above n 50, 13, citing Friedrich Nietzche, The Gay Science, Translated, with Commentary, by Walter 
Kaufmann (1974) 319 (emphasis in original). 
73    Alison Towns and Peter Adams, '"If I Really Loved Him Enough, He Would Be OK": Women's Accounts of Male 
Partner Violence' (2000) 6 Violence Against Women 558, 566. 
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of perfect love to transform or redeem the loved one is axiomatic to depictions of perfect love, 
these discourses script women to love better to stop their male partner's violence.  Jealousy and 
possessiveness may be reinterpreted as placing an onus on the woman to avoid attracting the 
attention of other men, thereby restricting her freedom of expression and association.  There may 
also be 'a seductive invitation to the woman to forgive a man who is so powerfully afflicted by his 
love for her that he is at times driven "berserk" to use violence against her'.74  
 
This cultural equation of male jealousy/possessiveness with romantic love is also evident in Case 
Study D/99/11(S).  The couple in this case separated following alleged assaults by the offender on 
his partner who took out a protection order.  While on bail on the assault charges, the offender 
sought out his estranged partner in breach of his bail conditions.  Finding her with another man, he 
attacked the woman, threatened her with a knife and left the house with the couple's 10-month old 
child, still wielding the knife.  He was shot by police.  At depositions, with her baby daughter 
playing at her feet, the woman reportedly gave evidence of her partner's attack on her, his threats 
to kill, and how he had tied her up on the day of the shooting.  Informing the Court that she wished 
to reconcile with the offender and did not want him imprisoned, the woman stated:  'I know that 
deep down [the offender] didn't want to hurt me.  He was just…showing me who was boss'.75    
 
Two apparently opposing views of female love in the face of male aggression can be contrasted.  
An Auckland psychologist is reported as suggesting that women have traditionally mistaken male 
aggressiveness and bullying with strength or charisma:  '[A] lot of women kid themselves with 
"naïve idealism"…It's that belief that underneath that rough exterior is a heart of gold - "he might 
have shot a few people, but its because no one loved him and I can provide all that now"…it's 
those mothering, nurturing traits that should be saved for our children'.76  By contrast, Nan 
Seuffert argues that psychological discourses of female love in the face of horrific abuse fail to 
acknowledge ambiguities and complexities in relationships and discount battered women's 
heroism.77  
 
                                                 
74    Ibid. 
75   The sentencing judge noted that he had been swayed inter alia by the victim's attitude and expressed his regret that 
under home invasion legislation he was unable to impose a lesser sentence. 
76    Allure of the Bad Boy Proves Hard to Resist, Truth, 30 March 2001. 
77    Nan Seuffert, 'Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love, and Complex Personhood in the Law' (1999) 23 
MULR 211. 
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Although Seuffert's analysis implies some criticism of feminist activists who 'are uncomfortable 
with, or embarrassed for, women who state that they love their abusers',78 other legal scholars 
suggest that in the present system of gender inequality, 'romantic love plays an apologetic role; it 
mystifies women about their dependency on men and reinforces male hegemony'.79  Alison Young 
observes that: 
 
Just as it is possible to argue that the legal construction of marriage permits a degree of violence to 
be perpetrated on the wife by the husband, so it can be said that contemporary elaboration of the 
nature of romantic love contains within it the potential for precisely the kind of reactions that lead 
to the battered woman being categorized as having a psychiatric disorder.80 
 
The present research found Seuffert's contention that 'when a woman states in court that she loves, 
or loved, an abusive partner, the court has no jurisdiction to hear her statement and no lens of 
precedent through which to reflect and refract this love'81 needs refining.  While courts may be 
unable 'to hear the claims of love made by women who have killed abusive partners',82 courts have 
little difficulty validating, even valorising women's protestations of love and pleas for leniency 
when mitigating the sentences of their batterers.83  These expressions of love and pleas for 
leniency frequently occur in the context of gross violence toward the female victim.  
 
In Case Study D/97/1(S), the sentencing judge noted that despite evidence at depositions from a 
gynaecologist who described the victim's  'horrific' genital injuries as 'the worst he'd seen in 25 
years', the woman had minimised the extent of her suffering, forgiven the offender, and the couple 
were planning a new life together.  In Case Study T/97/2(S), the offender was convicted of 
disfiguring his partner with reckless disregard after he set her alight.  Defence counsel stated that 
the offender had acted in the 'heat of the moment' during a serious domestic dispute.  The couple 
                                                 
78      Ibid 212. 
79   Francis Olsen, 'The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform' in Patricia Smith (ed), 
Feminist Jurisprudence (1993) 65, 86. 
80    Alison Young, 'Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis' (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
761, 805. 
81     Seuffert, above n 77, 235. 
82     Ibid 232. 
83    Geoff Hall, 'Victim Impact Statements: Sentencing on Thin Ice?' (1992) 15 NZULR 143, 158-161 notes that the 
weight to be attached to victim impact statements under s 8 of the Victims of Offences Act 1987 was earlier considered 
in Lowe v Police (1988) 3 CRNZ 199.  While the Court in Lowe held this legislation did not require courts to 
surrender their responsibility to impose the appropriate sentence, in R v B, (Unreported, High Court, Dunedin, Smellie 
J, 14 June 1989) Smellie J noted that while it would ordinarily be quite inappropriate for a victim to suggest the 
punishment to be imposed, 'the one exception to that is where the victim volunteers a plea of clemency or 
compassion'.  Such pleas are a notorious feature of domestic violence cases.   
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were reconciled and now wanted to support each other and look after their child.  In Case Study 
K/97/3(S), the victim was punched in the face, dragged through a car window, punched, kicked 
and her throat cut with a butcher's knife.  Police stated that the wound 'came within a whisker' of 
hitting a main artery.  The couple married 20 days after the assault.  The victim told the Court that 
the offender 'was the only man she had ever loved'.84    
 
In Case Study K/00/6(S), the judge granted leave to apply for home detention to an offender who 
beat his partner, and kicked her in the face with his steel-capped boots so hard that one of her eyes 
fell out.  The sentencing judge stated that he had taken into account the fact that the victim 'was 
still with [the offender], still loved him and wanted him back'.  In Case Study G/05/1(S), the victim 
received multiple stab wounds to her throat, body, legs and hands.  The attack left her 
'permanently scarred and disabled'.  Defence counsel acknowledged that 'the assault was horrible.  
The injuries were awful'.  However, the woman refused to make a statement, or appear in court to 
testify against the offender and prepared an affidavit about their relationship in his favour.  
Although the Crown argued that this could be seen as the act of a dependent battered woman 
whose real need was to be protected, the sentencing judge stated that the only mitigating factors 
saving the offender from a longer jail term were the victim's support and the offender's remorse.85     
 
                                                 
84    See, also, Case Study H/08/6(S) where the judge described 'an appallingly terrifying series of events' in which the 
victim was grabbed and thrown onto the bed, pulled by the hair, grabbed by the ears, and verbally abused.  She was 
then pinned against the wall with the offender's forearm across her throat, had her head banged against the wall several 
times and was head-butted.  Following this, she was taken to a local reserve where the offender again took her by the 
ears and banged her head into the ground, tearing two earring studs from her right ear.  Later that morning, he 
assaulted her again, throwing food at her, picking her up and throwing her to the ground, ripping her dress and spitting 
on her.  The judge noted that although the victim had suffered terribly at the hands of the offender, she still wanted the 
relationship to continue.  In Case Study N/01/23(S the offender was convicted of rape, unlawful sexual connection, 
and breach of a protection order in relation to his partner.   The sentencing judge noted that the victim still loved the 
offender and they had resumed a relationship.  The woman wanted to protect her partner, particularly as they had 
children together.   
85     In Case Study W/08/5(S) the offender was convicted on four charges of injuring with intent to injure and one of 
cruelty to an animal.  The judge stated that he was sorry to have to read out the details of these assaults but the 
offender had to face the cruelty he had engaged in.  In the first incident the offender slashed his wife's hand with a 
knife.  In the second, without warning, the offender 'drove her head-first into a wall, causing severe concussion.  The 
woman was left with vision problems'.  In the third, the offender 'hit the woman across the back of a leg with a sword.  
A few moments later he slashed her across the face with the blade, opening a gash across her nose'.  In the fourth, the 
offender 'began punching the woman and when she retaliated he threw a knife at her, swung the sword at her again, 
head butted her and put her in a headlock.  She escaped only after [the offender] had slammed her head-first against a 
wall'.  The judge noted that on this occasion the woman was found to have injuries to her head, arms, legs, chest and 
face.  The offender was also convicted of kicking a two month-old terrier pup with his steel-capped boots breaking the 
dog's hind leg.  Defence counsel stated that the offender and his 'now pregnant 18 year-old partner' were reconciled.  
The offender's sentence was described by the sentencing judge as 'appropriate' given his remorse and his wife's wish to 
resume their relationship.  Later that year the offender was convicted of attempting to procure the murder of the police 
officer who arrested him.  
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Abusers were also congratulated as 'lucky' or 'fortunate' to have such a forgiving partner or spouse.  
In Case Study T/99/8(S), the offender, who was fined after punching his partner in the face and 
locking her out of her home, was described by the sentencing judge as 'lucky your partner 
continues to support you'.   In Case Study C/99/8, police personnel watched the woman victim exit 
the passenger door of a car and fall to the ground.  The offender exited the car and assaulted her, 
stopping only when police dragged him away.  Following his assault conviction, the offender was 
discharged.  The sentencing judge noted that the offender was 'fortunate' his partner had written to 
the court on his behalf.    
 
Notwithstanding earlier legal commentary suggesting that victims' pleas for leniency are irrelevant 
on appeal,86 the New Zealand Court of Appeal has acknowledged the relevance of victim 
forgiveness when discounting an abuser's sentence.  In Case Study P/99/10(S), the offender was 
convicted of attempting to procure the murder of his partner.  The intended victim stated that 'she 
had no fear of [the offender] and wanted him to return to her as soon as possible'.  When reducing 
the offender's sentence, the Court of Appeal noted that:  'A sentence of two and a half years will in 
all the circumstances, including the unusual feature of the intended victim's attitude and desire to 
retain her relationship with the appellant, meet the overall ends of justice'.87  Subsequently this 
offender was convicted of attempting to procure the murder of his former wife in order to collect 
her life insurance.  This second intended victim stated that she had been 'an absolute fool' to ignore 
signs that the offender was trying to kill her, including the fact that he had planted petrol filled 
containers around their home.88     
                                                 
86   Geoff Hall, 'Sentencing (I): Matters of Aggravation and Mitigation' [1985] NZLJ 139, 142, stating: 'A plea for 
mercy by the victim of an offence, after sentence has been imposed, is a matter that should not be considered by an 
appellate Court: R v Pritchard (1973) 57 Cr App R 492.  A complainant's subsequent attitude to the degree of sentence 
is an irrelevant consideration: R v Hampton [1965] Crim LR 564'. 
87    R v P [1999] CA 202/99 (Unreported, Henry, Anderson and Robertson JJ, 28 July 1999) [10]. 
88   See, also, Case Study M/06/4(S) where the offender's partner informed him that she wanted to end their two and a 
half year relationship and refused to leave a bar with him.  The offender responded by throwing beer at a man whom 
he believed was romantically interested in his partner.  When his partner tried to prevent him from throwing the bottle, 
the offender picked up a piece of broken glass from the floor, dragged the woman by the hair and slashed her face with 
the glass.  She was cut from her mouth to her ear and required 60 stitches to her face.  A witness later stated that the 
offender then wrapped his legs around the woman's neck and tried to choke her.  The witness said he tried various 
ways learned after 14 years' experience as a prison officer to break the offender's hold on the woman.  In the end, he 
'grabbed his private parts and lifted him off the woman'.  A barman also gave evidence that the offender deliberately 
slashed the woman's face.  Subsequently, both the victim and the offender claimed the victim's injuries were 
accidental.  The jury convicted the offender of wounding the woman with intent to injure and he was sentenced to two 
and a half years' imprisonment.  On appeal the Court of Appeal in R v M [1997] CA 128/97 (Unreported, Eichelbaum 
CJ, Henry and Heron JJ, 23 September 1997) [3-4], reduced the sentence by six months noting that the judge had 
given insufficient weight to the punishment the offender received by virtue of the loss of his career as a soldier.  The 
offender had benefited from an anger management course and the offender and victim had reconciled.  While the 
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A sentencing policy which provides offenders with an incentive to manipulate or coerce victims so 
as to influence the disposition of their cases is inconsistent with New Zealand Family Violence 
Prevention Strategy aimed at consistent, comprehensive legal intervention89 and batterer 
accountability.90  Sentences may differ according to the different attitudes of domestic violence 
victims.  The policy may also create different sentencing regimes for the same acts of violence 
depending upon the status of victims and offenders as intimate partners or strangers.  'In other 
words, will the status of the victim as wife or de facto spouse, rather than a stranger, be more 
relevant in sentencing than the actus reus of the offence?'91   
 
C   Battered Wives versus Battered Mothers: What's Love Got To Do With It? 
Under the Domestic Violence Act 1995 violence in the presence of children constitutes an act of 
psychological abuse.92  In the UK, the law was clarified in 2005 to require courts to consider the 
harm to children of witnessing violence against another person.93  However, the present research 
found the impact of violence on children was not generally acknowledged when courts refused to 
allow a case to proceed without the victim's participation,94 or mitigated the sentences of batterers 
based on the attitudes of their victims.95  Nor did the judicial response to offenders who launched 
attacks upon women who were holding young children appear especially denunciatory.96  As 
                                                                                                                                                                
wishes of domestic violence victims should be treated with 'considerable reserve' they should not be entirely 
discounted in this case.     
89    Ministry of Social Development, above n 2, 13, 16. 
90    Ibid 12. 
91   Ruth Busch, 'Was Mrs Masina Really "Lost"?:  An Analysis of New Zealand Judges' Attitudes Towards Domestic 
Violence' (1993) 8 OLR 17, 40. 
92    Section 3. 
93    Home Office, Domestic Violence: A National Report (2005) 7. 
94   See, eg, Case Study L/99/19(S) where the seven months pregnant victim received second and third degree burns 
after allegedly being pushed into a fire during an argument with her partner.  The offender was charged with 
wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.  The victim subsequently recanted and defence counsel requested 
a discharge.  Although the Crown wished to proceed with the charges, the judge granted the discharge. 
95    In Case Study M/01/26 the offender launched an attack on his partner and continued to assault her as she held a 
two-year-old child.  The offender admitted a charge of assaulting a female and the judge described the attack as 
'cowardly' and 'savage'.  The judge noted that the offender 'would have been put in jail had it not been for the victim's 
wishes that he remain in the community'.  In Case Study S/99/20(S) the offender admitted two charges of assault with 
a weapon, one of threatening to kill and one of indecent assault.  The judge stated that the offender fought with his 
wife and mother-in-law, threatened to kill his children while holding a knife and held the knife to his mother-in-law's 
throat.  The offender then subjected the women to humiliation by forcing them to remove their clothes and lie down in 
'positions of a sexual nature'.  The judge stated that the offending appeared to be impulsive behaviour, the offender 
was remorseful, and had strong 'family support'.  His sentence of imprisonment was suspended.  
96   In Case Study R/01/8(S) the offender launched an attack on the woman while she was holding a child.  The child's 
left femur (thighbone) was broken.  The judge accepted that the offender had no intention to harm the child, and the 
injury was the result of a very serious assault on his partner.  The offender was sentenced to 4 months' PD, nine 
months' supervision and ordered to undertake drug, alcohol and relationship counselling.  In Case Study W/01/9(S) 
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illustrated in the following case study, despite the legislative prohibition against inflicting violence 
in the presence of a child, judges deferred to the attitudes of battered victims notwithstanding the 
presence of a child witness.   
 
Violence in the Presence of Children and Victim Forgiveness: Case Study S/99/6 
The 35 year-old male offender appeared for sentencing after pleading guilty to an assault on his partner.  At 
the time the offender launched the attack, the woman victim was holding a small child in her arms.  The 
offender punched the woman in the face with a closed fist and after she fell to the ground, he continued to 
punch and kick her.  The sentencing judge noted that after punching and kicking his partner, the offender 
bit the woman 'all over her body, including her feet, legs, arms, elbows and around the throat'.  Shortly after 
this assault the woman collapsed and died at her home.  Although at the time of sentencing, a spokesperson 
for the Coroner told the media that the woman's death was still under investigation, the judge stated her 
death was 'unrelated' to the offender's assault.  Adding that he had seen photographs of the woman taken 
after the attack, the judge told the offender that if he also had copies of the photographs they would prove a 
'lasting reminder' of his violence, now that his partner was dead.   
 
In a letter to the Court, the victim expressed a 'dying wish' that her partner not be sentenced to prison.  
Instead, she wanted the offender 'to do something about his problems'.  The offender's problems, as cited by 
the judge, were related to his violence and use of alcohol.  The reports note:  'Saying he had agonised over 
the case [the judge] said there was no doubt the attack demanded a prison sentence but the court was 
constantly being reminded, not that it needed to be, of taking into account the victim's views'.  The judge 
suspended an 18 month prison sentence and sentenced the offender to six months' periodic detention, nine 
months' supervision and counselling.   
 
The above offender's 'problems' with violence indicate that this was not his first assault.  Battered 
mothers who witness their abusers being congratulated and rewarded with reduced sentences on 
the basis of their victims' forgiveness are likely to get the message that courts approve of women 
                                                                                                                                                                
after 'punching, slapping and kneeing' the victim, she was 'slapped' around the head while holding a child.  The 
sentencing judge noted that the assault arose from a 'destructive relationship'.  The offender was sentenced inter alia to 
5 months' PD.   In Case Study R/06/5 the offender aimed a kick at the three year-old child's mother, and struck the 
child in the head instead.  The sentencing judge noted the kick had not been deliberately aimed at the child, but at her 
mother, who the offender also 'prodded' 20 times with a fork.  The offender was sentenced to 5 months' PD and one 
years' supervision to include counselling.  Cf Case Study K/08/7(S) where the offender assaulted a woman and 
breached a protection order soon after he had been released from prison for 'similar offences'.  The sentencing judge 
stated that whilst the assault 'was not the worst case of its kind', the offence was aggravated because it happened in 
front of the woman's eight month-old baby.  In Case Study N/01/24(S) the judge is reported as stating he remembered 
the case clearly, particularly the evidence of the offender's wife and child, and was  'frankly alarmed' that the couple 
were considering a reconciliation.  Should reconciliation occur, the violence would probably escalate and involve the 
couple's child.  
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who 'stand by' violent men.  In stark contrast, courts roundly punish and condemn battered mothers 
who 'stand by' while children are abused.97   
 
Acceptance of a battered woman's choice to remain in the abusive relationship turns to outrage at 
her 'failure' to leave or stop the abuse when her children are injured or killed.  Although a wealth 
of evidence reveals battering constrains a mothers' ability to parent effectively,98 the following 
response to a sentencing remark that the defendant, whose child was killed by her partner, may 
have been a victim of battered women's syndrome, is not atypical:  
 
[T]his was no battered woman.  She had been assaulted a few times by [the offender] but by her 
own admission to police, while he was beating [her son] he left her alone.  She was a manipulative, 
lying coward who, instead of placing herself between her child and danger, was happy for him to 
take [the offender's] punches instead of her.99 
 
Courts are also highly critical of women who fail to prioritise the protection of children over their 
relationships with violent men.100   In R v Emery the defendant stated that her partner had routinely 
and severely abused both herself and her baby daughter.  Her failure to protect her child was the 
result of her fear of her partner and inability to act independently from him.  However, the Lord 
Chief Justice in the English Court of Appeal noted that the case clearly called for a substantial 
period of imprisonment.   The mother's paramount duty was to protect her child and her failure to 
do so, with resulting harm to the child, could not  
 
be excused by other pressures that there may have been upon the mother, unless they were such as 
to render her incapable of action.  Still less can such failure be excused by a mother putting her 
                                                 
97     See, eg, Law Society Wants Goff to Get Tougher with Child Abusers, Dominion, 30 August 2000. 
98    See, eg, Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence 
on Family Dynamics (2002). 
99   Deborah Coddington, 'Disciplined to Death' in North and South, February 2000, 32, 36.  See, also, David 
McLoughlin, 'The Canonisation of Tania Witika' in North and South, November 1998, 33; Law Society Wants Goff to 
Get Tougher with Child Abusers, Dominion, 30 August 2000; Neglect Judgment Angers Welfare Groups, Press, 16 
November 2000; Sentences for Child Abusers Seen as Unfair, Press, 23 March 2001. 
100   In Case Study N/97/1(M), the mother was convicted after failing to intervene in her partner's abuse of the child 
(the offender had also threatened to kill the mother).  Defence counsel noted that all the woman wanted in life 'was to 
have a husband and a family'.  The sentencing judge described the mother's behaviour as 'reprehensible'.  In Case 
Study N/99/1(M), a female offender, who had not personally abused her three young children, was convicted of 
wilfully permitting the children to be ill-treated by her partner. Defence counsel stated that the mother's level of 
intellectual ability, and abusive and traumatic upbringing, meant she lacked the skills to protect herself or to confront 
her partner.  However, the judge stated that while the woman may not have been aware of the extent of the abuse she 
'should have "ejected" her partner from the house or reported the problems'. 
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relationship with her partner, or even her own protection, before the life and health of her child, as 
the learned judge found was the case here.101 
 
The well established correlation between child abuse and women battering may ensure that many, 
if not most prosecutions of mothers for failing to protect children are currently being brought 
against battered women.102  Researchers note a not uncommon pattern in which a battered mother 
has previously sought protection from police and the courts but when that protection proves 
ineffective, the woman reverts to the only other tactic available to her, that of placating her 
abuser.103  Given New Zealand research indicating that children are most at risk from their 
fathers,104 constructions of battered mothers' culpability  
 
need to avoid the common injustice done to women by attributing to them sole responsibility for 
children's protection and well-being.  If we believe women and men are to share responsibility for 
the well-being of their children, we can no longer ignore the role of battering men as fathers.105 
   
While the Court in Emery observed that the battered mother had 'ample opportunity to seek help 
from others', research shows abused women are at increased risk of violence at the time they 
attempt to leave or seek help.   Holding battered mothers accountable for the violence inflicted by 
male partners on children,106 while refusing to denounce and deter attacks on women in the 
context of separation, would be profoundly unjust.  Yet, as discussed below, this is the very 
situation in which abused women are presently entrapped.  
                                                
 
 
 
 
101    [1993] 14 Cr.App.R 394, 396-397 (emphasis added).   
102  See, eg, Karen McDonald, 'Michigan's Efforts to Hold Women Criminally and Civilly Liable for Failure to 
Protect: Implications for Battered Women' (1998) 44 Wayne L.Rev. 289. 
103    Neville Robertson and Ruth Busch, 'Seen but not Heard?  How Battered Women and their Children Fare Under 
the Guadianship Amendment Act 1995' [1997] BFLJ 177.   
104    Dads Are Killing Kiwi Kids, Sunday News, 13 July 1997 4, citing New Zealand research showing that of children 
intentionally killed between 1988 and 1995, 38% were killed by a father figure; 24% were killed by their natural 
father and 14% by their step-father or de facto parent.  Mothers were killers in 12% of cases. 
105    Einat Peled, 'The Battered Women's Movement Response to Children of Battered Women: A Critical Analysis' 
(1997) 3 Violence Against Women 424, 428. 
106    In R v Lunt [2004] 1 NZLR 498, the Court of Appeal held that the parental duty to provide 'necessaries' under  s 
152 Crimes Act 1961 did not extend to 'protection from physical violence'.  However, the Court noted such a duty 
arose at common law, thus an indictment could be preferred for manslaughter where a parent failed to protect a child 
from foreseeable physical violence resulting in death.  Section 5 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 
(UK) creates a statutory offence of failure to protect.  See also, A-G's Reference 24 of 2001 [2001] EWCA Crim 894.   
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IV   THE RED FLAGS FOR DANGEROUSNESS/LETHALITY 
The object of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 as set out in s 5(1) is to reduce and prevent violence 
in domestic relationships by  
 
 (a)  Recognising that domestic violence, in all its forms, is unacceptable behaviour; and 
(b)  Ensuring that, where domestic violence occurs, there is effective legal protection for its 
       victims. 
 
Laypersons are unlikely to have difficulty affirming the unacceptability of domestic violence and 
the need for effective legal protection for victims as paramount principles of intervention.  
However, legal commentators note these objects may clash with other legal principles.107  Since 
judicial balancing of these competing principles has enormous implications for victim safety, the 
following case studies explore judicial responses to established risk factors for 
dangerousness/lethality and factors accepted by courts as mitigating offending in these contexts. 
 
A   'A "Severe or Life-Threatening" Incident'  
The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study notes two different scenarios of intimate femicide have 
emerged from domestic violence research.  In one scenario, a regular pattern of violence 
eventually leads to the fatal event.  In a second scenario, something about a particular violent 
incident signals a risk of future death or serious injury.108  These researchers identified a prior 
'severe or life threatening' incident (defined to include: permanent injury; being severely 'beaten 
up'; being choked; burned; internal injury; head injury; broken bones, and a threat or attack with a 
weapon)109 as a risk factor for future serious violence and lethality.   
 
1.   Being Severely 'Beaten Up' 
 During the period of the research, the judicial response to 'serious' violence was governed by s 5 
of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 as amended by s 2 of the Criminal Justice Amendment (No 3) Act 
1987.110  Under s 5, imprisonment was mandatory for persons convicted of an offence punishable 
                                                 
107   Webb, et al, above n 8, 1433, citing as an example, a respondent's right to be heard which meant an abusive father 
could cross-examine the two daughters he had sexually abused. 
108    Carolyn Block, et al, The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study: Risk of Serious Injury or Death in Intimate 
Violence A Collaborative Research Project (2000) 269. 
109    Carolyn Block, 'How Can Practitioners Help an Abused Woman Lower Her Risk of Death' [2003] NIJ Journal, 4, 
5. 
110     Repealed by the Sentencing Act 2002. 
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by a term of imprisonment of two or more years, who used 'serious' violence or caused serious 
danger to the safety of any person in the course of committing the offence.  The offence of assault 
by a male on a female under s 194 Crimes Act 1961 (the proxy denominator of intimate partner 
violence) carries a maximum penalty of two years' imprisonment. The legislation provided a 
judicial discretion to impose a sentence other than imprisonment if the court determined that 
'special circumstances of the offence or of the offender' rendered a full-time custodial sentence 
inappropriate.111   
 
'Serious' violence was not defined in the legislation.  The Court of Appeal emphasised that the 
measure of seriousness was to be found in the acts themselves, rather than consideration of the 
effects of the violence in terms of subsequent injuries.112  Since 'serious violence' did not 
necessarily imply serious injury, Warren Brookbanks suggested that the solution to whether or not 
the violence was serious 'must be obtained with reference to objective criteria standing apart from 
the actual exercise of violence in the particular case'.113  On this analysis, an attack which did not 
involve serious injury was serious violence because it was perpetrated against a police officer.114   
 
By contrast, the fact that the charge was assault by a male on a female was held not to be relevant 
to determinations of serious violence.115  Consistent with this approach, assaults against women, 
including pregnant women, and children were not automatically categorised as serious.116  For 
example, the pregnant woman in Case Study T/01/22(S) was 'struck' by her partner in what the 
judge described as a 'nasty' assault.  Defence counsel stated it was not serious violence and the 
offender was fined.  In Case Study P/00/17(S) the offender, whose relationship with his partner 
was ending, walked into the bedroom of the woman's seven year-old daughter, pulled back the 
covers and punched the child in the face with a closed fist.  The sentencing judge observed that the 
                                                 
111   Section 7 of the Act created a general limitation on the use of imprisonment and s 7(3) specified that this 
limitation was subject to s 5.  W Brookbanks, 'Property Offences and Special Circumstances in the Criminal Justice 
Act 1985' [1987] NZLJ 163, 163, citing W Hodge, Doyle Criminal Procedure in New Zealand (2nd ed, 1984) suggests 
that the opposing policy statements of anti-imprisonment under s 7 and pro-imprisonment in s 5 set 'the stage for a 
political "tug-of-war"'.  The phrase 'special circumstances' thus became determinative of which policy statement 
would prevail in a particular case. 
112     R v Dunn [1989] CA 113/89 (Unreported, Casey, Hardie Boys and Wylie JJ, 9 May 1989)  
113    W Brookbanks, 'Serious Violence and Special Circumstances: Criminal Justice Act 1985, s 5' [1987] NZLJ 390, 
390, 391. 
114     Ibid.  
115     Kelly v Police (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Doogue J, 15 May 1991).  
116    It was not unusual for men who assaulted pregnant women to avoid a custodial sentence. For example, in Case 
Study B/00/24(S) the offender smashed two windows in the house of a seven-month-pregnant woman and held a knife 
to her throat.  He admitted charges of assaulting a female, assault using a butcher's knife as a weapon, assaulting 
police, resisting arrest and intentional damage.  His six month jail sentence was suspended. 
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effect on the mother and child was considerable.  Both required counselling, and they had moved 
to another city.  The judge stated that this was 'on the border of being serious violence'.117   
 
Considerations of 'serious' violence included whether the violence inflicted was an open-handed 
slap; a roundhouse or a punching blow; a head-butt or 'nudge with the head'; a hit; or a punch.  In 
this lexicon of abuse, the term 'serious' violence might not apply to a woman who was 'slapped' so 
hard her neck cracked, or 'pulled' so her head hit a concrete wall.  In Case Study F/08/10(S) 
defence counsel noted it was unclear whether 'pushing' the woman to the ground, then picking her 
up and repeatedly 'slapping' her face, leaving her with a bruised face, grazed chin, and cut hand, 
constituted serious violence.118   
 
In many reported cases there was no discussion of whether the violence was serious or not and no 
explanation for the non-custodial sentence was provided.119   For example, the offender in Case 
Study H/99/18 who admitted beating his partner who was nine months' pregnant, was convicted on 
charges inter alia of assault on a female.  The sentencing judge observed that he had never before 
been confronted with an assault on a woman who was so close to giving birth.  The judge told the 
offender 'You are extremely lucky that the child was not born dead.  Then you might have faced a 
manslaughter charge.'  The offender was sentenced to six months' periodic detention.120   
 
Where a sentence of imprisonment was imposed, it could be suspended under s 21A Criminal 
Justice Act 1985.  'A suspended sentence has no punitive effect whatsoever, although it probably 
will have if a further imprisonable offence is committed within the period in which the suspension 
lasts.'121  Since courts were required under s 5 to impose a full-time custodial sentence for serious 
                                                 
117   The offender was sentenced to four months' PD, ordered to undertake counselling and to pay $350 to cover the 
counselling costs of the victim and her mother.  In Case Study H/08/17 the offender, who punched and kicked his 
partner was described by the judge as coming 'as close as it gets' to serious violence.   
118    The offender was sentenced to five months' PD. 
119   In Case Study M/00/18(S) the offender, who was charged with assaulting a female, 'hit' his former partner in the 
mouth.  The woman suffered a cut which required 11 stitches to close.  The offender was fined and sentenced to 
supervision.  
120    Periodic detention (PD) as an alternative to imprisonment requires offenders to participate in supervised, unpaid 
work, for a specified period of time.  Periodic detention and community service were abolished by the Sentencing Act 
2002 and replaced by a sentence of 'community work'.  This offender was additionally sentenced to nine months' 
supervision, 1 year driving disqualification and ordered to undertake 'anger management counselling'.   
121    Michael Bodie, 'Suspended Sentences and s 5 of the Criminal Justice Act' [1995] NZLJ 103, 104 (citations 
omitted). 
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violence, a sentence of imprisonment could not be suspended without first determining that special 
circumstances were present.122   
 
In a beating described by the sentencing judge as 'savage', the offender in Case Study W/00/9(S) 
responded to his partner's attempt to stop him from drink-driving by beating and kicking her while 
wearing steel-capped boots.  The judge noted that the beating was severe.  The woman suffered 
black eyes, a broken nose and required plastic surgery.  When stopped by police, the offender was 
too intoxicated to blow into a breath test.  Defence counsel told the court that 'poor communication 
and the strains of managing the couple's newborn baby were likely causes of mounting stress'.  
Although the judge found it hard 'to imagine a worse drink-driving incident', he suspended the one 
year jail sentence for two years.  Campaigners for tougher drink-driving laws criticised the 
suspended sentence, describing the decision as 'incomprehensible'.  Community outrage was 
directed at the driving offence, rather than the decision to suspend the sentence of an offender who 
kicked and beat a woman so badly she required plastic surgery. 123   
 
The Sentencing Act 2002 abolished the power to suspend a sentence of imprisonment.  However, 
the Select Committee drew attention to the sentencing alternatives inter alia of home detention,124 
and an order to come up for sentence if called on.125  As discussed below, use of these sentencing 
options in domestic violence cases requires careful monitoring. 
 
2.  Attempt to Strangle or Choke 
The Chicago Study identified any attempt to strangle, choke or smother a woman as a risk factor 
for severe or fatal violence.  The researchers recommended that practitioners 'ask an abused 
woman if her partner has ever tried to choke her or grab her around the neck'.126   
 
In the present research, violence involving strangling and choking also met with a non-custodial 
sentencing response.  For example, in Case Study M/00/19(S) the offender was convicted of 
threatening to kill and assaulting a female.  The offender grabbed the victim's throat, pushed her 
                                                 
122    Ibid, citing R v Wright, R v Malcolm (Court of Appeal, CA 390, 391/94,, 23 February 1995).  
123   In Case Study S/06/7, the offender faced a charge of assaulting his partner and was described by his counsel as a 
'recidivist' in that crime. The judge noted that by law he was required to sentence the offender to a term of 
imprisonment, but the offender was attending an anger management course.  The judge sentenced the offender to a 
term of imprisonment of one day.  
124     Section 97 Sentencing Act 2002. 
125     Section 110 Sentencing Act 2002. 
126     Block, above n 109, 6. 
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head into a concrete wall, and threatened to slit her throat.  The woman told the Court 'I thought I 
was going to die that day'.  Her injuries included lumps on her head, bruising and welts on her 
neck.  The offender was sentenced to four months' periodic detention.  In Case Study R/00/23(S) 
the offender admitted assaulting a female.  At sentencing, he denied 'punching' his former partner, 
but admitted pushing her 'really hard'.  The offender also admitted holding a pillow over the 
woman's face.  The judge noted that the woman's injuries included two black eyes, swelling and 
bruising to both cheeks and bruising to her arms.  However, after citing the probation report 
description of the offender as 'kind, caring, hard working, soft-hearted and placid' the judge 
sentenced him to a fine.127  
 
3.   Threat or Assault with a Weapon  
The Chicago researchers found women who reported that an intimate partner had 'scared them 
with a weapon' were much more likely to experience severe violence in the follow-up period.  
Women homicide victims were also about twice as likely to have been threatened with a knife or 
gun, or to have a knife or gun used on them, than were other abused women.128  Accordingly, 
'severe or life threatening' violence was defined to include 'a threat or attack with a weapon'.129   
 
Offenders in the present study who threatened their partners with a weapon also avoided 
imprisonment.  For example, the offender in Case Study D/97/14(S), who admitted assaulting his 
wife and breaching her protection order, smashed his wife's head into a wall, grabbed her by the 
throat and threatened her with a knife during the assault.  Stating that the offender should read the 
victim impact report so he could see what he had done to his wife, the judge is reported as telling 
the offender:  'This was quite a severe assault…This is your last warning - you will go to jail if you 
breach the order or assault her again'.  
 
As illustrated above, notwithstanding the presumption of a custodial sentence for serious violence 
under s 5, many offenders whose violence met the research definition of a 'severe or life-
threatening incident' avoided imprisonment.  Therefore, the following section examines 'special 
circumstances' considered by courts to warrant an alternative to a full-time custodial sentence.    
 
                                                 
127    Such outcomes were apparently due to unreported  'special circumstances'.  
128    Block, et al, above n 108, 272-273. 
129    Block, above n 109, 5. 
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4.   'Special Circumstances of the Offence or of the Offender' 
In R v Donaldson130 Thomas J warned that s 5 could not be given an artificial or strained 
construction so as to avoid its impact.  Legal commentary also observed that the term 'special 
circumstances' implied 'matters of mitigation outside of the ordinary range of factors which 
palliate guilt'.131  However, while not at all unusual or exceptional in domestic violence cases, 
victim forgiveness was regarded as a 'special circumstance'.  For example, in Case Study S/97/6(S), 
the judge informed an offender who broke his wife's pelvis after running over her in his car that 
'the only thing stopping him from sending [the offender] to jail was his wife's plea for leniency'.   
 
Courts also regarded loss of family support resulting from the offender's imprisonment as a special 
circumstance.  In Case Study K/06/2(S), the offender, who was originally charged under the 
Crimes of Torture Act 1989 after repeatedly beating his partner and burning her, was told by the 
judge that he was not being imprisoned because the victim had written to the Court saying this 
would deprive herself and her children of the offender's financial and emotional support.   In Case 
Study W/01/22(S), the offender admitted a charge of injuring his disabled wife with intent to 
injure.  The judge accepted that this serious assault was triggered by a build-up of frustrations 
arising from his wife's disability and the problems of caring for her.  The offender was reportedly 
advised by the judge to consider staying away from home 'until matters have settled down'.  
Although he had previous convictions for violence, including three for assaults on another family 
member, the judge suspended the sentence of imprisonment, telling the offender that:  'In the end 
probably your wife and your family need your moral and physical help'. 
 
A sentencing approach which treats a batterer's repeated use of violence as irrelevant to his 
capacity to nurture and care for his family is extremely dangerous.  Since research indicates people 
with disabilities face at least one and a half times greater risk of violence than the non-disabled 
                                                 
130    (1997) 14 CRNZ 537, 546 (CA). 
131    Brookbanks, above n 113, 393. 
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population, and much of this violence is perpetrated by family members,132 disabled women may 
be especially vulnerable to this analysis.133    
 
B   The Red Flag of Repeat Victimisation 
1.   The Criminal Justice Act and Recidivist Offenders 
Section 5(2) of the Criminal Justice Act dealt with recidivist violent offenders.  The section 
provided that persons convicted of an offence punishable by imprisonment for a term of two or 
more years, who had previously been convicted of such an offence within the preceding two years, 
and who used violence against, or caused danger to the safety of any other person in the course of 
committing the offences, should be imprisoned in the absence of 'special circumstances' of the 
offence or the offender.  Since there was no requirement of 'serious' violence under this sub-
section, Brookbanks observed that the  
 
 standard of violence simpliciter will mean that it will be extremely difficult to avoid the 
presumption of imprisonment.  'Special circumstances' will not be easy to establish and will offer 
little relief to most offenders; and granted the fact that 'serious violence' may imply no injury at all, 
'violence' may be found to be present in respect of conduct which in other circumstances would 
seem quite innocuous.134      
 
Notwithstanding this observation, the research found seriously violent recidivist abusers frequently 
avoided a sentence of imprisonment.  Victim forgiveness was relied on as a 'special circumstance' 
justifying an alternative to imprisonment.  Recidivist abusers also avoided imprisonment where 
this was perceived as having a negative impact on their families.  In Case Study R/08/7(S), the 
report states that the offender, who punched his wife in the head, and kicked her in the head, torso 
and stomach, 'avoided going to prison for his second male assaults female conviction only because 
Hamilton District Court judge James Rota did not want to hurt his family financially'.  The judge 
is reported as telling the offender: 
                                                 
132  Miriam Ticoll, Family Violence Prevention Division, Health Canada, Violence and People with Disabilities: A 
Review of the Literature  (1994) 17.  Mary Ann Curry, Dena Hassouneh-Phillips and Anne Johnston-Silverberg, 
'Abuse of Women with Disabilities: An Ecological Model and Review (2001) 7 Violence Against Women 60, note that 
unlike women without disabilities, disabled women may be dependent on their abuser for essential care and may not 
have any external validation that what they are experiencing is abuse. 
133   Men who used violence toward seriously ill women sometimes claimed their violence arose from frustration that 
the victim was not taking her medicine.  Defence counsel apparently anticipate that courts will regard this context as a 
mitigating factor.  Courts appeared to do so.      
134   Brookbanks, above n 113, 408. 
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 If I send you to jail, I deprive your family of money.  I have to think about that because I genuinely 
  care for your family.  If you continue to knock her about, at the end of the day that is your problem  
 if they go without money and do it hard.  That's not my problem, it's yours.  [As the offender left the 
  dock, the judge stated: Maybe I'm too soft.]  
 
Repeat offenders could also be harshly reprimanded and sentenced to a period of imprisonment, 
which was then suspended.   
 
2.   A Judicial Typology of Recidivist Abusers  
Violent offenders are not a homogeneous group.135  Batterer typologies therefore have the 
potential to enhance victim safety by acknowledging that a 'one size fits all' rehabilitative response 
is inappropriate.  In October 2005, a judge in a New Zealand pilot Family Violence Court was 
reported as articulating a typology of battering men apparently in use by the Court: 
 
The family man, who has lashed out under stress, with police having visited several times before; 
the cobra, who is repeatedly remorseful and fuelled by drugs; and the rottweiler, who shows no 
remorse and whom Judge Recordon likens to Once Were Warriors Jake the Muss.  The first two 
could be dealt with without prison, [the judge] said.136 
 
The empirical foundation for this typology of batterers is not discussed in the report.  However, the 
approach appears surprisingly indifferent to a large body of research showing repeat victimisation 
is a leading risk factor for future victimisation,137 and a red flag for serious violence and 
                                                 
135   See, eg, Amy Holtzworth-Munroe, et al, 'A Typology of Male Batterers: An Initial Examination' in Ximena 
Arriaga and Stuart Oskamp (eds) Violence in Intimate Relationships (1999) 45, 46.  Gondolf and Fisher, above n 32, 
report that sociopathic or antisocial batterers exhibit a recurring and increasingly serious pattern of violence towards 
their partners.  These men are likely over represented among those who kill estranged partners.  Desmond Ellis and 
Walter DeKeseredy, 'Rethinking Estrangement, Interventions, and Intimate Femicide' (1997) 3 Violence Against 
Women 590, identify a further pattern not included in the Gondolf and Fisher typology of males who have rarely or 
never abused or beaten their partners, but who kill them and others as a reaction to separation.  For this male, and 
others like him, who tend to be ranked low in terms of attributes that indicate superordinate male status, separation is 
seen as abandonment and the likelihood of multiple killings post-separation increases.  
136     Jail 'Not for all Violent Husbands', Hawke's Bay Today, 12 October 2005.  
137    Sylvia Walby and Andrew Myhill, 'Assessing and Managing Risk' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in 
Reducing Domestic Violence? A Comprehensive Guide for Professionals (2001)314, note that '[o]ne of the most 
robust, simple and straightforward risk factors for domestic violence is that of a previous assault'.  See also, Block, 
above n 109.   
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lethality.138  An assumption that certain categories of recidivist abusers will avoid imprisonment 
also appears inconsistent with research showing men with longer and more serious histories of 
violence are more intractable to treatment interventions.139   
 
Risk assessment grounded in domestic violence research would likely regard the 'family man' 
whose violence has resulted in police call-outs in the past and whose further act(s) of violence 
result in his appearance in court, and the 'cobra's' drug-fuelled violence as posing a high risk to 
their partners.  Prior police contact is an established risk factor for dangerousness/lethality.  
Consequently, researchers note the need for police to document police attendance in response to 
domestic violence call-outs.  Although drug and alcohol abuse may exacerbate conflicted 
interactions, research indicates that this factor does not create the necessary or sufficient 
conditions for relationship violence to occur.140  Differentiating remorseful abusers from men who 
show no remorse also misunderstands the dynamics of violent relationships.141  Remorse, 
apologies and promises to change are an integral feature of the cycle of violence.142  Domestic 
violence research is replete with cases in which men repeatedly abuse their partners, express 
remorse, and subsequently go on to severely injure or kill their victims.  
  
Judicial depictions of recidivist abusers as 'family men' lack cognisance of the inter-generational 
effects of partner abuse and a wealth of research showing the devastating effects of violence on 
children: 
 
                                                 
138   See, eg, Metropolitan Police Service, Findings from the Multi-Agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in 
London: Prepared for the ACPO Homicide Working Group (2003) Appendix  III 10.  See, also, Walby and Myhill, 
above n 137, 315; Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study' (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 1089, 1089; Lisa Sanctis, 'Bridging the 
Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence' (1996) 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 
359, 388-389.      
139    Johnson, above n 43, 37.  Ken McMaster, the then National Convenor of Men for Non-Violence, in 'Hitting 
Home: Men Speak About Abuse of Women by Julie Liebrich, Judy Paulin and Robin Ransom, Department of Justice, 
in association with AGB McNair' [1995] Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 173, 175, notes that based on clinical 
experience with both men who are violent and those whom they victimise in 'the majority of situations the abuse is 
incremental in that it becomes more serious, frequent and intrusive over time'.    
140    Richard Gelles, 'Alcohol and Other Drugs are Associated with Violence - They are Not its Cause' in Richard 
Gelles and Donileen Loseke (eds), Current Controversies on Family Violence (1993) 182.  K Leonard, 'Alcohol Use 
and Husband Marital Aggression Among Newlywed Couples' in Ximena B Arriaga and Stuart Oskamp (eds), 
Violence in Intimate Relationships (1999) 17. 
141   Geoff Hall, 'Sentencing (II): Matters of Aggravation and Mitigation' [1985] NZLJ 184, 190, notes that lack of 
contrition is not a factor to be considered by the court at sentencing.   
142     See, eg, Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984) 95-104. 
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The public interest in ensuring legally and socially acceptable behaviour is not restricted to the 
present but is multi-generational.  The inter-generational effect of violence within the family…is 
well known.  To treat such behaviour as having other than a 'public' effect is to ignore its 
significance not only within the immediate relationship between victim and offender, but also for 
the ripple effect that is has upon the children and thereby the future and effectively will condone 
and perpetuate a social evil of substantial proportions.143 
 
A typology of batterers which assumes violent recidivists can expect to 'be dealt with without 
prison' would not be accepted in cases of violence between strangers.  Since a great deal of serious 
and lethal violence in New Zealand is perpetrated against women in the home, allowing 'the 
relationship' to mitigate repeated acts of violence is tantamount to authorising violence against 
women.   
 
C   The Red Flag of Separation 
Martha Mahoney's groundbreaking work defined separation violence as 'the particular assault on a 
woman's body and volition that seeks to block her from leaving, retaliate for her departure, or 
forcibly end the separation'.144  Consistent with overseas research, the present study found women 
who asked men to leave their homes, or alternatively left themselves, were at risk of sub-lethal and 
lethal violence.  Women were stalked, physically abused, raped and sexually violated by estranged 
partners,145 who also physically and sexually assaulted children to punish their mothers.146  Judges 
described offenders as 'ritualistically' plaguing and assaulting former partners; 'setting out to 
torment and destroy' the women; and making the lives of women and children 'a living hell'.  
Women were hounded for many years after separating from abusive men.147  'Beleaguered' and 
'unfortunate' women victims were forced to give up their employment and relocate with children;  
                                                 
143    Judge David Harvey, above n 19, 115. 
144   Martha Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation' (1990) 90 Mich.L.Rev. 
1, 6. 
145   In Case Study N/97/17(S) the court heard the offender, who attacked his partner and caused injuries to her genitals 
wanted to 'ruin her for anyone else'.  
146    In Case Study N/97/3(C) the offender raped the couple's daughter in front of his divorced wife.  The mother of the 
child stated that she was too frightened to intervene as the offender threatened to slit her throat.   In Case Study 
L/97/2/(C) the offender, who beat his partner and punched her 8 year-old child in the face, was said to have done so 
because of his jealousy.  In Case Study N/01/1(C) the judge noted that the offender raped his 3 year-old step-daughter 
to 'get back at his partner'.   
147  In Case Study T/06/9 the offender was imprisoned for three months in relation to his 20th conviction for trespassing 
at his ex-wife's home.  The prosecutor stated that the couple had been separated for nine years and the offender had 
been imprisoned seven times and spent about 18 months in jail over the past five years for the same offence.  The 
judge noted that the probation service had 'bent over backwards' to help the offender but despite every effort to help 
him, the offender did not want to do as he was told.    
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were abused at their places of work; tied up; kidnapped; forced to jump out of moving cars; chased 
at high speed; and their homes set on fire by offenders.148     
 
However, rather than scorn and opprobrium, law generally constructs this offending from a 
perspective of empathy with the pain caused to the offender by the defection of his spouse or 
lover.149  
 
1.   The Crime of Passion Analysis and Associated Empathy with Offenders 
Crimes of violence against separated and separating women are constructed in law as 'tragic' and 
'sad' (as opposed to despicable) 'crimes of passion'.  Offenders who perpetrate violence against 
estranged partners are said to experience 'cascades of violent emotion', and 'disordered thought 
processes', which render them unable (as opposed to unwilling) to control themselves and deal 
non-violently with the end of the relationship.  By viewing the woman's decision to terminate the 
relationship as provoking the offender to lose his self-control, the victim is inculpated in the 
offending.   
 
In Case Study W/08/2(S), the offender responded to his wife's expressed desire to separate from 
him by attacking her with a meat cleaver in a 'sustained and terrifying' attack.  The sentencing 
judge noted that the offender first attacked his wife with his fists.  As she crouched down in a 
corner with her arms over her head, she was struck in the head and body with the meat cleaver.  
Following the attack, the woman was left 'with life-long injuries and a legacy of psychological 
trauma'.  However, the judge observed that the circumstances were also tragic for the offender.  
The offender still loved his wife, and her desire to separate caused him to lose control and attack 
her.  While accepting that domestic violence must be denounced and deterred, the attack was out 
of character, and was caused by the offender's psychiatric condition and the stresses in his life 
which caused him to lose control.   
 
Termination of the relationship, even when this was due to the offender's use of violence, appeared 
to be accepted as self-evidently mitigating.150  In Case Study J/01/16(S), the offender was 
                                                 
148  In Case Study D/00/28(S) the offender torched his estranged partner's home causing damage amounting to 
$270,000.00.  
149  See, eg, Elizabeth Rapaport, 'The Death Penalty and the Domestic Discount' in Martha Fineman and Roxanne 
Mykitiuk (eds), The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse (1994) 224, 230. 
 121
convicted on charges of assaulting a female and breach of a protection order after going to the 
victim's workplace and punching her up to six times about her ribs and head in breach of her 
protection order.  The Court was told that the offender was having difficulties dealing with his 
marriage break-up.  Sentencing him to a fine, the judge noted that the offender had earlier breaches 
of protection orders on his record and there must not be any more.  In Case Study W/00/2(S), the 
offender, who pleaded guilty to assault, threatening to kill and breach of a protection order, 
verbally abused, kicked, punched, and threatened to rape and kill his former partner by hanging 
her.  He was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment, suspended for nine months.151   
 
The tendency to view separation violence through the lens of romantic passion was not displaced 
by evidence that the violence was premeditated and life-threatening.152  Although jealousy and 
possessiveness are well-established risk factors for serious violence and lethality,153 the context of 
jealousy was seen to mitigate, as opposed to aggravate the offending.154  The separated woman's 
forming of a new relationship was invariably regarded as mitigating the violence.  In Case Study 
C/99/2(S), the offender attacked his estranged wife from whom he had recently separated.  The 
Court was told that the offender 'had been under considerable stress at the time of the incident 
because he knew his former wife had a new relationship'.  Noting that this was serious violence, 
the judge found sufficient mitigating circumstances to suspend the sentence.  In Case Study 
W/00/1(S), the offender, who was living apart from his wife, went to the woman's home and seeing 
                                                                                                                                                                
150    For example, in Case Study W/99/4(S) the offender, who assaulted his son and threatened his partner with an 
idling chain-saw, was sentenced to periodic detention.  The judge noted that the offender had 'lost everything and it 
was unlikely that his relationship with his partner would resume'. 
151    In Case Study M/01/3(S) the offender met his ex-girlfriend by chance and accompanied the woman and her 
friends to a bar.  Following an argument, the offender pushed his ex-girlfriend down the stairs and kneed her in the 
face.  A male intervened and the offender left.  In the early hours of the morning, the offender went to the woman's 
home and smashed a terracotta pot over the head of a man he found in his ex-partner's bedroom.  The male left and 
was later found unconscious beside the road.  His ex-partner was sleeping in another room and while she slept, the 
offender went to the kitchen, turned on all the elements of a stove, draped the woman's clothes over the elements and 
watched them burn.  Before leaving, he dropped a lit cigarette on the woman's bed.  The woman was awoken by the 
smoke and escaped from the house before fire-fighters arrived.  Damage caused by the fire was estimated at around 
$73,000.  The offender's sentence of 18 months' imprisonment was suspended for two years. 
152    In Case Study W/99/5(S), the 19 year-old offender arrived at the home of his ex-partner armed with a shotgun.  
When the young woman refused to get into his car, the offender shot her in the back as she was running away from 
him.  A third party who tried to intervene was injured, and the offender then shot himself.  All parties survived.  The 
offender had apparently stalked the woman for several weeks, assessing her movements.  He 'ignored three separate 
protection orders taken out by [the victim]…never accepted the relationship had ended…and asked a workmate: "If 
you were going to kill someone which gun would be best?".'  However, the Crown told the jury it was a 'tale of 
unrequited love gone terribly, terribly wrong' and two jurors wept when the guilty verdicts on the various charges were 
handed down.    
153      See, eg, Block, et al, above n 108, 269. 
154    For example, in Case Study J/01/29(S) the offender assaulted a male he saw sitting in a car beside his former 
partner.  Defence counsel told the court that 'alcohol and jealousy were the reasons the defendant beat up the man'.  
The offender was fined. 
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her new partner's van parked outside, entered the house carrying a screwdriver.  The offender 
'barged into the lounge where his estranged wife's partner was sitting on the floor watching 
television', and stabbed the man in the side of the head with the screwdriver, causing him to bleed 
profusely.  After also punching the man several times in the head, the offender advanced on his 
wife, pointed the screwdriver at her, and told her to lick the blood off and that she would be next.  
The offender's 15 month sentence of imprisonment was suspended.  
 
Since the judgments of courts send powerful messages to the community, the research found men 
who harassed and abused estranged partners had an expectation that courts would view their 
behaviour sympathetically.  For example, in Case Study N/00/15(S), the offender went to the home 
of a woman who had a protection order against him, knocked on her door and window, and after 
refusing to heed her repeated demands that he leave, entered the house.  When the woman 
telephoned the police, he 'took several knives, put a large serrated bread knife to his chest and told 
her to kill him'.  In court, defence counsel stated that his client 'viewed his action as a crime of 
passion'. 
 
2.   'Character Enhancement' of the Separation Offender 
Carolyn Copps Hartley describes a strategy employed in domestic violence cases which she terms 
'character enhancement of the abuser'.  The violent offender is depicted as a normally decent man 
whose offence is out of character.155   The victim is implicated in the offending - but for her 
conduct, the violence would not have occurred.    
 
In Case Study J/08/4(S), the offender broke into his estranged partner's home at about 3.30 am and 
attacked the woman and her new boyfriend with a socket wrench in the presence of a small child.  
After the woman ran from the house taking her two children with her, the offender continued to 
beat the boyfriend with the wrench, punch and kick him until police intervened.  Although the 
offender told police he would have killed the couple had his young son not been present, he was 
described by the sentencing judge as 'essentially a good person'.156  In Case Study V/06/1(S), the 
offender, who suspected his wife was having an affair with her employer, attacked the pair when 
                                                 
155    Carolyn Copps Hartley, '"He Said, She Said": The Defense Attack of Credibility in Domestic Violence Felony 
Trials' (2001) 7 Violence Against Women 510, conducted an in-depth study of the trial process in domestic violence 
felony cases, focusing on themes and strategies used by the defence. 
156   See, also, Elisabeth McDonald, 'Provocation, Sexuality and the Actions of "Thoroughly Decent Men"' (1993) 9 
Women's Studies Journal 126. 
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he found them together in the tea-room.  Following his convictions for assaulting his wife and 
assaulting and wounding her employer, the sentencing judge stated that the offender was facing a 
situation which 'made an apparently, decent, law-abiding man crack'.   
 
This approach also allowed courts to condemn the violence, but sentence the offender leniently.  
About six weeks after separating from his de facto partner, the offender in R v M invaded her 
home around 2.30 am 'crazed with alcohol and jealousy'.157  Entering the bedroom where she was 
sleeping with her new boyfriend, the offender attacked his ex-partner with a 30 centimetre-long 
butcher's knife, stabbing her in the leg, the shoulder and the forehead.  When her boyfriend came 
to her rescue, the woman escaped and her boyfriend was stabbed in his hand.  After failing to find 
his ex-partner, the offender stabbed large holes in the bedroom wall, slashed the furniture and 
items of the woman's clothing.  The judge noted that the effect on the woman victim involved stab 
wounds and obvious emotional trauma.  Her boyfriend had since committed suicide, and his 
suicide was 'not unconnected with this event and the pressures that it produced for him'.158   
 
The judge observed that the offender had attempted 'to paint the picture of a husband who comes 
home and finds his wife being unfaithful to him'.  His referees from the community also described 
the crime as 'understandable, almost to the point of acceptability'.  One referee suggested that '90% 
of men would do the same when confronted with that type of incident'.159  After refusing to accept 
these analyses, the judge then remarked that apart from this incident, the offender was 'a good 
father and a good man', who had acted under extreme emotional trauma.  In light of the offender's 
strong community support, and the fact that the victim was 'effectively supporting' him and 
recognised the harm to the couple's children if the offender went to prison,160 a restorative justice 
approach was required.  On the charges of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm 
and wounding with reckless disregard for safety the offender was sentenced to nine months' 
imprisonment. 
 
Although a number of variables are implicated in sentencing decisions,161 the above analyses led 
to outcomes which failed to reflect the grave social implications of separation violence.  
                                                 
157   (Unreported, High Court, Whangarei, Fisher J, 28 March 1996) 1. 
158   Ibid 2. 
159   Ibid 1-2. 
160   The extent to which the victim's support was influenced by messages from her community that '90 per cent of men 
would do the same' is unknown. 
161    See, eg, Hall, above n 86, 139; Hall, above n 141, 184. 
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Empathetic legal narratives of male passion deflected attention from harms to women and children 
inflicted by men who invaded their estranged partners' homes under the cover of night, assaulted 
and injured the terrified women, often in the presence of their children and in breach of their 
protection orders.  Legal constructions of separation violence also failed to acknowledge the 
human rights implications of these assaults on women's autonomy, and the relationship between 
this structural pattern of offending and the ability of abused mothers to protect children by exiting 
abusive relationships. 
 
This criticism is echoed in the comments of one woman in the present study who recognised the 
dangers inherent in the offender's escalating violence and ended the relationship.  After escaping 
with her seven year-old daughter to a Woman's Refuge, she took out a protection order, and set up 
in a new home.  The judge noted that the offender did everything he could to track her down.  
After locating her home, he cased the grounds, and returned armed with a baseball bat.  Smashing 
through a ranch slider door with the bat, the offender beat the woman with the weapon, while 
repeatedly stating he was going to kill her.  The violence only ceased when the couple's terrified 
child, who witnessed the attack, begged the offender: 'Don't kill mummy'.  Following the 
offender's conviction and sentence, the victim expressed her dissatisfaction with the legal 
response:  'I just find that the justice system is not as fair as it should be.  For women in our 
situation, we have these protection orders to protect us but they don't actually protect women.'  She 
said abusive men had to be made more accountable.  'I hope that women being abused get help and 
get out because once you are in an abusive relationship, they don't stop.  What women have to 
realise is the longer you stay…the harder it is to get out.'162 
 
D   Other Red Flag Offending 
Legal perceptions of separation violence through the lens of romantic love and male passion are 
likely to obscure the dangers of other red flag behaviours which occur in the context of separation.   
 
1.   Suicide Threats 
Suicide threats and attempts are an established risk factor for serious violence and lethality.163  
However, men who attacked estranged women partners and subsequently claimed their intention 
was merely to kill themselves in the presence of their victims, or to 'scare' the women in 
                                                 
162    Case Study S/00/25(S). 
163     See, discussion above, at p 13. 
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furtherance of their suicide plans frequently encountered judicial understanding as opposed to 
denunciation.  In Case Study M/00/3(S), the offender assaulted the victim, handcuffed her, and 
locked her in a wardrobe to force her to watch his apparent suicide.  The offender was convicted of 
assault and fined.  In Case Study W/06/1(S), the offender, who admitted kidnapping his estranged 
partner and breaching a protection order, was acquitted on two charges of raping her at knifepoint.  
The offender stated that it was not his intention to harm the woman, but to release her, and gas 
himself in his car.  At the completion of his trial, the offender was described as 'an anxious man of 
depressive nature' whom the judge did not think was 'naturally violent'.  Instead, the offender had 
'desperately wanted to talk to his partner on the day of the offence'.164   
 
Although male suicide in the context of separation is generally associated with intimate femicide, 
as previously discussed, it was also a feature of sub-lethal assaults.165   
 
2.   Stalking 
The Chicago Study found controlling behaviour and stalking to be strongly associated with the 
severity of violence in the past year and continued severe violence in the future.  'This was true for 
each individual racial/ethnic group, as well as for pregnant women.'166  In Case Study G/99/7(S) 
the judge noted that the offender, whose actions were 'clearly' those of a stalker, had 'terrified' the 
                                                 
164    In Case Study W/08/1, the offender  went to the home of his estranged wife who had been granted a protection 
order, waited until his step-daughter left for school, and then entered the house armed with a metal bar and carrying a 
rope with one end fashioned as a noose, a balaclava, gloves and 'various hand tools'.  Once inside, he confronted the 
woman in her bedroom and began beating her about the head with the bar.  The victim subsequently stated that she 
thought she would be killed and her only hope was to pretend to be dead.  After protecting herself by wedging her 
head under the bed, she lay as still as she could.  The offender then fetched the noose and placed it over his head.  As 
he was doing so, the woman ran past him screaming, and called the police.  Upon their arrival, the police cut the 
offender down.  The sentencing judge noted that the offender had been convicted of threatening to kill his first wife in 
1981, and in 1984 he discharged a firearm after his then partner indicated a desire to leave him.  That woman dived 
through a closed window to get away.  The victim of his current offending had a protection order in force and this was 
the fourth time the offender had breached it.  The judge told the offender: 'You are a serious danger to any woman in 
the future who forms, then terminates, a relationship with you'.  However, on appeal, the Court of Appeal reduced his 
sentence by two years, stating that the sentencing judge may not have given enough weight to the psychological 
condition of the offender in the light of the pressures upon him. 
165    See, discussion above, at p 67. For example, in Case Study T/02/1(S) the offender was described in court as 
keeping his partner 'a virtual prisoner', monitoring her every movement, following her to her workplace and 'abusing 
her if he thought she got too close to colleagues'.  After waking the woman from sleep, pinning her to the mattress, and 
head-butting her four or five times, the offender 'bit the woman's upper lip, ripping his teeth from side to side.  That 
resulted in a section of her upper lip being ripped and left hanging loose'.  Following intervention by a third party, the 
woman ran from the house, with the offender in pursuit.  After chasing and catching her, the offender 'ripped off the 
piece of lip and threw it away'.  He pleaded guilty to charges of assaulting a female and assault with intent to injure.  
Nine days later, the offender, who was considered 'at risk' and placed on 'special watch', was found dead in his prison 
cell.  Prison staff would not comment further as the matter had been referred to the coroner and the police.  Eight days 
later, in the same prison, a prison inmate who was charged with murdering his de facto partner was also found dead in 
his cell.  
166    Block, et al, above n 108, 271. 
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victim in breach of her protection order.  The offender avoided a sentence of imprisonment and 
subsequently went on to kidnap and assault his seriously ill partner in breach of her protection 
order.  The woman was badly injured during the second assault.  
  
3.   Violence in retaliation for seeking legal intervention 
The Chicago Study found women 'who were making active efforts to obtain formal interventions 
to stop the violence, such as seeking help from a counselor or agency, contacting the police, going 
to court, or getting an order of protection, were at higher risk for continued severe violence'.167 
However, where the only evidence that this was the motive for the assault came from the victim, 
the research found no reported recognition of this structural pattern of offending as a threat to 
victim safety and the successful prosecution of domestic violence cases.  Indeed, as discussed in 
Part II, in a case of lethal separation violence the victim's conduct in reporting her partner's 
violence to the police was accepted as supporting a provocation defence for her killer.   
 
In Case Study M/97/18(S) the offender, a recidivist abuser, wrote letters to the victim while in jail 
awaiting trial on charges of assaulting her and breaching a protection order, urging her not to give 
evidence against him.  In a somewhat equivocal response, the sentencing judge noted that the 
offending 'could be seen as a pathetic attempt by a distraught man or, more sinisterly, as an 
attempt to manipulate the victim'.168   
 
V   RISK MANAGEMENT:  THE MISSING FOCUS ON VICTIM SAFETY 
A   The Focus on Rehabilitation 
The research found recidivist batterers were sentenced on multiple occasions to treatment 
programmes.  In Case Study R/99/15(S) the offender, who was convicted of assaulting a child, 
assaulting his ex-partner, and threatening to kill, was reported as having previously attended six 
anger management courses.  Violent men who repeatedly failed to attend programmes could also 
avoid meaningful sanctions.  In Case Study M/00/20(S), the offender admitted four charges of 
                                                 
167    Ibid 277. 
168   The offender was sentenced to nine months' imprisonment.  In Case Study A/00/29(S) the offender was acquitted 
by a jury on charges inter alia of assaulting his former partner, threatening to kill her, and forcing her at gunpoint to 
strip naked, dig her own grave and lie in it.  He was convicted of attempting to pervert the course of justice by 
arranging for a former prison inmate to contact the woman and threaten her with a contract killing if she did not 
withdraw the charges.  The male who made the threat was sentenced to two months' PD and given a suspended jail 
sentence.  The offender was sentenced to four months' PD to 'mark society's condemnation' of the offence.  The judge 
noted that the offender had already served nine months in prison on remand and thus had served an appropriate jail 
sentence on the 'gagging charge'.    
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failing to comply with a court order that he complete an abuse intervention programme.  The 
offender was first ordered to attend a programme when an interim protection order was served on 
him in 1996.  That order became permanent and the offender was twice convicted of breaching it.  
The prosecutor stated that between September 1996 and June 2000 the offender had been directed, 
or had signed contracts to agree to attend eight 16-week programmes, but failed to attend any.  The 
offender was sentenced to six months' supervision and convicted and discharged on an additional 
charge of failing to appear at court.169   
 
Since repeat victimisation is a red flag for future violence and a risk factor for 
dangerousness/lethality, repeated attempts to rehabilitate recidivist offenders in the context of lack 
of monitoring and accountability of batterers who enter treatment undermines the emphasis on 
effective legal protection for victims in the Domestic Violence Act.  
 
B   Victim-Blaming 
Although the Domestic Violence Act acknowledges the unacceptability of all forms of domestic 
violence,170 victim-blaming is an institutionalised response to violence in intimate relationships.  
In court, victims are blamed for conduct and character deficiencies such as inadequate mothering, 
bad housekeeping, and inviting the behaviour by nagging or drinking.  In cases of repeat 
victimisation, sentencing judges sometimes implicated victims in the offending by attributing the 
violence to a 'destructive' or 'dysfunctional' relationship.  The problematic nature of this analysis 
was revealed when abusers not only continued to assault their partners, but also perpetrated acts of 
violence toward 'innocent' third parties. Warring metaphors of violence which implied mutually 
aggressive persons also belied the reality that only one of the parties sustained injuries.   
 
Courtroom constructions of separation violence also operated to confuse, even reverse, the roles of 
perpetrator and victim.  Violence was attributed to the frustration of offenders who were the 
victims of 'on-again, off-again' relationships.  Despite strong evidence that the instability of the 
relationship was linked to the offender's use of violence, no such connection was acknowledged.  
Victims of separation violence who attempted to keep on good terms with former partners were 
                                                 
169    In Case Study C/01/10(S) in which the offender, who was convicted on charges of assaulting his wife, his mother-
in-law and his step-daughter, in addition to his seventh and eighth driving while disqualified convictions, had his 
sentence deferred to allow him to complete drug rehabilitation and stopping violence programmes.  He failed to 
complete them.  While noting a custodial sentence was 'richly deserved', the judge accepted defence counsel 
submission that having a suspended sentence of imprisonment hanging over the offender's head, might motivate him  
170    Section 5(1)(b). 
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also blamed for sending offenders 'mixed messages'.  Ironically, it was the messages batterers 
received from the legal system that were 'mixed'.  As defendants, batterers were permitted to deny 
or minimise their violence and blame victims.  Once convicted, they were sentenced to batterer 
treatment, where denial, minimising and victim-blaming are prohibited.171     
 
C   The Human Cost of Legal Intervention 
Although courts, police and probation officers routinely make decisions about the risks posed by 
domestic violence offenders, the present study found little evidence of a standardised risk 
assessment instrument and referral protocol in use by police, probation and the courts.  Courts 
sometimes declined to follow a recommendation in the pre-sentence report and/or refused to defer 
to the wishes of victims, but these decisions appeared to depend upon judges' informal assessments 
of risk.  For example, in Case Study W/00/5(S), the judge noted that the offender's assaults and 
threats against his estranged wife had resulted in her experiencing significant trauma.  The 
seriousness of the charges and the offender's lack of remorse rendered the recommendation in the 
probation report of a suspended sentence of imprisonment inappropriate.  In Case Study 
C/00/22(S), the judge remained unconvinced that the offender was amenable to rehabilitation 
despite his victim's support.  Since there was an unacceptable risk that the offender would 'erupt' 
again, the issue of deterrence became more prominent.172  By contrast, the offender in Case Study 
M/97/8(S) punched his wife in the face five times, knocking her unconscious.  He was convicted 
on charges of assaulting a female and breaching a protection order.  The judge is reported as 
stating that the only reason he decided to suspend the prison sentence was the genuine wish of the 
offender's wife that her assailant not be sent to jail.  Two months later, this offender beat his wife 
with a vacuum cleaner pipe and punched her in the face several times, loosening her teeth.   
 
                                                 
171    See, eg, Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 33. 
172    See, also, Case Study T/08/13(S) in which the offender, who had previously assaulted his partner, and was under 
supervision at the time he beat her again, was imprisoned and told a sentence of PD would simply amount to a licence 
to hit his partner again.  In Case Study B/00/8(S) the judge refused to suspend the offender's prison sentence despite a 
letter from his girlfriend stating that she did not want him imprisoned.  The judge noted that the offender had a history 
of breaching court orders, a suspended sentence had already been imposed, and the current offences were serious.  The 
sentence was a matter for the whole community, and not just for the accused and the prosecuting authorities.  In Case 
Study N/99/16(S) the judge noted that the offender's partner had 'ended up on crutches' as a result of the kicking she 
received from the offender in breach of a protection order.  When sentencing the offender to six months' imprisonment 
the judge noted that the court's primary function was to punish offenders and not to provide social services for those 
who could not resist offending.  
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Formalised risk assessment requires the gathering of complete information about the violent record 
of the defendant, including information on protection orders.173  Yet courts sometimes seemed 
unaware of exactly how many prior convictions the offender had garnered for assaulting the 
complainant.174  No inquiry appeared to be undertaken into prior arrests and police call-outs that 
did not proceed to court.  In contrast to research showing 84 per cent of women apply for 
protection orders on the grounds of physical violence,175 and respondents who have multiple 
applications taken out against them are especially dangerous,176 courts appeared to credit 
respondents of protection orders for not previously perpetrating violence despite the existence of 
the protection order.177    
 
The Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families notes that domestic violence is 'usually a 
deliberate strategy to exert domination and power over others'.178  However, many judges 
appeared not to subscribe to this analysis.  Rather, the view of the judge in Case Study P/99/3(S) 
that domestic violence occurs 'because people give way to the effects of alcohol, temper and 
frustration' was one which was frequently expressed.  This perception of domestic violence as a 
problem of anger management is controversial.179  'In domestic-violence situations the offender 
specifically targets a weaker family member for the purposes of control, not just because he is 
angry.'180   Indeed, in the aforementioned case in which the judge also described the frequency of 
male assaults on women as a 'national disgrace', the offender's sentence of imprisonment was 
suspended and the offender went on to perpetrate further violence against his partner.   
 
                                                 
173    Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 33, 89. 
174   In Case Study W/99/13(S) the offender beat his pregnant partner with a broken broomstick, smashed household 
items and windows.  The sentencing judge is reported as telling the offender: 'Sadly you have a bad record of violence.  
You have some 15 previous convictions relating to violence, some or all of those related to the same victim.'  In Case 
Study W/00/13(S) the offender was convicted of breaching a protection order in relation to his estranged partner.  The 
sentencing judge is reported as stating that the offender had a 'long list of assaults, some of them on women and 
possibly some on his ex-partner'.  
175    Barwick, Gray and Macky, above n 18, 53. 
176    Anna Stewart, 'Who are the Respondents of Domestic Violence Protection Orders?' (2000) 33 ANZJ Crim 77. 
177   In Case Study W/00/11(S) in addition to assault convictions, the offender, who beat his partner so badly she 
suffered permanent injury, was also convicted and discharged for breaching the woman's protection order.  The judge 
is reported as noting that the offender had not previously used violence against the victim.   In Case Study S/06/8(S) 
the offender punched his ex-wife, pulled out her hair and stabbed her several times in the chest and neck.  She was 
saved from further violence by the intervention of a neighbour.  The sentencing judge noted that the women had taken 
out a non-molestation order, but then she allowed the offender to visit.  When sentencing the offender, the judge 
remarked that he had taken into account his early guilty plea, his remorse and lack of previous convictions.   
178    See, eg, Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report (2006) 4. 
179    Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 33, 24-25. 
180    Johnson, above n 43, 38 (citations omitted). 
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At least 20 US state standards and guidelines prohibit couple counselling for batterers.181  
'Mediation frames violence as a derivative of conflict when it is really about power and 
domination'.182  However, the offender in Case Study K/01/2 who admitted a charge of assaulting 
a female, was sentenced to nine months' supervision and directed by the court to attend an 'Abuse 
Intervention Programme and Attitude Programme', and to undertake 'family counselling' with his 
partner.  Some time after the court-ordered counselling, the offender broke into the locked home of 
his former partner and in the presence of the couple's three year-old daughter, threatened to kill the 
woman, and smeared blood from a serious cut he received while smashing a window to gain entry 
on the woman's face.  The judge told the offender, '[m]y fear is that one day you are going to hurt 
someone.  I am sure that psychologically you have already hurt your daughter'.   
 
While the media occasionally draw attention to cases in which women are beaten, stabbed, shot 
and killed by offenders who were the targets of earlier criminal justice interventions, the present 
study found many more such incidents.  Cases in which re-offending had a lethal outcome are 
discussed in the following chapter.  Following are further examples of sub-lethal re-offending.   
 
In Case Study M/97/11(S), defence counsel for an offender who assaulted his partner over 'an 
extended period of time' stated that the complainant had ended the relationship, taken out a 
protection order, and the offender had lost custody of his child.  He had attended a Stopping 
Violence Programme and the complainant asked for leniency.  When sentencing the offender to 
four months' periodic detention, the judge reportedly told him:  'Apparently you have made 
changes.  Had you not, you would be facing a jail sentence'.  The offender was subsequently 
convicted of raping his former partner, performing oral sex on her, aggravated burglary of her 
home and four breaches of a protection order in relation to offending which occurred a few months 
later.   
 
                                                 
181   Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 33, 25, noting that disapproval 'is based on a belief that victims of abuse 
are intimidated and cannot fully participate in therapy in the presence of their abusers.  If victims do reveal the 
batterer's violence or disclose other problems, they face the threat of reprisal.  Restrictions on couples therapy and 
individual psychotherapy for battering are a point of contention between feminist-oriented batterer intervention 
providers and mental health providers in many communities'. 
182   Loretta Stalans and Arthur Lurigio, 'Public Preferences for the Court's Handling of Domestic Violence Situations' 
(1995) 41 Crime and Delinquency 399, 405.   Judge Boshier, A Review of the Family Court (1993) 119, recommended 
avoidance of mediation as a means of dispute resolution in New Zealand domestic violence cases.  The fear is that 
victims of violence will be coerced into agreeing to orders which may compromise their own and/or their children's 
safety. 
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In Case Study T/01/20(S), the offender received a suspended term of imprisonment for assaulting 
his partner.  Within a month he assaulted the same woman and threatened to kill her in breach of a 
protection order.  The victim was hospitalised and underwent surgery as a result of the second 
attack.  Just six weeks after he received a suspended sentence of imprisonment, the offender in 
Case Study A/99/12(S) argued with his estranged wife, then travelled to the home of her sister and 
smashed a rock in her face three times, leaving the woman permanently disfigured.  The victim's 
nine year-old daughter witnessed the attack, and 'had been affected by it'.  The offender in Case 
Study H/94/1(S), whom the judge described as having one of the worst records of assaulting 
women he had seen, was under a suspended sentence at the time he assaulted his pregnant partner.  
His one year suspended sentence was activated, with an added one month imprisonment.  Eleven 
months later, this offender forced his way into his former partner's home and perpetrated a 'savage 
attack' on the woman as she huddled over her child to protect it.183  One month and one day after 
the offender in Case Study M/97/4(S) received a suspended sentence for beating his partner; he 
inflicted a further 'shocking' beating on the woman.  The offender's fifth conviction for assaulting a 
female brought a jail sentence.  In Case Study S/01/2(S), following a sentence of home detention in 
relation to an assault which the judge described as 'one of the worst cases of a man assaulting a 
woman he had come across for many years', the offender was subsequently convicted of 
attempting to murder the woman.184   
 
When women have attempted in vain to use the criminal justice system to protect themselves, 
failure to keep the batterer away puts pressure on women to return to the battering relationship.  
This situation has devastating implications for children.   In Case Study H/01/9(S), the battered 
woman recognised that her de facto partner was becoming increasingly dangerous, and requested 
                                                 
183   In Case Study O/00/10(S) the offender beat his wife so severely she needed reconstructive surgery to repair her 
face.  During the 40 minute beating, which ended when the woman's daughter raised the alarm with neighbours, the 
offender punched his wife three times in the face, gripped her by the back of the neck and slammed her face into a 
wall and the floor.  The woman's injuries included a broken jaw, a fractured eye socket and severe bruising.  The 
offender had been convicted of a prior assault on his wife just one month earlier.  The attack by the offender in Case 
Study A/06/6(S) resulted in permanent disfigurement of his estranged partner's face and scarring on her neck and leg.  
The judge noted that the offender had avoided a jail sentence for threatening to kill a woman only a short time before 
the assault. 
184    In Case Study R/01/11(S) the offender's third assault on the victim and breach of her protection order was met 
with a sentence of four months' imprisonment and leave to apply for home detention.  Later that year, the offender was 
charged with rape, wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, unlawfully detaining, and two counts of 
unlawful sexual connection, in relation to the same complainant.  The physical assault involved attacking his partner 
with a metal tube or curtain rod, punching and kicking her as she lay on the floor.  After making the woman and her 
daughter clean the house and remove bloodstains from the walls and carpet, in response to his partner's statement that 
she wanted to end the relationship 'another assault began that continued sporadically throughout the night'. The 
offender also threatened to stab the woman and her children.  The offender was convicted on the wounding charge.  
The outcome of the sexual offence charges is unknown. 
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he leave the family home.  He refused to go, informing her that she 'could not kick him out without 
a protection order'.185  The following day, the male murdered the woman's two daughters age 11 
and 12 years.186  The children's mother told the court that she had taken out a protection order 
against the offender a few years earlier, but he had ignored the order and it was easier to let him 
stay in the home.  'You can't cut [the offender] out.  I tried before: he won't leave…police can't 
stop him', she said.   
 
Failure of batterer accountability also places abusive men's lives at risk.  One woman in this study 
who employed lethal self defence against her husband stated that after calling the police 'dozens of 
times' and taking out a protection order, these legal avenues failed her and 'I ended up marrying 
the guy because I could not get away from him…The law doesn't do anything for me'.  The 
deceased victim in this case had previously beaten the woman and assaulted their four week-old 
son.  He received a two month sentence of imprisonment following these assaults.187       
 
Although women in the present study were assaulted, injured, maimed, disfigured and sometimes 
killed following abusers' interactions with the legal system, a culture of silence militated against 
institutional accountability for the ways these cases were processed.   
 
VI   PRINCIPLED CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTION 
A   The Power and Control Analysis 
The power and control model of domestic violence, developed by the DAIP in Duluth, Minnesota, 
is commonly used to explain the many facets of domestic violence.188  Rather than a one-off 
incident of physical or sexual abuse, domestic violence is defined as 'a range of tactics by which 
abusers seek to maintain power and control over their partners'.  Psychologically abusive tactics 
include denial, minimising, blaming, isolation, intimidation, invalidating a partner's reality, 
manipulation, and using children and economic privileges.189  Studies show aspects of men's 
controlling and coercive behaviour include jealousy motivated strictures on what women wear and 
                                                 
185    The offender had assaulted the mother with a knife and threatened to kill her. 
186    Apparently to prevent the discovery of his sexual offending against the children. 
187    Case Study S/01/F.  
188    The power and control wheel was developed by Minnesota Program Development Inc. 
189  Randye Semple, 'Psychological Abuse in Intimate Relationships: A New Zealand Perspective' (2001) 30 New 
Zealand Journal of Psychology 60. 
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how they look; restrictions on women's movements outside the home; commanding women 'keep 
their heads down' in public; forced sexual activity and financial exploitation.190   
 
Julie Stubbs notes that 
 
a control-based theoretical analysis of domestic violence is preferable because it has the capacity to 
recognize a number of features of domestic violence such as that: domestic violence includes a 
range of behaviours and coercive tactics not all of which are immediately discernible to others; it is 
often repetitive, meaningful and strategic, reflecting deeply held attitudes and beliefs rather than an 
isolated incident; and there are social and cultural dimensions that give meaning to the violence, 
that may authorize or sustain gender-based violence, and may constrain women's options in dealing 
with violence.191 
 
The above observation highlights the importance of the power and control analysis to societal and 
system accountability for the way violence against women is constructed, prosecuted and 
punished.192  This systemic analysis can be distinguished from more limited theories which 
concentrate on individual abusers and/or victims in isolation.193   
 
B   Principled Sentencing  
Although the judicial typology of batterers discussed above apparently presumes that some 
recidivist batterers will avoid imprisonment, the power and control model of intervention is 
premised upon the assumption that the batterer will be held accountable. This requires a 
consequence for every act of violence, and incremental penalties for further acts of violence.194  
This intervention approach also appears consistent with established sentencing principles.  For 
example, Hall notes that while a sentence cannot be increased merely because an offender has 
previous convictions, with the result that he is punished twice for the same offence,  
 
                                                 
190  Catherine Itzen, 'Gendering Domestic Violence: The Influence of Feminism on Policy and Practice' in Jalna 
Hanmer and Catherine Itzen (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and 
Practice (2000) 356, 358, citing  Jalna Hamer, 'Out of Control: Men, Violence and Family Life' in J Popay, J Hearn 
and J Edwards (eds), Men, Gender Divisions and Welfare (1998).  
191   Julie Stubbs, 'Domestic Violence and Women's Safety: Feminist Challenges to Restorative Justice' in Heather 
Strang and John Braithwaite (eds), Restorative Justice and Family Violence (2002) 43-44 (citations omitted). 
192    Pence and McDonnell, above n 15, 251-252.  
193    Ruth Busch and Neville Robertson, '"What's Love Got To Do With It?" An Analysis of an Intervention Approach 
to Domestic Violence' (1993) 1 Waikato L.Rev. 109, 131. 
194    Ruth Busch, 'Editorial' (1996) 4 Waikato L.Rev. i, iii.  
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[t]he commission of several offences of the same or similar type will normally result in an offender 
receiving a more severe sentence on the basis that his previous convictions indicate a predilection 
to commit a particular type of crime…This is especially so where a second offence is committed 
against the same victim.195 
 
However, as discussed above, the present study found little evidence of a graded system of legal 
sanctions within a framework of increasing severity.  When the court activated a suspended 
sentence of imprisonment and imposed a concurrent sentence in relation to subsequent offending, 
depending on the length of the sentence, an offender could also avoid sanctions for the previous or 
current assaults.196  When more than one victim was involved and the sentences run concurrently, 
violence toward one of the victims effectively remained unpunished.  The same problem occurred 
in cases where offenders perpetrated a number of assaults on different occasions against the same 
victim and the sentences for each were expressed as running concurrently.  Sentences for breach of 
the victim's protection order also ran concurrently with sentences for assaults.  
 
During the research, s 21D of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 required courts to consider granting 
leave to apply for release to home detention to offenders sentenced to two years' imprisonment or 
less.197  Although use of this sentencing option in domestic violence cases has the potential to 
expand opportunities for offenders to re-offend or reactivate a regime of harassment, seriously 
violent, recidivist offenders and those who perpetrated assaults in the context of separation were 
granted leave to apply for home detention.198   This sentencing option appeared particularly 
inappropriate when applied to an offender whose violence forced the victim to flee her home and 
relocate somewhere else with her children.   
 
                                                 
195    Hall, above n 141, 187 (citations omitted). 
196   For example, in Case Study T/06/10(S) the offender, who had been convicted in relation to three violent offences 
in the previous three years, beat his wife so badly she nearly died.  Five months earlier, he received a one year 
sentence of imprisonment for assaulting a child which was suspended.   Telling the offender he was lucky he was not 
appearing for murder, the judge ordered that the suspended sentence be served concurrently with the four year 
sentence for the present offending. 
197    See, also, s 97 Sentencing Act 2002. 
198   In Case Study H/01/22(S), the offender met up with his partner in a bar where she was drinking with friends.  
After arguing with the woman, the offender hit her in the face with a glass which smashed on impact, cutting the 
woman's face.  She required surgery and the attack left her permanently scarred.  Defence counsel told the court the 
offender had a momentary loss of control.  Although the complainant stated she still feared her former partner, he was 
sentenced to 15 months' imprisonment and granted leave to apply for home detention.   
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Hall notes that 'the most significant factor in sentencing involves an assessment of the gravity of 
the offence'.199  In the light of traditional legal condonation of wife-beating, when courts weigh the 
comparative gravity of domestic assaults against the full range of offending in the criminal 
calendar, a longstanding tendency to trivialise this offending may be reflected in sentencing 
outcomes.200 
 
C   Monitoring and Evaluation from the Standpoint of Victim Safety 
The Hamilton Abuse Intervention Project (HAIP) set up in July 1991 was modelled on the 
philosophy and practices of the DAIP in Minnesota.  The project required criminal justice agencies 
and frontline battered women's advocacy groups to work collaboratively to achieve consistent 
interventions and batterer accountability through incrementally severe sanctions for repeat acts of 
violence.  Battered women were provided with support and advocacy throughout the criminal 
justice process and beyond.  Men's attendance at court-mandated treatment programmes was 
monitored, with penalties for those who were uncooperative or failed to attend.  Protocols for 
sharing information between agencies were developed.  Compliance with the protocols was 
systematically monitored and intervention practices were evaluated from the standpoint of victim 
safety.201  Collaborative relationships between government agencies and the community were 
forged to provide strong and direct intervention when necessary.202  In addition to contextualising 
violence within a cultural framework of power and control, the analysis also 'accounted for the 
impact of colonization on Maori life and violence against Maori women by Maori men'.203  As a 
result, the HAIP project received good support from Maori activists and Refuge workers.  
Subsequent research confirmed the benefits of HAIP for Maori and non-Maori battered women.204   
 
Nevertheless, following the pilot period of three years, government funding for the HAIP project 
was cut.  Sixty five per cent of funds received were tagged for different forms of independent 
                                                 
199    Hall, above n 86, 140.   
200   In R v Green (1994) 11 CRNZ 641, 645, the Court of Appeal noted that [e]ven a robber of long habit and perhaps 
ineradicable inclination is entitled to a sentence balanced by comparison with worse crimes and more depraved 
offenders'.  Cf Hall, above n 141, 184, 188, citing 'domestic difficulties' as a background circumstance which may 
mitigate offending.  Credit may also be given to offenders who have 'weakened under pressure (eg loss of job through 
redundancy, domestic crisis)'.  (emphasis added.) 
201   Roma Balzer, 'Hamilton Abuse Intervention Project: The Aotearoa Experience' in Melanie Shepard and Ellen 
Pence (eds), Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond (1999) 239, 
240-241. 
202    Ibid 248-249. 
203    Ibid 240. 
204    Ibid 252. 
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monitoring and this level of funding was withdrawn from the project.  Roma Balzer notes the 
immediate effect of this move was to almost destroy the viability of HAIP.  However, the 
government's action has had much wider and longer-lasting ramifications: 
 
In taking [that] action…the government has decided against making the HAIP experiment standard 
national practice.  It has once again left it to local groups to argue for a collaborative government 
and community-based program effort to confront this violence.  It has retreated from a commitment  
 to its own obligation to be accountable to a broader vision of intervention.  No funding is available  
 through any of the conventional funding sources for the independent monitoring of agencies and  
 practitioner performance.  In many parts of the country, government agencies give mere lip service  
to interagency collaboration, and victim's advocacy groups are accorded the status of service 
providers with little or no allowance for them to critique how agencies' performance affect battered  
 women.205 
 
While the family safety teams currently being piloted by the government have a monitoring 
function, policies and practices which fail to promote victim safety evolve within a particular work 
culture.  Systematic, independent monitoring, including input from specialist domestic violence 
advocates is necessary.  The tracking system should follow the victim and offender from the time 
of initial contact with the police, through the Refuge, court and prison system, into the 
rehabilitation course, probation office and beyond.206   
 
VII   CONCLUSION 
Although feminists have succeeded in defining domestic violence as a crime, progress has been 
uneven and gains achieved cannot be taken for granted.207  The present compartmentalised legal 
response to domestic violence lacks awareness of the interconnections between various categories 
of abuse.  Consequently, while battered victims' protestations of love and forgiveness are regarded 
as reliable, credible assertions of agency when courts sentence their abusers; feminists note these 
assertions are disbelieved and discredited when articulated by battered defendants.208  Legislation 
deeming violence in the presence of a child or within earshot of a child to be psychological abuse 
                                                 
205    Ibid 253. 
206    Falk and Helgeson, above n 1, 91. 
207    See, eg, Wendy Davis, 'Gender Bias, Fathers' Rights, Domestic Violence and the Family Court' [2004] BFLJ 299, 
309, noting that allegations by the Fathers' Rights movement and some politicians and sections of the media that the 
Family Court is biased against men have influenced the direction of family law, both locally and internationally, 
despite an almost complete absence of reliable empirical data to support these claims. 
208    See, eg, Seuffert, above n 77.  
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frequently remains unacknowledged when courts mitigate batterers' sentences according to the 
wishes of battered mothers.  Although this practice also sends a message of approval to women 
who remain in abusive relationships, law has become increasingly willing to prosecute battered 
mothers for failing to protect their children from battering men.  The 'crime of passion' 
construction of separation violence and related empathy with violent men209 lacks 
acknowledgement of the relationship between this violence and mothers' ability to protect their 
children by safely exiting abusive relationships.  This fragmented response is inconsistent with 
New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy which seeks consistent, comprehensive 
intervention that keeps victims safe and holds abusers accountable.   
 
Assumptions that 'the relationship' mitigates repeated acts of abuse have their origins in historical 
legal condonation of violence against wives.  Minimising the dangers inherent in violent 
relationships also permits batterers to be repeatedly ordered to attend treatment programmes in the 
absence of monitoring and meaningful sanctions for non-compliance.  Abused women are 
compelled to testify against violent men without recognition of the elevated risk of violence in 
these circumstances and related provision of protection and support.   The primary red flags of 
separation and repeat victimisation are also masked by legal analyses which fail to challenge 
debilitating and dangerous cultural constructions of romantic love at the individual and societal 
level.  Although domestic violence legislation emphasises the importance of effective legal 
protection for victims, silence surrounding the casualty toll of women and children who are 
harmed following criminal justice interventions with domestic violence offenders has contributed 
to a systemic failure of state accountability to abused women and their children. 
                                                 
209   In Don't Blow It, Youth Warned, Press, 13 November 1997, defence counsel for an offender convicted of his 
fourth, fifth and sixth breaches of a protection order told the court that: 'If this was Shakespeare, we would say "How 
Beautiful"'. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
REVIEW OF AGENCY RESPONSES TO LETHAL ASSAULTS 
 If I die, I want you to tell the world what happened to me. 
I don't want other women to suffer as I have suffered. 
I want them to be listened to.  
Maria Teresa Macias (1959-1996), Sonoma County, California, 19961 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
The reality that decades of reform have failed to substantially alter the toll of women's deaths from 
domestic violence has led US2 and Canadian3 jurisdictions to establish domestic violence fatality 
review panels.  The Home Office and London Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) also set up 
'Domestic Violence Murder Review' panels to investigate and report on domestic homicides 
perpetrated in London between 1 January 2001 and 6 April 2002.4  These reviews have now been 
placed on a statutory footing.5   
 
Neil Websdale notes that fatality reviews 
 
are increasingly part of an expanding arsenal of multiagency, interdisciplinary strategies for 
addressing the effects of violence against women.  Underpinning these strategies is a concern about 
the risks of harm faced by women and other family members and a desire to improve the 
accountability of individual service agencies and to enhance the effectiveness of interagency co-
ordination efforts.  If conducted thoroughly and thoughtfully, fatality reviews may yield a more 
comprehensive understanding of the causes of and prevention strategies for domestic violence.6 
 
                                                 
1   Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 'Tell the World What Happened to Me': Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2002) 3.  
2  Neil Websdale, Maureen Sheeran and Byron Johnson, Reviewing Domestic Violence Fatalities: Summarizing 
National Developments (1998) Violence Against Women Online Resources, http://www.vaw.umn.edu at 15 November 
2005 describe the state-by-state matrix of Domestic Violence Death Review initiatives. 
3   In Ontario, domestic violence fatality reviews have been set up under s 15(4) of the Coroners Act 1990.     The 
Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, Annual Report to the Chief Coroner: Case Reviews of Domestic 
Violence Deaths, 2002 (2004) 12, notes the legislation 'allows for not only an extensive investigation process, but also 
a systematic examination that provides the basis for recommendations for preventing deaths in similar circumstances'. 
4   Metropolitan Police Service, Findings from the Multi-agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in London: 
Prepared for the ACPO Homicide Working Group (2003). 
5     Section 9 Domestic Violence, Crime and Victims Act 2004 (UK). 
6     Neil Websdale, 'Reviewing Domestic Violence Deaths' [2003] NIJ Journal 26, 28.  
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Websdale and his colleagues distinguish the 'investigative' model of fatality review from a 'systems 
approach'. 
  
The 'investigative model' prioritises the need to identify domestic violence fatalities which have not 
previously been identified as domestic violence related by police, prosecutors, and coroners.  Its 
goals include understanding how or why deaths were not classified as domestic violence related and 
working toward clearer elucidation of causes of death…The 'systems approach' prioritizes the need 
to identify how interventions were ineffective.  The goal is to change the policies and procedures of 
involved agencies.  Under this model, it is not necessary to identify every domestic violence related 
death. 7   
 
Systems reviews consistently report that women engage in multiple attempts to seek help before 
they are killed.8  The Ontario Domestic Violence Death Review Committee found a domestic 
homicide would likely have been predicted by knowledgeable professionals in five of the eleven 
cases the panel reviewed.  Furthermore, in every case it examined, 'family members, friends, 
neighbours, and/or professionals had some knowledge of the escalating circumstances between the 
perpetrators and victims'.  These persons failed to appreciate the significance of the situation and 
the information available to them.9  The Committee concluded that domestic violence risk 
assessment tools have the potential to save lives.10   
 
The London MPS review also found no standardised domestic violence risk assessment tool was 
applied across the MPS and its partner agencies.  Although red flags for serious violence/lethality 
were present in the majority of cases, these were not identified due to little guidance or research 
about what they are.11  Courts granted bail to repeat domestic violence offenders who went straight 
to the homes of their victims and seriously assaulted or killed them.12  Probation and Corrections 
Departments paroled violent offenders to the homes of women they had been imprisoned for 
battering and women were killed within a short time of their release.13   
 
                                                 
7    Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 2. 
8  Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Every Life Lost is a Call for Change: Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2004) 6.  See also, Metropolitan 
Police Service, above n 4, 16. 
9     Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, above n 3, 30. 
10    Ibid 44. 
11    Metropolitan Police Service, above n 4, 10. 
12    Ibid 31. 
13    Ibid 29.   
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While accepting that perpetrators are individually responsible for their violent acts, the Washington 
Review Panel notes that the quality of agency interventions, and provision of options for victims to 
obtain some measure of safety, self-determination and economic autonomy, is the responsibility of 
all persons in our society.  
 
What we have learned from in-depth reviews of domestic violence fatalities over the last seven 
years is that domestic violence and domestic violence homicides are not an inevitable fact of life.  
Most homicides are preceded by multiple efforts to get help by the victim and multiple opportunities 
for the legal system and community to hold the abuser accountable…The actions and choices of 
both victims and abusers are substantially influenced by the institutional, social and cultural reality 
which surrounds them…[W]e identify the shortcomings in policy, practice, knowledge, training, 
collaboration, resources, communication and referrals that worked to amplify abusers' ability to 
control and terrorize their partners, or conspired to create insurmountable obstacles to safety and 
autonomy for domestic violence victims and their children.14  
 
This chapter reviews agency interventions with victims and offenders prior to lethal assaults. 
Following a 'systems review' of selected cases, an 'investigative review' explores women's deaths in 
situations that call for ongoing monitoring and improved protocols for coroners and others 
investigating deaths.   
 
II   MISSING DATA 
Cases and commentaries in this chapter are subject to a proviso regarding the nature and 
availability of data.  The Wisconsin Domestic Violence Homicide Review provides an example of 
data available when fatality committees are established on a statutory footing.  The Panel gathered 
anonymous demographic information from a computerised official data base followed by an 
Internet search for newspaper accounts of the selected homicides.  If there were gaps in this data, 
the panel could access police and court records; contact local domestic violence programmes; 
district attorney's offices; adult protective services; medical examiners/coroners; and community 
response coordinators in the counties where the homicides took place.15   
 
By comparison, in many cases in the present study where prior violence against the victim and/or 
prior convictions for domestic violence by the perpetrator could be established, no information on 
                                                 
14    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 1.  
15    Wisconsin Coalition Against Domestic Violence, 2003 Wisconsin Domestic Violence Homicide Report (2005) 13. 
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the nature and quality of interventions was found.  As demonstrated by the following case, without 
information about prior agency interactions with abusers it is impossible to identify the ways in 
which interventions were ineffective, or to hold institutions accountable.    
 
Case Study H/00/2: The Role of the Victim in Criminal Justice Interventions16 
In 1991, 32 year-old Trina was granted a final non-molestation order against Mark, her 31 year-old male 
partner.   In 1996 Mark was convicted of wounding Trina with intent to injure and sentenced to two and a 
half years' imprisonment.  In 1998 he appealed to the High Court against a refusal of bail in the District 
Court in relation to a further charge of assaulting Trina.  In the lower Court, Trina offered to give evidence 
in support of the bail application 'that it was she who assaulted the offender, not the other way around, and 
that in fact he did not assault her on the night in question'.17  The District Court judge considered Trina's 
offer to give this evidence but declined bail as Mark had a 'lengthy list' of prior convictions, including a 
number involving violence; breach of various Court orders; and a conviction for escaping and failure to 
answer bail.   
 
On appeal, Trina signed a statement in the High Court which was attached to Marks' affidavit in which she 
stated: 'He did not hit or touch me once…he did not assault me at all and I told the policeman in Court 
this'.18  However, an independent bystander witnessed the assault and signed a police officer's statement in 
his notebook.  Although that statement had yet to be tested under cross-examination, the judge noted it was 
a careful and detailed recollection of events.  Accordingly, it could not be said that the charges against Mark 
would fail despite Trina's stance.  The judge observed: 
 
[I]t is commonly the case that, for whatever reason, women in circumstances such as that in which 
[Trina] found herself on this night and on previous occasions, continue to support those who have 
assaulted them so the reasons for her taking the attitude which she has consistently taken during and 
since the bail hearing must remain imponderable.19  
 
In 2000, Mark arrived home in the early hours of the morning and after arguing with Trina and assaulting 
her, Mark stabbed her in the neck and chest with a kitchen knife.  Trina's children witnessed the 
unsuccessful attempts of emergency services to revive their mother. 
 
                                                 
16    See, discussion of this case, above at p 71. 
17    H v Police (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Williams J, 21 May 1998) 2. 
18    Ibid. 
19    Ibid 5. 
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A wealth of research over almost three decades has exposed barriers to effective and safe 
participation in the criminal justice process that confront battered women.20  The judge's 
description of battered women's withdrawal from, or lack of support for prosecutions as 
'imponderable' is therefore dispiriting.  
 
The offender in this case was reported as having a 'lengthy list' of past convictions.  However, 
despite a search of the database, a search for unreported judgments, and the obtaining of a 
transcript of the murder trial, no information on the nature of these convictions, or the extent, if 
any, to which they related to his partner was found.  Nor was information available on the role 
Trina played in the offender's earlier conviction and subsequent imprisonment for assaulting her.  
The offender's prior convictions included 'breach of various Court orders' but it could not be 
established whether some or all of these related to the protection order Trina had sought and been 
granted, and if so, whether she had cooperated in the prosecution of the offender on these 
occasions.  Penalties imposed in relation to these convictions also remain unknown.  Given an 
apparently clear pattern of escalating violence, it is particularly unfortunate that no information 
could be found relating to the 1998 offending.  Consequently, it could not be ascertained whether 
the offender was convicted of the alleged assault in the absence of Trina's evidence, and if so, the 
sanctions involved, and if relevant, the period of imprisonment imposed.    
 
III   THE SYSTEMS REVIEW 
In September 1998, the media reported that during the previous 18 months at least four New 
Zealand women were killed by male partners who were on bail on charges of breaching protection 
orders at the time of the lethal assault.21  Official statistics do not isolate domestic violence 
offending from other acts of violence perpetrated while on bail,22 so the present study could not 
                                                 
20    Lee Bowker, 'A Battered Woman's Problems Are Social, Not Psychological' in Richard Gelles and Donileen 
Loseke (eds), Current Controversies on Family Violence (1993) 154, 158-160 identified the six barriers to escape as 
fear of worse battering; fear of harm to children; retaliation against parents or other close relatives; poverty and 
homelessness; shame; failure and public sin; loss of social identity and one's entire way of life.  
 See also,  Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse, Barbara J Hart's Collected Writings 
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/ at 15 November 2005 providing a comprehensive analysis of obstacles to battered 
women's participation in prosecutions; Kersti Yllo and Michele Bograd (eds) Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse 
(1988); Louise Ellison, 'Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim Participation' (2002) 65 MLR 834; Louise 
Ellison, 'Responding to Victim Withdrawal in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' [2003] Crim.L.R. 760. 
21    'Raw Deal' for Women in Courts, Press, 24 September, 1998;  
22   See, eg, Barbara Lash, Research Findings: Trends in the Use of Bail and Offending While on Bail 1990-1999 
(2003). 
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confirm these cases.23  However, during the period 2000 and 2002, at least four more women were 
killed by offenders who were on bail on domestic-related charges at the time they killed current or 
estranged female partners.  The following case study is also significant for the number of victim 
and offender interactions with state agencies shortly before the killing which failed to avert the 
final lethal assault.  
 
A   Case Study One 
Battered Victim or Battered Free Agent?:  Case Study T/00/624 
Sam, the 32 year-old offender had served six prison sentences for assaulting females, and had a history of 
threatening and violent behaviour toward Millie, his 41 year-old partner, over their two year relationship.  
At the time he killed Millie, Sam was on parole after serving three-quarters of a 14-month prison sentence 
for a previous assault on her.  While in prison for this offence, Sam sent a number of abusive and 
threatening letters to Millie which the police recovered after her death.  In a letter addressed to 'My Lovely' 
he told Millie she had four options when he was released: 'I stay, I stay and crack you, I crack you and 
leave, I get life'.  He warned her: 'I don't need to be pissed to crack you and I most likely be sober next time 
I do it and then you will know and feel it properly what it is like to f***me around, go on do it again and 
find out... You see I don't care about anyone else but how you treat me is how I treat you.  Like a dog.  If it 
takes off you give it a hiding ...next time I am going to take some teeth, next time break your legs'.  In 
another letter he wrote: 'Wait till I get hold of you.  Nothing can stop me when my mind is set to do 
something'.  Upon his release, Sam was sent to live at Millie's home as a condition of his parole.   
 
Two weeks after his release from prison, members of Millie's family requested that Sam's probation officer 
recall him to prison as he was continuing to assault Millie and had failed to attend 'relationship counselling' 
as a condition of his parole.  However, the probation officer decided not to recall Sam as his sentence was 
due to expire some six days later.  Following complaints over the probation officer's handling of this case, a 
Corrections Department Internal Audit Report found the probation officer had decided to give Sam a 
'second chance'.  The Report also found Sam had been considered at high risk of re-offending and within a 
day of his release had continued his assaults on his partner.  Referral notes written by the probation officer 
to a relationship counsellor recorded his concern that Millie had accepted Sam back, and that she was being 
physically abused by him.   
 
                                                 
23    The 24 September report discusses these cases in terms of fatalities.  However, an earlier report: Alarm at Rise in 
Domestic Violence, Press, 22 September 1998 states four offenders on bail for breaches 'killed or tried to kill their 
partners'. 
24     The victim/agent dichotomy is further discussed in Chapter Ten. 
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Sam and Millie also visited Work and Income New Zealand.  At this time, Millie had 'blackened eyes and 
appeared frightened'.  However, no action was taken by WINZ staff as Millie 'had not wanted to press 
charges'.   
 
A social worker later gave evidence that she accompanied the police to Millie's home the month before she 
was murdered to remove her 14 year-old son from her care after reports of domestic violence.  The social 
worker noted that at the time she met the boy's mother, Millie had a black eye and broken glasses.  Millie 
told the social worker: 'I know that I am going to die at the hands of Sam'.  When asked by defence counsel 
why she did not pass this comment on to the police, or take it seriously, the social worker responded that she 
did take it seriously, and removed Millie's son the following day.  However, she could only give Millie 
advice:  'She knew what her fate was, but she wasn't prepared to move'.   
 
On the night of the murder, the couple attended a party and Millie refused to go home with Sam.  He left 
alone, but subsequently returned armed with a baseball bat.  Millie's friends had hidden her.  Sam warned 
those present that he would kill Millie if she was not home by 6 pm.  The police were called and witnesses 
complained that Sam had threatened to kill his partner.  Sam was arrested and taken to the police station.  A 
police officer later gave evidence that during the police interview, Sam denied he had threatened other 
people at the party, stating that the only person he would threaten to kill was his 'missus'.   Sam was charged 
with possession of an offensive weapon and threatening to kill.  He was given police bail, and a police 
officer delivered him back to Millie's home.   
 
Millie was asked by the attending officer if she 'had any problems' with this arrangement and reportedly 
responded that 'everything was okay'.  At this time, Millie also told the officer that 'one day [Sam] was 
going to kill her, but he was a good man and she loved him'.  Sam then entered the room and put his arm 
around Millie.  The couple were told by the police officer to work out their problems when they were sober 
and the officer left.  Presumably out of concern for Millie's safety, the officer asked a male neighbour to 
'keep an eye' on the couple.  Some time that evening, Sam beat Millie 'from head to foot until her face was 
unrecognisable and five of her ribs were broken'.  She died from throat injuries inflicted with a spade 
handle.  The sentencing judge later noted that Sam believed his partner 'got what she deserved'.   
 
Millie's sister told reporters that she blamed this murder on the Department of Corrections for paroling the 
offender to her sister's home and refusing to recall him when faced with evidence of ongoing physical 
violence.  She pointed out that it was difficult for the family to remove Sam from Millie's home as his parole 
conditions specified that he reside there.  Millie owned her own home, so she could not leave without a large 
financial loss.  Millie's sister said her family 'wanted a law change that set a minimum time frame before 
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someone could be paroled to their victim's home'.  A Woman's Refuge spokesperson agreed, noting that 
'abused women would find it hard to turn their abusive partners away'.   
 
However, criminal justice personnel told the media that the Parole Board had been informed by Sam's 
probation officer that Millie consented to the residence condition.  Millie's sister replied that Millie was too 
afraid of Sam to deny his request.  'Of course she couldn't refuse him...she was afraid of him.  It should 
never have been an option.  At some point they have to make a judgment call and see the bigger picture' she 
said.   Considering Millie had left behind a son, who was taken away by the child protection agency because 
of Sam's violence, and whose last memory was of his mother with a black eye, Millie's sister considered 
Sam's sentence of imprisonment was not long enough.  'To a 14-year old boy with no mother, it's not very 
long at all', she said.    
 
Victim advocates agreed with Millie's sister that the risks faced by Millie, and her family's concerns about 
them, had been minimised.  However, the Corrections Department Internal Audit found management of the 
offender's parole 'did not demonstrate a lack of integrity and concern' for Millie.  Even so, action should 
have been taken over the offender's failure to attend relationship counselling and management of high-risk 
offenders needed to be improved.  Millie was described as having 'battered women's syndrome' and the 
Report notes 'major power and control issues' in her relationship with Sam.  When releasing the report, the 
Corrections Minister stated that under new legislation, sentencing judges, parole boards and probation 
officers would have more tools at their disposal to keep 'the public' safe.  It was also likely that violent 
offenders like Sam would receive longer sentences.  The new Parole Board would be able to issue an interim 
recall order if parole conditions were breached, and this would speed the return of the offender to custody.  
No reference was made to the proposal by Millie's family of a minimum time period before offenders could 
be paroled to the homes of their former victims.   
 
Police also defended their actions in bailing Sam to Millie's home.  A police detective stated that many in 
the area, including the local Women's Refuge, who had smuggled Millie out of town a few months earlier, 
had warned her that she would be killed by her partner.  The police were helpless to save Millie, who had 
'cuddled up' to Sam in front of the police officer: 'If a person won't tell us what is happening to them how 
can we help them?  Our hands were tied - we can only act within our legal boundaries', he said.   Noting that 
the case was 'typical' of battered women who refuse to leave abusive men, a police sergeant is reported as 
stating that: 'She [Millie] was a lovely person and just couldn't say "no"'.   
 
A domestic violence risk assessment tool would have alerted agencies involved in this case to 
Sam's dangerousness and potential for lethal violence.  Escalating violence, public displays of 
 146
aggression toward the victim, and a highly controlling abuser, are strongly correlated with 
lethality.25  Recent abuse (within 30 days of the current incident) increases the risk either that the 
woman will be killed, or that she will kill her abusive partner.26   The Campbell et al study found 
abused women whose partner's threatened them with murder were 15 times more likely than other 
women to be killed.  Threats with a weapon were rated as especially serious.27  The addition of 
survivors' predictions to risk assessment tools can significantly improve their accuracy.28  It is 
therefore disturbing that Millie's premonitions of her death were ignored or trivialised, both by the 
attending police officer, and the child social worker.29   
 
While intervention in the form of skilled assistance with safety planning,30 and risk management 
for both victim and perpetrator, may have averted the final deadly outcome in this case,  
shortcomings in agency interventions were obscured by critical evaluations of the deceased 
woman's inability to say 'no' to domestic violence.  This response belied the concrete reality of 
Millie's unsuccessful attempts to protect herself.   
 
1.  The Police Response 
Given the paramountcy of victim protection in police domestic violence policy,31 the actions of 
police in this case appear exceptionally self-defeating.  Sam had a history of violence against Millie 
and had only recently been released from a sentence of imprisonment for assaulting her.  He armed 
himself with a weapon and publicly threatened to kill her.  The threat was taken so seriously by 
witnesses that they called the police and hid Millie to protect her.  Nevertheless, after arresting and 
                                                 
25   See, eg, Peter Jaffe and Myrna Dawson, 'Domestic Homicides: Critical Issues in the Development of Death Review 
Committees' in Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, Annual Report to the Chief Coroner: Case Reviews of 
Domestic Violence Deaths, 2002 (2004) Appendix B 53; Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Risk Factors for Femicide in 
Abusive Relationships: Results From a Multisite Case Control Study' (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 
1089. 
26   Carolyn Block, 'How Can Practitioners Help an Abused Woman Lower Her Risk of Death?' [2003] NIJ Journal 4, 
5. 
27    Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide' [2003] NIJ Journal 14, 17-18. 
28   See research cited by Lesley Laing, Risk Assessment in Domestic Violence (2004) 8-10, Australian Domestic & 
Family Violence ClearingHouse www.aust.dvclearinghouse.unsw.edu.au at 15 November 2005. 
29   Neil Websdale, Lethality Assessment Tools: A Critical Analysis (2000) 5, National Electronic Network on Violence 
Against Women, Applied Research Forum, VAWnet www.vaw.umn.edu/Vawnet/lethality.htm at 15 November 2005 
warns that use of risk assessment tools by police, probation officers and court personnel should not be a substitute for 
listening to abused women. 
30    See, eg, Appendix V. 
31   Sergeant JJ Taylor, 'Intervention into Family Violence by New Zealand Police: Appendix: Police Family Violence 
Policy' in Jon Patrick, Helen Foster and Brian Tapper (eds), Successful Practice in Family Violence in New Zealand 
(1997) 99, 106. 
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charging the offender, police bailed him, and delivered him to the home of the woman against 
whom he had made the threat.   
 
Acknowledgement that domestic violence is a process rather than a series of discrete events has 
been codified in the Domestic Violence Act 1995.32  Accordingly, assessments of victim safety 
require the specific incident to be viewed in the context of the offender's overall history of violent 
behaviour.  However, the Washington Review Panel observes that the criminal justice system has 
difficulty responding to this concept of domestic violence. 'Domestic violence advocates on 
Fatality Review panels and advisory committees have observed that victims often feel a profound 
disconnect between their experience of domestic violence as a pattern of behaviour and the 
incident-based response of the criminal legal system.'33  This problem is apparent in the police 
failure to recognise that Sam's threat to kill Millie, in the context of his past violence toward her, 
required highly proactive police intervention. 
 
Despite the paramountcy of victim safety in police domestic violence policy, courts have ruled that 
the protection of domestic violence victims does not have automatic pre-eminence over the rights 
of persons arrested to be presumed innocent, and to have their bail applications given 'appropriate 
consideration'.34  Consequently, police policy required the officers considering bail to weigh the 
circumstances of the offending (in this case a history of serious violence) and the safety of the 
victim, alongside the provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.   
 
Nevertheless, had a protection order against the offender been in force police would have been 
prohibited from releasing him on bail.  Section 51 of the Domestic Violence Act which required 
offenders who contravened protection orders to be held in custody during the 24 hours immediately 
following arrest was subsequently incorporated in s 23 of the Bail Act 2000.  In red flag cases like 
the above, the existence or otherwise of a protection order as the determining factor in whether the 
law will prioritise women's safety appears anomalous.  Some women in this study who were killed 
had protection orders, others did not.  Given evidence of economic and other barriers to obtaining 
                                                 
32   Section 14 of the Act requires the Court to consider whether the abusive behaviour may, if viewed in isolation 
appear 'minor or trivial' but may nevertheless form 'part of a pattern of behaviour' from which the applicant and child 
need protection. 
33    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 1, 66. 
34    Whithair v Attorney-General [1996] 2 NZLR 45, 52 (CA). 
 148
protection orders,35 women's lives should not have to depend upon the existence or otherwise of a 
protection order.    
 
Before releasing Sam, police policy required that Millie be informed of the decision to grant him 
bail and afforded 'appropriate protection and/or support'.36  It is not known whether Millie was 
contacted by police prior to bailing and delivering the offender to her home.  However, the query 
whether Millie had 'problems' with police actions was made at the point police returned Sam to her 
home, which may indicate that no prior contact occurred.  One of the issues frequently identified 
by review panels is the failure of police to conduct separate interviews with victims and 
perpetrators at domestic violence scenes.37  (Websdale also warns against placing women in the 
situation of completing risk assessment tools in close proximity to batterers.)38  Sam appears to 
have been in close proximity at the time the police officer questioned Millie - he entered the room 
immediately afterward - and Millie may well have believed he was in a position to hear, and exact 
retribution, if dissatisfied with her response.   
 
Aside from this obvious point, Millie made it clear to the police officer that she feared Sam would 
kill her.  The fact that this statement was accompanied by a declaration of love for her partner was 
apparently sufficient for the officer to ignore Millie's fears for her life.  However, the fact that 
women may continue to feel strong emotional ties towards abusive men, or even 'cuddle up' to 
them, does not imply a licence to commit violence.  Perpetrators of intimate femicide (including 
the offender in this case) frequently express their love for the women they kill.  Such expressions 
of attachment by either the offender or the victim should not be invoked by police as a reason for 
failing to implement police policy or to circumvent application of risk assessment protocols.   
 
Police policy currently requires assault victims to identify abusers and outline their complaints in 
their presence.39  While this investigative strategy may be intended to increase the chances of a 
successful prosecution, it overlooks research showing an elevated risk to women seeking formal 
interventions.  Since fear of reprisal may lead women to minimise or deny the violence in the 
abuser's presence, the most dangerous batterers may remain unaccountable.   
                                                 
35    See, eg, Faith in Protection Orders Wanes, New Zealand Herald, 20 October 2005. 
36    Dick Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand (11th ed, 2003) vol 2, 1516.   
37   Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 1, 66, provides examples of a number of other 
failures of police work commonly identified by panels. 
38    Websdale, above n 29, 6. 
39    Webb, et al, above n 36, 1515. 
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The MPS domestic violence policy regards Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights as placing police under a positive duty to protect both adult and child victims of 
domestic violence.  If the actions of police have left the victim in immediate danger, the police 
service exposes itself to legal challenge.40  Police action similar in kind to that in the above case 
would arguably attract such a challenge. 
 
2.  The Probation Service and Department of Corrections 
The probation officer's response to the family's complaints of renewed violence toward Millie 
illustrates the same misunderstanding of the process of domestic violence as the police response.  
The probation officer artificially disconnected Sam's post-release assaults from his history of 
violence against women in general, and his pattern of assaults against his partner in particular.  By 
construing the latest assault as a 'first' offence; Sam's previous history of violence disappeared.  
The resulting 'clean slate' permitted the probation officer to afford him a 'second' chance.  The 
dangerousness/lethality potential of repeat victimisation and potential for escalation is obscured by 
this analysis, which reduces the process of domestic violence to a 'static, one dimensional, 
snapshot'.41   
 
The reports indicate that Sam was considered to be at high risk of re-offending prior to his release.  
In this context, the decision to parole Sam to Millie's home, thereby providing him with increased 
opportunities to renew his assaults, while simultaneously restricting Millie's opportunities to 
escape, appears perverse.  Millie's consent to this residence condition was obtained in the context 
of Sam's repeated threats to her life.  The condition obstructed attempts by Millie's family to 
remove Sam, and Millie owned her home so she could not leave it without incurring substantial 
economic costs.  Tragically, the parole address was the residence to which Sam was bailed and 
delivered by the police shortly before he brutally murdered Millie.    
 
Commenting upon the role of the probation service in this case, the Corrections Minister 
announced that probation officers were now trained to understand 'controlling relationships', and it 
was now policy to recall a high-risk offender, with no 'second chance'.  However, use of this 
                                                 
40    Metropolitan Police Service, above n 4, 3. 
41  See Benjamin Bowling, 'Racial Harassment and the Process of Victimization: Conceptual and Methodological 
Implications for the Local Crime Survey' (1993) 33 Brit.J.Criminol. 231, 232, discussing the implications of this 
analysis for the criminal justice response to racially motivated offending.   
 150
'second chance' terminology suggests an ongoing dissonance between victims' experiences of a 
continuing pattern of abuse, and the criminal justice tendency to view violence in terms of specific, 
discrete, incidents.42   
 
The Minister also announced that forthcoming sentencing and parole legislation might recommend 
that offenders were not paroled to their victims' homes 'unless it helped rehabilitation'.  However, 
the ensuing legislation failed to address the position of domestic violence victims.  The key test 
under s 28(2) of the Parole Act 2002 is whether the Parole Board are satisfied that the offender 
poses an undue risk to the safety of the community, or any person, or class of persons.  When 
considering this issue, the Board must have regard to the 'support and supervision available to the 
offender following release' and 'the public interest in the reintegration of the offender into 
society'.43  Since the best predictor of post-incarceration dangerousness is a history of prior 
assaultive behaviour,44 paroling domestic violence offenders to the homes of their former victims 
in the belief that this will assist rehabilitation is extremely dangerous. 
 
Just how dangerous this practice is for New Zealand women is revealed by the present research.  
Four months after Millie was killed, a further offender who had habitually assaulted his partner 
served six months of a nine month sentence of imprisonment for an assault which left the woman 
bruised and with two broken ribs.  (This woman had taken out a protection order against the 
offender.)  The offender was paroled to the home of his former victim and killed the woman when 
she tried to order him out of her home 19 days after his release.  Surprisingly, this further example 
of the failure of current criminal justice practices in domestic violence cases, so soon after Millie 
was killed, attracted little media/public attention.  As discussed below, two further offenders were 
convicted of violent assaults against their partners, served a short term of imprisonment and were 
released to the homes of their former victims.  These women were also killed shortly thereafter.  
     
When assessing whether an offender poses an undue safety risk, the Parole Board is required to 
consider the likelihood of further offending, and the nature and seriousness of any likely 
                                                 
42    For an overseas example of the use of this 'second chance' terminology see:  Court Offered a Second Chance, and 
Three Now are Dead, Minneapolis-St.Paul Star Tribune, 20 September 2004. 
43    Under s 7 of the Act, the paramount consideration for the Board is the safety of the community.  Other principles 
that must guide the Board's decisions include under s 7(2)(a) that offenders must not be detained any longer than is 
consistent with the safety of the community, or subject to release conditions or detention conditions that are more 
onerous, or last longer, than is consistent with the safety of the community. 
44     Campbell, et al, above n 25, 1093. 
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subsequent offending.45  However, Barbara Hart suggests that despite irrefutable evidence to the 
contrary, batterers have not yet been identified as a category of recidivist offenders.46  An apparent 
example of this problem is New Zealand research which examines issues of identification and 
management of high risk violent offenders.  While the research notes a supportive spouse is a 
positive factor when predicting recidivism, no distinction is made between domestic violence and 
other violent offenders.  Consequently, there is no discussion of risk management issues when the 
high risk offender's violence has been directed against his supportive spouse.47  Such approach can 
be contrasted with recognition in the UK of the serious implications of domestic violence for 
Corrections and the Probation Service:  
 
Traditional ways of dealing with male offenders, including their strategies for rehabilitation, are 
based on the assumption that the sooner the offender returns to a settled family life (supported by 
his partner), the better the outcome will be.  Where there has been domestic violence, however, this 
is tantamount to encouraging a repetition of the crime.  The woman may feel unable to refuse, 
however, particularly when this is stipulated as a condition of parole.  The probation service is now 
re-thinking their approach to men who abuse.48 
 
A US probation programme reports that a major reason why supervising domestically violent men 
is such challenging, and at times, very dangerous work, is that most 'have been socialized to 
believe that they have a right to use violence to control their families.  This makes motivating the 
offender to change his behavior very difficult, since he sees no moral reason to change'.49   
 
Without an understanding of the dynamics of violent relationships, or standardised domestic 
violence risk assessment, police, parole and probation decisions can systematically undermine the 
aim of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 to provide effective legal protection for victims.  High rates 
of domestic homicide,50 and patterns of repeat victimisation and escalation, make it essential that 
                                                 
45    Section 7(3) Parole Act 2002. 
46    Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse, above n 20, 44. 
47   Nick Wilson, New Zealand High-Risk Offenders: Who Are They and What Are the Issues in their Management and 
Treatment? (2004) 11, notes most of the high risk offenders were imprisoned for between eight months and 3.62 years 
and these relatively short periods of imprisonment limited the ability of Corrections to deliver intensive treatment.   
48   Nicola Harwin and Jackie Barron, 'Domestic Violence and Social Policy' in Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzin, 
Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice (2000) 205, 212. 
49    Richard Johnson, 'Intensive Probation for Domestic Violence Offenders' (2001) 65 Federal Probation 36, 37. 
50   Ian Miller and Nestar Russell, Homicide in New Zealand 1988-94: Patterns and Relationships (Paper presented at 
the 11th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 29 January-1 February 1996). 
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the criminal justice system responds systematically to the special problems posed by domestic 
violence offenders.  
 
3.   Involvement of Other Agencies  
While courts, professionals and the general public 'are often impatient with battered women for not 
leaving the abuser, assuming that the mother and children will be safer after separation, data reveal 
that leave-taking is fraught with danger'.51   
 
It is a potentially fatal error to assume that children will always be safer if their mother leaves the  
abuser.  Post-separation violence can be more lethal than anything that went before, posing grave  
risks both to women and children.  Intervention needs to take the whole family into account and  
multi-agency working designed to hold the perpetrator to account while helping the woman and  
children to be safe may be most effective overall.52  
 
Child protection policies must acknowledge that cooperation with child safety plans may increase 
the mother's risk of danger.   
 
Staff at WINZ appeared unaware that the onus was not on Millie to 'press charges' against Sam 
(notwithstanding that she appears to have done so in the past).  As previously discussed, early 
police policy relating to domestic violence directed that where possible, the victim should not be 
required to make a formal complaint, or give evidence in court, unless such evidence was 
necessary to avoid collapse of the prosecution.53  Legal materials indicate the ongoing relevance of 
this policy, at least in relation to laying a formal complaint.54   The Ministry of Health Intervention 
Guidelines also suggest that police pro-arrest policy 'mean[s] that [police] can arrest and charge the 
abuser if they have evidence of partner assault, without necessarily requiring the victim to make a 
formal complaint or give evidence'.55   
 
If police have reverted to their pre-1987 practice of relying on victims to determine the extent, if 
any, of criminal justice interventions, urgent action is necessary.  On the other hand, if the 1987 
                                                 
51    Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse, above n 20, 69-70. 
52    Audrey Mullender, et al, Children's Perspectives on Domestic Violence (2002) 224. 
53    Police Commissioner, 'Domestic Dispute Policy Changes', Commissioner's Circular, 1987/11. 
54   Webb, et al, above n 36, 1431, citing 'Husband and Wife' The Laws of New Zealand (para 66) as authority for the 
proposition that police will arrest and charge the offender without requiring the victim to lay a complaint. 
55   The Ministry of Health, Family Violence Intervention Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse (2002) 51. 
 153
policy of not requiring victims to lay a complaint is extant, then the reactions of WINZ staff in this 
case demonstrate the importance of public and professional education in relation to this issue. 
 
Millie predicted her own death at the offender's hands and relayed her fears to police and the social 
worker.  The following case study provides further grim evidence of the accuracy of battered 
women's premonitions of death.   
 
B   Case Study Two 
Media commentary on this case notes that 'in a recent Government-driven initiative, the State will 
step in and remove children from couples who won't end abusive relationships'.  However, a social 
and legal system which blames and penalises mothers who fail to 'end abusive relationships', while 
ignoring separation violence as a barrier to escape, and failing to direct adequate resources to 
ensure safe exit, perpetrates a deep injustice on New Zealand women and children.   
 
Battered Victim or Battered Free Agent?:  Case Study F/02/1  
Forty-seven year-old Christine began a relationship with 26 year-old Nick 18 months before Nick killed her 
in 2002.  The Court heard police had been called 'many times' to the address, both by independent witnesses 
and by Christine herself.  Christine 'frequently' telephoned or personally presented at the local police station 
to report Nick's violence and threats of violence.  Nick was also asked 'many times' to leave the family 
home.  In addition to numerous complaints to police, Christine escaped on a number of occasions to a 
Women's Refuge and took out protection and trespass orders against Nick.  Some time during the 
relationship, Nick was sentenced to six months imprisonment for assaulting Christine and holding a knife to 
her throat.  Refuge workers reported that while Nick was incarcerated Christine 'thrived' and began to take 
charge of her life.   
 
Following his release, agencies, including the Probation Department and Women's Refuge, were on 
occasions so worried for Christine's safety that they also contacted the police.  Records held by the agencies 
all indicated that the offender exerted oppressive control over Christine and her young daughter.  Nick's 
'anger [was] fed by jealousy and a paranoid belief that Christine was interested in other men.'  As the 
violence escalated, Women's Refuge workers stated that three months before she was killed, Christine was 
'the domestic equivalent of a shell-shock victim.  She would tell us the only way she was going to get out of 
this mess was if he [Nick] killed her...he created that person who had no other options and he did it by 
keeping her isolated and filled with dread.'   
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On the occasion of the final lethal assault, Nick knocked Christine to the ground and repeatedly kicked and 
stomped on her face and head, twice breaking her jawbone and breaking her teeth.  Christine was stabbed 11 
times in the chest and once in the neck with such force that one of her ribs was severed from her sternum. 
Christine's jeans and underpants were cut from her body with the knife.  
  
Following her death, a police detective told reporters that Christine 'made no secret of the fact she was 
assaulted by [Nick] frequently and he had threatened to kill her'.  The detective noted that the offender's 
behaviour was so oppressive that Christine could not go anywhere without him:  'She went to a number of 
meetings that were arranged for her (about domestic violence) but he would arrive at the door during it and 
make her go home with him.  It was kind of like persistent stalking' the detective said.  Nevertheless, police 
and the media concluded that Christine wanted to help Nick reform and 'kept going back to him'.  It was this 
behaviour that 'cost her life'.   
 
The police detective noted that this case was 'typical' of other domestic violence cases in the region.  The 
problem lay with Christine - she was a 'gentle' woman who had 'loved too much'.  The detective recalled that 
a few months before her death, Christine made a complaint to the police, but withdrew it before the matter 
got to court:  'She did the right things in getting the court orders, but she always relented and went back to 
him.'  However, Refuge workers stated that society had let Christine down.  'We all have to take 
responsibility.  It's easy for us to take this sort of thing on face value, forget it, and get on with life' a Refuge 
spokesperson said.   
 
It is deeply troubling to find no reported review of agency responses to Christine's numerous 
attempts to seek help and survive Nick's violence.  The official construction of this intimate 
femicide in terms of an emotionally or psychologically helpless victim who 'loved too much' flies 
in the face of evidence that throughout this short relationship Christine repeatedly sought 
protection from the violence.  According to police, Christine 'made no secret' of Nick's frequent 
assaults and threats to kill.  (It is not known whether she was also terrorised by the offender during 
his short period of incarceration.)  Following a heroic, but unsuccessful battle for survival, it 
appears Christine, like other women in this study, 'just gave up'.56   
 
Since the corollary of placing the onus of arrest and prosecution on victims is victim blaming,57 the 
official narrative of Christine's personal pathology silenced consideration of her struggle to survive 
                                                 
56    See, eg, Case Study D/00/7 discussed below.  
57   Ruth Busch, Neville Robertson and Hilary Lapsley, Domestic Violence and the Justice System: A Study of Breaches 
of Protection Orders (1992) 161.   
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the violence and attempts to seek help.  The public were therefore advised that the lesson to be 
learned from Christine's death was the need to remove children from battered mothers who cannot 
or will not leave violent men.   
 
1.  Missing Information 
At his sentencing, it was revealed that Nick had garnered 45 criminal convictions in the eight years 
prior to his killing of Christine.  No information was available on the nature of these offences, or 
the extent, if any, to which they involved crimes against Christine.  Although Nick's violence 
toward Christine involved repeated breaches of a protection order, it is not known whether these 
were the subject of charges, and if so, the type and length of sentences that were imposed.   
 
As previously discussed, Nick's action in holding a knife to Christine's throat should have alerted 
all involved in this case that Christine was in grave danger.  The reports note that the Probation 
service contacted police out of concern for her safety - which suggests some ongoing involvement 
of the criminal justice system with the offender.  Yet no information on action by police or the 
probation officer in relation to this warning was found.   
 
2. The Police Response 
The detective's comment that Christine's withdrawal of her complaint prevented the police from 
pursuing a prosecution against Nick further suggests that police have reverted to their pre-1987 
policy of holding the battered woman responsible for state intervention.   Over a decade ago New 
Zealand researchers warned that complainant-reliant criminal justice intervention fails to 
acknowledge threats and pressures that are brought to bear on victims to withdraw their 
complaints, assuming instead that women have power they in fact lack.58   Under this policy, 
batterers may avoid legal sanctions for life-threatening assaults as well as capitalise on the fear of 
their victims by having the charges reduced.59   
 
Given the seriousness of Nick's violence, it is difficult to accept that Christine's 'frequent' 
complaints could not have been pursued by police without placing the decision whether to proceed 
                                                 
58    Ibid 160-161.   
59    For example, the offender in Case Study F/08/12(S) admitted charges of assault with intent to rape and assaulting a 
female.  The victim was punched and kicked in the head, ribs, kidneys and limbs for refusing to have sex with the 
offender.  The following morning, when she again refused the offender beat the woman again.  The police stated a 
charge of rape had been withdrawn as the complainant feared for her safety and could not be relied on to give evidence 
against the offender. 
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with charges on her.60  In all cases, and clearly in this one, the threat of retaliation was real.   It 
may be that police have been discouraged from pursuing charges in the absence of victim 
cooperation due to the unwillingness of courts to support this prosecution strategy.61  If the victim 
gives evidence that she lied in her original statement to police, in the absence of independent 
testimony the charges are likely to be dismissed.62  Nevertheless, the present study found police 
can obtain a conviction when both the offender and the victim deny an attack occurred and there 
are no other witnesses to the assault.63  This highlights the importance of enhanced evidence 
gathering techniques in domestic violence cases.   
                                                
 
Although 'fast-track' options are specified as a component of current police domestic violence 
policy, it is not known whether these were utilised in an attempt to retain Christine's commitment 
to prosecution of the batterer.  It is clearly unjust to require battered women who are in need of 
protection to remain resolute throughout the granting of bail and long delayed court processes 
when research shows this can expose women to further abuse.64  Hart notes domestic violence 
victims are among those who are most likely to require state assistance in relocation and in legal 
process to change the victim's identity.  Victims of domestic violence must be eligible for witness 
protection programmes when it becomes apparent that their lives may be in danger.65   
 
 
60   New Zealand Commissioner of Police, Commissioner's Circular 37/8/1 (1987) stated that an arrest should occur 
without the need for a complaint from the victim.  Nor should the victim be required to give evidence in court unless 
there was no case to answer without her evidence.  
61    See, eg, Case Study L/99/19(S) where the offender allegedly pushed his seven months' pregnant de facto partner 
into a fire causing second and third degree burns.  The offender was charged with wounding with intent to cause 
grievous bodily harm.  However, the victim subsequently stated that she had not told police the truth.  The defence 
requested a discharge on the basis of the victim's altered version of events.  Although the Crown wished to proceed 
with the charges, the judge granted a discharge stating that if the case went ahead, a jury could not be reasonably 
satisfied of guilt. 
62    See, eg, Case Study D/97/19(S) where the defendant was charged with injuring the victim with intent to injure and 
assaulting her in breach of her protection order.  At trial, the Crown was successful in having the recanting victim 
declared a hostile witness.  The woman continued to deny that the defendant attacked her, stating that she made her 
original statement because she was angry with the defendant.  She said she had woken up in hospital, but could not say 
how she got there.   The judge dismissed the charges.  In Case Study H/01/25(S) the nine months' pregnant victim and 
her father were rushed to hospital following alleged assaults by the defendant who was charged with three assaults and 
a charge of intentional damage.  The woman received bruising but her unborn child was unharmed.  Her father suffered 
a broken arm, cuts to the head and a badly bruised chest.   At trial, the woman victim recanted and the charges were 
dismissed.   
63   In Case Study H/06/10(S) the offender punched his girlfriend twice in the face.  At trial, both the offender and the 
victim gave evidence that no assault occurred.  Although the only two witnesses to the assault denied any attack had 
occurred, the jury relied on 'peripheral evidence' to convict the offender. 
64    Jennifer Hand, et al, Free From Abuse: What Women Say and What Can Be Done (2002).  The researcher has been 
informed by one defence counsel that delay is a common tactic employed in the hope that battered women will recant 
before the court hearing. 
65    Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse, above n 20, 41. 
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Utilisation of an appropriate risk assessment tool would immediately have revealed that Christine 
was in grave danger.  The case involved if not all, then at least the majority of indices of lethality 
identified by domestic violence research:  repeated acts of violence; controlling behaviour; jealousy 
and possessiveness; threats to kill involving use of a weapon; victim premonitions of death; and the 
presence of a step-child in the family.66  These red flags for dangerousness/lethality should have 
resulted in a pro-active criminal justice response. However, attention was diverted from 
shortcomings in agency interventions by a focus on the 'typical' battered woman's self-abnegating 
and pathological construction of romantic love.   
 
C   Case Study Three 
While data on legal responses to past domestic assaults was often unavailable, the research points 
to a pattern of repeated attempts to rehabilitate violent men prior to the final lethal incident.  As 
demonstrated by the following case study, this unprincipled approach to treatment may be 
manipulated for the benefit of habitual batterers whose violence escalates to lethality.   
 
Battered Victim or Battered Free Agent?: Case Study D/00/7  
The sentencing judge described a ten-year history of assaults inflicted upon Matekino by David, her 31 year-
old male partner.  The couple had four children, the first born when Matekino was age 15 years.  Four years 
before David killed her, the state removed Matekino's children from her care.  The sentencing judge notes 
that this was due to the violent nature of the relationship and 'issues surrounding the victim's absences from 
home'.67  David had three previous convictions for assaulting Matekino.  In 1993 he was directed to receive 
counselling.  In 1997 he received a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment which the judge noted reflected 
that this assault involved serious violence.  David was granted an early release to attend and complete a 
domestic violence prevention programme.  Following its completion, David told his probation officer that 
the programme had 'put things into perspective'.68  In striking contrast to this assertion, violence relating to 
the third conviction was alleged to include kicking, strangling, and punching Matekino and beating her with 
a baseball bat over four days.  Following his conviction for this assault, Matekino apparently tried to reduce 
David's sentence by telling the Court that she had lied in her statement to police.  David was sentenced to a 
term of four months' imprisonment and was released from prison just two months before he beat Matekino 
to death.     
                                                 
66   See, eg, Campbell, et al, above n 25, finding the presence of stepchildren in the home was an element which 
increased the risk of femicide.  See also: Aruna Radhakrishna, et al, 'Are Father Surrogates a Risk Factor for Child 
Maltreatment?' (2001) 6 Child Maltreatment 281. 
67    R v D (Unreported, High Court, New Plymouth, Laurenson J, 29 October 2001) [15]. 
68    Ibid [19]. 
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At trial, several witnesses gave evidence that they had seen David assault Matekino on a number of 
occasions, and had repeatedly warned him that these attacks could one day prove fatal.  David allegedly 
responded that the witnesses should 'mind their own business'.  One witness stated he saw David punching 
Matekino around the head about five or six times on one occasion:  'She was actually screaming out for help 
but I didn't want to get involved. [David] was taller than me and quite a bit bigger'.  Another male witness 
described how months before her death, he witnessed David punching Matekino one or two times in the 
face, while kneeling over her as she lay on the floor.  'For a female they would have been hard (punches), 
not something you would normally see' he said.  Later, the witness asked David why he continued to assault 
his partner.  David allegedly replied: 'Sometimes she's so stupid, she annoys me.'   
 
Matekino's father told reporters he knew that the relationship was violent and had warned David that he 
should control his anger. He said the whole family were trying to put a stop to it as 'we thought it was going 
to kill her'.  Part of his daughter's reluctance to leave the area was her desire to be near her children.  Despite 
the fact that she did not have custody, and needed court permission to spend time with them, she had hopes 
of regaining custody of her children.  Also, Matekino thought that 'David really loved her.  I do think he 
loved her', her father said.   
 
Following Matekino's death, a newspaper editorial noted that 'psychiatrists have names for it, but 
[Matekino] merely accepted that this [violence] was her lot in life.  It is one of life's mysteries why some 
women would quit a relationship at the first hint of violence, and yet others endure years of mental cruelty 
and brutality beyond imagination…[Matekino's] life and death always was just a matter of time'.  A police 
spokesperson also described the homicide as avoidable: 'Firstly, the young woman could have got out of the 
relationship and secondly, [the offender] could have resisted the temptation to beat her.'   
 
In striking contrast, Matekino's best friend stated that Matekino 'was scared'.  The beatings had become 
more frequent in the months leading up to the homicide as David was jealous and believed Matekino had 
been sleeping with other men.  '[H]er whole body had been broken by him.  If it wasn't her arms, it was her 
legs…All her body was in pain, from the top to the bottom.  She'd get earache all the time, now and then 
she'd get bleeding from her ears.  She said it was something about her brain, that her head was always being 
smashed up' her friend said.  Seventeen days before she was killed, Matekino attempted to seek Women's 
Refuge assistance but was turned away as she owed rent from a previous stay.  Her friend said Matekino had 
been angry at this rejection and: 'I think she gave up then...she just totally gave up'.  
 
At sentencing, David's defence counsel submitted that the fact Matekino 'kept coming back' to David should 
be regarded as a mitigating feature of this killing.  Addressing David, the judge responded that: 'The 
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question is, of course, whether she was able to escape from you.  I don't know.  Certainly, at the end, there 
was evidence to indicate that she was scared and wished to be kept away from you'.69   
 
1.   Criminal Law and the Courts 
The four month sentence of imprisonment imposed in relation to David's third conviction for 
assaulting Matekino - proof that prior attempts at rehabilitation had failed - appears a manifestly 
inadequate legal response to serious violence by this recidivist batterer.  A history of violence is a 
major risk factor for dangerousness/lethality.  Therefore, the sentencing principle that an offender 
who has previously received a lenient sentence will subsequently be sanctioned more severely due 
to his failure to avail himself of the opportunity for rehabilitation70 appears especially apposite to 
domestic violence offending.  However, the emphasis on victim responsibility in this case deflected 
public attention from the quality of legal responses to habitual abusers.  
 
Defence counsel's submission that batterers who kill women who return to abusive relationships 
should have their sentences reduced is both alarming and deeply ironic. The approach appears to be 
a modern variant of the old criminal law doctrine that a woman cannot complain of violence she 
has condoned.71   Rather than outright rejection of this analysis, the judge's remark that 'at the end', 
there was evidence Matekino 'was scared and wished to be kept away' from David implies the 
submission was considered credible, albeit irrelevant on the facts of this case.   
 
However, batterer treatment is a state-sponsored intervention strategy in domestic violence cases.  
Consequently, women whose partners attend stopping violence programmes must have a legitimate 
expectation that the violence will cease.  A woman who returns to an abusive relationship 
following her partner's completion of a programme must therefore be exercising her agency and 
choice in a reasonable way.  To hold otherwise, is to argue that contrary to prevailing societal 
beliefs, batterers are not amenable to treatment.  
  
Accordingly, Matekino must have been acting as a reasonable agent when she returned to the 
relationship following the offender's completion of the counselling programme he was court-
ordered to attend.  So also must she have acted reasonably when she returned to the relationship 
                                                 
69    Ibid [34]. 
70    Geoff Hall, 'Sentencing (II): Matters of Aggravation and Mitigation' [1985] NZLJ 184, 187. 
71   See, eg, Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law (1984) 129, for a discussion of the doctrine of 
condonation. 
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following the batterer's completion of the stopping violence programme he attended as a condition 
of his early release. (It could also be argued that women have a legitimate expectation not to be 
killed following decisions by criminal justice personnel that offenders may be safely released to the 
homes of their former victims.)    
 
If partial responsibility for their deaths is to be sheeted home to deceased victims who keep 
returning to abusive relationships, then society and the courts must accept responsibility for 
creating an expectation that batterer treatment programmes work.  Since victim blaming is deeply 
engrained in the legal system, there is an urgent need for the state to direct resources to educating 
and informing women of the actual potential of programmes to reform recidivist batterers, and the 
optimum conditions for successful treatment.  
 
In a cruel distortion of battered women's social reality, the assertion by defence counsel that 
Matekino failed to leave is belied by the judge's acknowledgement that 'at the end' Matekino 'was 
scared and wished to be kept away' from the offender.  Thus rather than an example of battered 
women's so-called failure to leave, this intimate femicide is more accurately categorised as a 
separation attack. 
 
2.  Community Agencies 
While the extent of her participation in David's earlier prosecutions for assaulting her remains 
unknown, media reports that Matekino simply accepted that violence was 'her lot in life' ignore 
clear evidence of her previous contact with police, and her escape on a number of occasions to 
Women's Refuge.  Matekino was killed shortly after she was turned away from Refuge due to her 
failure to pay her past accommodation costs.  One newspaper observed that there 'would be few of 
us guiltless enough to point the finger of blame at the refuge.  That refuges should be so poorly 
funded they're forced to refuse help to a woman who's failed to pay her $10 or $12 a night rent is a 
disgrace'.  While this observation might have prompted concerted demands for better funding of 
Refuges, a focus on the 'inevitability' of Matekino's death due to her 'failure' to leave failed to hold 
the state accountable for discharging its obligation to provide all New Zealand women with access 
to temporary safe housing.  
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3.  Child Protection 
Policies to protect children from domestic violence must be cognisant of their impact upon battered 
mothers.  Following the removal of their children by the state, battered mothers may choose, as 
Matekino did, to remain close to their children, rather than attempt to escape from the batterer by 
moving to another geographical location.  Penalising battered mothers, while leaving abusers at 
large to inflict further violence on women who want to stay close to their children, simply increases 
the risk of further serious injury and lethality.   
 
D   Case Studies Four and Five 
Overseas and New Zealand research reveal access changeover times are particular risk situations 
for separated women, with the potential to expose both the woman and her children to further 
abuse.72  Three women in this study were killed during access changeover times, and a further 
woman was killed when she attended an access hearing at a courthouse.  However, while killings 
of battered women who 'failed' to leave abusive relationships were constructed in terms of victim 
helplessness and pathology; women who were killed after leaving abusive relationships and taking 
their children with them had their actions scrutinised for the extent to which they provoked their 
former partners to perpetrate lethal violence.   
 
Separation Killings and Child Access: Case Study B/97/4  
Stephine lived with Michael her 25 year-old male partner for 'several years'.  During this time, Michael was 
physically violent toward Stephine 'on a number of occasions'.73  After three previous attempts to separate, 
Stephine exited the relationship and applied for, and was granted, a protection order which covered herself 
and her two children.  
 
On the day of the homicide, pursuant to an arrangement made with Michael's mother, Stephine drove with a 
female friend to the home of the mother to drop off the couple's one year-old daughter for an access visit.  
The Crown later stated that Stephine made the 'fatal mistake' of going to the front door with her daughter.  
Stephine's friend heard the child cry and heard Stephine calling out 'What are you doing Michael...stop it!'  
The friend then ran to the house, found the door locked, and unsuccessfully tried to kick it in.  After calling 
police from a nearby house she returned, and upon entering through the back door, found Stephine lying on 
her back covered with blood, calling out 'help me, help me, help me.'   
                                                 
72   Busch, Robertson and Lapsley, above n 57; Alison Chetwin, Trish Knaggs and Patricia Young,  The Domestic 
Violence Legislation and Child Access in New Zealand (1999).  See, eg, R v Nepia [1983] NZLR 754 involving a 
victim who was stabbed 14 times after arriving to collect her children. 
73    R v B (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Randerson J, 24 March 1998) 2.  
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A pathologist later gave evidence that the deep knife wounds on both Stephine's hands and severed tendons 
were defence injuries.  Stephine was also slashed in the throat with the knife, severing a major artery, and 
stabbed four times in the back, one of the wounds piercing her lung.  During the attack, Michael also 
assaulted his mother and father.  The Crown contended that after killing Stephine, Michael made a 'half-
hearted' attempt to kill himself.  
 
At trial, the Crown stated the background to this killing was a history of violence by Michael who wanted 
total control of Stephine.  Michael's mother told the Court that her son was depressed and angry and had 
threatened to kill both himself and Stephine on a number of occasions.  Michael's father confirmed his wife's 
evidence.74  Although an affidavit that Stephine had sworn in support of the protection order described the 
couple's daughter as a 'child of our relationship', Michael alleged that he had been provoked to kill Stephine 
when she informed him that their daughter was not his child.75  
 
1.   Criminal Law and the Courts   
Although the batterer in the above case study had been attending a domestic violence programme,  
no information was available on whether he had completed the programme, and if not, whether he 
had been referred back to the court for non-attendance, and if so, the type, if any, of sanctions 
involved.  
  
Prior to enactment of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 and the Guardianship Amendment Act 1995 
courts generally promoted conciliation and resolution by agreement between the parties in relation 
to access arrangements, whether or not the non-custodial parent had used violence within the 
family.  The Guardianship Amendment Act 1995 created a rebuttable presumption that a parent 
who has used violence in a domestic situation is not to be regarded as a fit and proper person to 
have custody of, or unsupervised access to, the child.  Section 3 of the Act requires the Court to 
consider whether or not to place conditions on any supervised access order to protect the safety of 
the custodial parent.  Such conditions may include a requirement that the parent not be required to 
have face-to-face contact with their abuser.76  Under s 27 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 the 
court can also include special conditions in a protection order which are 'reasonably necessary' to 
                                                 
74    Ibid 3.  
75    Ibid. 
76    McMaster v Soley (Unreported, Family Court, Christchurch, Judge Kean, 3 March 2000). 
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protect the protected person from further domestic violence and these may relate to the manner in 
which arrangements for access to a child are to be implemented.    
 
Research on this issue found that in the majority of cases (68%) no clear directions from the court 
about access occurred, or parents could not remember whether directions had been made.  
Unsupervised access was taking place immediately after a protection order had been made in a 
significant number of cases (23%).  In most cases, such access was occurring without any 
assessment of risk, or formalised direction from the court, and in contravention of the non-contact 
conditions of the protection order.  Almost all custodial parents who used formal supervised access 
centres reported that they had been harassed by the non-custodial parent when arriving at or 
leaving the centre.  This conduct was in breach of the protection order, and left custodial parents 
feeling very unsafe.  The researchers concluded that 'courts need to take into consideration that any 
access places custodial parents in the position of being accessible to the non-custodial parent and 
assess the safety implications of this'.77    
 
It could not be ascertained what, if any, conditions relating to access changeover were attached by 
the court to Stephine's protection order.  Sir Ronald Davison's Report recommended children 
should be delivered and collected by an independent person at access changeover times or the 
delivery and collection supervised by an independent person.78  This recommendation was not 
taken up in 1995 legislation.  Had Stephine not been exposed to her estranged partner's violence at 
the access change-over point, the lethal outcome on this particular occasion would have been 
avoided.    
 
2.   Other Agencies 
Although red flag evidence of Michael's stalking, threats to kill, threats to commit suicide and 
recent assault with a weapon made the final lethal attack reasonably foreseeable, it could not be 
ascertained whether Stephine's lawyer or the programme provider undertook a risk assessment, or 
alerted Stephine to Michael's potential for dangerousness/lethality and helped her with safety 
planning.   
 
                                                 
77    Chetwin, Knaggs and Young, above n 72, 85. 
78    Sir Ronald Davison, Report of Inquiry into the Family Court Proceedings Involving Christine Madeline Marion 
Bristol and Alan Robert Bristol  (1994) (the 'Bristol Report') 42, concerned the killing of children by their father in the 
context of estrangement.  The children were in their father's care by consent order.   
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The following case study chillingly reveals how victim-blaming camouflages structural patterns of 
offending and inadequate/ineffective agency responses to women who are killed after 'begging 
authorities for help'.  
 
Separation Killings and Child Access:  Case Study G/01/7 
Jarrod, the 33 year-old offender, and Tracey, his 34 year-old partner, lived together for approximately 5 
years during which time the couple had 'broken up 5 or 6 times'.79  In October 2000, Tracey left the 
relationship taking her four children and obtained interim custody of the couple's 3½ year-old son.  At the 
time of her death she had been separated from her partner for approximately three months.  Following an 
alleged assault by Jarrod, Tracey obtained a temporary protection order which also covered the couple's 
child.  Under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act 1995, Jarrod had three months from the time the 
temporary protection order was made to apply to the Family Court for a full hearing before the order was 
made permanent.  However, the approaching Christmas holiday period, coupled with a busy Family Court 
schedule resulted in advice from his lawyer that a hearing could not be set down for some months.   
 
Tracey originally provided Jarrod with liberal access to his son.  A female friend of the couple, who 
provided her home as an access drop-off point, later gave evidence that Jarrod exercised access 'whenever 
he wanted'.   However, the witness said things 'began to get crazy' and Tracey became uncomfortable with 
the access arrangements.  Following an incident in December 2000, after which her new partner reported to 
police that Jarrod had driven a car at him, Tracey stopped access saying she 'wanted things sorted out 
properly in court'.   
 
Two days before the homicide, Jarrod's new female partner broke off their relationship after discovering 
Jarrod had gained the assistance of her son to telephone his child in breach of the protection order.   
 
On the day of the murder, Tracey and her family were picnicking at a park.  Her three children age 8, 10 and 
15 years and her new partner went down to the river to swim, leaving the child at the centre of the access 
dispute and his mother sitting on a blanket by the car.  A witness later gave evidence that Jarrod arrived at 
the park and the child ran toward his father's car, followed by Tracey who was walking behind.  The witness 
stated 'the man in the car was yelling and swearing at the woman.  She just sounded like she was saying it 
wasn't her fault'.  The witness saw Tracey walk away from the car carrying the child and Jarrod exit his 
vehicle and approach Tracey, who was standing by her car holding the child.  The witness watched as Jarrod 
grabbed Tracey in a headlock and began stabbing her repeatedly.  Shouting for help, the witness ran toward 
the couple and called out to Jarrod to stop.  By this time, Tracey no longer had hold of the child, who was 
                                                 
79    R v G [2002] CA 372/01 (Unreported, McGrath, Robertson, and Gendall JJ, 8 August 2002) [2].  
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'just standing there watching'.  Several people ran over to the scene, and one man armed with a cricket bat 
and another male tried to 'sneak up on the offender' but both backed off when Jarrod turned and saw them.  
Jarrod continued to stab Tracey.  As she lay dying on the ground, Jarrod collected the child, who was 
splattered with his mother's blood, and drove away.   
 
An off-duty detective armed with a jack handle, and his brother-in-law armed with a dog chain, 
unsuccessfully attempted to smash the windscreen of Jarrod's car and set chase leaving the detective's wife 
and others to tend to the mortally wounded woman.  A lengthy police chase ensued and the offender's car 
was finally forced to stop by road spikes and a police block.  A police officer later gave evidence that Jarrod 
spoke through a partially open car window and stated 'I know I've done something wrong, I know it, I 
couldn't help it, I went to see my boy… they were all there.  I saw her with her new boyfriend, I had a 
couple of beers and I just lost it, I know I shouldn't have done it but I just lost it'.   
 
At trial, a pathologist gave evidence that Tracey received 31 wounds mostly to her head, neck, upper body 
and arms.  There were also seven defence wounds to her hands where she had tried to fend off her attacker.  
Five of the wounds could have proved fatal on their own, particularly the cutting of her carotid artery, and 
an injury in which a portion of the knife was left in her skull.    
 
Tracey's new partner told the Court that Jarrod threatened him on several occasions and told him 'to keep 
away from his son'.  Four witnesses gave evidence that Jarrod also made 'dark threats' to kill Tracey prior to 
his carrying them out.  A long time male friend of the offender stated that Jarrod told him he still loved 
Tracey, could not live without her, and was going to kill her.  Under cross-examination, the witness said he 
could not be sure whether the offender had said he wanted to kill Tracey, or that he was going to kill her.  
Jarrod's father told the court that his son told him two months before the homicide that he was considering 
killing Tracey because 'he was going through pain' and thought this 'would ease the pain'.  His son's problem 
was 'basically he still loved [Tracey] and he wanted to be with [her]'.  The father stated that he 'agonised' 
over his son's threats for some time, while trying to decide what action to take.  Eventually, he telephoned 
Tracey to express his concern.  Although he did not give her the 'exact details' of his son's threats, he warned 
Tracey to 'be on her guard'.  Police also spoke with the offender about threats he had allegedly made against 
Tracey over the telephone.  Although at this time, a protection order was in place, it appears no further 
action was taken by police. 
 
Jarrod's father also stated that shortly after the separation, his son purchased a car and informed him that he 
needed it to drive around unrecognised.  'He basically said he wanted it to keep an eye on what [Tracey] was 
doing.'   Jarrod's brother also gave evidence that although the offender told others the car was for his new 
girlfriend, Jarrod 'called it the "snoop wagon" and used it to spy on [Tracey]'.  On one occasion the offender 
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had been 'snooping around' Tracey's home and saw her with her new partner.  The witness said his brother 
told him 'he felt better after that, because he now knew for certain [Tracey] was seeing someone else'.   
 
Jarrod's brother and his father talked about getting him psychiatric help.  However, staff at a local 
psychiatric unit informed his father that 'they couldn't do anything until [Jarrod] had done something'.  The 
witness said he was so concerned about his brother's behaviour that he believed 'the best thing that could 
happen was that [Jarrod] would hopefully get locked up'.  Asked by defence counsel if Jarrod had caused the 
family a lot of problems, his brother replied that he had, but said despite this he did not resent him.  Jarrod's 
mother also gave evidence that prior to Tracey's death there had been difficulties regarding child access as 
Tracey 'wanted more structured visits'.  She and his father believed their son 'needed professional 
counselling to get over [Tracey] and to let go of her'.  Shortly before the murder, Jarrod told his mother that 
his life was not worth living.  Although she agreed with defence counsel that her son seemed to have been 
contemplating suicide, the witness said she did not take her son's comments seriously. 
 
Jarrod gave evidence in his defence.  He told the Court that he 'did not think he had ever loved anyone the 
way he loved Tracey'.  He stated that on the day of the killing he arrived at the park and told Tracey he 
wanted to take the child for a drive.  She refused, called him crazy and told him he 'needed time to get his 
head sorted out'.  Tracey also told him she would be complaining about this breach of the protection order to 
police.   
 
Defence counsel argued that because of his under-treatment for severe clinical depression, Jarrod had been 
particularly vulnerable to provocation from Tracey leading up to and just before the killing.  It was 'obvious' 
said counsel, that Tracey was using access to his son to punish Jarrod for 'not acting in a way she expected 
him to'.  A psychologist stated Jarrod had known intellectually that his relationship with Tracey was over, 
but he could not 'let go' emotionally.  Jarrod loved his son intensely and was compensating for his own 
childhood. Jarrod had also developed a conduct disorder which meant he disliked rules, such as protection 
orders.  In response to a question by the trial judge as to what acts Tracey had done that were provocative, 
the psychologist replied that these were: 'her comments about [Jarrod] being a crazy person, picking up the 
boy, holding and restraining him, preventing him talking to his father and walking away'.   
 
Tracey's brother told reporters that prior to her death, Tracey 'had been begging authorities for help to 
protect her from Jarrod'. 
 
Despite the presence of all or most of the established risk factors for dangerousness/lethality in this 
case, Tracey died.  Had Jarrod's depression, suicide threats, threats to kill his estranged partner, 
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threats to her new partner; stalking and harassment of her post-separation been identified as high 
risk behaviours requiring pro-active intervention, including immediate and detailed safety 
planning, Tracey's death might have been avoided.  However, the research found no evidence of a 
fatality review of agency interventions in response to Tracey's brother's statement that his sister had 
been 'begging authorities for help' before she was killed.    
 
1.   Criminal Law and the Courts  
Tracey's death could have been depicted in a way which educated the public about red flags for 
lethality, including the increased danger to women and children post-separation.  Instead, this 
killing of a woman by a jealous, estranged male partner, who stalked her in his 'snoop wagon', 
threatened to kill her, threatened her new male partner, and 'disliked rules such as protection 
orders', was attributed to Tracey's attempt to obtain 'more structured' access arrangements and the 
granting of temporary protection orders to separated women.   
 
After the trial, Jarrod's defence counsel criticised legislative provisions in the Domestic Violence 
Act 1995 which permit ex parte hearings for the granting of protection orders: 
  
Defence counsel, Dr Donald Stevens, doesn't practise family law so was shocked when he read the 
Domestic Violence Act that outlines protection orders.  He said the balance has been lost.  'It 
infuriates fathers so much' he says 'to no longer have access or interim custody…and it was done 
behind their back'.  It could, he adds, send people over the edge.  He said it suits the applicant to get 
the order but also to allow some contact, but doesn't always work when dealing with those 
emotionally troubled or angry over the way they have been treated. 
 
On this analysis, separating women should receive less rather than greater legal protection from 
jealous, abusive male partners.80  The assertion that granting protection orders erodes the rights of 
fathers and provokes violence against separated women fails to acknowledge that it was Jarrod's 
abusive and threatening behaviour that prompted Tracey to restrict his original liberal access to his 
child.  Jarrod's own family recognised the danger he posed to Tracey, and warned her to that effect.  
The social reality that Jarrod finally killed Tracey in the presence of her child surely constitutes 
evidence that her concerns for her own and her child's safety were justified.   
                                                 
80    Sir Ronald Davison, above n 78, 41, found 'the laws relating to domestic protection and to protection of children in 
custody and access situations…are inadequate to deal with the types of domestic violence that we are currently faced 
with'.  The Domestic Violence Act 1995 provisions regarding custody and access were largely in response to this report. 
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The views of defence counsel in the above case are shared by fathers' rights groups who argue that 
men are victimised by the 'one-sided Family Court system' which dispenses protection orders too 
readily.81  These unsubstantiated claims of gender bias have apparently resulted in courts lifting the 
bar for without-notice protection orders.82  However, a 
 
Women's Refuge report notes that what motivates almost all women who apply for protection orders 
is fear and a desire to make themselves and their children safe.  This is reflected in Australian 
research about women's attitudes to access where 'one of [the] most striking findings was that most 
women who had experienced violence in their relationships still wanted their children to have some 
contact with their other parent, but what they sought (and often did not get) was an arrangement that 
ensured the safety of the children and themselves'.83 
 
The following case provides further stark evidence of the way claims of gender bias against fathers 
distort the social reality of women and children.   
 
Three weeks after separating from the children's mother, the father in this case strangled his two 
daughters to death and committed suicide.  The case was used by fathers' rights groups to promote 
their claims that suicides by 'desperate dads' had become increasingly common.  A representative 
of one group queried: 'How alone, threatened, and cornered must this man have felt to have found 
resolution by taking the lives of his children and his own?  There are many in political power and 
in the courts and the bureaucracy that have blood on their hands once again.'84  The National 
Director of the group remarked: 'We encourage men to mourn the passing of their children as 
though they have died, because they have died from their lives'.85   The Commissioner for Children 
is also reported as expressing his concern over the case and citing the principal Family Court 
                                                 
81   Group Backs Fathers' Fight, Daily News, 11 September 1998 reports that Men Against Female Emotional Abuse 
(MAFEA) was the first group of its kind to fight protection orders.  The report notes that the organiser of the group had 
been involved in a custody battle and had a protection order out against him on the grounds of psychological abuse. 
82    Wendy Davis, 'Gender Bias, Fathers' Rights, Domestic Violence and the Family Court' [2004] BFLJ 299, 302-303, 
noting recent research 'found that 61 per cent of the without-notice applications that were directed to proceed on notice 
involved severe abuse'.  The research 'called for further research about the exercise of judicial discretion in directing 
applications to proceed on notice as well as further training for Judges on the dynamics of domestic violence'.  
83    Ibid 304-305 (citations omitted). 
84    When The Strain Gets Too Much, Press, 11 August 2001. 
85    Ibid. 
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judge's recommendation that courses be provided to assist couples to move on from their break-up 
and focus on working out child access arrangements.86   
 
However, the actual facts of this case are in striking contrast to a 'fathers' rights', or even a 
children's rights analysis.  The maternal grandfather of the deceased children told reporters that 
although the children's father had been verbally abusive he had never been denied access to the 
children and there were no issues over custody.87  The children's mother stated that she made sure 
their father 'had as much access to the girls as he wanted'.  The father would call or send a text 
message that he wanted to see the girls, and since the father had no transport, the mother would 
drive the children to his address herself.  Indeed, it was the mother who suggested her daughters 
spend time with their father on the night they were killed.88  'I thought, rather than drag them 
through the courts; we should be able to do this in a civilised manner.'  The mother was angry at 
media reports linking her daughters' deaths to 'fathers' rights' claims over custody and access: 'It 
doesn't have to be a custody battle for something like that to happen.  I'm not trying to scare people.  
But this has nothing to do with custody'.  She did not dwell on her decision to take the children to 
their father on the night they were killed:  'If it wasn't the Friday night, it would have been the 
Saturday night…  I think he did this to punish me.  He's given me a life sentence', she said.89 
 
Despite incontrovertible evidence that women (and children) are most in danger at the time they 
leave or attempt to leave a violent relationship, and recognition of this elevated risk in New 
Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy90 and Ministry of Health Intervention Guidelines,91 
the legal system has systematically failed to respond to separation violence as a gendered, life-
threatening pattern of offending against women and children.92  The terrible social reality that New 
Zealand women are being killed despite 'begging authorities for help' therefore remains 
unacknowledged. 
 
                                                 
86    Men Poorly Equipped to Deal with Break Ups, Nelson Mail, 8 August 2001. 
87    Death Inquiry Finishes, Press, 7 August 2001. 
88    Mother Dealing With Her Grief, Nelson Mail, 25 August 2001. 
89   'You've Got to Move On'…Bereaved Mum Faces the Future, Nelson Mail, 25 August 2001. 
90    Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) 24.  
91    Ministry of Health, above n 55. 
92    In Courting Family Tragedy, Sunday Star Times, 13 December 1998, 2, Auckland and Dunedin lawyers discuss 
the 'frustrations' experienced by their clients when a protection order is issued.  A spokesman for the 'Caring Fathers' 
organisation suggests two classes of protection order are necessary - one for fathers with a history of violence, and 
another for fathers who perpetrate separation violence - the latter apparently to reflect the less serious nature of 
separation violence. 
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2.  Other Agencies 
As discussed above, the family of the offender in Case Study G/01/7 unsuccessfully attempted to 
seek intervention by health professionals.  This was a recurring pattern in the research.   
 
A further offender referred by his general practitioner for urgent psychiatric assessment was found 
to pose no risk and refused admittance for treatment.  He killed his wife the following day.93  The 
Coroner found another male who killed his estranged partner when she left their 'volatile' 
relationship had been inappropriately discharged from mental health treatment.94  The Coroner 
criticised the outpatient mental health care of a further offender who killed his estranged partner 
after he was discharged from inpatient treatment.95  The father of another offender contacted 
mental health authorities to express his concern regarding his son's post-separation depression and 
abusive behaviour.  The offender was interviewed by a mental health worker who advised that he 
was an adult and should take responsibility for his life.  A few hours later, this offender killed his 
estranged partner.96  Another offender presented at a local hospital requesting psychiatric 
assistance but was turned away.  This offender also killed his partner a few hours later.97  Another 
male killed his wife a few hours after he was assessed by a mental health team and permitted to 
return home.98  Yet another offender sought medical help and was placed on a three day 
monitoring plan.  He murdered his estranged partner the following day.99   
                                                
 
In 2002, the Ministry of Health published domestic violence intervention guidelines for use in a 
number of health professions and clinical settings.  The Ministry's 'Danger Assessment Scale' 
drawn from domestic violence research is accompanied by safety planning protocols.100  However, 
research published in 2003 found little consistency in forensic risk assessment and the data on 
which some approaches were based was of questionable validity.101  In 2004, an offender who had 
previously sought help from mental health services killed his estranged wife and six month-old son 
and set fire to himself.  Police had been called twice previously to the home.  The local Women's 
 
93    Case Study C/95/2. 
94    Case Study P/97/8.  
95    Case Study G/01/3. 
96    Case Study S/97/6. 
97    Case Study M/99/7. 
98    Case Study K/01/9. 
99    Case Study W/02/10. 
100   Ministry of Health, above n 55. 
101  Callum McCall, 'A Review of Approaches to Forensic Risk Assessment in Australia and New Zealand' (2003) 10 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 221.  
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Refuge had also become involved.  Relatives of the deceased woman stated that 'she had a 
protection order against [the offender], escape plans in place for her children and an electronic 
security system installed in her home'.102  However, a police spokesperson told the media that the 
offender's drug taking, history of violence, and the context of estrangement, 'certainly didn't 
highlight any problems as far as the mental health services were concerned'.103  
 
E   Case Studies Six and Seven 
Although the overwhelming majority of offenders who commit acts of serious domestic violence 
are men, overseas research indicates that a significant number of arrested women are self defending 
or angry victims of violence.104  The following case study provides an insight into police and 
judicial responses to angry domestic violence victims.   
 
The Angry Homicide Victim: Case Study M/02/4  
Bill, the 34 year-old male offender was in an 'on again, off again' relationship with 28 year-old Karnia for 
'several months'.105  Bill had abused Karnia on 'several' occasions106 and had prior convictions for violence, 
including assault with a weapon and two counts of assaulting a female.  A week before he killed Karnia, Bill 
was arrested and charged with an assault against her.  On the morning of the homicide, Bill appeared in the 
District Court, pleaded guilty to the assault, and was bailed on terms that he not associate with Karnia, and 
not consume alcohol.  Upon his return home, Karnia was apparently waiting outside Bill's house.107  Bill 
later stated that he told Karnia to leave.  Before she did so, Bill gave her a sum of money and Karnia 
returned later that day with a bottle of bourbon.  An 'altercation' developed, and Bill summoned a neighbour, 
who forcibly restrained Karnia by holding her down and lying on top of her.  The sentencing judge later 
stated that the 'precise details' of this altercation were unknown, but it was 'highly likely they were of a 
relatively petty nature'.108  The police were called.   
 
                                                 
102    Upsurge in Concern About Family Safety: More Calls to Police, Otago Daily Times, 24 May 2004. 
103    Double Homicide Suspect Had Drug Habit - Police, New Zealand Press Association, 22 May 2004. 
104   Kerry Healey, Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal 
Justice Strategies (1998) 73, note intervention programmes differentiate between: self-defending and angry victims, 
mutually combatant women and primary physical aggressors with the latter constituting approximately two per cent of 
women arrested for domestic violence.   
105    R v M [2004] 1 NZLR 71 (CA). 
106    Ibid 75. 
107    Karnia's reasons for seeking out the offender: whether from a sense of connectedness; a desire for reconciliation; a 
need to establish whether he had been taught a salutary lesson from his experience in court; and/or assurance that legal 
intervention had effected a change in his abusive behaviour;  remain unknown.   
108    R v M [2004] 1 NZLR 71, 74. 
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The attending police officer gave evidence that he arrived at the home to find Karnia was 'irate'.  So he 
handcuffed her to a pole while he 'tried to resolve the dispute'.  The sentencing judge subsequently observed 
that the officer 'was on duty on his own and needed to separate [the couple] whilst he endeavoured to calm 
the situation down'.109  Bill told the police officer that Karnia had consumed an 1125ml bottle of bourbon, 
had become angry when he refused to drink with her, and had broken a mirror.  (Karnia's version of the 
incident was not reported.)  The police officer agreed with defence counsel that Bill 'was calm and sober' 
throughout the time he was present.   The officer obtained assurances from the pair that there would be no 
further problems, released Karnia, and left the property.   
 
Shortly thereafter, Bill beat Karnia and stabbed her three times in the chest. Bruises on Karnia's body 
indicated that she had received seven blows to her head and face.  Her forearms were slashed in places, and 
in addition to a serious chest wound, Karnia died from another deep penetrative knife wound to her heart.  
While she lay dying, Bill contacted emergency services claiming that Karnia had stabbed herself.  When 
police returned to the house, Karnia was lying on the bed in a pool of blood.  Bill subsequently changed his 
account of Karnia's death, alleging that she had threatened him, and in particular, told him she was going to 
'get [a gang] onto him' and 'get somebody to kill him'.  
 
The Court of Appeal cites the following passage from the police video interview:   
 
'Question: How did it happen?  Answer:  She said she was going to get the [gang] onto me for 
hitting her last week.  Her parents don't like me.  Question: So what did you do?  Answer:  I went to 
the toilet.  She was lying on the bed.  I came back.  The knife was by the bed, by the floor.  She was 
mouthing off saying I was going to be killed.  I said is that right...I stabbed her in the chest and said  
I hope you die you little bitch.  Question:  How many times did you stab her?  Answer:  In the chest.   
Question:  Why did you stab her in the chest?  Answer:  Because I wanted to kill her.  Question: 
How long did you think about it before you decided to stab her?  Answer:  Probably a minute, she 
just kept mouthing.  I didn't say anything. I thought about being at Court today because of her and 
stabbed her.  Question:  How were you feeling when she was mouthing at you on the bed?  Answer:  
I just wished she would shut up.  Question:  What were you thinking just before you stabbed her?  
Answer:  Well, your going to get it good bitch now aren't you.  Question:  What did you think as 
you stabbed her?  Answer:  Take it, take that.'110   
 
This account omits any reference to Bill beating Karnia prior to her 'mouthing off' at him as she lay on the 
bed.   
                                                 
109    Ibid. 
110    Ibid 74-75. 
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The court heard medical evidence that a car accident three years earlier had produced behaviour and 
personality changes in the offender.  These included paranoia, impulsiveness, aggressive anti-social 
behaviour, and loss of control.  Bill's personality was summarised as: 'currently marked by the presence of 
passive aggressive, aggressive antisocial, and paranoid traits at clinically significant levels.  These are 
manifest in his irritability, verbal and physical aggression, impulsivity, disregard for the effects of his 
actions on others, and suspiciousness.'111   
 
Neverthless, the sentencing judge found 'the events of the evening of the murder were brought about by 
[Karnia] who had goaded [Bill] badly.'112 (The Court of Appeal notes Bill's conduct was also influenced by 
the alcohol he had consumed in breach of his bail conditions.)113  Invoking the Sentencing Act 2002, the 
judge determined that a sentence of life imprisonment would be manifestly unjust. On the night of the 
offence Bill was not 'the full quid' and was 'every bit as battered (in moral terms) in his mind as a battered 
woman.'114  Although expert opinion suggested Bill posed an on-going risk, the judge thought it unlikely 
that Bill would ever again find himself in the extreme situation that occurred in this case.  The Court of 
Appeal overturned this decision and imposed a sentence of life imprisonment.  In doing so, the Court noted 
that the degree of static risk posed by Bill would not change.  Nor was the dynamic risk likely to be 
manageable to such an extent that amenability to lifetime recall should be displaced.   
 
As Sally Merry observes, the 'innocent' victim in law is not the woman who fights back, drinks, or 
takes drugs along with her abuser.115  Given so little information is available from the victim's 
perspective, a fatality review of this case can only hint at possible shortcomings.   
 
1.   The Police Response 
Although Bill was on bail at the time he killed Karnia, no review of police handling of the original 
domestic violence call could be found.   
 
Busey attributes the frequency with which police arrest self-defending victims to the sometimes 
confusing behaviors a victim may display to police.  For example, the victim may feel safe to 
express her own anger after the police have arrived, or the victim may express anger toward the 
police because the justice system failed to protect her in the past.  Victims suffering from post-
                                                 
111    Ibid 75. 
112    Ibid 81. 
113    Ibid 76. 
114    Ibid.   
115   Sally Merry, 'Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women's Human Rights to Protection from 
Violence (2003) 25 Hum.Rts.Q. 343. 
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traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) may have angry outbursts or take aggressive postures - such as 
picking up a knife - which they feel are necessary in order to survive…research in Wisconsin shares 
this conclusion: 'Research with the community sample of domestically violent [women] indicated 
most were motivated by a need to defend themselves from their partner's assaults or were retaliating 
for previous beatings'.116 
 
The reasons for Karnia's 'irate' behaviour at the time of the original police call-out remain 
unaddressed in the reports.  Nor is it known whether police policy requiring officers who attend 
domestic violence call-outs to consult with their supervisor if no arrest is made117 was followed in 
this case.  There is no information on whether, and how, the attending officer assessed the issue of 
victim safety (a paramount principle of police intervention).  Completion of a risk assessment 
instrument to assist in determining which party was the primary aggressor might have alerted the 
police officer to a number of red flags for lethality: Bill's history of violence against women, 
including Karnia; his recent assault and Karnia's decision to report the violence to police; Bill's 
psychological disturbance; aggressive behaviour outside the relationship; unemployment; and use 
of alcohol and drugs.  In the absence of such assessment, it was Karnia who was forcibly restrained 
by police. 
 
2.  Criminal Law and the Courts 
It is not known whether, and if so how, the District Court assessed the likelihood of further 
violence against Karnia, including the possibility of retaliation for her decision to involve the 
police.  The sentencing judge's balancing of Bill's lethal attack with evidence that Karnia 'forced 
herself [on Bill] and took advantage of him and his drugs'118 depends upon a perception of equal 
antagonists and a woman who could 'give as good as she got'.119   The history of battering in this 
relationship and Karnia's eventual death illustrates that this was not the case.  Although the Court 
of Appeal recognised Bill posed an ongoing risk to public safety, it is significant (in terms of 
domestic violence risk assessment), that the sentencing judge did not.  In order to view Karnia as 
the provoker of lethal violence, it is necessary to ignore or trivialise Bill's beating of Karnia to 
which she was apparently responding at the time she was killed.     
 
                                                 
116    Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 104, 73. 
117    Webb, et al, above n 36, 1515. 
118    R v M [2004] 1 NZLR 71, 73. 
119   Donald Nicolson, 'Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and Battered Women Who Kill' 
(1995) 3 Fem.L.S. 185, discusses this analysis in battered defendant cases.   
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The following case provides further evidence of the need for police training on risk assessment 
protocols which can assist to identify the primary aggressor.  The depressing reality that many 
women who seek help from the legal system before they are killed have predicted their own demise 
is also evident in this case.   
 
The Angry Homicide Victim: Case Study H/00/8  
Thirty four year-old Jian separated from her 41 year-old husband John and was granted a protection order.  
In a letter written to her husband two months before she was killed, Jian told him she had made up her mind 
to leave because of his gambling and violence:  'Time after time, if it was not physical abuse, it was verbal 
abuse.  You threatened me at every turn.'  She told her husband he had never treasured her and had 
squandered her money.  'I really cannot work like this any more...You are not a human being.  You are not a 
man...You should begin anew to earn your own living....I would rather die than live...You thought you could 
control me like this forever...If another violent behaviour should occur, do you want to kill me?  The child 
will then have no mother.'  Jian's family stated that they also received a letter from Jian a few days before 
she was killed which confided her fears that her husband would kill her.  
 
Less than an hour before her death, Jian pleaded for help during a 111 call from her cell phone outside a 
closed police station.  Jian told the police operator that her estranged husband had taken her son and was 
threatening to kill him.  After informing the operator that she had a protection order, Jian was advised to 
wait outside the station while units were sent out to her.  A male associate of Jian, who was present at the 
time, later gave evidence that two police officers arrived, and after a computer check, queried the existence 
of the protection order.  Jian's cell phone rang, and after telling police that her husband had demanded 
$30,000 or he would kill their son, it was decided that Jian should return to the unit she occupied in the same 
building as her husband to retrieve the protection order.  Cross-examined by defence counsel, the attending 
police officer agreed that at this time the male associate warned police that Jian's estranged husband might 
be waiting outside her home when they arrived.  Jian did not want to leave her car unattended, so was 
permitted to drive on ahead alone, while the male associate travelled with police.  The officers lost her in 
traffic.   
 
Fearing for her son's safety, and believing her husband was elsewhere, Jian entered her home to fetch her 
protection order.  However, although her unit had been locked, her husband had persuaded their son to reach 
through a slot in the front door to open it.  The husband, described by the Crown as 'eaten up with anger and 
jealousy' had kept watch for his estranged wife from an upstairs window, armed with a hammer.  On seeing 
a knife, he decided to use that instead.   By the time police arrived, they heard 'full-on, hard core screaming' 
and entered the house in time to find the offender straddling his dying wife.  In addition to defence wounds 
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to her hands and forearms Jian was stabbed in her heart and lung and the stab wounds in her shoulder and 
back suggested she was trying to escape.  Her face was also 'a target area'.  The reports do not mention the 
whereabouts of the boy during this attack on his mother. 
 
A senior police officer (who declined to be named) told reporters the case was symptomatic of a lack of 
supervision in the police.  A senior police officer should have travelled with Jian, and the constables should 
have called their sergeant as soon as they realised a threat to kill a child had been made.  'If the cops had 
done their jobs right, it would never have happened', he said.  In a further report, a police officer is quoted as 
stating that it would be a serious misjudgement to allow a woman in a custody dispute back into a 
potentially volatile situation without first securing the scene.  'Common sense dictates...that if there's been a 
domestic at the address, you would make sure that the woman stayed outside until you made sure it was 
safe.  For all they knew he could have been sitting there with a firearm waiting for her to come back...I 
would be asking those cops some real serious questions about why they didn't tell her ''You wait here, we'll 
go back to the address'' or ''Come with us in one of the cars"'.  However, although a Police Complaints 
Authority investigation was pending, the police commander told reporters he believed that the two officers 
had done a 'really professional job'.  He said staff had been 'reminded' that family violence would not be 
tolerated and that protection orders were not to be taken lightly.   
 
By contrast, a domestic violence advocate complained that police should not have required the victim to 
return home to provide evidence of her protection order.  The Education Co-ordinator of Auckland's 
Domestic Violence Centre was reported as stating that a police review of this case was only a 'small part of 
the picture…Many agencies miss vital clues because they have yet to build domestic violence risk factor 
assessment into their work practice.'  He wanted an inter-agency death review team set up, so lessons could 
be learnt from this homicide.  No subsequent reports relating to either this recommendation, or the finding 
of the Police Complaints Authority, could be found.  
 
At trial, the jury heard a tape of Jian's call to the police communications centre on the afternoon she was 
killed.  Jian repeatedly told the call taker that her estranged husband had taken her son and was threatening 
to kill him.  She stated she had a temporary protection order against the offender and police had been called 
six days previously.  (The jury heard Jian had applied to have the protection order discharged, but this had 
not occurred.)  Defence counsel claimed Jian's husband had been provoked into killing his wife.  When 
ruling on the admissibility of certain evidence, the trial judge noted that the offender was claiming Jian had 
started the fight.  Accordingly, evidence that the police had been called to the home just six days before Jian 
 177
was killed might be 'very helpful to the defence'.  This evidence was said to provide 'some basis' for arguing 
that 'it was the deceased who was behaving in an aggressive way, at least verbally' on that occasion.120      
 
The judge's suggestion that Jian may have been verbally aggressive at the time of the earlier police 
call-out indicates that no action was taken by police against the offender despite the protection 
order.  Research reveals police attitudes that women 'bring the violence on themselves', or could 
avoid it by 'being quiet', or whose husbands allege are 'looking for a fight' are often implicated in 
police failure to arrest the abuser.121  If some police officers construct domestic violence victims as 
troublesome or undeserving, and the violence against them as trivial, the strong investigatory 
procedures required to establish probable cause for arrest will be missing.  Without further 
information it is only possible to speculate whether this may explain why no action was taken when 
police attended the domestic violence call-out six days before the offender murdered his estranged 
wife.  
 
Four days after Jian's murder, a newspaper office received a telephone call from a man who 
threatened a copy-cat killing.  The male was arrested by police after stating that he also was on the 
verge of killing his wife.  He reportedly spoke of his anger that a protection order prohibited him 
from contacting his partner directly, stating his belief that protection orders were 'worthless' as they 
aggravated the situation.  His wife's order would not stop him from going to her home and killing 
her:  'I'm going to go around and kill her if I don't get satisfaction...I don't care if I go to jail.  I 
would rather she died and I was in prison and [his child] was brought up by strangers' he told the 
call taker.  No reports relating to subsequent court appearances, or the disposition of this case could 
be found by searching available records. 
 
IV   INVESTIGATIVE FATALITY REVIEWS 
The aims of investigative reviews include understanding how or why deaths were not classified as 
domestic violence related.   
   
In particular, the investigative reviews make much of the need to improve protocols for coroners 
and others investigating deaths.  If this is achieved then the outcome will be not only a more 
                                                 
120    R v H (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Fisher J, 15 November 2000) [12]. 
121   N Zoe Hilton, 'Police Intervention and Public Opinion' in N Zoe Hilton (ed) Legal Responses to Wife Assault: 
Current Trends and Evaluation (1993) 37. 
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accurate count of domestic violence related deaths, but also an increase in public awareness of 
domestic violence as a threat to life and well-being.122     
 
The following categories of cases requiring monitoring and review were identified from the present 
research. 
 
A   Misclassification of Domestic Violence-related Deaths 
1   Drug-Taking versus Domestic Violence 
As demonstrated by the following case, attributing women's deaths to drug-taking has the potential 
to downplay or ignore the role of domestic violence.  
 
Misclassification of Domestic Violence Deaths: Case Study O/98/1(I)  
Camellia, age 25 years, whose occupation was described as 'solo mother', appeared in Court and admitted a 
charge of assault on a child.  The Prosecutor noted that Camellia was preparing her seven year-old son for 
school and 'asked the boy something and after he lied to her, she smacked him on the bottom four or five 
times with an open hand'.  The child was then hit 'with a vacuum cleaner pipe, twice on a leg and twice on 
an arm.  After the boy apologised [Camellia] calmed down and comforted him.  He did not go to school that 
day or the next'.   Two days later, Camellia 'left the house, leaving a note saying she had to get away from it 
all and needed help.  Later that day the child was admitted to Christchurch Hospital with a swollen left arm, 
bruising to his back near the buttocks, a grazed elbow, bruising to his chest, shoulder, and legs, and a cut to 
his head'.  When interviewed by police, Camellia stated that she came from 'a violent domestic situation and 
was coping with an out-of-control drug habit'.  She was remanded on bail for sentencing in August 1998.  
(No report of her sentence could be found.) 
 
Around two years later, a woman who lived with Camellia answered the door about 3 am and found three 
men standing on the doorstep.  The jury was told one of the men, armed with a tomahawk, pushed her 
against the wall, while Camellia's ex-husband 'held a machete against her cheek, asking: 'Where is the 
bitch?'  The offender with the tomahawk passed it to Camellia's ex-husband who went into a bedroom where 
Camellia was asleep.  The Court heard that Camellia 'woke up screaming…as her ex-husband beat her with 
a tomahawk'.  While her estranged partner was repeatedly striking Camellia with the blunt end of the axe, 
another man removed a crying baby from the bedroom.  The three men were convicted on various charges 
which included burglary, kidnapping, wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and wounding 
with intent to injure.   
                                                 
122    Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 2, 23. 
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Approximately four months after this attack, Camellia, aged 28 years, was found dead in the bath in her 
home at about 2.30 am.  Police originally treated Camellia's death as a possible homicide.  However, after 
ascertaining that her ex-partner was still in prison, her death was subsequently declared accidental.  
Although police found no evidence of drug taking in the bathroom, the Coroner found Camellia drowned 
after taking a potentially fatal dose of morphine either before or during the bath. 'The medical evidence is 
that she died by drowning but it is also clear she almost certainly lost consciousness because of an overdose 
of morphine that caused her to slip and that caused the drowning'.  The Coroner regarded Camellia's death 
as 'really a chicken and egg situation, if drowning had not occurred, the morphine would have resulted in 
death anyway - it’s a grim scenario and grim way of putting it'.  A police detective gave evidence that 
although morphine was now a problem in New Zealand, he was unsure if it was a problem in the area where 
Camellia lived.   
 
The Coroner concluded that the message must go out from the court that taking illegal drugs was a life 
threatening practice which could and would continue to take lives. 'If this is a wake-up call to even one 
possible victim [Camellia's] death will have served some purpose' the Coroner said. 
 
The conclusion that Camellia's death would 'serve some purpose' if one person were influenced not 
to take illicit drugs fails to look beyond the symptom of drug taking, to the scourge of domestic 
violence and its impact on Camellia's life, her drug taking and her death.  Research shows 
tranquillisers, alcohol and/or illicit drugs are often used by battered women as a means of blocking 
out the effects of the violence.123  However, in the absence of protocols to facilitate Coroners' 
understandings of domestic violence, society will remain unaware of the true human cost of this 
violence and its impact on society.   
 
2   Deaths arising from 'Relationship Break-ups' 
In June 2005, the Christchurch Coroner publicly reported that 'depression, relationship break-ups 
and backgrounds of drug and alcohol dependency' were the chief factors behind eleven suicides he 
had recently ruled on.124  One report notes: 'The themes running through these inquests were 
familiar: suicide afflicts more men than women and is closely associated with depression, and often 
                                                 
123    Sue Griffiths, 'Women, Anger and Domestic Violence: The Implications for Legal Defences to Murder' in Jalna 
Hanmer and Catherine Itzin (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice 
A Reader (2000) 133, 141. 
124    Suicide Factors Emerge, Press, 18 June 2005; Concern over Suicide Silence, Waikato Times, 23 April 2005. 
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linked to relationship breakdowns and alcohol misuse'.125  However, this analysis fails to 
acknowledge the interrelationship between domestic violence and suicide.    
 
Coroners' findings are an essential source of information and the public are dependent upon a 
complete set of facts in order to extract the lessons that are to be learned from each case.  When the 
role of domestic violence is overlooked, opportunities to educate the public and develop proactive 
strategies to prevent future deaths in these circumstances are lost.   
 
3    Suicides of Domestic Violence Victims 
As previously discussed, the male boyfriend of one woman in the present research was assaulted by 
his girlfriend's former partner and committed suicide.  The judge noted the assault and the suicide 
were not unrelated.126  In Case Study NS/99/1(C) the offender was charged with beating and 
sexually abusing his 16 year-old daughter who committed suicide.  Research also shows a 
significant number of women who commit suicide do so because they have been abused by an 
intimate partner.127  '[W]ithout more thorough examination of these cases, we cannot be sure how 
many of these women's despair was directly tied to feeling trapped and abused at the hands of their 
partners.'128  New Zealand research on the relationship between suicide and domestic violence is 
overdue.  
 
B    Death Following an Assault: Only Assault Charges Laid 
The present study found a significant number of women died shortly after being assaulted by an 
intimate partner, but the male faced only assault, as opposed to more serious charges.  (These cases 
were not included in the sample of lethal assaults.)  There are a number of possible explanations for 
this pattern of domestic violence followed by the death of the victim and conviction of the offender 
on assault-related charges.  However, given the present tendency to downplay or minimise the 
lethality potential of male assaults upon women, these cases require monitoring to improve 
understanding of deaths in this category and the legal issues involved.    
 
R v Erutoe demonstrates that a tendency to downplay the role of domestic violence in women's 
deaths extends beyond the legal system.  In this case, the pathologist concluded that the deceased 
                                                 
125    Breaking the Taboo, Press, 23 June 2005. 
126    See, discussion of this case above, at p 123. 
127    Websdale, above n 6, 30.  
128    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 1, 19. 
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women's injuries were consistent with a motor vehicle injury.   After police and the pathologist 
announced her death as the result of a motor accident, the woman's husband told family members 
that he killed her.  The Court of Appeal notes a 'curious' feature of the pathologist's evidence was 
that at the time he made his original finding he doubted that the woman's injuries were received in 
a motor vehicle accident.  However, the pathologist only resiled from this position following the 
husband's confession and a further examination.129   
 
C   Unresolved Cases 
Although the actual rate is likely to be much higher, a significant number of women died or 
disappeared in suspicious circumstances indicating domestic violence during the period of this 
study.  Following are examples of deaths in this category.   
 
Unresolved Cases: Case Study C/96/2(I) 
In 1996 a 24 year-old woman was found floating and unconscious in an Auckland river.  She was taken to 
hospital and died two days later.  The victim's ex-partner told police the woman had fallen out of a dinghy 
the pair were occupying and disappeared despite his attempts to save her.  Although an autopsy found the 
victim had injuries to her scalp consistent with blunt force trauma, the cause of death was established as 
accidental drowning.  In early 1997, the victim's friends and family, dissatisfied with the police 
investigation, approached the police requesting that the file be re-opened.  However, at the inquest in late 
2000, a police spokesperson gave evidence that due to 'work pressures' on police, a homicide investigation 
was not launched until late 1997.   
 
The Coroner heard that the woman had a 'tempestuous' relationship with her ex-partner and told friends she 
wanted to leave him.  However, he allegedly threatened her with violence should she end their relationship.  
The woman served a trespass order on her ex-partner and terminated the relationship.  The following month, 
her ex-partner allegedly broke into her home, forced the woman to the floor, and put a gun to her head.  A 
friend gave evidence that she had pleaded with the woman to get help to protect herself from her ex-partner.  
However, the woman replied: 'You don't understand what you're dealing with.  He told me he'll kill me and 
he'll come after you, too.'   
 
A police officer gave evidence that the woman, probably in an attempt to get property back from her ex-
partner, had met him at a Boating Club and the pair rowed out to a launch.  Police conducted tests in the 
river which showed the woman could not have drowned in the circumstances described by her ex-partner.  
                                                 
129    [1990] 2 NZLR 28, 32. 
 182
However the absence of witnesses, and 'problems with admissibility of evidence' meant the police could not 
proceed with criminal charges.  'It is the police view, however, that the death is suspicious and the file 
remains open', a police spokesperson said.  
 
Unresolved Cases: Case Study D/98/2(I) 
In 1998, an ambulance was called to the home of a wealthy 65 year-old woman.  Medical treatment and 
resuscitation were unsuccessful and the woman died at the scene. The woman's 46 year-old partner, who had 
begun a relationship with her about six weeks before her death, was the last known person to see her alive.  
He told police that after the pair had dinner and sex the woman began suffering shortness of breath at which 
time he called an ambulance.  The attending doctor refused to sign a death certificate stating the cause of 
death.  However, the woman's death was not regarded by the police as suspicious, and her body was handed 
over to her family.  She was cremated two days after she died, and her house commercially cleaned.   
 
In the absence of a death certificate, a routine blood sample was ordered and sent to the Institute of 
Environmental Science and Research.  The sample revealed a massive amount of heroin in the woman's 
system - four times more than the previous highest recorded amount in an overdose victim by the Institute.  
Police launched an investigation 'on the back foot' having no body; the main evidence in any suspicious 
death investigation.  The high levels of heroin and/or morphine in the victim's body suggested that death had 
occurred soon after the drug entered her system.  However, police inquiries established that the woman did 
not have the contacts to obtain heroin or morphine.  She had a fear of needles and disliked taking even her 
own medicine.  The woman's family and friends told police she would never knowingly have taken the 
narcotics and they suspected 'foul play'.   
 
In a police interview, with his lawyer present, the woman's partner told police that he had no knowledge of 
the heroin.  At the inquest, police stated that suicide was the least likely cause of the woman's death.  The 
Coroner found the presence of morphine at a fatal level to be 'unexplained'.  After the inquest, police 
continued their calls for answers to the woman's death:  'We are certain that we have not been told the whole 
story in relation to this incident', a police spokesman said.  
 
Unresolved Cases: Case Study M/97/1(I) 
On New Year's Day 1997 the woman and her partner attended a party to celebrate the New Year.  By about 
1.30 am most of the guests had left.  At 2 am the woman and her partner were alone in the bar.  Four other 
guests were outside on a concrete patio.  A witness told police he heard the woman shouting, which caused 
him to turn and look through the door.  He saw the woman and her partner arguing.  As he watched, the 
woman fell backwards and was then pulled up by her partner.  Shortly after, the male shouted for someone 
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to call 111.  The woman's throat had been cut with a broken glass.  When the ambulance arrived, ambulance 
officers endeavoured to resuscitate the woman.  Meantime, her partner destroyed the homicide/accident 
scene by upturning a table, smashing a glass, and trampling blood through the floor.  Following 
unsuccessful attempts to revive the woman, police were called at 2.19 a.m.  Although the results of forensic 
examinations were as yet unknown, the day after the incident the officer in charge of the investigation 
decided that the woman's severe neck and throat injuries were the result of a 'freakish accident'.  The media 
and the deceased's family were advised accordingly.   Following complaints from the deceased woman's 
father, and her sister, a serving police officer, the investigation was re-opened.   At the conclusion of that 
investigation, the file was submitted to the Crown Solicitor, who advised there was insufficient evidence to 
pursue a homicide charge.   
 
At the inquest, the woman's partner stated that the deceased had stumbled into a wineglass he was holding in 
his hand:  'I'm not sure how it happened but she sort of fell into me and we both went down', he said.  He 
acknowledged the relationship had been violent, but denied he had been arguing with the woman 
immediately before she received the injuries.  The Coroner recorded an open verdict stating that the 
evidence did not enable him to find 'exactly how [the deceased] came to suffer the wound to her neck as a 
result of which she died.'   
 
The deceased woman's family complained to the Police Complaints Authority.  After a police investigation, 
the family's complaints were upheld on a number of grounds.  Investigation deficiencies were described by 
police as 'errors of judgment'.  The Authority held that 'it would have been more prudent' for the officer to 
have awaited the result of forensic examinations, the blood/alcohol tests, fracture tests on the glass, and 
blood grouping before a final decision was made whether this death was an accident or homicide.  Evidence 
from the witness who saw the couple arguing; evidence that a chain worn by the woman's partner had been 
broken, placed in his pocket and never taken for forensic tests; and evidence that the relationship between 
the deceased and her partner was 'turbulent', should have persuaded the officer in charge to undertake 
further background enquiries into the relationship.  Having regard to the explanations the woman's partner 
offered for her death, the police should have interviewed him using video facilities.  It would also have been 
'preferable' if initial interviews with witnesses at the party had been followed up by qualified investigators.  
Furthermore, only those witnesses remaining at the scene were interviewed.  Again, it would have been 
preferable for a wider range of those who attended the function earlier - friends and work colleagues - to be 
spoken to by experienced investigators.  In all these circumstances, the early conclusion of accidental death 
was 'probably premature and clearly risky'.   
 
After this report was published, a police spokesman told the media that the officer in charge of the initial 
investigation was counselled, but not disciplined, because that was the recommendation of the Authority.  
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The deceased woman's father told the media: 'I think that's wrong - I think that's shocking...We would have 
liked to have seen him reprimanded.  Over his incompetence they [the police] have had to rewrite the 
manual.  That's got to tell you something'.  He believed that had the investigation into his daughter's death 
been handled properly from the start, the result may well have been different.  But 'we've got to put the 
matter to rest and that's the end of it', he said. 
 
During an investigation into the death of a woman who also died when her throat was cut in the 
presence of her male partner, the Coroner in Case Study T/97/2(I) twice adjourned the inquest for 
further investigation by police and evidence from the deceased's male partner.  The court heard two 
persons who were drinking at the house at the time initially lied about the woman's death.  
Subsequently, they stated that the woman died after her partner pulled her toward him and the pair 
fell to the floor, causing the woman to accidentally smash through a conservatory door and cut her 
throat.  The Coroner noted that no charges would be laid and police would follow up on the failure 
of the woman's partner to appear at the inquest.    
 
In the final stages of this research, a police investigation was launched into the disappearance of a 
woman who set off to meet with her estranged partner.  The woman's partner stated she arrived at 
his home, their meeting was amicable, and the woman left.  However, she has not been heard from 
since.  After an unsuccessful offer of reward for information, police announced in 2003 that all 
avenues of the inquiry had been exhausted.  The woman's mother, who shared a house with her 
daughter and her three grandchildren, appeared on national television pleading for information.  
She stated her daughter was extremely security-conscious, and would not stop to pick up 
hitchhikers in the dark.  The mother told reporters that all she had left was hope....'Once you've 
given that up, you've had it', she said.130 
 
As illustrated by the cases above, challenges to police findings rely substantially on the willingness 
and ability of the deceased's family members to press for review.  The role of the independent 
Police Complaints Authority (PCA) is highly circumscribed and does not overcome police 
domination of the complaints process.  Investigation of complaints is conducted by police officers 
and the PCA cannot investigate of its own volition unless there are reasonable grounds to believe it 
is in the public interest to do so.  An individual-initiated, reactive, ad hoc complaints procedure 
cannot provide the systematic monitoring necessary to improve accountability in domestic violence 
                                                 
130    Waiting for HerDaughter to Drive In, New Zealand Herald, 11 April 2003. 
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cases.  Graeme Dunstall notes that the independent initiative of the Authority is envisaged to be 
used only sparingly, and this has proven to be the case. 
 
Given that the police have been left with the main responsibility to control the misconduct of their 
members, 'the soft influences of culture, education, and conscience' remain as (as for forces 
elsewhere) perhaps the crucial constraints on New Zealand police behaviour.131 
 
To ascertain the true prevalence of violence in intimate relationships it is necessary to investigate 
the extent to which the official category of women's deaths for which no finding could be made 
whether injuries were accidentally or purposefully inflicted refers to death in the context of an 
abusive relationship.  As discussed in Chapter Two, this research is also overdue.    
 
V   CONCLUSION 
The cases show many abused women are killed following frequent and fruitless appeals to the 
criminal justice system for help.  This social reality is masked by oppositional discourses of 
deceased women as pathological victims or provocative agents which obscure a pattern of struggle 
and resistance by deceased victims.  This included exiting the relationship, summoning the courage 
to seek help from police, and pursuing convictions against violent men.  As Patricia Easteal points 
out, cases in which state intervention failed to avert women's deaths 'are in some ways, even more 
depressing than those which involved little or no intervention from the criminal justice system'.132      
 
Pervasive misunderstandings about the significance of risk factors for dangerousness/lethality 
reveal the need for public and professional education and a standardised risk assessment tool for 
use across agencies dealing with domestic violence.  Systematic review of domestic violence 
fatalities is also crucial to identify gaps and shortcomings in agency interventions and provide 
greater protection for battered women.  Margaret Hobart notes fatality reviews should go beyond 
examination of the criminal justice system, to critical analysis of the broad spectrum of community 
support.133  Lessons learned should be used to update standards and best practice guidelines, 
improve risk assessment protocols and counter victim-blaming which has become an 
institutionalised response to violence in intimate relationships.      
                                                 
131   Graeme Dunstall, 'Police in New Zealand' in D K Das (ed), Police Practices: An International Review (1994) 393 
(citations omitted).     
132    Patricia Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (1993) 105. 
133    Margaret Hobart, Advocates and Fatality Reviews (2004) 15. 
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CHAPTER SIX: THE 'RED FLAG' OF SEPARATION 
PART I:  THE SEXUAL PROVOCATION DEFENCE 
 Alison Aris made up her mind to leave her partner for a new start so she packed  
her things and organised a moving truck.  She never found a new life.  On   
Tuesday, the New Lynn mother was found, shot to death, in an Arahoe Rd 
house. Police have started a manhunt, across Auckland and in the rugged 
Waitakere Ranges, for her de facto, Keith Ray London, 41…Ms Aris, a 32-
year-old chef, was shot in the head after going to the house to pick up some 
belongings around midday.  She had left her two-year-old daughter…with her 
parents.1 
 
                    The answer to the common question, 'Why doesn't she leave?' is that women do  
 leave or try to leave.2 
  
                            
I   INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand's national domestic violence prevention strategy acknowledges separation as a period 
of increased danger for women and children.3  Ministry of Health guidelines for practitioners also 
warn of the increased risk of violence around the period of separation.4  The Domestic Violence Act 
1995 recognises separation violence can extend beyond the individual woman and her children by 
providing new partners of previously victimised ex-spouses with the opportunity to obtain 
protection orders under the Act.5  National domestic violence policy expresses a related concern 
that current processes for working through custody and access issues may compromise the safety of 
women and children.  Accordingly, action is contemplated to 'review the operation of legislation 
that interfaces with the Domestic Violence Act 1995…to ensure consistency in approach and 
effective integration in law, related policy and service delivery'.6   
 
Notwithstanding this emphasis on integrated, consistent law and policy, no consideration is given 
to reviewing the operation of s 169 of the Crimes Act 1961 which codifies the common law 
doctrine of provocation.7  Given criticism by the New Zealand Law Commission of the way the 
                                                 
1     Manhunt After Woman Shot, Dominion, 29 June 2000.  This Case Study L/00/4 is discussed above, at p 66. 
2    Carolyn Block, 'How Can Practitioners Help an Abused Woman Lower Her Risk of Death?' [2003] NIJ Journal 4, 
6.  
3     Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) 24.  
4    Ministry of Health, Family Violence Intervention Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse (2002) Appendix J offers 
safety planning as a patient resource to assist women prepare for separation and long term safety after separation. 
5     Section 16.  See, also, Ruth Busch, 'Editorial' (1996) 4 Waikato L.Rev. i, ii. 
6     Ministry of Social Development, above n 3.  
7      The Children, Young Persons, and their Families Act 1989; Guardianship Act 1968; Family Proceedings Act 
1980; Protection of Personal and Property Rights Act 1988 are specified as requiring review to ensure consistency in 
law, policy and service delivery.  
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doctrine is applied in domestic violence cases,8 and critical commentary on its operation in cases of 
separation violence,9 there appears a striking inconsistency between law and national domestic 
violence policy. 
 
The partial defence of provocation reduces liability for intentional killings to manslaughter if, in 
the circumstances of the case, something said or done by the deceased (or in some cases a third 
party) was sufficient to deprive the offender of his power of self-control and thereby induce him to 
commit the act of homicide.10  The provocation must have actually deprived the offender of his 
power of self-control and the objective or evaluative component of the defence requires the 
offender's behaviour to be judged by 'an estimation of the effect of the provocation on the self-
control of a hypothetical "ordinary" person'.11  Sexual provocation, defined by Ian Leader-Elliott as 
'the claim that infidelity, desertion or sexual humiliation drove the offender to kill a rival or sexual 
partner' is 'a distinct variety of the defence, with its own peculiar history'.12  This form of 
provocation is commonly raised in intimate femicide cases13 and is sometimes described as 'le 
crime passionel'14 or a 'heat of passion' killing, denoting a crime committed in the throes of 
passion, especially sexual passion.   
 
The New Zealand Law Commission notes the provocation defence diverges from modern values in 
significant respects.  Its historical genesis is apparent in the way it is currently used to excuse 
killings arising from jealousy and possessiveness, or in response to perceived insults to a man's 
'honour'.  Echoing a previous recommendation advocating abolition of the defence provided the 
                                                 
8   See, eg, New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered 
Defendants, Report 73 (2001) [105]. 
9    See, eg, Elisabeth McDonald, 'Provocation, Sexuality and the Actions of ''Thoroughly Decent Men"' (1993) 9 
Women's Studies Journal 126; Sue Lees, 'Naggers, Whores, and Libbers: Provoking Men to Kill' in Jill Radford and 
Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 267; Graeme Coss, 'Provocation, Law Reform 
and the Medea Syndrome' (2004) 28 Crim LJ 133. 
10    Provocation is not available as a defence in cases other than homicide, although it remains a factor which may be 
taken into account at sentencing. 
11    Gerald Orchard, 'Culpable Homicide' in  A P Simester and W J Brookbanks (eds), Principles of Criminal Law (2nd 
ed, 2002) 507, 525. 
12    Ian Leader-Elliott, 'Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation' in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary 
Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997) 149, 151.   
13    The Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report (2004) [2.22], cites research by the 
New South Wales Law Reform Commission, Provocation, Diminished Responsibility and Infanticide, Discussion 
Paper 31 (1993), para 3.98, which found the defence is commonly used by men who kill female intimates in a jealous 
rage, while women are more likely to call on the defence where they have been victims of long term abuse.  
14   Joshua Dressler, 'Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale' (1982) 73 J.CrimL.& 
Criminology 421 n1. 
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sentence of life imprisonment for murder ceased to be mandatory,15 the Commission called for its 
abolition.16  However, notwithstanding an apparent consensus that the provocation defence is in 
need of statutory reform,17 calls for its demise may hold little or no political appeal.18   
 
A number of submissions to the Commission were in favour of reforming the defence to exclude 
'acts of sexual infidelity and other acts causing jealousy, and reporting the defendant's unlawful 
acts to the police' from its scope.19  The Victorian Law Reform Commission also raised the 
possibility of excluding certain defined conduct.  Circumstances that could be removed from the 
ambit of the defence included: the deceased leaving, attempting to leave, or threatening to leave an 
intimate relationship; suspected, discovered or confessed infidelity; a context of sexual intimacy or 
spousal homicide; where the accused had engineered a confrontation with the deceased, for 
example if he killed in breach of a protection order.20   
 
However, critics of such reform argued that 
 
 the exclusion of certain circumstances from the scope of the defence might be applying an overly 
simplistic view of the range of factors which might be relevant in any particular case.  For instance, 
there are very few cases in which the provocation will be simply that the person says he or she is 
leaving.  The context is critical.21   
 
This chapter explores 'the range of factors' that may be relevant to a provocation defence in the 
context of separation violence.  Separation violence was defined as encompassing cases in which 
the parties had separated in fact, or where the provoking party sought to terminate the relationship.  
Given research showing formal and informal support networks are crucial to women's ability to 
safely exit abusive relationships, violence in response to victims' appeals for assistance to family 
and associates, and reporting an abusive partner to the authorities were included as separation 
                                                 
15    The Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Culpable Homicide (1976) [15], based its case for abolition of 
the defence mainly on its belief that the 'hybrid person' test had become too complex for juries.  The role of the 
Committee as a reform body under the auspices of the Department of Justice has now been subsumed by the New 
Zealand Law Commission. 
16    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 8, [120]. 
17   Warren Brookbanks, 'English Law Commission Project on Partial Defences to Murder' in England and Wales Law 
Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Consultation Paper 173 (2003) Appendix D [95]. 
18    R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385, 447 (CA) per Thomas J.         
19    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 8, [111]. 
20    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 13, [2.57-2.58]. 
21    Ibid [2.61]. 
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scenarios.  The study also investigated whether an offender who killed an estranged partner, or one 
who was attempting to escape, could access the provocation defence despite a history of violence 
toward the deceased victim.   
 
The research does not attempt to prove the statistical likelihood of a manslaughter verdict.22  
Instead, the methodology employed in Victoria Nourse's study of the provocation defence which 
viewed 'getting to the jury' as the measure of a successful provocation claim rather than the actual 
jury verdict is adopted.23  As Nourse points out, if the sample were limited to those cases where a 
provocation plea was accepted, this would provide a skewed picture of legal practice as it would 
not give a sense of those cases in which juries were actually instructed on provocation.   
 
Criminal law is a potent means by which the state regulates the conduct of citizens and sets 
standards of acceptable behaviour.  Section 169(3) of the Crimes Act 1961 makes evidence of 
provocation a question of law and was intended 'to ensure that provocation is not lightly left to a 
jury'.24  Since it has never been the law that any provocation will suffice, before evidence of 
provocation can raise a jury question the objective component of the defence requires that the 
conduct complained of was capable of amounting to behaviour which might provoke the 'ordinary 
person' and potentially reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter.25  Therefore, a decision to 
allow the jury to consider the defence expresses a normative judgment that the alleged provocation 
was sufficient to provoke an ordinary person to respond with lethal violence.  Nourse notes that if 
judges usually allow allegations of sexual provocation to go to the jury, this may reflect a policy to 
send almost every case to the jury for fear of reversal on appeal.  However, even if this were the 
case, a decision to allow the jury to consider the defence has legal meaning.  While expediency 
may explain the practice, it neither sets a legal standard, nor accounts for its legitimacy.  'One 
cannot answer questions about the proper legal practice by asserting the existence of an expedient 
one.'26  Accordingly, this chapter is concerned with the substantive content of provocation claims 
as opposed to the verdicts of juries. 
                                                 
22  Difficulties accessing data also precluded such investigation.  The Victorian Law Reform Commission, 'Getting 
Away With Murder' (2003) 77 LIJ 89, 89, notes that provocation is most commonly raised by men who kill women in 
the context of sexual intimacy. 
23   Victoria Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense' (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 1331. 
24  R v King (1987) 7 CRNZ 591, 593 (CA).  By contrast, R v Nepia [1983] NZLR 754 (CA); R v Taaka [1982] 2 
NZLR 198 (CA) are authority that the defence is not lightly to be withdrawn from the jury. 
25   Lord Hobhouse in R v Smith(Morgan) [2001] 1AC 146, 195 (HL) notes this test expresses 'a concept used not 
infrequently in the criminal law to prevent a legitimate defence from becoming a licence to commit crimes'. 
26   Nourse, above n 23, 1357.  
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Following a brief outline of the history of sexual provocation, case studies examine the operation 
of the doctrine in the various separation scenarios.  Mechanistic constructions of self-control are 
critiqued, and the moral basis of the defence is examined.  A connection is drawn between the 
close association of intimate femicide with a provocation analysis and the dominant stereotype of 
lethal male violence as spontaneous and unpredictable offending.  The chapter concludes that 
contemporary elaborations of sexual provocation have their origins in patriarchal legal norms that 
have successfully resisted decades of law reform.  These relationship norms obscure the social 
reality of a gendered, structural pattern of violence toward women and children which the legal 
system is presently failing to acknowledge and address.   
 
II   THE ORIGINS & DEVELOPMENT OF PROVOCATION 
Recognisable theoretical foundations of provocation doctrine can be traced to the seventeenth 
century,27 although as far back as the fourteenth century English criminal law drew a distinction 
between premeditated killings (malice prepense) and hot-blooded killings (chance medley).28  At a 
time when the mandatory penalty for premeditated murder was execution 'common law developed 
the crime of manslaughter, or a homicide without malice aforethought, for which the penalty was 
handburning and forfeiture of one's goods, but not death'.29  The origins of provocation are 
therefore inextricably linked to a desire to mitigate the harshness of a mandatory death sentence.30   
 
'Malice aforethought' (in the sense of premeditation) was implied in cases when a man suddenly 
killed without provocation.  This legal fiction developed to cover unpremeditated killings where 
there was only 'trivial' provocation or where the response of the accused was excessive, in which 
case the defence would fail whether the accused had acted under sudden provocation or not.31  
Early courts restricted conduct that could amount to adequate provocation to four categories which 
were by 'general consent' allowed to be sufficient provocation.32  In R v Mawgridge33 these were 
classified as a grossly insulting assault; witnessing a friend or relative being attacked; witnessing 
                                                 
27    England and Wales Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder: Consultation Paper 173 (2003) Part I, [1.24]. 
28    Michael Allen, 'Provocation's Reasonable Man: A Plea for Self-Control'  (2000) 64 J.C.L. 216, 217. 
29    Joshua Dressler, above n 14, 426. 
30    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 13, [2.3]. 
31    Allen, above n 28, 218, citing Oneby (1727) 92 ER 465 and East in Pleas of the Crown (1803) Vol I, 234. 
32    R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146 (HL) per Lord Hoffman. 
33    (1707) Kel 119, 135-137; (1707) 84 ER 1107, 1114-1115. 
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the illegal arrest of another; and seeing a man in adultery with the accused's wife.34  Lord Holt in 
Mawgridge made it clear that English courts were enforcing gender relations grounded in the 
protection of property rights.   
 
 When a man is taken in adultery with another man's wife, if the husband shall stab the adulterer, or  
 knock out his brains, this is bare manslaughter; for jealousy is the rage of a man, and adultery is the  
 highest invasion of property….a man cannot receive a higher provocation.35 
 
Jeremy Horder explains the moral underpinning of cases in the seventeenth and early eighteenth 
centuries as deriving from a Restoration code of behaviour in which affronts to a man's 'honour' 
were expected to lead to righteous anger and retaliation against the provocateur.36  However, 
Leader-Elliott suggests English courts were more responsive to the interests of property, and more 
inclined to put the value of human life above the value men placed on their honour.  Accordingly, 
while insults to honour were at the heart of the French excuse for the criminel passionel, and 
French law allowed a husband to kill his wife, or her lover, or both of them, if they were caught in 
adultery, 
 
the insistence, in English law, on direct observation of adultery and the denial of a complete defence 
to the avenging husband formed part of an ensemble of rules intended to deter recourse to arms for 
the sake of honour…It is hardly surprising that an era so much more violent than ours was so much 
more restrictive in its recognition of sexual provocation.  The imposition of patriarchal order on the 
dispositions of property required the creation of a fraternal pact, restricting violence among men.37     
 
                                                 
34    In R v Mawgridge (1707) Kel 119; (1707) 84 ER 1107, Holt LCJ noted parents who killed 'obstinate and perverse' 
children and enraged masters who killed insolent servants had no defence.  Andrew Ashworth, 'The Doctrine of 
Provocation' (1976) 35 CLJ 292, 293-294, suggests the old categories reflected conduct regarded as either immoral or 
unlawful.  The latter category became relevant if adultery of the wife (a crime of immorality punishable by the 
ecclesiastical courts) precipitated the killing.  A boxing to the ears, Stedman (1704) unpublished, reported in [1803] I 
E. East Pleas of the Crown 234; insulting words, Hugget's Case [1666] Kel 59, 84 ER 1082, R v Palmer [1913] 2 KB 
29; and the sight of unfaithfulness by one's fiancé R v Greening [1913] 3 KB 846 were also inadequate provocation.  
35    (1707) 84 ER 1107, 1115 per Holt LCJ. 
36    Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (1992). 
37    But see Laurie Taylor, 'Provoked Reason in Men and Women: Heat-of-Passion Manslaughter and Imperfect Self-
Defense' (1986) 33 UCLA LR 1679, 1694, noting that until the 1960s and 1970s statutes in four North American states 
made it justifiable for the husband to kill his wife's lover.  
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No reported case before the early nineteenth century concedes the possibility of a defence for men 
who killed unfaithful wives and legal texts of the period are equally silent on this issue.38  Since 
there was an absolute requirement of 'ocular inspection', and the killing had to be an immediate 
response to catching the adulterers in the act, Leader-Elliott notes the occasions when such 
condition could be met must have been rare.39  These constraints on the doctrine were abandoned 
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.   
 
Provocation doctrine has never been truly consistent, coherent or logical.40  While in the early 
cases it was the magnitude of the wrong done to the husband and not the intensity of his rage which 
palliated homicide, Leader-Elliott notes uncertainty over its rationale was apparent as early as 1727 
when Lord Raymond in R v Oneby reformulated the defence as one in which reason was said to 
have lost 'her dominion' or become displaced from her 'seat' under the impetuous demands of 
passion.41  'Provocation was conceived as a domain of suspended reason, a temporary madness 
excited by some serious cause, in which "the law condescends to human frailty"'.42  Around the 
middle of the nineteenth century judges changed the law in two further ways.  First, they shifted 
'the emphasis of the law from the question of whether the angry retaliation by the accused, though 
excessive, was in principle justified, to a consideration of whether the accused had lost self-
control'.43  Second, judges generalised the specific situations which the old law regarded as 
sufficient provocation into a rule that whatever the alleged provocation, it must be 'something 
which might naturally cause an ordinary and reasonably minded man to lose his self-control and 
commit such an act'.44  Although earlier cases appeared to treat the objective test in provocation as 
mere evidence of subjective passion, it 'gradually became clear that the "reasonable man" test was 
an independent and indispensable substantive element.'45   
 
These changes swept the established code of provocative conduct away, but the defence still 
required that the provocation in question be a 'wrongful' act or insult: 
 
                                                 
38    Leader-Elliott, above n 12, notes that even if law denied such a defence, juries might nevertheless have returned a 
sympathetic verdict of manslaughter.   
39    Ibid 153.   
40    England and Wales Law Commission, above n 27, [1.32]. 
41    (1727) 92 ER 465, 472. 
42    Leader-Elliott, above n 12, 159, citing R v Kirkham (1837) 173 ER 422, 424, per Coleridge J. 
43    R v Smith(Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 160 (HL) per Lord Hoffman. 
44    R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336, 339. 
45    Dressler, above n 14, 427, citing R v Welsh (1869) 11 Cox CC 336, 338. 
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If the moral notion was that, while the defendant had gone too far, the victim was partly responsible 
by his conduct for causing the defendant's reaction, it would turn the notion [of provocation] on its 
head to apply it in circumstances where the victim had a right to behave as he did.46   
 
The elaboration of a new ideal of 'companionate marriage' some time in the early decades of the 
19th century was accompanied by a 'progressive enlargement of excuses for jealous homicide'.47  
Although Mawgridge was authority that words of reproach or infamy were insufficient 'without 
more' to found a sexual provocation defence, '[f]rom 1871 to 1946, a line of English cases held that 
words alone could sufficiently provoke if those words confessed adultery'.48  This trend was 
temporarily arrested in 1946, when the House of Lords in Holmes v DPP49 held as a matter of law 
that a confession of adultery could not amount to provocation.  Words alone, save of a most 
extreme and exceptional character, could not reduce culpable murder to manslaughter.  Although 
adultery had not been available as a partial excuse to women who killed philandering husbands, 
Viscount Simon in Holmes declared that wives who killed husbands or their husband's lovers after 
witnessing adultery could also avail themselves of the defence.50  In reality, this is a concession to 
formal as opposed to substantive gender equality:  
 
Although the defence of provocation upon the discovery of adultery now applies to women as well 
as to men, it is a shallow concession to equality that bears little legitimacy or meaning.  Cases and 
social studies show that women rarely react to their husband's infidelity with deadly violence.  In 
contrast, men who kill their wives or lovers frequently act after accusing them of infidelity.51 
 
The reasonable man of the UK defence came under scrutiny in Bedder v DPP52 where an 18 year-
old man was accused of stabbing a prostitute to death because she allegedly jeered at his 
                                                 
46     England and Wales Law Commission, above n 27, [1.27] citing the Law Commissioner's Digest of 1839.  
47   Leader-Elliott, above n 12, 157.  Reva Siegal, '"The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy' 
(1996) 105 Yale L.J. 2117 discusses the shift in US criminal law from an analysis of violence against wives as the 
prerogative of husbands to a judicial view of companionate marriage. 
48    Taylor, above n 37, 1695, citing inter alia R v Rothwell (1871) 12 Cox CC 145, 147 where the court held that 
'under special circumstances there may be…a provocation of words…if a husband suddenly hearing from his wife that 
she had committed adultery, and he having had no idea of such a thing before, were thereupon to kill his wife, it might 
be manslaughter'. 
49      [1946] 2 All ER 124 (HL) per Viscount Simon. 
50    Ibid 127-128.  Holmes involved a husband who beat his wife and strangled her to death after she admitted her 
infidelity.  The husband had also been unfaithful.   
51    Taylor, above n 37, 1697 (citations omitted).   As discussed in Part I, two women offenders in the present study 
raised sexual provocation as a defence and claimed their cultural backgrounds as mitigating features of the offending.  
One was identified as a battered woman.   
52     [1954] 2 All ER 801 (HL).   
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impotence.53  The House of Lords ruled that to invest the reasonable man with the peculiar 
characteristics of the accused would make 'nonsense' of the objective limb of the defence.  The 
reasonable man could not be impotent - notwithstanding that the defendant in this case was: 'If the 
reasonable man is then deprived in whole or in part of his reason, or the normal man endowed with 
abnormal characteristics, the test ceases to have any value'.54 
 
Trenchant criticism of Bedder 'facilitated the regression of men's matrimonial evolution'55 through 
statutory reform of the defence in New Zealand56 and the UK.57  Within 11 years of the Holmes 
prohibition against confessions of adultery this limitation was removed.  Sue Bandalli notes that in 
permitting words to amount to provocation, UK legislators had the 'nagging' (as well as the 
unfaithful) wife in mind.  The Royal Commission paid particular note to the submissions of Lord 
Denning and the Chief Justice that words should amount to provocation and should cover the case 
of a husband whose patience is exhausted by a persistently nagging wife and so suddenly strikes 
out and kills her.58    
 
From its beginnings, New Zealand criminal law was also engaged with the question of a wife's 
adultery.  Warren Brookbanks notes that at the time a Criminal Code Bill was introduced in 1883, 
the law recognised the infliction of a blow or the sight by the husband of his wife's adultery might 
amount to provocation.  By providing the grounds for provocation in s 165 of the Criminal Code 
Act 1893 as 'any wrongful act or insult' legislators ensured that an insult without a blow could be 
sufficient provocation.59   
 
                                                 
53    When he failed to perform, the prostitute jeered at Bedder and tried to leave.  Bedder held on to her as she hit and 
kicked him, then stabbed her to death.  Nourse, above n 23, 1402 fn408, notes that while legal scholars have had great 
sympathy for Bedder, feminists have seen this sympathy as another example of the law bowing to male concerns about 
virility.  Rather, the jury should have been instructed to consider whether Bedder intentionally created the conditions of 
his own defence, either by refusing to allow the victim to leave (her 'striking' him in this scenario is an act of self 
defence) or by soliciting the prostitute knowing he was impotent. 
54    [1954] 2 All ER 801, 803-804 (HL).   
55    Sue Bandalli, 'Provocation - A Cautionary Note' (1995) 22 Brit.J.Law & Soc. 398, 399. 
56    Section 169 Crimes Act 1961. 
57    Section 3 Homicide Act 1957. 
58   Bandalli, above n 55, citing Royal Commission, Report on Capital Punishment 1949-1953 (1953; Cmnd. 8932; 
Chair, Sir Ernest Arthur Gowers) [55].  Bandalli notes that men have been particularly sensitive to loquacious wives 
throughout the ages and the Branks (a spiked cage placed over the woman's head with a spike or pointed wheel to pin 
down her tongue) was devised to punish women adjudged quarrelsome or not under the proper control of their 
husbands. 
59     Brookbanks, above n 17, [9]. 
 196
Earlier statutory tests of provocation expressly required the homicide to be committed in 'the heat 
of passion caused by sudden provocation', which the offender must have acted upon 'on the sudden' 
and before there had been 'time for his passion to cool'.  The Crimes Act 1961 dispensed with these 
formulae.  The Holmes restriction on words alone as sufficient provocation was also dispensed 
with, and the restriction of provocative conduct to any 'wrongful' act or insult was removed.  By 
providing that 'anything done or said may be provocation' legislators significantly expanded the 
reach of the sexual provocation defence.  In an avowed response to the decision in Bedder that the 
personal characteristics of an accused could not be taken into account when examining the gravity 
of the verbal provocation,60 s 169(2) invests in the person with 'ordinary' power of self-control, the 
'characteristics' of the accused person.61  This hybrid person test, which attributes certain 
'characteristics' to the hypothetical ordinary person 'has been the single most controversial and 
complex aspect of New Zealand's provocation defence'.62   
 
Trial judges in New Zealand retain the responsibility of ruling on whether the subjective and 
objective limbs of the test are satisfied.  Although the evidence must support a 'credible narrative of 
causative provocation',63 the accused need not make out a prima facie case of provocation,64 and a 
'liberal view' is taken, even where the evidence relied upon is 'somewhat equivocal'.65  Despite 
evidence that abusive men cultivate delusions of sexual betrayal,66 the accused is not required to 
prove the provocation actually occurred.  Nor is it essential that he give evidence of provocation 
and loss of self-control.67  The defence will not necessarily be negated by time lapse and delayed 
reaction,68 and the provocative conduct need not come from the deceased victim.69   There is no 
requirement that the conduct be involuntary70 as 'New Zealand law does not require a complete 
                                                 
60    (1961) 328 NZPD 2681.  The 'Memorandum of Explanation' accompanying the first reading of the 1961 Crimes 
Bill contained a detailed discussion of Bedder and the need to avoid such a result in New Zealand. 
61    In R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069, 1081, (CA) North J observed this hybrid subjective/objective standard 
involves the 'fusion of two discordant notions'. 
62     Brookbanks, above n 17, [21]. 
63     R v Matoka [1987] 1 NZLR 340, 344 (CA). 
64     R v Anderson [1965] NZLR 29 (CA); R v Taaka [1982] 2 NZLR 198 (CA). 
65     R v Makoare, [2000] CA 469/99 (Unreported, Blanchard, Robertson and Williams JJ, 18 April 2000) [4]. 
66    Leader-Elliott, above n 12, 153; Glanville Williams, Textbook of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 1983) 543, notes: 'Medical 
men now recognise that the crime passionelle is sometimes the result of intense worry and depression reaching the 
psychotic state of morbid jealousy, when the jealousy may be based on beliefs that are without foundation.'  
67     Orchard, above n 11, 526. 
68   Ibid 528-529, citing R v Taaka [1982] 2 NZLR 198 (CA) as authority that 'neither the lapse of some hours nor 
intervening conduct of some complexity and apparent deliberation are necessarily fatal to the defence'.   
69     R v P [2000] 1 NZLR 234 (CA). 
70     R v Campbell (1997) 15 CRNZ 138 (CA). 
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loss of self-control, to the extent that the accused really did not know what he was doing'.71  The 
previous requirement that the response to the provocation must be proportionate72 is no longer a 
rule of law, and it 'may now be arguable whether lack of proportion will ever justify withdrawing 
the defence from the jury, and even whether it is relevant in applying the "ordinary person" limb'.73 
 
In summary, the provocation defence has evolved from a theory of partial justification based on 
moral culpability and wrongdoing by the victim (whom the law assumed partially deserved his or 
her fate) to a theory of lost self-control and partial excuse in which the traditional element of 
wrongfulness - and to some extent moral norms and values - has given way to a focus on whether 
the defendant lost self-control, and a reasonable or ordinary person in the same situation might 
have done likewise.  Consequently, crying infants,74 and physically or mentally handicapped 
persons,75 may be provokers of lethal violence.   
   
Just as society was confronted in the late 1950s and 1960s with concerted action to improve 
women's status, the law of provocation shifted the inquiry away from changing social norms and 
values toward a more subjective focus on individual defendants.  Confessions of adultery can 
trigger this partial excuse,76 and while under Bedder it could not be founded upon sexual taunts, 
the ordinary man is no longer expected to tolerate attacks on his sexual prowess.77  The defence is 
no longer limited to offering a partial excuse to men motivated by jealousy and rivalry to kill their 
                                                 
71    Brookbanks, above n 17, [17]. 
72    Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 9 (HL). 
73    Orchard, above n 11, 532. 
74    In R v Doughty (1986) 83 Cr App R 319 the prosecution argued acts which constituted provocation should involve 
some element of wrongfulness.  Thus the crying and restlessness of a 17 day-old baby could not constitute provocation.  
However, the Court of Appeal held that the words of the English statute required the defence to be left to a jury where 
there was evidence that the baby's crying had caused the D to lose his self control and kill it.  In New Zealand, in R v 
Iorangi [2000] CA 533/99, 534/99 (Unreported, Elias CJ, Gault and Fisher JJ, 30 March 2000),a father who killed his 
17 month-old child after he could not stop the infant from crying during a televised rugby game was said to have lost 
his self-control. The defendant had assaulted the child on two previous occasions.  
75    See eg, R v Simpson (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Potter J, 12 October 2001), where the defendant who 
strangled his terminally ill mother was provoked by her pitiable condition.  In R v L (Unreported, High Court, 
Hamilton, Randerson J, 29 August 2002) [26-27], defence counsel suggested that had the case gone to trial the 
accused, who killed his elderly wife who was suffering from Alzheimer's disease, may have relied on provocation.  
(The judge noted the defence may have failed due to the extent of deliberation involved in the killing.) 
76   Finbarr McAuley, 'Provocation: Partial Justification, Not Partial Excuse' in Stanley Yeo (ed), Partial Excuses to 
Murder (1991) 19, 21, argues that the established claim of provocation by adultery would also include acts of sexual 
betrayal by an unmarried cohabitant. 
77    McDonald, above n 9, 129, discusses the 1980 Minnitt case in which the sexual provocation was based on the 
wife's alleged description of the defendant as a 'sterile bastard' and a 'terrible lover' with too small a penis.  
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wives' paramours,78 and now permits men who kill female partners or ex-partners to rely on it.79  
Indeed, research indicates that the male paramour is now less likely than the female partner to 
become the subject of violence at the hands of the jealous male.80   As Leader-Elliott observes, the 
marked expansion of the doctrine, during a period of marked decline in acceptance of other 
concessions to masculine aggressiveness is the most striking aspect of the sexual provocation 
defence.81   
 
III   SEPARATION AND FEMALE 'INFIDELITY' 
Research shows intimate femicide is frequently associated with allegations that the victim was 
unfaithful whether or not such claims are substantiated.82   '[T]he point here is that many close to 
the victim allege that the male had deluded himself into believing that his partner was unfaithful, 
and the weight of the evidence suggests that males are too ready to not only believe in their 
partner's infidelities, but to react to these with violence.'83  However, while legal academics may 
differ over whether provocation is a defence of partial excuse, or one of partial justification, 
scholars on both sides of the debate assume allegations of unfaithfulness in the context of an 
intimate relationship provide sufficient basis for a sexual provocation claim.84   
 
Nourse's research found that where the provocation relied on the deceased's 'infidelity', the 
researcher was as likely, if not more likely to find a relationship that had ended, was ending, or in 
which the victim sought to leave, as opposed to an affair or sexual infidelity alone.  Although 
female sexual betrayal would, by definition, appear to depend upon a continuing relationship, 
courts simply presumed defendants' claims were 'rational' even where time or other factors 
                                                 
78    Leader-Elliott, above n 12, 153, notes no reported case before the early 19th century concedes the possibility that 
provocation might provide a partial excuse to a husband who killed his wife.   
79    McDonald, above n 9; Jenny Morgan, 'Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told 
About Them' (1997) 21 MULR 237, 256 citing research by the New South Wales Law Reform Commission.   
80    J Arturo Silva, et al, 'The Dangerousness of Persons with Delusional Jealousy' (1998) 26 J Am Acad Psychiatry 
Law 607, 615, citing research. 
81    Leader-Elliott, above n 12, 157. 
82   See, eg, Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton, 'Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A 20-Year 
Review' in M Dwayne Smith and Margaret Zahn (eds), Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research (1999) 159. 
83    Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 33. 
84    See, eg, McAuley, above n 74, 21 arguing provocation entails a denial that the Ds actions were entirely wrongful 
thereby implying the D was partially justified in reacting as he did because of the untoward conduct of the victim.  
Wrongful conduct likely to provoke violent retaliation includes 'any conduct likely to provoke violent retaliation' 
which would include 'acts of sexual betrayal by an unmarried cohabitant'.  On the partial excuse side of the debate, 
Joshua Dressler, 'Why Keep the Provocation Defence?: Some Reflections on a Difficult Subject' [2002] 86 
Minn.L.Rev. 959, 981, 999, argues provocative conduct should encompass non-criminal violation of widely shared 
social norms, which include adultery, including cases in which the D makes a reasonable mistake as to whether 
adultery in fact occurred, and where adultery did in fact occur, but the D mistakenly killed the wrong person.  
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suggested quite the contrary.   Thus defendants were permitted to enforce a relationship by 
claiming an emotional attachment that the victim had repudiated.  'Given that the criminal law 
rarely if ever embraces those who use violence in response to lawful acts, this should be a 
controversial outcome…although presently it is not.'85  Indeed, the mere sight of an estranged wife 
walking toward her lover in the street may be sufficient to provoke the jealous male.86   
 
In New Zealand, the husband and wife in R v Nepia87 had been separated for a period of twelve 
months.  The wife was stabbed fourteen times by her estranged husband when she arrived with a 
woman friend to collect her child following an access visit.  Apparently, the husband had not 
returned the child as initially arranged and the couple argued.  The wife requested her friend call 
the police and when she left the scene to do so, on the uncorroborated word of the husband, his 
estranged wife told him he would not get access again and that the car she was driving belonged to 
her new de facto partner.   
 
Perhaps in recognition of the danger of rendering killings of separated women 'singularly 
vulnerable to the tactical use of the provocation card',88 the trial judge withdrew the defence from 
the jury.  In so doing, the judge observed:  
 
In this day and age a separated man and father who has had difficulty but has had access to his 
children and who has had and who had instructed a solicitor previously in respect of access would 
not as a reasonable man be deprived of self control to the extent of the actions taken by the accused 
in this case.89 
                                                 
85     Nourse, above n 23,  
86    In R v Davies [1975] 1 QB 691 the wife began an association with another male.  After being threatened with a 
firearm by her husband she left the matrimonial home to live with her parents.  The husband broke into the home of her 
parents, went into a bedroom where his estranged wife was sleeping and again threatened her with a firearm.  The 
police were called and the husband was charged with offences relating to the break-in and possession of the firearm.  
He was bailed on condition he not molest his wife.  Subsequently, while on bail, the husband attempted to set fire to 
the house in which his estranged wife was living.  He then bought a shotgun and ammunition and later drove to the 
library where his wife worked.  He stated he saw her new male associate walking toward the library and that made him 
angry.  When his wife left her workplace, he called her name, she answered 'What?' and turning to face him, saw the 
gun, stepped back two or three paces and said 'No, no'.  The husband then shot and killed her. The Court of Appeal 
accepted that the wife's conduct over the previous year could be considered as acts of provocation and the mere 
presence of her new male partner outside her workplace could also amount to provocation.  Cf Holmes v DPP [1946] 
AC 588 (HL) neither the wife's confession of adultery or her 'pertinent' inquiry about the offender's own sexual 
misconduct were sufficient grounds for provocation.   
87    [1983] NZLR 754 (CA).   
88   Mitchell Davies, 'Leaving Provocation to the Jury: A Homicidal Muddle?' (1998) 62 J.C.L. 374, 384, makes this 
comment in relation to abandonment of the proportionality principle as a legal test. 
89    [1983] NZLR 754, 756 (CA). 
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However, the Court of Appeal determined that the defence had been too lightly withdrawn from the 
jury.  A reasonable jury could find that the 'ordinary' man might go berserk and kill his estranged 
wife following her alleged remark that she would terminate access and her 'revelation that she had 
formed an association with another man'.90   
 
Nourse points out that when courts emphasise female infidelity as opposed to the status of the 
parties as separated, they enforce the male offender's view of the status of the relationship over that 
of the female victim:   
 
 [I]nfidelity implies an ongoing relationship to which the parties are expected to be faithful.  But 
what if the parties are legally divorced?  Separated by force of law?  What if the defendant finds the 
rival in the arms of his ex-wife, ex-lover, or ex-girlfriend?  A jilted lover snaps when he sees his 
former girlfriend 'dancing' with another man?  A battered woman is thwarted by physical force 
when she tries to leave for another?...Seen through the lens of infidelity, these cases may seem only 
minor extensions of our canonical image of a crime of passion.  Seen through the lens of departure, 
however, these cases challenge us to ask whether it is possible to be unfaithful to a relationship if 
one party believes that there is no relationship at all.91 
   
In earlier cases, judicial tolerance of male sexual jealousy/possessiveness did not extend to 
separation assaults on unmarried women.92  In R v Tai,93 the New Zealand Court of Appeal noted 
that the fact the offender's girlfriend showed an intention to break off the relationship, 'something 
which is by no means uncommon and which every girl must be held free to do if she wishes', could 
not amount to provocation.  Consequently, legal commentary suggests it may well be the case that 
the objective limb of the test cannot be satisfied where the provocation consists of a mere 
admission of unfaithfulness or the intimation of a decision to end a relationship.  This view is 
qualified by the proviso that 'the particular circumstances must be considered'.94  Whether the 
defence reaches the jury in 'particular circumstances' concerning unmarried women, and the sort of 
circumstances that might suffice are examined below.  
                                                 
90    Ibid 757. Orchard, above n 11, 527 n 139, cites this decision as illustrating that sexual provocation may be founded 
on 'the revelation of [an] adulterous relationship plus a threat of loss of access to children'.  
91    Nourse, above n 23, 1359. 
92    See, eg, R v Gauthier (1943) 29 Cr App R 113, 118-119. 
93    [1976] 1 NZLR 102, 106 (CA). 
94    Orchard, above n 11, 527-528, citing R v Anderson [1965] NZLR 29 (CA); R v Tai [1976] 1 NZLR 102 (CA).   
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IV   THE CONTEXT OF SEPARATION: THE CASE STUDIES 
A   Unmarried Women's Attempts to Terminate Intimate Relationships as Sexual Provocation 
A number of women in the present study opted not to leave their homes, but demanded instead that 
their male partners do so.  In these cases, the woman's intention to terminate, or at least gain a 
temporary respite from the relationship was no less clearly articulated, and the response of the 
jealous male no less lethal than in cases in which the woman fled from her home, but was pursued 
and killed by the jealous male. 
 
Sexual Provocation and Unmarried Women: Case Study S/97/6 95    
Charles, the 26 year-old offender and Karen, his 26 year-old girlfriend had a brief romantic involvement 
which Karen 'was trying to end'.  At about 1 pm on 4 July 1997 Karen's mother, who had gone to her 
daughter's home to investigate the lack of response to her telephone calls, found Karen's body in the 
bedroom of her home.  Karen had been attacked with a garden spade and her throat had been cut.  The spade 
and two blood-stained kitchen knives were found in the room.  Police stated Karen had suffered 'horrific' 
injuries and her 3 year-old daughter, who was in the house at the time her mother was killed, might have 
been alone with her dead mother for up to 16 hours.   
 
In the days before the killing, Charles spoke to a number of medical professionals, including his general 
practitioner, about his suicidal feelings.  He was also taking the anti-depressant Prozac.  On 30 June 1997, 
Charles was admitted to a psychiatric unit and treated for depression apparently after taking a drug 
overdose.  However, on 1 July he left the unit and did not return.  Charles' father told the Court he 
telephoned the unit on the afternoon of 3 July to advise that Charles, who was living with his parents, had 
'difficulties accepting the end of his relationship' with Karen, and his parents were concerned Charles may 
be suicidal.   
 
A psychiatric nurse gave evidence that following this telephone call she interviewed Charles at his home 
about 7.30 pm that day. The nurse stated she knew Charles had been a voluntary patient at the acute 
psychiatric ward a few days earlier and had been discharged.  She said he had an appointment with a doctor 
the following day which Charles had assured her he would keep - although his father did not believe that he 
would.  During the visit she heard Charles 'yelling' at his mother and Charles admitted being 'preoccupied' 
with Karen.  She noted Charles appeared vague, although he assured her that he would not harm himself.  
                                                 
95     No legal judgments in relation to this case were found.  Attempts to access the trial transcript were also 
unsuccessful.   
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After interviewing Charles, the nurse reportedly told his parents that 'Charles was 25, an adult, and should 
take responsibility for his own life.'   
 
Some time following this interview, Charles went to Karen's home.  Two of Karen's neighbours later gave 
evidence of hearing screams late that night or in the early hours of the morning.  One witness said she 
awoke between midnight and 1 am and heard a high pitched crying which continued for a few minutes.  
Another stated he heard a male voice from behind Karen's home in the early hours of the morning and an 
intense scream lasting 10 to 20 seconds.  At this time Karen's home was the only one with lights on.  
 
Charles gave evidence at his trial on a charge of murder.  He told the Court of his anxiety at Karen's desire 
to have 'space' in their relationship.  He said Karen had refused his proposal of marriage and would not 
allow him to move in with her. When she told him she 'did not want to see him as often' he became 
depressed and sad.  He stated he had taken a spade and broken into her home through a dining room window 
after which he went to her kitchen and retrieved two knives.  He intended to use one to kill Karen and the 
other to kill himself.  Charles went to her bedroom and 'it just happened'.  Charles said he tried to cut his 
wrists while in Karen's bedroom.   
 
A forensic psychiatrist told the Court of two interviews he conducted with Charles following the killing.  
During the first interview, after prompting from his father to 'tell him what you told me', Charles stated 
Karen told him she would be 'getting the biggest guy around tomorrow if you turn up'.  In the second 
interview, Charles stated that Karen also told him she already had a 3 year-old child, and did not need 
another.  When he said he would see Karen around, she replied 'in your dreams'.  After this exchange, 
Charles said he felt he had 'had enough' and decided then to kill her. From these meetings and the 
information he had available, the psychiatrist concluded that Charles had a personality disorder.  Features of 
this disorder were 'persistent feelings of inadequacy, dependency on others in decision making and problem 
solving and persistent fear of rejection.  There was long-standing paranoia, pathological jealousy and 
obsessional behaviour'.  In the psychiatrist's opinion, at the time of the killing, Charles had been suffering 
from 'a major depressive episode'.   
 
Defence counsel noted that mental illness was 'something easily swept under the carpet because we are not 
sure what was going on it people's minds' and Charles 'might have been placed in the "too hard basket"'.  
Counsel noted that Charles' characteristics, as detailed by the psychiatrist, were not transitory as Charles had 
'virtually the same reaction in 1992 after a previous relationship ended'.  Evidence was given by Charles' 
former partner who stated that she became concerned about his possessiveness and cruel sense of humour. 
When she tried to end their relationship, Charles engaged in sexually and psychologically abusive behaviour 
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which continued for some months.  A friend of Charles also gave evidence that Charles was obsessed with 
Karen and fearful she might find another man.   
 
Defence counsel told the jury that Charles had been provoked by Karen's threat to find a 'bigger man' if 
Charles returned; her comment regarding his childish behaviour; and her refusal to resume the relationship.  
The crumbling of the relationship, together with Karen's comments could amount to provocation.  'It was the 
only logical, plausible explanation'.  Although the Crown had questioned Charles' selective memory, 
counsel inquired of the jury:  'was not he [Charles] likely to remember [Karen's] words because they went to 
the heart of his insecurities?  They were words and phrases likely to be spoken in annoyance and frustration 
at the accused having returned to her house'.   
 
The Crown told the jury the three elements of murder had been established in this case.  There had been a 
death; the accused had admitted responsibility for it; and also acknowledged he entered Karen's home 
committed to causing her death.  The Crown noted there were four points to the provocation defence:  The 
first was whether Karen actually said the words claimed by Charles.  The only evidence of this came from 
Charles and was a 'selective and self-serving explanation'.  The next was whether, if she did say these 
things, this would have deprived a person, having the power of self control of the ordinary person but 
otherwise having the accused's characteristics of the power of self control?  Thirdly, did it in fact deprive 
him of his self control and fourthly, did that induce him to commit the homicide?  It was the Crown's view 
that none of these four points were satisfied.   
 
Karen was described by the Crown as sensitive and kind.  She had treated Charles with 'kid gloves' and '[i]t 
was a great irony that her kindness might have been her undoing.'96  Defence counsel also informed the jury 
that they were not to 'think that someone is being blamed'.  The judge is reported as directing the jury that 
the defence of provocation did not imply any criticism of Karen, who 'could not have been expected to 
appreciate or expect the consequences that followed her alleged comments'.  Karen had 'emerged as kind, 
popular, and in the words of her father, "probably too nice to people"'.  
 
The jury convicted Charles of murder.  Defence counsel told reporters he was 'disappointed' at the murder 
verdict, but at the end of the day, it was the jury's decision whether to accept or reject the defence.  Although 
it was not a difficult case to defend, it 'was sad and tragic.  There are never any winners in a case like this'.   
 
After pressure from Charles' family, two internal investigations and a report from the Health and Disability 
Commissioner, it was revealed that while Charles' individual care met applicable standards, and a staff nurse 
                                                 
96    No explanation of this comment is provided.  
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had not breached the Code of Health and Disability Consumers' Rights, there was a need to ensure active 
communication within a multi-agency service, continuing systems audits and assertive follow-up care.  The 
Chief Executive of Healthcare Otago publicly announced that Charles' family would receive an apology.  
Although he also observed that 'depressed people do not usually go on to kill others…staff are treating the 
unpredicted, if not unpredictable', the Labour Associate Health Spokesperson, who requested an 
investigation of the case, is reported as stating that prior to the murder Charles had been examined by a 
psychiatrist who believed Charles to be a danger both to himself and to Karen.   
 
While media reports focused on possible failures or 'procedural weaknesses' in Charles' care and 
management by the mental health system, there is no discussion of the risk assessment instrument 
employed by health professionals in this case.  Charles had a history of abusive and controlling 
behaviour, was jealous, possessive, experiencing 'difficulties accepting the separation', and had 
contemplated suicide.  Prior abusive incidents, threats of suicide, obsessive jealousy, 
possessiveness, and controlling behaviours, in the context of a woman's attempts to break free from 
an intimate relationship, are major risk factors for dangerousness/lethality.97  Given that the 
lethality risk Charles posed to Karen did not go unnoticed by at least one mental health 
professional, it is concerning that her death could be categorised as 'the unpredicted, if not 
unpredictable'. 
 
Cultural depictions of domestic violence often send the message that the burden of change is on 
women and 'the ultimate solution to domestic violence…is to simply stand up to the abuser'.98    
Domestic violence information pamphlets also advise women to 'stand up' to domestic violence.99  
While standing up to an abuser may prove successful in some cases; such conduct may also put 
women at increased risk.100  As demonstrated above, standing up to a bully is also behaviour which 
may subsequently form the basis of a sexual provocation defence.   
 
                                                 
97    Browne, Williams and Dutton, above n 82, 161; See, also, Sylvia Walby and Andrew Myhill, 'Assessing and 
Managing Risk' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in Reducing Domestic Violence?  A Comprehensive Guide 
for Professionals (2001) 307.  
98    Diane Shoos, 'Representing Domestic Violence: Ambivalence and Difference in What's Love Got to Do with It' 
(2003) 15 NWSA Journal, 57, 68 (citations omitted).   
99    A fact sheet for victims of violence published by the New Zealand Department for Courts is titled 'Standing Up to 
Domestic Violence: A Guide to Protection Orders and the Domestic Violence Act' (Wellington, Department for Courts, 
1996).  
100    Neil Jacobson and John Gottman, When Men Batter Women: New Insights Into Ending Abusive Relationships 
(1998) 252-253. 
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The judge's observation that Karen 'could not be expected to appreciate or expect the consequences 
that followed her alleged comments' implies Charles' lethal response was considered by the judge 
to be objectively extraordinary behaviour.  Since the required standard of self-control purports to 
deny the defence 'to those whose reactions show a lack of self-control falling outside the ordinary 
or common range of human temperaments',101 Charles' response should have failed the objective 
limb of the test.  The contrary decision that conduct which would be regarded as innocuous by the 
'ordinary woman', could simultaneously constitute 'grave and weighty'102 provocation to the 
'ordinary man', deprives all women of the possibility of understanding, much less challenging the 
kind of behaviour criminal law is imposing upon women who wish to exit unwanted relationships 
and pre-empt their killers' sexual provocation claims.   
 
Contemporary evaluations of provocation ignore the social reality that a woman is not generally the 
physical match of a male who is intent on denying her freedom and autonomy.  Gender differences 
in physical strength and aggressiveness are likely to require imaginative techniques to safely 
accomplish exit.  Given that women who are attempting to terminate their relationships with 
abusive men face potentially deadly choices, inventing a 'bigger man' to deter the abuser can 
readily be envisaged as one such protective strategy.  Recent interviews with abused women also 
found that for some, recognition they had assumed a 'mother' rather than a lover position in relation 
to their partner was a decisive factor in their decision to end the relationship.103  However, if 
women articulate this understanding ('I already have one child and don't need another') the law may 
provide an excuse for the man who kills in response to it.  The formal autonomy of unmarried 
women to enter and exit intimate relationships recognised in Tai is thereby undone by women's 'kid 
glove' efforts to do so.  
 
Joshua Dressler points out that when psychiatric evidence is given that a defendant had become 
obsessed with the deceased woman and this, together with several personality attributes peculiar to 
the defendant caused him to react in a particular way, if the defendant deserves to have his 
culpability mitigated it is not because he was 'adequately provoked'.  What is being advanced in 
such cases is a diminished capacity defence disguised in provocation garb.104  Nourse notes that the 
                                                 
101    Orchard, above n 11, 531, citing R v Enright [1961] VR 663, 669; Stingel v R (1990) 171 CLR 312 (HCA).  
102    R v McGregor [1962] NZLR 1069, 1075 (CA). 
103    Alison Towns and Peter Adams, '"If I Really Loved Him Enough, He Would Be OK": Women's Accounts of Male 
Partner Violence (2000) 6 Violence Against Women 558. 
104    Dressler, above n 84, 988. 
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emotional claims of defendants in these cases ask us to accept meanings about relationships as 
much as they purport to describe a defendant's personality or character.   
 
To embrace the defendant's emotional judgments in these circumstances not only allows the 
defendant to serve as judge and executioner, but also as legislator.  It allows the defendant to stand 
above the victim and enforce at penalty of death a set of emotional judgments that are, at best, 
partial.105    
 
If a policy of autonomy for unmarried women in forming and leaving intimate relationships can be 
subverted on the basis that individual male offenders are pathologically averse to its practice then 
no statement of policy is immune from such claims.  Although reports of the trial also fail to make 
clear when the alleged verbal provocation took place, the words appear to have been spoken in 
response to Charles' breaking into Karen's home armed with a spade.  As a matter of policy (apart 
from likely public indignation) courts would be reluctant to permit an armed offender who invades 
the home of a stranger to advance a provocation defence based on the verbal response of the 
householder.  To demand that a woman whose home is invaded by an armed ex-partner be more 
polite and accommodating than a householder confronted with an armed stranger appears no more 
morally or ethically justifiable.106   
 
Charles was a serial offender, who had demonstrated a propensity for violence against women who 
attempted to practice the ideal of female autonomy recognised in Tai.  If the freedom of unmarried 
women is subject to exceptions based on the idiosyncrasies of individual defendants which render 
them less likely to respect it, both the policy and the freedom it espouses become meaningless.   
 
B   The Violent Pursuit of the Separated Wife 
Although the context of separation per se may be insufficient to trigger the defence,107 appending 
an allegation of verbal abuse appears to suffice.  As one legal commentator observes, in the 
absence of witnesses, apart from the children, only the offender's version of events is heard.  Thus 
the following is an account of 'what he said she said or did'.108   
                                                 
105    Nourse, above n 23, 1338.     
106   See R v W [1996] 1 NZLR 147 (CA) for a further example of verbal provocation in the context of home invasion 
by an estranged male partner. 
107   Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 13, [2.61]. 
108    Morgan, above n 79, 242.   
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Sexual Provocation and the Violent Pursuit of the Separated Wife:  Case Study S/00/10  
Thirty-four year-old Liam, beat his estranged wife Jiang to death in a car park in the presence of their two 
small children who were splattered with their mother's blood.  During their five year relationship, the couple 
lived in Levin and Jiang worked for 'long hours' with her husband in his market garden.  Family members 
gave evidence of prior violence by Liam toward his wife, including an attempt to suffocate her and threats to 
kill her.  Jiang's mother came to stay with her daughter for about four months.  Mother and daughter then 
left the home and did not return.  Jiang went to live in another city with her uncle and worked in his 
takeaway business.  Liam remained in the family home with the couple's two children.   
 
After the separation, Jiang consulted a lawyer who wrote to her husband about 'matrimonial matters, 
including property issues'.109  Liam made a number of unsuccessful attempts to persuade Jiang to return to 
the relationship during the 'several months' period of their estrangement. 110  The week of the homicide he 
visited Jiang's residence with members of his family and tried to speak to his estranged wife.  Although she 
was on the premises, Jiang's uncle informed Liam that his wife was not there, that she had not changed her 
mind about leaving the relationship, and would not return to live with him.  The day before the killing, Liam 
again travelled to the city in which Jiang lived, taking the two children with him. On that occasion he met 
with his estranged wife and there was evidence of angry words and 'pushing' of his wife.  Liam returned the 
following day demanding to speak to his wife.  Jiang left the shop with the two children and accompanied 
him to the car park.  Liam later stated that at this time he again asked his wife to resume the relationship and 
she again refused.  They argued and he knocked her to the ground and repeatedly bashed her head on the tar 
sealed surface of the car park, causing skull fractures and deep injury to her brain from which she died.111  
Liam told police he was angry because his wife was going to leave him, wanted his property and intended to 
resume a relationship with a former boyfriend.   
 
At trial, the Crown contended that Liam was concerned about his estranged wife's property claim, wanted to 
secure her return, and upon discovering that she would not accede to his demands, became angry and carried 
out his prior threat to beat her to death.112  However, defence counsel claimed that Jiang had provoked 
Liam.  Matters relied on as constituting provocation were: Liam had sponsored Jiang to come from China to 
New Zealand to be his wife and she had obtained her New Zealand citizenship shortly before the separation; 
Jiang had left the relationship leaving Liam to look after the children; she had made a claim for a 
matrimonial property settlement; had stated an intention to divorce Liam; and a further intention to leave her 
                                                 
109    R v S [2001] CA 407/00 (Unreported, Richardson P, Blanchard and Randerson JJ, 5 July 2001) [10]. 
110    Ibid [2-5].  
111    Ibid [11]. 
112    Ibid [13]. 
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uncle's home and live with a former boyfriend. While in the car park she had also 'pushed the offender away' 
and allegedly told him that she only married him to gain money and residency in New Zealand.113   The jury 
convicted Liam of murder. 
 
Jenny Morgan points out that once sexual provocation claims are stripped of the intensifiers of 
departure and betrayal it becomes clear that women need not do or say very much to provoke their 
own demise.114  The Court of Appeal acknowledged Liam's distressed state subsequent to his 
wife's departure which led him to be miserable, irritable, and lacking his usual interest in work, did 
not distinguish him from others facing the normal stresses of a relationship breakdown.115  So, 
apart from leaving an abusive relationship and refusing to return, what else did Jiang do?   
                                                
 
Civil law grants wives the right to leave abusive relationships and matrimonial property claims are 
a legally approved and legislatively provided for aspect of separation.  Given judicial concern that 
fathers maintain a substantial role in their children's lives,116 and complaints by fathers' rights 
groups that men are prevented from participating equally as parents by social policies that give 
preference to women, advancing Jiang's decision to leave the children with their father in support 
of a provocation defence appears perverse.  We have only Liam's word that Jiang confessed to 
using him to gain money and residency.  By comparison, Patricia Easteal found women from other 
cultures, brought into Australia as brides, appeared at increased risk of homicide by the sponsoring 
male, particularly if the husband/killer had a history of assault against other women.117   
 
Judicial acceptance that an 'ordinary' man might respond with lethal violence to his estranged 
wife's decision to begin life anew with another (perhaps less abusive) male partner assumes a 
husband retains an ongoing proprietary interest in his wife despite their separation.   
 
It is only possible to argue that the provocation defence potentially applies to anger following 
unfaithfulness in the context of a relationship that has ended, if the reality is substituted with the 
 
113    Ibid [15], [18].  
114    Morgan, above n 79, 245. 
115    R v S [2001] CA 407/00 (Unreported, Richardson P, Blanchard and Randerson JJ, 5 July 2001) [19]. 
116    In Taking the Sting Out of Family Law: Peter Boshier says that Australian Initiatives Point the Way Forward For 
Our Family Court, New Zealand Herald, 12 August 2004, the Principal Family Court judge is reported as emphasising 
the importance of helping fathers, in particular, to maintain a substantial role in their children's lives.   
117    Patricia Easteal, Killing the Beloved: Homicide between Adult Sexual Intimates (1993) 180, suggests the relevant 
government bodies would do well to check the histories of sponsoring males before allowing them to 'import' another 
victim.  See, also, Case Study H/02/11 below, at p 327. 
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male's 'fantasy' relationship.  He still conceives his former partner as his possession…The 
availability of the defence of provocation in these circumstances suggests that…the legally endorsed 
position in respect of the status of a relationship is that 'it ain't over, until HE says it is'.118    
 
Michael Detmold comments that when criminal law adopts the male offender's subjective view of 
the status of the relationship and ignores the external reality, it perverts the dignity of self and other 
which in relation is absolutely equal.  Although in the subjective mind of the male offender the 
relationship is not terminated, 'the existence or non-existence of a relation is a real and objective 
question, a thing in the world, a relation of subjectivities, not a thing in the mind of one 
subjectivity':   
 
In patriarchy…there is an illusory (private) metaphysics at work giving men the authority to deal 
with their women without regard to the relational question of whether they really are their women 
any longer.  If a man loves a woman in his mind, that is, as it were, where the action is.  So, in his 
mind she is still his woman no matter what is going on in the real world.119   
 
If Jiang's attempt to 'stand up' to the offender had been set in the context of a structural pattern of 
violence toward women, as a matter of policy the court may have been less willing to find that an 
'ordinary' man could respond to her comments by holding his estranged wife by the neck and 
repeatedly bashing the back of her head on the pavement until she was dead. 
 
When the relationship the deceased victim had repudiated was marred by the offender's prior use of 
violence and courts nevertheless allow a provocation plea, they are providing the opportunity for a 
manslaughter verdict based, at least in part, on the defendant's own prior violence.  Allowing the 
defence to go to the jury in such cases   
 
betrays an implicit judgment that the departure reflected betrayal, desertion, or abandonment.  If we 
were to believe that the defendant's own wrongful acts caused the departure, we would not describe 
the case as one of 'lingering feelings' even though the defendant may well have had such emotions.  
What makes the defendant's claim rationally productive of emotion is not the fact of the prior 
                                                 
118   Rebecca Bradfield, 'Domestic Homicide and the Defence of Provocation: A Tasmanian Perspective on the Jealous 
Husband and the Battered Wife' (2000) 19 U Tas LR 5, 32. 
119    Michael Detmold, 'Provocation to Murder: Sovereignty and Multiculture (1997) 19 Syd LR 5, 25.  
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relationship alone, nor the leaving itself, but a set of meanings about relationships in which it is 
wrong to leave, in which leaving breaches a covenant implicit in the relationship.120  
 
Furthermore, the reality that 'the triers of fact in these cases returned murder verdicts does not 
diminish the fact that the law permitted these cases to come out quite differently, allowing 
defendants with essentially "unclean hands" to claim the law's leniency'.121  
  
C   Protection Orders and Child Access Disputes as Sexual Provocation 
As previously discussed, the offender in Case Study B/97/4122 killed his partner in breach of her 
protection order when she dropped off their child for an access visit.  Although the affidavit the 
woman signed acknowledged that the offender was the child's father, her killer was permitted to 
mount a provocation defence based on an alleged comment that the child was not his.    
 
In Case Study G//01/7123 the offender threatened and stalked his estranged partner in his 'snoop-
wagon' and eventually killed her in breach of her protection order and in the presence of her child.  
Despite the deceased victim's unsuccessful appeals to authorities for help, the offender was 
portrayed as a loving family man, driven to kill his estranged partner by her efforts to seek legal 
protection and structured access arrangements.  Defence counsel also criticised the granting of ex 
parte protection orders to separating women, and another male speculated that 'draconian non-
custodial-parent rules' meant the offender would get better access to his son now his estranged wife 
was dead and he was in prison.124  A representative of one men's group also predicted that more 
killings would follow, given the New Zealand government's lack of positive family policy.125   
 
By contrast, victim advocates expressed their mounting concern regarding the effectiveness of 
protection orders, inadequate follow-up of breaches by police, the imposition of token sentences 
for breaches and the need for greater protection of women within the first six months of leaving a 
                                                 
120    Nourse, above n 23, 1378. 
121    Ibid 1355.  Although Ronnie Mackay, 'The Provocation Plea in Operation - An Empirical Study' in England and 
Wales Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder 290 (2004) Appendix A [5], found 'a mere 8.5% (n=6, all male 
defendants} had perpetrated some form of domestic violence', since most domestic violence goes unreported, or if 
reported, may not proceed to a conviction, a history of prior convictions is not a reliable indicator of presence or 
absence of violence.  
122    See, discussion of this case above, at p 161. 
123    See, discussion of this case above, at p 164. 
124    Why Does It Take A Murder? Evening Post, 31 October 2001. 
125    More Killings Will Follow, Evening Post, 31 October 2001. 
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relationship when separating women are most at risk.126  The victim's children planted a tree in 
memory of their mother at a vigil where their mother and 'hundreds of other women and children 
who had been victims of violence were remembered by people who attended'.127   
 
D   Battered Women's Attempts to Seek Formal and Informal Assistance as Sexual Provocation 
Family, community, and formal service networks are especially important to the safety of 
separating women in countering on-going violence and the jealous surveillance of abusive 
males.128  This social reality is acknowledged in national domestic violence policy which 
emphasises the need for all persons in society to understand the dimensions of domestic violence 
and play their part in preventing it.  Those who become aware of situations of violence are called 
upon to 'act promptly and appropriately'.129   
 
In a perverse contradiction of national domestic violence policy, the legal system permits the 
deceased woman's help-seeking efforts to be advanced in support of a provocation defence.   
 
1.   Reporting Violence to the Police as Sexual Provocation 
Battered Women's Help Seeking as Provocation:  Case Study T/97/5  
George, the 24 year-old male offender, had a 'difficult' relationship with Kim, his 24 year old partner over a 
period of around 18 months.  George told police that the day before the homicide he saw Kim kissing and 
fondling a shopkeeper and believed she was offering him sex.  (The shopkeeper stated that nothing 
happened between himself and Kim, although 'he said she had been making suggestions to him about sexual 
activity'.)130  Later that afternoon the couple went to a cemetery where George attacked Kim, punching and 
kicking her and stomping on her neck.  'The bashing only stopped when the pair had sex.'   
 
Kim's injuries were so severe that George took her to the local hospital the next day, but only after 
extracting a promise that she would not report the assault to the police.  Kim left the hospital because she 
was 'uneasy' about George's presence there.131  A number of witnesses were shocked at the extent of Kim's 
injuries, including her sister who stated: 'I told her [Kim] to get down to the police station but she wouldn't 
go…I rang the police, they came around and talked her into going to the station to make a statement.'  A 
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police spokesman stated that although Kim was initially reluctant, she went with police to the local police 
station, allowed police to photograph her injuries and made a statement about the assault.  The officer said 
Kim was asked by police if she required the services of a Woman's Refuge and when she declined this 
assistance she was driven by police car back to the home of her sister.   
 
George was watching nearby, and saw Kim arrive in the marked patrol car.  After police drove off, he 
attacked Kim with a knife telling her: 'You said you loved me, you promised'.  Kim was stabbed repeatedly 
until the knife broke.  She escaped and ran back into the house but was followed by George, who obtained a 
further knife from the kitchen and continued to stab her, stopping only when the second knife also broke.  
When ambulance officers arrived the broken knife was still embedded in Kim's back.  Family members, 
including three adults and six children ranging in age from 3 to 8 years witnessed the attack.  Kim 'was dead 
within a very short time of making the complaint and the argument starting'.132 
 
George later told police that he had become angrier and angrier as time went by because he thought Kim 
might make a complaint regarding his prior violence toward her, although she had promised that she would 
not.  George said that after arguing with Kim over her broken promise, he 'lost it'.  He was charged with 
murder and a further charge of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm in relation to the earlier 
assault.  At trial, defence counsel argued George had been provoked by Kim's complaint to the police and 
her earlier infidelity with the shopkeeper.   
 
The jury were told to 'consider the part low intellect played in [George's] reaction, including [Kim's] 
promise not to go to the police.'  George's actions must also be viewed in the context of the relationship.  
Kim was addicted to solvents and was the dominant one in the partnership.  She had refused to let George 
go.  When George met her, he had a job, accommodation, and lived a 'regular life' but by the time he killed 
her, he had no job and no accommodation.133  The Crown argued that the jury must not confuse anger with 
the specific legal defence of provocation as George had deliberately chased and killed Kim because she had 
reported George's earlier assault to the police.  The jury acquitted George of murder and convicted him of 
manslaughter.   
 
At sentencing, the judge noted that the crime had 'elements of dominance and revenge'.  Rather than Kim 
trying to dominate George in the relationship, it was George who was trying to dominate her.  George also 
had 'a considerable history of violence' toward Kim during the relationship.134  However, the judge accepted 
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that George had 'lost good things in his life' because of his relationship with Kim.135  (The judge also noted 
that 'even after she had been to the hospital, according to the statement that was produced, she [Kim] was 
telling you [the offender] one thing, and other people she was dealing with something else'.)136   
 
Despite 'the background of this relationship', and the urgings by defence counsel on George's behalf, the 
judge accepted that there could not be a lenient sentence for a lethal assault on a woman who had simply 
complained to the police about an earlier violent attack.  George was sentenced to eight years' imprisonment 
on the manslaughter charge and two years' imprisonment on the charge of causing grievous bodily harm.  
The sentences to be served concurrently.  The judge added that he wished to make a further comment about 
this case to the effect that he agreed with defence counsel it was 'simply scandalous' for merchants to have 
continued supplying Kim with solvents when she was a known user.137  
 
Kim's sister, who had originally contacted the police, told the media the justice system needed reviewing.  
George 'was going to serve five to six years and he'll have his life back.  Nothing will bring Kim back'.  
Women's Groups described themselves as 'astounded', 'incredulous' and 'outraged' at the decision to allow 
the provocation defence in this case, noting it sent all the 'wrong messages' to battering men.  One group 
observed that the decision flew in the face of the Domestic Violence Act and police policy based on the 
premise that battered women would report violence against them.  Another group suggested the decision 
that a woman who had been beaten so badly she was taken to hospital, who then complained to the police, 
could have that complaint used to reduce the seriousness of the offence and the length of sentence defied 
'common sense'.  The Labour Justice spokesman described the case as a 'travesty of justice'.   
 
In response to this public criticism, the then Minister of Justice is reported as stating that the government 
had no plans to review the law on provocation.  The decision had been made by the jury and no one else 
apart from the 12 jurors knew what went on in the jury room.  A Ministry of Justice source noted the case 
was considered to be an 'exceptional and somewhat anomalous' one:  'That is essentially why the minister is 
not convinced that there is any need to turn the whole system upside down'.  Although the Crown stated it 
was considering appealing against the trial ruling which allowed the jury in this case to consider 
provocation, no subsequent appeal was found. 
 
The Ministry's description of this case as 'exceptional and somewhat anomalous' highlights the 
extraordinary nature of the 'ordinary man'.  Reporting a batterer to the police is not 'exceptional' or 
'anomalous' conduct.  Losing one's self-control and killing the victim for reporting the violence 
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might well be regarded as exceptional or anomalous' conduct which falls 'outside the ordinary or 
common range of human temperaments'.138  Thus as Leader-Elliott points out, the 'provocation 
defence makes responsibility depend on an estimate of the extraordinary - the atypical - responses 
of the ordinary man.'139  Although George's personal characteristics may have enhanced his 
perception that Kim's conduct in reporting his violence to police constituted especially grave 
provocation, Timothy Macklem and John Gardner note that an offender's personal idiosyncrasies 
can bear on the gravity of the provocation only in a limited way.  'It is not that he has his own 
judgment of what is insulting, and to what extent it is insulting, a judgment that needs somehow to 
be respected or accommodated by the law…[the issue] is how grave a certain insult really is, never 
mind how he feels about it'.140  Macklem and Gardner note that the very setting of an objective 
standard implies an expectation that some defendants will be unable to reach it.  However, as 
Nourse observes, if courts cannot see that the termination of a relationship is lawful conduct which 
ought to be uncontroversially and unambiguously protected, they are unlikely to recognise other 
claims in the context of an intimate relationship that rest on manifestly inappropriate emotional 
evaluations.141   
 
Seeking formal intervention is a well established red flag for dangerousness/lethality.  The New 
Zealand Law Commission has recognised that reporting an abusive partner to the police can be 
fraught with danger:  
 
Going to the police, for example is a reasonable alternative to the use of force if thereby the 
[battered woman] obtains effective protection, but not if it will ensure the [woman's] safety only for 
as long as she is in the presence of police officers.142 
 
However, rather than denouncing offending in this context, and upholding women's unqualified 
right to report violence to police without fear of retaliatory violence, the above decision to allow 
the jury to consider the defence sends a message of support for batterers' demands that promises 
extracted from their victims not to report their crimes should be respected.   
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2.    Seeking Help from Male Associates as Sexual Provocation 
Notwithstanding the expectation in New Zealand's Family Violence Prevention Strategy that all 
members of society will play their part in preventing violence toward women, courts appear 
especially suspicious of third party intervention when that third party is a male associate, or new 
male partner.143  As illustrated above, even the threat of obtaining help from an apparently 
imaginary 'bigger man' may be deemed provocative.  The following case illustrates judicial 
acceptance of the claim that a male associate has no responsibility, or indeed, any right, to 
intervene to protect the battered woman from her husband's violence.   
 
Battered Women's Help Seeking as Provocation:  Case Study P/98/3 
Malcolm, the 34 year-old male offender, beat Patricia, his 32 year-old wife and mother of six children to 
death during a birthday party for the couple's nine year old son.  Malcolm had a history of violence toward 
his wife who had escaped to a Women's Refuge on a number of occasions in the past.  Non-violence and 
temporary protection orders against Malcolm were issued in 1995 and again in 1998.  Just three months 
before he killed his wife, Malcolm pleaded guilty to an assault against Patricia and received a 12 month 
suspended sentence of imprisonment.  
 
On the day of the homicide, a number of people came and went during the party in the garage at the couple's 
home.  The pair consumed 'considerable amounts of alcohol'.144  At depositions, the District Court heard 
that around 10.30 pm Patricia became upset following an argument over Malcolm's 'dirty-dancing' with a 
friend of his sister who was a known prostitute.  Patricia went to bed shortly after Malcolm left to go night-
clubbing with a group from the party.  Some time later, Malcolm's cousin entered the house with the stated 
intention of getting 'a feed'.  Instead, he went to the bedroom and later stated he and Patricia kissed and 
sexually fondled each other.  He denied sexual intercourse had taken place.  Malcolm entered the bedroom 
and found his cousin, who was apparently fully dressed at the time, lying on the bed and Patricia in bed 
dressed only in a t-shirt.  The cousin stated that Malcolm told him 'It's all right cuz', at which stage he 
walked out of the bedroom. The cousin acknowledged that he was aware Malcolm might respond to this 
situation with violence and stated: 'I thought I was going to get my head kicked in…I thought [Patricia] may 
have got a slap. I did not think she would end up the way she did.'   
 
The Crown later stated that when the cousin left the room, Malcolm punched Patricia several times in the 
head.  Patricia tried to escape through a window, but was tackled by Malcolm and the pair fell onto concrete 
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below.  Around 10 minutes later, the couple returned to the party and those present saw Patricia stumble and 
'there was evidence that she had recently been beaten'.145  Patricia, who at this stage was appealing to 
partygoers for help, was grabbed in a headlock by Malcolm and dragged up the steps at the front of the 
house.  The cousin and another guest attempted to intervene.  However, Malcolm threatened to break 
Patricia's neck unless they stopped trying to assist her.  The Court of Appeal notes that at this point Patricia 
fell free to the bottom of the steps, and Malcolm once more grabbed her neck, imposed another headlock 
and dragged her back up the steps.  'Everyone was still trying to tell the appellant to leave his wife alone'.  
The cousin tried to assist Patricia but was told by Malcolm to 'f*** off' as he had tried to 'f*** his 
missus'.146  The cousin and the guests left.   
                                                
 
After their departure, the Crown stated that while Patricia's head was on concrete, Malcolm struck repeated 
blows to her head with his fists and stomped on her abdomen.  After placing Patricia in bed, Malcolm rang 
for an ambulance and washed the pair's bloodied clothes.  He also telephoned a friend and stated he had 
'done a stupid thing'.  A pathologist gave evidence that Patricia's death resulted from a number of injuries to 
her head and neck and particularly to a subdural haematoma, caused by blunt force trauma.  Patricia's nose 
was broken and part of her dental plate was found in the rubbish bin.  The other half was found near her 
body.  Two days after her death, Patricia's court order of protection against Malcolm arrived in the mail.   
 
Although DNA evidence confirmed that sexual intercourse between the cousin and Patricia had not taken 
place, defence counsel argued Malcolm was justified in thinking that sex had taken place.  This was 
sufficient to put sexual provocation to the jury.  The defence argued that Malcolm had killed his wife in a 
'blind jealous rage' sparked by the 'devious and opportunistic actions of the cousin'.   
 
To rebut the defence argument that Malcolm had lost his power of self-control, (and presumably to show 
Patricia had not condoned his violence - the judge noted that at all times the letters expressed 
disenchantment with Malcolm's violent behaviour)147 the Crown introduced letters written by Patricia to 
Malcolm while she was in hiding from him. In one letter Patricia told Malcolm:  
   
 Too many times I put your happiness first, and trying to make you happy, forgot about me and the 
kids.  I was a baby machine, a cook, a cleaner, a punching bag and a sex machine, and I don't want  
 to go back to that…I have a lot of bad habits still. Like screaming.  But if I don't yell, nobody 
listens. And at other times my heart aches for you only because you're missing out on seeing the kids 
 
145    Ibid [8].  
146    Ibid. 
147   Ibid [11]. The letters also countered Maurice's claims that he assaulted his wife in response to her abuse of their 
children. 
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grow up.  They come home with new things every day, like words and books, and things they did.  
My heart melts when you treat me like someone special, and when you tell the kids you love them.  
Why does it always have to end?   
 
 And I think you're wrong when you say I make you hit me.  You're the one with the problem, and 
you had it well before you met me.  See, violence gets you nowhere.  I loved you, and I gave up 
everything for you to come up here, and you took my heart and shit on it again.  Anyway I lie in bed 
 thinking about everything, I don't want to be hurt.  I don't want you to hurt.  All I ever wanted was 
for our kids and us to be happy.  Have a happy, violence-free home.  That's all.   
 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the police officer who read the letters at trial 'broke down' and had to pause for 
significant periods of time before he could continue.148  One juror also broke down in tears.  The trial judge 
told the jury that provocation must stem from the victim.  Therefore, the cousin's later intervention to protect 
Patricia could not constitute provocation.149  The jury rejected the provocation defence and convicted 
Malcolm of murder.  Malcolm appealed to the Court of Appeal. 
 
Before this appeal was heard, the media roundly criticised the actions of the party guests in leaving Patricia 
to her fate.  One report described Patricia as raising 'her bloodied and swollen face and feebly lifting a hand 
for help' in response to which 'the crowd melted into the night'.  Responding to the case, campaigners 
against domestic violence urged people to intervene when they witnessed aggression.  A spokesperson for 
the 'Face Up To It' domestic violence campaign stated friends and family who witnessed assaults should ring 
the police, inform others, or stay with the victim during 'volatile' situations.  A Women's Refuge manager 
noted that Patricia's agony was 'the extreme face of what many women experienced when trying to leave 
abusive relationships'.  Patricia's sister told the media that Patricia 'always put her children first' and urged 
battered women to leave their abusive partners.  She said many women stayed with violent men because 
they wanted their children to have a father around.  However, 'there is only one answer if you are in a 
violent relationship, and that is to get right out.  The kids suffer even worse than mum does'. 
 
Subsequently, the Court of Appeal overturned the murder conviction and ordered a re-trial.  The court noted 
that the trial judge should not have allowed the jury to hear Patricia's letters to Malcolm, which also 
included details of his assaults on the children, and sexual violence toward Patricia.  Suggestions by the 
Crown in its closing address that Malcolm had been coached by his lawyer, and had engaged in sexual 
intercourse with Patricia at some point during the attack (DNA evidence found Malcolm's sperm and not the 
cousin's, Patricia's panties had been ripped, and her bra broken) were held to be prejudicial to Malcolm, and 
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the judge's direction on these issues did not remove the prejudice.  The Court noted that the combined effect 
of these matters may well have led to the ordering of a new trial.  However, it was not necessary to decide 
this issue as a new trial could be ordered on the basis of the judge's directions on provocation.   
 
The Court held that the judge had wrongly instructed the jury that provocation must come from Patricia.  
Rather, the cousin's attempt to help Patricia was capable of amounting to provocation as the jury might find 
it indicated 'an understanding or association between [the cousin] and the deceased and a continuing 
interference in the relationship between the accused and his wife'.150  
 
This decision by the Court of Appeal that a habitual batterer could understandably become enraged 
at a male rival's attempt to prevent him from perpetrating further, even lethal violence against his 
wife constitutes an extraordinary reaffirmation of past sexist legal norms.  Although courts 
currently regard allegations of infidelity so seriously that a deceased woman can be internally 
examined for evidence of her 'innocence', wife battering is a crime; sexual infidelity - actual or 
imaginary - is not.  Given that the marriage vows no longer imply an agreement between the parties 
that unfaithful conduct by the wife may be punished by violence, a wife caught in adultery might 
expect recriminations but 'there is no doubt that she is entitled to expect her husband to refrain 
from violence'.151  As Nourse points out, since law refuses to jail adulterers, we are compelled to 
ask why private parties may enforce a sense of outrage that society has refused itself.152   
 
Robert Lithgow posits the decision in this case as confirming the flexible approach of the courts 
which now 'realistically accepts the social context in which individuals interact'.153  The question 
must be asked: whose social context is recognised in this decision?  The social context of the victim 
who continually pleaded for her right and the right of her children to live in a violence-free home is 
not represented in this decision.  Nor are government concerns to target repeat victimisation;154 to 
change proprietary attitudes toward women which justify or partially excuse use of violence 
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against them;155 and to engage the entire community in domestic violence interventions,156 
reflected in this 'flexible approach'.    
 
Lithgow confuses the legal narrative with the social context of this homicide.  The legal narrative 
confirms and reinforces representations of women as the possessions of male partners and 
homicidal rage as a rational response to a male rival's intervention to protect.  The social context 
reveals the brutality of wife abuse, and its maintenance by members of the community, who 
'melted into the night' in the face of threats to further harm the victim.  The social context also 
reveals the killer as a serial abuser and a danger to public safety, evidenced by his violence toward 
his sisters and four previous partners.157    
 
3.    Seeking Help from Relatives as Sexual Provocation 
In response to the above Court of Appeal decision that third party conduct can be sheeted home to 
the deceased victim if she is 'sufficiently associated' with it, Lithgow notes provocation cases 
'illustrate elasticity over many years as to conduct involving the victim rather than strictly 
emanating from the victim'.158  In line with this trend, the jealous male in Case Study S/00/10 who 
killed his estranged partner in the presence of the couple's children, sought to have the principle 
that intervention to protect the battered woman may constitute provocation extended to include 
relatives of the deceased victim.159  Defence counsel argued in the Court of Appeal that the actions 
of the uncle, who hid the woman, kept the offender waiting, and lied to him about whether his 
estranged partner was in the takeaway shop, amounted to provocative conduct which could be 
attributed to the deceased victim.   
 
However, the Court held that the uncle's conduct the day before the killing and six days earlier was 
not sufficiently proximate to the events and could not be associated with the separated woman's 
alleged provocation in the car park.  The Court noted there was some evidence that the uncle kept 
the offender waiting 'for a short time' on the day of the killing, but that conduct could not be 
associated with the deceased victim.160  This leaves open the possibility that had the woman hidden 
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in her uncle's shop and entreated him to lie on her behalf, perhaps directing the offender to another 
location, the uncle's acquiescence in her plan might be sufficient grounds for provocation if she 
was found by the offender shortly afterwards and killed. 
 
Ironically, constructions of third party intervention as provocation stand in stark contrast to the 
approach to this issue in the Family Court.  Following the killing of one woman in the present 
study, whose death was also the culminating event in a history of violence by the batterer, who also 
threatened to harm her if family or friends intervened,161 the killer's mother applied for access to 
her grandchild.  While accepting that the grandmother may have been fearful of her son, the Court 
held her failure to intervene to protect the deceased woman, and her actions and those of other 
family members in reinforcing her son's conduct, militated against the grandmother's on-going 
involvement with her granddaughter.162   
 
V   INDIVIDUAL CAPACITY Versus A REASONS-BASED APPROACH 
Alex Reilly's examination of the literature on the philosophy and psychology of emotion found no 
consensus over what constitutes a loss of self-control and no consistency in how psychological 
theories explain the concept.  Neuro-psychological research in fact supports the ability of offenders 
to choose patterns of behaviour even while in an extreme state of emotion.163  Stephen Morse 
argues expert evidence that an actor is mentally or emotionally disordered does not compel the 
further conclusion that he could not have controlled his legally relevant behaviour, or even that the 
behaviour was related to the disorder.  A mentally or emotionally disordered defendant may be 
aware at some level that his perceptions are 'out of line' but may be unwilling to exert himself not 
to act on the basis of those disordered beliefs.164  Since there is no scientific measure of the 
strength of emotions or urges; gauging the strength of the defendant's anger and comparing it to the 
anger of men who do not kill in the same circumstances is all but impossible.165   
 
These arguments cast doubt on the notion that extreme emotional states can trigger an 
uncontrollable response.  However, the provocation doctrine does not require that the loss of self-
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control be complete.  Since the defendant is assumed to have retained some control, the difficulty 
arises in defining the degree of reduced control that will be sufficient to found the defence.  Noting 
the difficulty of defining whether, and at what stage self-control was lost, and then subsequently 
regained, Stephen Odgers suggests that 'the sufficiency of the degree of self-control actually lost 
would seem to depend on whether the accused is rendered qualitatively less blameworthy than a 
"murderer"'.166   This observation hints at the normative evaluations underpinning the defence.  
 
Nourse notes that a variety of recent scholarly works have urged a fresh examination of the concept 
of evaluation in the law relating to criminal defences.167  Citing Nourse, the UK Law Commission 
highlights flaws in constructions of passion as obscuring reason, so that the quantity or intensity of 
the emotion, rather than the reasons underlying it, is said to provide the excuse.  
  
In the past two decades, the idea of emotion as the natural enemy of reason has been seriously 
questioned by brain scientists and psychologists, by rhetoricians and philosophers, by classicists and 
even by legal scholars.  That both brain scientists and philosophers may now agree that emotion 
reflects or assists our reasoning processes tells us something that law, and life, already reflect.  
When we see that someone is angry we do not call…[a] psychiatric expert for a diagnosis, we 
simply ask 'why'?  We expect reasons, and they are typically attributions of wrongdoing and 
blame.168   
 
Scholars who support a reasons-based approach169 argue that emotions embody beliefs and ways of 
seeing the world for which defendants can and should be held to account.170  Dan Kahan and 
Martha Nussbaum point out that there is no philosophical analysis of emotions which proposes to 
define them without reference to underlying thoughts or beliefs essential to identifying emotions 
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and individuating between them.171  Studies showing subjects differentiate emotions, not in 
accordance with their physiological state, but in accordance with their beliefs about their situation, 
were widely regarded as having sounded the death-knell for mechanistic conceptions of self-
control in cognitive psychology.172  This reasons-based analysis    
 
 allows us to look beyond the act and the circumstances of the act to why people killed and to make 
judgments about the values and views that drove the accused's decision to act.  If criminal offences 
provide minimum standards of socially acceptable behaviour, then this reasons approach to defences 
assesses the extent to which accused persons' behaviour departed from that standard of behaviour.173   
 
Critics of such approach respond that provocation is not concerned with moral or social norms.  
Rather, 'emotion mitigates not because it expresses a morally appropriate evaluation of the actor's 
situation, but because it impairs volition'.174  Under this analysis, emotions are  
 
energies that impel the person to action, without embodying ways of thinking about or perceiving 
objects or situations in the world.  They are not even very reliably hooked up to these ways of 
thinking and seeing; they follow laws of their own.  The mechanistic conception typically sees these 
laws as deriving from an innate 'human nature' that precedes social shaping and responds to social 
cultivation only to a limited degree.  Emotions lie behind culture; they are parts of our innate human 
equipment, to be studied by the sciences of psychology and physiology rather than by the normative 
disciplines of ethics and political thought…emotions are seen as feelings relatively devoid of 
representational or cognitive content.175 
 
The assertion that it 'cannot be seriously argued that variable interpretations of the provocation law 
will be such as to alter the number of victims',176 apparently reflects a mechanistic theory of 
emotions as uncontrollable, irrational, internal forces which are largely impervious to law reform.  
However, research indicates that the way law deals with domestic violence offenders sends 
powerful messages to would-be aggressors and to the community.177  If a legal rule espouses a 
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norm that 'ordinary' men can lose self-control and kill female partners who leave or reject them 
'men can weave this apparent reality into narratives of excuse, and other men might feel less 
constrained to control their behaviour in the face of [real or imagined] infidelity'.178  Nor do 
families of victims,179 and domestic violence advocates,180 who complain about the messages these 
trials convey fail to appreciate the import of legal evaluations of male sexual proprietariness.  
 
Under such circumstances, the only parties from whom the law's evaluative content is possibly 
concealed are the decisionmakers themselves, who are spared the need to confront their appraisals 
directly, and less interested members of the public, who lack the information and incentive to pierce 
through the veneer of mechanistic rhetoric.181 
 
Horder has argued for a third dimension to a general theory of culpability.  He suggests that the 
orthodox two-dimensional approach: the subjectivist focus on intention, knowledge, advertence, 
actual foresight etc; and objectivist concerns with powers of cognition and what the defendant 
ought to have known, ignore a third dimension which draws on a moral theory by reference to what 
we (morally) expect of people experiencing desires associated with emotion.182  As Kahan and 
Nussbaum observe: 
 
Such a view opens to public debate and deliberation many crucial areas of human conduct - what 
provocations are reasonable, what anger a reasonable citizen would experience - and thus fosters a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Men Use To Discuss Their Violence Towards Women' (1995) 6 Discourse and Society 387.  In Case Study G/01/3 a 
police officer, who was also an uncle of the victim, noted the offender, who had killed his partner shortly after she 
terminated the relationship, was well known for saying 'you can get away with anything if you act nuts'.  Nourse notes 
reported testimony that one defendant warned the victim if she left he would kill her, and in response to her suggestion 
that 'he would go to jail' he replied that 'he would just act like he was crazy and get off'.  See also Case Study D/00/7.  
A book by convicted murderer Michael Avanti, who persuaded one offender to reveal the whereabouts of his victim's 
body to police and subsequently received a reward of $10,000, aims to show how easily psychiatrists can be deceived 
by offenders:  Revelations in Book About Dash Killing, Dominion, 12 January 2002.  
178    Reilly, above n 163, 335.  Easteal, above n 117, suggests that if a man reads the newspaper and discovers another 
male has killed his estranged wife and received a lenient sentence, such an act might gain some attraction, particularly 
if there is already a history of severe violence in the relationship.  
179    Manslaughter Verdict Sickens Victim's Family, Sunday News, 13 December 1998. 
180  Manslaughter Verdict Outrages Dead Woman's Mother, Press, 20 November 2004, cites the comments of a 
Women's Refuge spokesperson following the successful use of the defence in 2004 by a male who killed his estranged 
partner when she left their 10 year violent relationship that the manslaughter verdict sent the message that 'it's OK' for 
men to kill their partners.  'After 10 years or more of abuse, its almost like the lessening of the charge means that there 
is some acceptance that if a woman chooses to live her life free from violence then it's in some way provocation for 
murder…It's quite an indictment of where our society is at.'  
181    Kahan and Nussbaum, above n 169, 363. 
182   Jeremy Horder, 'Cognition, Emotion and Criminal Culpability' (1990) 106 L.Q.R. 469, demonstrates this point 
with reference to the defence of mistaken belief in consent in rape cases.  While ethically well disposed agents may 
regard the experience of great fear as a sound moral basis for excusing negligent consequent wrongdoing, they would 
not regard even a very great desire for sexual satisfaction as morally equivalent.   
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deliberative public culture.  The mechanistic view of persons, by permitting us to ask only how 
strong certain impulses are, would actively discourage public deliberation on such matters.183 
 
When criminal law determines that an offender's aggression is out of all proportion to the deed 
when it occurs in response to desertion or rejection by friends, employers, or landlords, while the 
same acts in the context of an intimate relationship may seem 'rational', it reinforces specific norms 
of relationship.184  In other words, constraints on access to the provocation defence are imposed, 
not on the basis of the intensity of the emotions involved, but because the emotions are evaluated 
according to cultural norms of behaviour deemed appropriate to the different relationships.  These 
evaluations may be so deeply embedded in law that they do not seem like evaluations at all:  
 
Rather, we might say that these evaluations simply 'are' the law. It is only when we attempt to 
inscribe new evaluations of motivation into the law, evaluations that are more contested than the 
ones already long woven into the law's fabric, that we are able to see clearly the act of evaluation at 
all.185 
 
Kahan and Nussbaum point out that the perception provocation is concerned with an offender's 
capacity for choice, and not with the quality of the emotional response, severs the correspondence 
between the valuation implicit in the action and the condemning retort of punishment.  Since the 
role of evaluation in assessing the moral quality of emotions is disavowed, and the presence or 
absence of self-control is the only thing worth attending to, a defendant's lethal response to a 
battered woman's decision to exit an abusive relationship, and lethal retaliation in response to a 
long history of violence by the deceased, differ in no salient way. 'This disregard [for the question 
of evaluation] … has social consequences…the wrong people will be treated with indulgence, and 
the message of deterrence sent to the community as a whole, to potential offenders in particular, 
will be a confused and dangerous one.'186  
 
As discussed above, legal analyses concerned exclusively with the impairment of a defendant's 
volition deflect normative evaluations of the defendant's reasons for acting.  While a mechanistic  
                                                 
183    Kahan and Nussbaum, above n 169, 361. 
184    Nourse, above n 23, 1376-1377. 
185   Carol Steiker, 'Punishing Hateful Motives: Old Wine in a New Bottle Revives Calls for Prohibition' (1999) 97 
Mich.L.Rev. 1857, 1864. 
186    Kahan and Nussbaum, above n 169, 360. 
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view of self control would require us to treat large numbers of jealous and possessive male killers 
as beyond the parameters of rational judgment, the objective test in provocation requires evaluation 
of the type of conduct all citizens - including women - are entitled to expect from their fellow 
human beings.   
 
VI   PROVOCATION AND LEGAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF MORALITY 
The transfiguration of the 'reasonable man' of the English provocation defence into the 'ordinary 
person' of s 169 of the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 recognises that 'needless killing in the throes 
of passion is the antithesis of reasonable conduct'.187  Joshua Dressler suggests that unlike the ideal 
standard of the 'reasonable man', the 'ordinary man' is far less praiseworthy, which is why the 
provocation defence represents a concession to human weakness.188  However, Leader-Elliott notes 
that legislative substitution of the 'reasonable' with the 'ordinary' man diminished the paradox of the 
unreasonable reasonable man, but did not eliminate it.  Since most men who experience rejection 
and the break-up of a relationship manage to negotiate the related anger, bitterness and jealousy 
without resorting to lethal violence, 'if the defence of provocation was based on the likely reactions 
of ordinary men, of whatever culture, no man who killed from jealousy would escape conviction 
for murder'.189   
 
The paradoxical 'extraordinary ordinary man' test is complicated by two competing views of the 
moral structure of the provocation defence.190  On one view, the defence is not concerned with 
pathological unreasonableness and is to be contrasted with a diminished responsibility defence as 
provocation operates only in respect of reasonable losses of temper.  'The rationale of the 
provocation defence is that the defendant is a full moral agent capable of conforming to an 
objective standard.'191  Thus Horder argues that the moral boundary between the defences of 
diminished responsibility and provocation is delineated by the objective standard in provocation 
that excludes the mental abnormalities of the accused.192  This view was accepted by the majority 
of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v Rongonui193 which held that the legislative reference in 
                                                 
187    Orchard, above n 11. 
188    Joshua Dressler, 'When "Heterosexual" Men Kill "Homosexual" Men: Reflections on Provocation Law, Sexual 
Advances, and the "Reasonable Man" Standard' (1995) 85 J.Crim.L. & Criminology 726, 740. 
189    Leader-Elliott, above n 12, 161-162. 
190    Macklem and Gardner, above n 140, 815-816. 
191  Mandy Burton, 'Intimate Homicide and the Provocation Defence - Endangering Women? R v Smith' (2001) 9 
Fem.L.S. 247, 252. 
192    Horder, above n 36. 
193    [2000] 2 NZLR 385. 
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s 169 to a person having the power of self-control of an ordinary person, 'but otherwise having the 
characteristics of the offender', required the characteristic to be taken into account when assessing 
the gravity of the provocation to the accused, but did not allow the power of self-control of the 
hypothetical 'ordinary' person to be affected by such characteristic.   
 
However, as Celia Wells points out, courts and academics in common-law jurisdictions remain torn 
between the above strict approach to the objective test and 'one which allows the defendant's 
characteristics and circumstances to creep out of the gravity question and inform the self-control 
question as well'.194  The latter approach perceives the application of a uniform standard such as 
that of the 'reasonable' or 'ordinary' person as insufficiently astute to the many dimensions in which 
people differ, including differences in temperament and mental or emotional idiosyncrasies.  Since 
justice demands that allowances are made for handicaps for which the defendant cannot be held 
responsible, it is unjust to measure a defendant's conduct against objective standards they cannot 
meet.195    
 
In her dissenting judgment, Elias CJ in Rongonui argued that '[e]quality before the law is not 
achieved by holding those mentally damaged to the same level of culpability as those not'.196  
Accordingly, the 'ordinary man' should be invested with such characteristics as 'mental impairment, 
cognitive impairment through brain damage or senility, and heightened sensitivity through a 
recognised syndrome induced by abuse'.197  Proponents of this approach argue that it is more 
consistent with the likely intention of Parliament when drafting the statutory test than the strict 
interpretation adopted by the majority in Rongonui.198  Invoking the situation of the battered 
defendant, Elias CJ argued that requiring the jury to distinguish between the effects of battered 
woman's syndrome on the gravity of the provocation and its effect on the accused's powers of self-
control constituted an overly subtle, 'highly artificial' distinction, which was 'likely to be so 
regarded by the jury'.199    
 
                                                 
194    Celia Wells, 'Provocation: The Case for Abolition' in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds), Rethinking 
English Homicide Law (2000) 85, 90. 
195    See, eg, Eric Colvin, 'Ordinary and Reasonable People: The Design of Objective Tests of Criminal Responsibility' 
(2001) 27 Mon LR 197.   
196    R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385, 424 (CA).    
197    Ibid 422.    
198    Brookbanks, above n 17, [28]. 
199    R v Rongonui [2000] 2 NZLR 385, 420-421. 
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However, gender differences in size and strength generally preclude an immediate response by the 
battered woman to threats of violence and taunts.  Thus the battered woman's difficulty is with the 
requirement of a sudden and immediate loss of self-control and it is not necessary in the interests of 
justice to imbue her with a mental abnormality.200   Furthermore, while the battered woman 
syndrome has its origins in a laudable feminist attempt to counter gender bias in law, the analysis 
has been widely discredited as unscientific; inapplicable to the experiences of many battered 
women; offensive in its pathological connotations which imply that abused women suffer from a 
mental illness; misleading in its focus on the battered woman rather than on the batterer's use of 
violence and coercive control; and legally disadvantageous as the concept of 'learned helplessness' 
is incompatible with the actions of the battered defendant in actively seeking to protect herself.201  
In line with overseas jurisdictions, the New Zealand Law Commission has recommended the 
introduction of expert evidence on battering as opposed to establishing the existence of a particular 
'syndrome'.202    
 
Few women kill in response to sexual taunts or infidelity as the majority of intimate partner 
homicides by women are in response to the male victim's violence.  Any advantage to women 
defendants from the minority approach in Rongonui is far outweighed by its potential to expose all 
women to greater danger.  Diminishing support for the battered woman's syndrome stands in 
striking contrast to renewed interest among health professionals in the study of jealousy-related 
aggression.203   The 'Othello' syndrome and essentially equivalent diagnostic labels, for example: 
'psychotic jealousy, erotic jealousy syndrome, delusion of infidelity, and conjugal paranoia' are 
scientifically accepted, and are acknowledged as relevant to 'aggression associated with domestic 
violence'. The present research found men who injure or kill in the context of jealousy and 
estrangement are also represented as suffering inter alia from dissociation, post-traumatic stress 
disorder and severe clinical depression.   
 
                                                 
200   See, eg, R v Smith(Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146, 213 (HL) per Lord Millett. 
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The normative content of psychological evaluations of male sexual proprietariness is also evident 
in the well recognised difficulty of establishing the point at which 'normal' jealousy can be 
differentiated from its pathological forms.204  Thus 'jealousy is considered morbid when it exceeds 
that level of possessiveness which is regarded as the norm for that society or culture'.205  Most 
persons who experience the break-up of a relationship will be distressed, miserable and upset, and 
research indicates that while psychiatrists may disagree, men may fairly readily obtain psychiatric 
reports to substantiate claims they were experiencing pathological jealousy, fear of rejection, or 
clinical depression at the time of the homicide.206  As discussed above, provocation is currently 
available to jealous men who kill women and claim some personal characteristic rendered them 
more susceptible to losing their self-control due to rejection and assertions of independence by an 
intimate partner.207  Permitting the accused's personal pathology to modify the objective standard 
of self-control would increase the likelihood of success for such claims.208  Thus as Mandy Burton 
observes, the 'creeping subjectivism' of the 'ordinary man' strengthens rather than weakens the 
alliance between law and psychiatry in excusing male violence toward women.209    
 
Although Parliament's decision not to enact a diminished responsibility defence has been 
considered relevant to a restricted treatment of mental characteristics, Elias CJ suggests that 'the 
inevitable and deliberate effect of s 169 is to recognise a diminished responsibility within the limits 
of the provocation defence'.210  However, this analysis blurs the moral boundary between the 
defences.  Research indicates that the English defence of diminished responsibility has benefited 
batterers as opposed to their victims.  Thirty-eight per cent 'of diminished responsibility pleas were 
wife killings arising, in the majority of cases where the offender was not psychotic, from "amorous 
jealousy or possessiveness"'.211  Responding to a proposal by two English legal scholars that law 
reform should acknowledge the defences of provocation and diminished responsibility are merging 
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into a single defence by shifting the inquiry to whether the defendant acted under 'extreme mental 
or emotional disturbance',212 James Chalmers warned that unless the boundaries of these defences 
are clearly demarcated we may cease debating whether 'infidelity' in the context of estrangement 
should be an adequate basis for provocation, and find ourselves evaluating whether a refusal to 
even enter a relationship might suffice.  While the New Zealand situation is not directly analogous, 
this warning is nonetheless salutary.213   
 
Curiously, legal commentary also suggests that concern to deny the defence to accused persons of 
exceptional pugnacity and those with unusually low self-control was the rationale for excluding 
defendants' characteristics from the objective test of provocation.214  The minority approach in 
Rongonui would also prohibit defendants from calling 'in aid the bad temper or self-indulgence all 
ordinary people can be tempted by and can overcome'.215  However, the defence is presently 
available to habitual and serial domestic violence offenders.  Accordingly, it is difficult to envisage 
what circumstances could prompt its withdrawal on the basis of the defendant's bad temper and 
history of violence.  Indeed, on the authority of Case Studies T/97/5 and P/98/3 above, it is 
doubtful whether the defence would ever be withdrawn from the jury on the basis of a domestic 
killer's propensity to use violence.    
 
Morse points out that in the absence of scientific means by which to test a defendant's capability to 
weigh the relevant options, or persuasive evidence that psychiatric experts can detect 
malingering,216 courts, legislators and legal commentators cannot avoid the hard social, moral and 
legal questions by turning to mental health professionals.  Since there is no bright line between free 
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and unfree choices, society can only resolve on non-scientific grounds how to answer questions of 
moral and legal responsibility.217  While arguments in support of retaining the provocation defence 
are 'generally premised on the view that a person who kills in response to provocation is less 
morally culpable than other intentional killers',218 the provision of a partial excuse to proprietary 
men who pursue and kill separating women presently subverts civil law freedoms allowing women 
to exit unhappy relationships, and provides a partial excuse for male vigilantism.  
 
VII   PROVOCATION AND THE STEREOTYPE OF INTIMATE FEMICIDE: 
MASKING THE RED FLAGS OF SEPARATION AND REPEAT VICTIMISATION 
Feminist legal scholars point out that the close association of provocation law with intimate 
femicide has created a dynamic in which woman killing is constructed as typically spontaneous 
violence, perpetrated by men pushed beyond their limits by female misconduct.219  In reality, men 
who kill in the context of separation and rejection are afforded considerable latitude over issues 
such as pre-planning and the 'suddenness requirement'.220   The defence is said to be negatived if 
the killing was deliberate and premeditated, but 'cooling time' is a 'flexible and uncertain 
consideration' and neither the lapse of a number of hours nor 'intervening conduct of some 
complexity and apparent deliberation' will necessarily be fatal to the defence.221  As a result, the 
UK Law Commission notes that defendants are permitted to claim provocation in clear cases of 
considered revenge.222  The Commission's consultations with psychiatrists also revealed that 'those 
who give vent to anger by "losing self-control" to the point of killing another person generally do 
so in circumstances in which they can afford to do so'.   
 
An angry strong man can afford to lose his self-control with someone who provokes him, if that 
person is physically smaller and weaker.  An angry person is much less likely to 'lose self- control' 
and attack another person in circumstances in which he or she is likely to come off worse by doing 
so.223   
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Wayne Gorman observes that the ending of a relationship does not cause sudden violence, it 
creates the opposite effect.  'It creates long-term anger and jealousy that may eventually result in 
violence.  But that violence is not in response to provocation, it is in response to the jealousy that 
the ending of the relationship evokes.'224  However, legal narratives of provocation have diverted 
attention from the contradictory findings of social science research.225  Consequently, the 
stereotype of intimate femicide in terms of men who suddenly 'crack' or 'snap' is maintained despite 
obvious inconsistencies.   
 
Donna Coker suggests that   
 
 [o]ur oppositional definitions of 'premeditation' and 'impassioned' killings fail to capture the nature 
of this phenomenon which is both premeditated in its obsessive quality and 'impassioned' in that the 
killer believes himself to be 'out of control'.  The man 'may have fantasized events that would 
"trigger" him to commit homicide', rehearsing the killing, though not planning it in a straight-
forward cognitive fashion.  He may describe feeling that his choice to kill is completely in the hands 
of fate or, perhaps more accurately, in the hands of the victim.  If she continues to do 'x,' or if she 
refuses to do 'x,' then he will 'have no choice' but to kill.  These men may be heard to say with some 
resignation, 'one of us is going to end up dead'.226 
 
Coker points out that the provocation analysis perpetuates two major misconceptions about the 
nature of male violence toward women.  First, the violence is depicted 'as an uncontrollable 
response, which in turn reinforces the belief that intervention can have little deterrence or 
prevention impact.'227  Second, the violence is attributed to a particularly provocative victim, or the 
dynamics of a particularly dysfunctional relationship, as opposed to the personal proclivity of the 
offender to be violent with female intimates.  The offender is thereby depicted as an unlikely 
recidivist and less dangerous.228   
 
Well established patterns of repeat victimisation and escalation in battering relationships contradict 
the assumption in the provocation scenario of an ordinarily non-violent male offender who 
                                                 
224    Gorman, above n 143, 496. 
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suddenly and uncharacteristically 'snaps'.  The calculation central to intimate femicide is also 
evidenced by the determined pursuit of estranged women partners, including, stalking, death 
threats, and the wife killer's mantra:  'If I can't have you, nobody else can'.  By contrast, the 
provocation stereotype has masked the two major red flags for dangerousness/lethality of 
separation and repeat victimisation.  Junctures at which the offender's grim pursuit of his partner's 
destruction might have been halted by proactive intervention may therefore remain unrecognised.    
 
VIII   LEGAL NORMS OF INTIMATE HETEROSEXUAL RELATIONSHIPS 
Historical legal norms of relationship which permitted men to beat and imprison non-compliant 
wives linger on in modern interpretations of the provocation defence.  As Francis Dolan points out, 
the conception that a marriage may contain only one legal agent still casts women's assertions of 
sexual autonomy as a kind of violence that in turn provokes male retaliation.229  Although judges 
no longer mandate women's return to their husbands, the ghost of the feme covert hovers in judicial 
evaluations that men retain a proprietorial interest in women who want nothing more to do with 
them.  Despite research showing the level of support and protection women can obtain from law 
and the community makes the difference between breaking free and becoming more embedded in 
abuse,230 patriarchal relationship norms continue to construct women's attempts to seek help and 
third party intervention as a flouting by the woman of her male partner's authority.   
 
Why else would the law encourage protective orders in domestic violence cases but hold that juries 
could find such orders good causes for murderous rages?  How else are we to explain that divorce or 
departure, lawful acts, are assumed to spawn murderous rages that survive for months and years?  
How else are we to understand why the reformed defense, unlike almost any other criminal code, 
shows compassion to defendants who have created the conditions of their own defense, who 
respond to what would otherwise seem trivial slights, or who use violence to punish lawful acts?  
Because the relationship supplies the norms that the criminal law denies.231 
  
Criminal law interpretations of help-seeking by battered women individualise what is, in reality, a 
community problem.  Researchers note that while women 'have the responsibility to take action for 
themselves for their own safety and that of their children', this requires, and is possible, 'only in a 
                                                 
229    Francis Dolan, Battered Women, Petty Traitors and the Legacy of Coverture' (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 249, 272. 
230    Hand, et al, above n 128. 
231    Nourse, above n 23, 1380 (emphasis added). 
 233
context of social responsibility.'232  Acknowledgement of this social responsibility is missing from 
legal narratives of women who report abusers to the police; 'tell the accused one thing, and other 
people something else'; invent imaginary male protectors; hide from abusers; seek matrimonial 
property settlements; protection orders; and structured access arrangements, as provocateurs of 
men, as opposed to members of a particular social group who struggled, unsuccessfully, for their 
own (and sometimes their children's) survival.  
 
IX   CONCLUSION 
The recent successful use of sexual provocation by a male who shot and killed his estranged wife's 
new male partner, and shot the woman causing her arm to be amputated, led one academic to 
describe the defence as undermining the credibility of the law and a 'nightmare' which should be 
abolished.233  However, notwithstanding criticism of mechanistic constructions of emotion, and the 
elusive quality of the ordinary person test (Reilly notes courts and jurors have no knowledge of the 
power of self-control that the 'ordinary manslaughterer' is capable of obtaining),234 the defence has 
remained impervious to calls from advisory bodies for its demise.235    
 
Provocation is most commonly raised by men who kill women in the context of sexual intimacy.236  
Given that the defence relies on the uncorroborated claims of killers which are highly vulnerable to 
fabrication,237 all women remain vulnerable to men who manufacture allegations of provocation to 
excuse their violence.238  (The New Zealand Court of Appeal has observed that it is difficult to 
exclude provocation in the setting of a close personal relationship where there can be a build-up of 
emotions over a period of time and a further incident can cause feelings to run high and trigger a 
loss of self-control.)239  Studies indicate that it is rare for prosecutors to question alleged 
confessions of adultery or taunts about sexual prowess which defendant's claim provoked them to 
kill.240   Judges have also acknowledged that 'a case of provocation by words may be more easily 
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invented than a case of provocation by conduct, particularly when the victim was the wife of the 
accused'.241    
 
The stories law tells of sexual provocation are presently constructed in terms of the volition or 
capacity of individual defendants.  As Nourse points out, attempts to further subjectivise the 
hypothetical ordinary male by imbuing him with certain of the defendant's psychological 
characteristics shift the standard of self-control a step further inwards, placing normative questions 
- which passions the law should protect - into the minds of individual defendants.  These 
individualised analyses have masked a structural pattern of male violence towards women.  It is 
time to confront the terrible social reality that New Zealand women are being injured and killed 
while attempting to escape from abusive men.  In the interests of justice, the state can no longer 
avoid responsibility for failing to protect its citizens by blaming abused women for provoking their 
own deaths.242   
 
                                                 
241   Morgan, above n 79, 262 citing Mason J in Moffa v R (1977) 138 CLR 601, 618 (HCA).   
242   See, also, Raeder, above n 219, 1478. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: THE 'RED FLAG' OF SEPARATION 
PART II:  TOWARD A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE 
       A woman plans to marry the man accused of repeatedly stabbing her  
                    and breaking her arms with a hammer in an attempted murder.  [The 
 couple] applied for a marriage certificate this month.1 
 
       Let's say I committed this crime [the murder of ex-wife Nicole Brown  
       Simpson].  Even if I did do this, it would have to have been because I  
       loved her very much, right? 
                    ~ O J Simpson2 
 
  [H]omicide 'is the outcome, in most cases, of a society whose inter- 
 personal relationships deserve a thoroughgoing reanalysis'.3  
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Research has produced conflicting accounts of the relevance of estrangement to sentencing 
outcomes.  Patricia Easteal's study of judges' sentencing remarks indicates that constructions of 
separation violence in terms of male passion and female infidelity also operate at sentencing.4  By 
contrast, Myrna Dawson notes various theoretical perspectives predict that offenders who victimise 
women from whom they are estranged will be sanctioned more severely than those who target 
current partners.  Dawson's research found men who killed estranged partners were likely to 
receive harsher legal sanctions than men who killed women with whom they were co-residing.5   
Since scholarly research has produced such disparate sentencing scenarios, this chapter includes an 
examination of sentencing responses to lethal separation violence.  
 
The theory that the status of the intimate relationship (whether the parties are co-residing or 
separated) is predictive of punishment severity would require a major shift from legal constructions 
of sub-lethal separation violence and the provocation analysis of violence in the context of 
separation.  The recommendation by the New Zealand Law Commission that juries receive 
                                                 
1    Victim to Wed, Dominion, 23 January 1995. 
2    Sylvia Puente and Dov Cohen, 'Jealousy and the Meaning (or Nonmeaning) of Violence' (2003) 29 Personality and 
Social Psychology Bulletin 449, 449. 
3    Jenny Morgan, Who Kills Whom and Why: Looking Beyond the Legal Categories, Occasional Paper No 1 (2002) 4, 
citing Adam Sutton, in the Preface to Alison Wallace, Homicide the Social Reality (1986).  
4  Patricia Easteal, 'Sentencing Those Who Kill Their Sexual Intimates: An Australian Study' (1993) 21 
Int.J.Sociol.Law 189, 196, cites a case in which the sentencing judge accepted that 'an estranged wife's "infidelity" 
seventeen months after separation could cause some righteous indignation and depression by the estranged husband'.  
Geoff Hall, Sentencing Law and Practice (2004) 84, notes that '[w]here the contributing behaviour by the victim takes 
the form of provocation it will be considered when sentencing in cases of assault or manslaughter'.  
5    Myrna Dawson, 'The Cost of "Lost" Intimacy: The Effect of Relational Status on Criminal Justice Decision Making' 
(2003) 43 Brit.J.Criminol. 689. 
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information on the social reality of separation violence indicates that this red flag for 
dangerousness/lethality is also overlooked at the trials of battered defendants.6  Given that 
separation attacks are not uncommon, and media coverage of the trials of men who kill estranged 
partners is often extensive, an assumption that the public remain unaware of this structural pattern 
of offending appears surprising.  Notwithstanding high rates of sub-lethal and lethal separation 
violence, a critique of the Commission's proposal to reform self-defence law to accommodate 
battered defendants also suggests that rather than resort to lethal violence the battered defendant 
could 'summon help or simply walk out the door'.  Having chosen neither of these options; her 
claim of self-defence 'smacks of self-help'.7  The violent pursuit of the separated woman is missing 
from this legal analysis.   
 
Ian Leader-Elliott suggests that the availability of the provocation excuse to battering men and the 
difficulty battered women experience in accessing the defence of self-defence are manifestations of 
an underlying assumption in criminal law 'that women are subjects of men's dominion'.8  
Relationship norms associated with this model of heterosexual relations are discussed in this 
chapter.  In addition to the invisibility of separation violence in law and culture, the study found 
legal analyses are internally incoherent and in conflict with New Zealand Family Violence 
Prevention Strategy.  Statutory intervention is therefore essential to promote women's safety and 
achieve justice for battered victims and defendants.   
 
II   THEORIES OF SEPARATION VIOLENCE AND PUNISHMENT SEVERITY 
The relational distance between victim and offender 'has traditionally been perceived as a key 
determinant of criminal justice outcomes in cases of interpersonal violence'.9   'Relational distance' 
theory posits that as relationships change, so also will the amount and type of social control.   
 
Typically, socio-legal and feminist theorists argue that law varies inversely with the relational 
distance (or what is often referred to as the degree of intimacy) that exists between victims and 
defendants.  Specifically, they argue that 'law is most likely to become involved, to proceed 
                                                 
6    New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, Report 
73 (2001) [46]. 
7   Charles Cato, 'Criminal Defences and Battered Defendants' [2002] NZLJ 35, 39. 
8  Ian Leader-Elliott, 'Passion and Insurrection in the Law of Sexual Provocation' in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary 
Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of Law (1997) 149, 151.   
9   Dawson, above n 5, 690 (citations omitted). 
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aggressively, and to be penal in style when the parties are strangers; it is least likely to become 
involved and most likely to be lenient and conciliatory when they are intimates'.10 
 
On this analysis, persons who use violence against intimate partners from whom they are estranged 
'may be subject to more law than those who are still involved with their victims at the time of the 
crime'.11  Dawson's study of intimate partner homicides in Toronto from 1974 to 1996 found male 
offenders who killed female partners who were in the process of separating, or from whom they 
were estranged, received sentences that were around two years longer than those imposed on 
defendants who killed in the context of an intact relationship.  This raised the possibility of a 
sentencing hierarchy in which women who leave are viewed as somehow more victimised than 
women who decide to stay.12    
 
Dawson's research findings support Elizabeth Rapaport's 'household threshold' thesis13 which 
posits that the ongoing legacy of patriarchal legal doctrines that defined the domestic sphere as the 
boundary for male rule may ensure law offers 'less protection to men who have lost the status of 
husband of their victims'.14  Differences in the severity of sanctions may also reflect a greater 
degree of preplanning in estrangement cases than in cases involving cohabiting partners.15  
Punishment rationales may also inculpate women victims who have remained in violent 
relationships despite their perceived risk, while courts may perceive women who have attempted to 
minimise risk by severing the relationship as less responsible.16   
 
This issue is explored in the following section which examines sentencing responses to lethal 
separation violence in the context of legislation providing for additional public denunciation and 
deterrence of especially repugnant offending through a minimum term of imprisonment.   
                                                 
10     Ibid, citing D Black, The Behavior of Law (1976) 40. 
11     Ibid. 
12     Ibid.  Dawson notes the thesis that 'the culpability of defendants in separation killings may be greater than in intact 
killings because victims are perceived to be less responsible for their own demise in separation killings by virtue of 
their attempts, successful or otherwise, to exit the threatening relationship' is a disturbing possibility for two reasons:  
First, simply because it appears that the woman did not leave, does not mean she did not try.  Second, the view that 
separated women are more victimised than women who choose not to leave is clearly problematic.  
13   Elizabeth Rapaport, 'The Death Penalty and the Domestic Discount' in Martha Fineman and Roxanne Mykitiuk 
(eds) The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse (1994), 224, 235. 
14     Ibid 238. 
15    Ibid 236, noting that the distinction between premeditated, calculated killings and spontaneous 'crimes of passion' 
fails to account for the fact that killings not requiring premeditation, such as those committed in the course of a 
robbery, are nevertheless ranked among the most reprehensible types of murder: at 245. 
16     Elizabeth Rapaport, 'The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination' (1991) 25 Law and Society Review 367, 380. 
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III   SEPARATION VIOLENCE AND THE STATUTORY RESPONSE TO 
EGREGIOUS MURDERS 
Prior to the Sentencing Act 2002, a conviction for murder carried a mandatory sentence of life 
imprisonment.  Section 89(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1985 expressed a general legislative 
policy setting the earliest time that an offender convicted of murder might be released on parole at 
the discretion of the Parole Board as after the expiry of ten years of the sentence.17  The 1985 Act 
was amended by the Criminal Justice Amendment Act 1993 which empowered the sentencing court 
under s 80 to depart from this general policy in cases of offenders convicted of murder where the 
circumstances of the offending were so exceptional that a minimum period of imprisonment of 
more than 10 years was justified.  The Court of Appeal repeatedly warned that the power under s 
80 was to be exercised sparingly.18  Application of the section was restricted to cases that were 'so 
horrendous or repugnant as to justify additional denunciation',19 or which by their nature were 'so 
removed from the general run of offences which attract indeterminate sentences as to make that 
policy inappropriate'.20   
 
A   Separation Murders as Unexceptional 
Although murders of separated women were often accompanied by invasion of the women's 
homes, significant brutality, and perpetration of the violence in the presence of children, they were 
not generally regarded as meriting an additional minimum non-parole period under s 80.  
 
Separation Murder as 'Unexceptional': Case Study M/97/2 
Graham, the 46 year-old offender, broke into the home of Bobette, his estranged wife, shortly after the 
couple had separated and killed the mother of three children.   Bobette's 11 year-old son heard his mother's 
screams and reached her in time to witness his father stabbing his mother and cutting her throat with the 
knife.  Graham subsequently pleaded guilty to murder and aggravated burglary.21  Graham claimed he could 
not recall the killing and did not know why he murdered his estranged wife.  Defence counsel is reported as 
suggesting that Graham was a man who had kept his emotions to himself for years and 'snapped' on the 
night of the killing.  The Crown sought an extension under s 80 of the minimum non-parole period, on the 
                                                 
17   Section 103 Sentencing Act 2002 provides that 'an offender sentenced to imprisonment for life for murder will serve 
a minimum period of imprisonment of 10 years as provided in section 84(3) of the Parole Act 2002'. 
18    R v Hapi [1995] 1 NZLR 257; R v Parsons [1996] 3 NZLR 129.  
19    R v Parsons [1996] 3 NZLR 129, 131 (CA). 
20    R v W [1996] 1 NZLR 147, 149 (CA). 
21    C v M [1998] NZFLR 489, 490. 
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basis that the killing was premeditated, unprovoked, and a 'brutal' and 'repugnant' attack on a 'virtually 
defenceless victim'.  However, although the sentencing judge's voice reportedly 'broke with emotion' as she 
described the 'grievous and loathsome' factors involved in this murder of a separated woman in the presence 
of her child, the judge found there were no aggravating features of this offending which would categorise 
the crime as 'exceptional'. 
 
Outside the court, family members told reporters that the offender had been violent to his wife before he 
killed her and she had left him because of his violence.  They were concerned that the offender would be 
free in a few years.  'Life's not life' one family member said. 
 
Since the context of estrangement is not unusual or exceptional in intimate femicide cases, the 
murders of estranged partners could be accurately portrayed as not by their nature removed from 
the general run of domestic homicides, and therefore insufficiently horrendous or repugnant to 
justify additional denunciation and deterrence.    
 
Separation Murder as 'Unexceptional': Case Study M/97/3 
Donald, the 40 year-old offender and Pet, his de facto partner and 'mother of four', had been in a relationship 
for 'many years'.  The relationship was punctuated by periods of separation.  (As in so many of these cases, 
no explanation is given for the periods of separation or whether violence was a factor.)  Following a 
'domestic argument' Pet left the relationship and moved into the home of a friend.  The Crown stated Donald 
'could not accept the separation' and made many telephone calls to Pet's workplace pleading with her to 
resume the relationship.  On the day of the homicide, Donald travelled to the home of his estranged partner 
armed with a single-barrel shotgun.  Upon arrival, he placed the gun and five cartridges at the end of a 
veranda, went to the door and demanded to speak to Pet.  She refused to go outside to meet with him, and 
together with a woman friend demanded that he leave or they would call the police.   
 
In response, Donald retrieved the shotgun and fired one shot through the door lock of a ranch slider, 
breaking the glass.  He then reloaded the shotgun, entered the house and dragged Pet outside onto the 
veranda where he shot her through the lower left leg, almost amputating her foot.  As Pet pleaded for her 
life, Donald dragged her toward his car.  When he released Pet to reload the shotgun, she crawled under a 
bush.  Bending down, Donald fired again at Pet, who was hit in the chest lacerating her heart, liver and 
diaphragm.  
 
Several people witnessed the shooting, including a neighbour, employed as a security guard, who stated he 
looked out his window after hearing the first shot.  He heard a second shot, and a woman's voice crying out 
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for help.  He said he jumped out the window in time to see Pet dragging her leg as she tried to crawl away 
from Donald and hide.  As he watched, Donald lowered the gun and shot her again.  Donald then re-loaded 
the shotgun and turned toward the neighbour who sprinted towards Donald and with the help of another 
neighbour pinned him to the ground.  Others tried to help the dying woman by stemming the flow of blood 
from her abdominal and leg wounds.  However she died at the scene and ambulance officers were unable to 
revive her. 
 
During a police interview, Donald stated that he killed his estranged partner because she 'did not want to go 
home with him'.  Donald pleaded guilty to Pet's murder.  At sentencing, defence counsel reportedly told the 
judge that Donald had 'killed the one person who was close to him' and was remorseful.  The Crown made 
no submissions and Donald was sentenced to life imprisonment.   
 
The neighbour who intervened told reporters he wished he could have done more for Pet.  'I wanted to tackle 
[the offender] after the second shot, but I wasn't sure how quickly he would reload.  She may have been 
alive now if I had done it.'  Pet's repeated screams for help and the way she died still tormented him: 'I can't 
get rid of that vision' the neighbour said.   
 
This murder of a woman who 'did not want to go home' to an apparently abusive relationship 
excited little public attention or outrage.  Similarly, the habitual batterer in Case Study W/96/1 who 
informed police that he killed his estranged girlfriend after deciding that 'If I can't have her, no one 
will' did not serve a minimum non-parole period, and the case and legal response attracted little 
attention or controversy.  Nor was s 80 invoked where an offender used two knives to stab his 
estranged wife to death in the foyer of the Court she attended for a hearing over access to the 
couple's children.22 
 
Two cases were found of offenders who killed a separated partner and minimum non-parole 
periods were imposed.  In the first case, the offender murdered his estranged wife and attempted to 
murder her friend.  The wife was tortured for six hours prior to being killed and both victims were 
forced to consume tabs of LSD and informed of their intended fate.  The case attracted a great deal 
of media attention and the offender was sentenced to a minimum non-parole period of 12.5 years 
and his female accomplice to 13 years.23   
 
                                                 
22    Case Study L/98/4. 
23    Case Study G/95/3. 
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Although defence counsel in the following case study argued that the circumstances of this 
separation murder 'occur so often that they are in the category of normal',24 the trial judge imposed 
an additional minimum period of imprisonment under s 80.  On appeal, the Court of Appeal stated 
that each aggravating factor, on its own, would arguably not be exceptional in cases of domestic 
homicides, but taken together could suffice.  However, the Court reduced the minimum term of 
imprisonment imposed in the lower Court.   
 
An 'Exceptional' Separation Murder:  Case Study W/94/125 
Peter, the 31 year-old male offender, and Kimberley, his 21 year-old partner lived together for about one 
year, after which Kimberley moved out of the home and returned to live with her parents.  Peter was 
subsequently sentenced to 10 months' imprisonment following an assault on Kimberley which involved use 
of a firearm.  Apparently, Peter was also convicted of offending against Kimberley's father.26  The Court of 
Appeal suggests that following his release from prison, the relationship continued on an 'irregular basis'.27   
However, the evidence suggests Peter was stalking Kimberley. After discovering her association with 
another man, Peter returned home and allegedly informed his flatmate that 'she's dead'.   
 
The following month, Peter went to Kimberley's home armed with a knife and insulating tape.  After being 
told Kimberley was out, Peter threatened to cut the throat of her flatmate and forced him to crawl to his own 
bedroom, where he was gagged and his hands and feet bound with the tape.  He was then tied to the bed.  
Some time later, Kimberley arrived home and on hearing her car, Peter again threatened to cut the flatmate's 
throat if he made a noise and concealed himself in the house. Kimberley made a telephone call, watched 
television for a short time, and then went to the bathroom, where she was confronted by Peter.  At this point 
she was heard to 'scream out' and whilst in the bathroom suffered defensive wounds to her hands from the 
knife.   She was then dragged by Peter into her bedroom, where she was later heard to 'scream loudly 
again'.28  At trial, Peter gave evidence that while in the bedroom, Kimberley was shaking and complained of 
being cold, whereupon he cut off her jeans and underclothes with the knife.  The head note to this report 
suggests that 'as stated in evidence… consensual intercourse [then] took place'.29    
 
                                                 
24    R v W [1996] 1 NZLR 147, 150 (CA). 
25  Halls Sentencing vol 1, Issue 50 (2001) [D/838], cites this case as authority for the Court of Appeal approach to 
sentencing under s 80 Criminal Justice Act 1985.  
26    R v W (Unreported, High Court, Greymouth, Williamson J, 17 November 1994) 5. 
27    R v W [1996] 1 NZLR 147, 150 (CA). 
28    Ibid. 
29    The Court of Appeal acknowledges that the act of intercourse under these circumstances was 'highly unlikely' to be 
consensual. Ibid 151.    
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In support of his provocation defence, Peter gave evidence that, after having intercourse with Kimberley, 
they had a discussion about Kimberley's relationships with other men, and he gagged her, stabbed her, and 
cut her throat.  In addition to other injuries, the pathologist described two deep stab wounds on either side of 
Kimberley's neck and a third cutting injury across the front of her neck which severed the internal jugular 
vein and windpipe.  The jury rejected the provocation defence and convicted the offender of murder. 
 
At sentencing, psychiatric reports revealed Peter's childhood was marred by the separation of his parents and 
an abusive family background.  As a result, he was said to be 'more vulnerable in relationships'.30  Although 
Peter made an attempt to commit suicide after the murder by cutting his wrist, the judge noted that he also 
seemed prepared to justify his violence in what were completely unjustifiable circumstances.  This 
observation was supported by a medical report stating Peter showed no evidence of remorse, or indeed, any 
concern for Kimberley and her family.  Although defence counsel claimed this was due to an unreal 
appreciation of what had happened, the judge responded that this was a factor which made the offender 
dangerous.   
 
When deciding that the circumstances of Kimberley's murder were exceptional, the judge noted that the 
word 'exceptional' meant unusual or out of line with the normal range of such offences.  While the intention 
behind the legislation was to reflect public concern to see very severe sentences imposed for particularly 
repugnant offending, the judge also considered a likely primary purpose of the legislation was to limit 
danger to the community from some offenders who may threaten the well being of anybody with whom they 
form a domestic or personal relationship.  In this case, the degree of premeditation; immobilising and 
threatening of the victim's flatmate; cruel treatment, in the nature of torture of Kimberley by refusing her 
medical treatment for wounds to her hands; callously cutting off her jeans and pants when she complained 
of being cold; having sexual intercourse with her while she was in that condition and obviously fearing for 
her life; together with the forceful and deliberate method of killing, which involved an intentional cutting of 
her throat; committed in the context of the offender's past threats to kill his estranged partner, amounted in 
combination to exceptional circumstances.   
 
The judge also noted that Australian authorities on the imposition of minimum periods for this type of 
offending had emphasised 'the need to protect persons who might be linked in personal relationships with an 
accused and…the aspect of deterrence of persons tempted to commit similar offences'.  Given the serious 
need to protect others from the offender and deter those who might be tempted to commit a similar savage 
attack on someone with whom they had been in a personal relationship, Peter was sentenced to a minimum 
of 15 years imprisonment.   
                                                 
30    R v W (Unreported, High Court, Greymouth, Williamson J, 17 November 1994) 5.  
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On appeal, the Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had given undue weight to the need to protect others 
from the offender and the need to deter others who may be tempted to commit similar crimes.  The Court 
noted Peter's only previous convictions: male assaults female and unlawful use of a firearm, related to the 
deceased victim.  The reports had not disclosed any 'general' tendency of the offender to use violence and an 
earlier de facto relationship appeared to have terminated without any incident of relevance.  Bearing in mind 
that relationship homicides generally disclose a low rate of recidivism, the Court reduced the minimum non-
parole period to 13 years.31 
 
Peter was also convicted of kidnapping Kimberley's flatmate.  The judge in the lower Court noted that the 
male victim continued to experience problems arising from 'the manner in which he blames himself for not 
being able to cope with the situation and for the events which were happening in the room next door'.32 
 
The decision to allow the jury in this case to consider a provocation defence despite evidence that 
Peter had previously announced an intention to kill his estranged partner, had travelled to the 
homicide scene armed with a knife and insulating tape, had incapacitated Kimberley's flatmate in 
furtherance of his plan, and as the trial judge observed, had apparently formed an intention to kill 
Kimberley if she refused to resume the relationship, further demonstrates that violent, sexually 
possessive men are afforded considerable latitude in relation to issues of pre-planning and 
suddenness.33   
 
A victim-blaming analysis is also implicit in the Court of Appeal's observation that Peter's prior 
violence was limited to Kimberley, as opposed to a 'general tendency' to use violence.  As 
previously discussed, this analysis implicates the victim in the offending: something about 
Kimberley, or Peter's relationship with Kimberley caused Peter to react in the way that he did.  
Peter is thereby constructed as an improbable threat to any other woman he might form an intimate 
relationship with.34  This male-centred reasoning implies that but for women's provocation; men 
would not assault or murder them.   
                                                 
31    R v W [1996] 1 NZLR 147, 152 (CA). 
32    R v W (Unreported, High Court, Greymouth, Williamson J, 17 November 1994) 6.  
33    See, also, Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (1992) 193. 
34    This reasoning has been criticised by feminists in other contexts.  Kathleen Mahoney, 'Gender Bias in Family Law' 
[1996] 308, 3120 notes in relation to sexual harassment cases, the illogicality of the use by courts of evidence that 
other co-workers have not been harassed by a particular defendant to corroborate the defendant's denial he sexually 
harassed the complainant:  'At any given time or place, billions of women are not sexually harassed by a particular 
man.  To draw any conclusions from evidence of some of the billions not assaulted, is about as probative as a bank 
robber putting in as his defense, evidence from bank managers of banks he didn’t rob.'  
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Since much, if not most domestic violence goes unreported,35 lack of information that Peter had 
been violent toward a previous partner provides no assurance that his violence was confined to 
Kimberley.36  There is strong evidence that men who are abusive in one relationship are likely to 
abuse again in the next relationship.  Offenders who are motivated by jealousy and possessiveness 
to commit violent crimes appear to constitute a particular category of recidivist offenders.37   
Although the Court of Appeal noted that 'relationship homicides generally disclose a low rate of 
recidivism', both in the present research, and in overseas studies, there are examples of men who 
kill again in the same situation.38 
 
While the case attracted a minimum sentence, there is no evidence that the Court of Appeal 
regarded the status of the parties as estranged, or Kimberley's attempt to minimise her risk of future 
violence by leaving and setting up an independent place of residence as warranting its imposition.  
Indeed, any such interpretation is refuted by the Court's finding that the trial judge gave undue 
weight to the need to deter others who may be tempted to commit similar crimes.  
 
B   Separation Murders as Insufficiently Serious 
Section 80 was amended by the Criminal Justice Amendment Act (No2) with effect from 16 July 
1999.  As specified in the long title, the purpose of the amendment was to lower the threshold for 
imposing non-parole periods.39  The new s 80 permitted courts to impose a minimum period of 
imprisonment if the circumstances of the offence were 'sufficiently serious' to justify a minimum 
period of imprisonment of more than 10 years.  Under s 80(5A), when deciding whether the 
circumstances were 'sufficiently serious' courts were required to consider whether these took the 
offending 'out of the ordinary range of offending of the particular kind', although the circumstances 
                                                 
35    See, eg  Allison Morris, Women's Safety Survey 1996 (1997) finding only 8 percent of women who disclosed abuse 
by current partners and 21 per cent who disclosed abuse by recent partners reported the violence to police.  Patricia 
Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence: Findings From the 
National Violence Against Women Survey (2000) 52, found only 7.5 per cent of women who were raped by an intimate 
and 7.3 per cent of women who were physically assaulted by an intimate said their attacker was prosecuted. 
36    In R v Leuta [2002] 1 NZLR 215 [140] (CA), Thomas J noted in relation to domestic violence against children that 
absence of evidence on the point should not be elevated to a positive virtue, as the Court does not know whether there 
have been prior incidents of abuse or not. 
37    See, eg, research and discussion in Donna Coker, 'Heat of Passion and Wife Beating: Men Who Batter/Men Who 
Kill' (1992) 2 S.Cal.Rev.L.& Women's Stud. 71, 112-113. 
38    See, eg, Victoria Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense' (1997) 107 Yale 
L.J. 1331, 1403.  See, also, Case Study F/01/6. 
39  Halls Sentencing, above n 25, [D/831], notes the Justice and Law Reform Committee stated that the purpose of the 
Bill was 'to give the courts more flexibility to impose longer non-parole periods in a wider range of cases than at 
present' and 'to address public concern that serious crimes are not dealt with severely enough by the Courts'. 
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need not be exceptional.  The Court of Appeal accepted that s 80 as amended, would apply to a 
greater number of cases than had previously been the case.40  There was general agreement that 'the 
principle purposes were punitive and denunciatory'41 
 
Section 80 was applied in the cases of three offenders who killed women partners with whom they 
were cohabiting.   In the first case, the offender, a medical practitioner who was practising and 
teaching as a psychiatrist at a New Zealand School of Medicine, poisoned his wife over an 
extended period of time.  He continued to administer the drugs to his wife while she was in 
hospital, and various measures were taken by the offender after his wife's death to avoid detection.  
The Court of Appeal described murder by slow poisoning as 'amongst the most despicable of 
crimes'; aggravated in this case by the fact that the offender was a doctor, had deceived his medical 
colleagues, and abused his position in order to obtain the drugs.42  In addition to inducing or 
allowing his wife's medical team to perform a totally unnecessary six hour operation on the 
woman, the offender had caused her anxiety, pain and suffering over an extended period.  The 
Court sentenced the offender to a minimum period of imprisonment of 15 years' imprisonment.43  
 
The jealous offender in the second case beat his pregnant partner with a metal knuckle duster, a 
noose was tightened around her neck and she was eventually killed by being struck on the head 
with a hammer.  She was placed in a car which was torched.  The offender was sentenced to a non-
parole period of 12 years' imprisonment.44  In the third case of murder within an intact relationship, 
the offender in Case Study L/00/11 hacked his wife and seven year old daughter to death with a 
tomahawk or similar type weapon.  Noting that the victims 'were in the sanctity of their own home',  
the Court of Appeal held that legislative change to the criterion for minimum non-parole orders 
from 'exceptional' to 'sufficiently serious' circumstances signalled the letting in of 'relatively less 
serious cases'.45  The offender's conduct in killing his wife required strong denunciation and this 
was the position before any attention could be given to the fact that he had killed his daughter at 
the same time.  For the murder of his wife alone, a period of 15 years was appropriate.  The 
offender was sentenced to a non-parole period of 20 years.46  
                                                 
40    R v Poumako [2000] 2 NZLR 695 [19]. 
41    Hall, above n 4, 525. 
42    R v B [2002] CA 418/01, 431/01 (Unreported, Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ, 18 June 2002) [37]. 
43    Case Study B/00/12. 
44    Case Study M/00/1.  See, discussion of this case above, at p 63. 
45    R v L (2002) 19 CRNZ 574 [28]. 
46    Case Study L/00/11. 
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In comparison, between July 1999 and June 2002, in five of the eight cases in which offenders 
killed in the context of separation and were convicted of murder, no minimum non-parole period 
was imposed.  The 1999 amendment provided under s 80(2A) that if the Court was satisfied the 
murder involved home invasion, a minimum period of not less than 13 years must be imposed.47  
This legislation was invoked in two cases in which offenders were sentenced to a minimum non-
parole period of 13 years' imprisonment.48  In these two cases, it was the circumstance of home 
invasion as opposed to the relational status of the parties as separated that merited the imposition of 
a minimum non-parole period.   
 
The third case in which a non-parole period was imposed can be usefully contrasted with the Court 
of Appeal decision to impose a 20-year non-parole period in Case Study L/00/11.  As discussed 
above, this sentence included 15 years for the killing of a cohabiting wife 'in the sanctity of her 
home'.  By contrast, after threatening to kill his estranged partner and her new partner on a number 
of occasions, and telling others that 'If I can't have her nobody can', the offender in Case Study 
T/01/249 shot and killed the woman and her new boyfriend at the woman's home.  The sentencing 
judge described this double homicide as a crime of passion in 'the eternal triangle of love and 
jealousy'.  The offender was sentenced to a minimum term of 12 years' imprisonment. 
 
C   The Sentencing Act 2002 
The relevant provisions of the Criminal Justice Act were repealed from 1 July 2002.  The 
Sentencing Act 2002 replaced the previous sentencing regime with a sentencing discretion in 
respect of murder.  The legislation creates a four tier sentencing structure for offenders convicted 
of murder.50  There is a presumption under s 102 that an offender who is convicted of murder will 
receive a sentence of life imprisonment, unless, given the circumstances of the offence and the 
offender, such a sentence would be 'manifestly unjust'.  In intimate femicide cases, this first 
sentencing tier is relevant to the purported 'mercy killing' cases.51   
 
                                                 
47   The definition of home invasion in s 17A of the Crimes Act 1961 as inserted by the Crimes (Home Invasion) 
Amendment Act 1999 was imported into s 80.   
48    In Case Study H/00/8 the woman was stabbed to death by her estranged partner who entered her home and lay in 
wait for her.  In Case Study W/02/10 the offender, whose partner had also separated from him because of his violence, 
broke into the woman's home and shot her twice in the chest and once in the head. 
49    See, discussion of this case above, at p 75. 
50    Hall, above n 4, 592. 
51    See, discussion of these cases above, at pp 77-83.  See, also, Chapter Eleven. 
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The second tier includes the majority of offenders who will receive a sentence of life imprisonment 
requiring a mandatory non-parole period of ten years following the murder conviction.  The third 
sentencing tier includes offenders sentenced to life imprisonment, but who receive a minimum non-
parole period that exceeds ten years but is less than 17 years.  When deciding the duration of the 
non-parole period for offenders in this category, the Court under s 103 as amended by the 
Sentencing Amendment Act 2004 must consider the appropriate sentence necessary to satisfy all or 
any of four purposes specified in subsection (2).  These purposes are: 
 
 (a)  holding the offender accountable for the harm done to the victim and the community by the  
                    offending; 
 (b)  denouncing the conduct in which the offender was involved; 
 (c)  deterring the offender or other persons from committing the same or a similar offence; 
 (d)  protecting the community from the offender. 
 
The purpose of a minimum period order is to achieve greater punishment, denunciation and 
deterrence than would be achieved by the normal ten year period.52   
 
Section 104 provides for a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 years or more if certain 
circumstances are present.  Although existing home invasion legislation was repealed by the 2002 
Act, s 104 specifies unlawful entry into, or unlawful presence in, a dwelling place as a qualifying 
circumstance.  Other circumstances include calculated or lengthy planning; if the murder was 
committed with a high level of brutality, cruelty, depravity, or callousness; or if the deceased was 
particularly vulnerable due to age, health or any other factor.  If on the proven or accepted facts of 
a case, one of the prescribed circumstances is present, the imposition of a minimum term of 17 
years imprisonment or more is mandatory.  The Court is then expressly directed to impose such a 
minimum period pursuant to s 103 unless satisfied it would be manifestly unjust to do so.   
 
However, while a police officer described the circumstances of the following estrangement murder 
as 'everybody's worst nightmare', and the killing as the worst he had investigated during his 16-year 
CIB career, no minimum non parole period was imposed.53  
 
                                                 
52     R v Howse [2003] 3 NZLR 767 (CA). 
53    Under s 154(3) of the Sentencing Act 2002, s 104 does not apply to a crime of murder committed before 30 June 
2002.  The woman in this case was murdered in October 2002. 
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Separation Murder under the Sentencing Act:  Case Study T/02/9  
Kevin, the 42 year-old male offender and Edwina, the 30 year-old 'mother of three' were in a de facto 
relationship for nine years.  At Kevin's trial, the jury heard the couple's relationship had been marred by 
Kevin's jealous and violent behaviour.  Following one assault, Kevin warned his partner that he would kill 
her if she left him.  On this occasion, Edwina fled to a Woman's Refuge but 'after three or four months, she 
gave in to his persistence and returned home'.  Toward the end of the relationship, Edwina 'took on 
additional education and began to have a better social life'.  The pair separated five days before the murder 
and Kevin went to live at the home of his sister.   
 
The Crown pointed to evidence from witnesses that Kevin resented his estranged partner's new found 
independence and would telephone their homes to check on Edwina when she visited them.  Kevin's sister 
told the Court that her brother telephoned her and told her 'it was all over between him and [Edwina] and 
that she had found someone else'.  On the day of her murder, Edwina told a woman neighbour that when she 
informed Kevin the separation was permanent, Kevin responded that he would 'f***ing kill' her if she left 
him.  Edwina then accepted an invitation to visit hot pools for a swim and returned home to fetch her 
swimming costume.  During her absence, Kevin had soaked the house with petrol, and was laying in wait 
for Edwina.  When the unsuspecting woman walked into her home, Kevin threw petrol over her and ignited 
the fuel with a lighter.  Edwina died, 'standing upright' and 'burned head to toe'.  Kevin pushed past the 
burning woman and doused himself with water before escaping out a window.  A police detective stated that 
it was the worst homicide he had investigated during his 16-year CIB career:  'It is everybody's worst 
nightmare to imagine dying like that', he said.   
 
Kevin was charged with murder and arson.  At first, he claimed to have no memory of the events.  Later, he 
stated that he only intended to kill himself, but Edwina grabbed the petrol bottle from him and lit it. When 
asked why he had waited for Edwina to return home before killing himself, Kevin replied that he thought 
Edwina would want to see him burn.  The jury convicted Kevin of murder.   
 
The sentencing judge noted that the jury, rightly in his view, had been satisfied on the evidence that Kevin 
set out to kill his estranged partner.  The judge described the couple's relationship as 'up and down'.  He 
noted that it 'had its good points, it had its low points. Most relationships are like that from time to time.  
No-one's perfect'.54  Surprisingly, the judge told Kevin: 'you were a loving father and you cared for your 
children and your family.  You worked hard and you earned money for your family.  Perhaps you did more 
than your fair share of jobs around the home'.55  However, Kevin also had a 'darker side'.  He was jealous 
and possessive and could not cope with Edwina's new found independence. He had used violence against 
                                                 
54    R v T (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Venning J, 10 June 2004) [6]. 
55    Ibid [7].  
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her on at least two previous occasions and there was also a wilful damage charge relating to an occasion 
when Kevin had damaged her car.  The judge noted that it seemed to be in Kevin's nature to be violent when 
he could not 'cope' and Kevin would have to learn that violence does not solve anything.   
 
Although Kevin told his probation officer that he loved Edwina, he denied any responsibility for her murder.  
The probation report stated Kevin had no motivation to address his offending, and remained at risk of 
further offending until he addressed the factors underlying his actions.56  Kevin was sentenced to life 
imprisonment and six years' imprisonment for the arson conviction to be served concurrently.  The Crown 
did not ask for, and the judge did not impose a minimum non-parole period.   
 
The detective in charge of the case told reporters that no-one could have known Kevin would kill Edwina 
because domestic violence often went on behind closed doors.  The detective also observed that the way 
Kevin killed Edwina 'was just terrifying, but I believe his motivation for doing that was born out of extreme 
frustration and jealousy'.57   
 
Given that jealousy, prior violence, threats to kill, controlling behaviour, stalking and refusal to 
accept a woman's decision to leave are well established red flags for lethal violence, the police 
officer's assertion that no one could have predicted Edwina's death provides further evidence of the 
need to train police personnel on risk factors for dangerousness/lethality.     
 
There is no recognition or condemnation in the sentencing remarks of the fact that Edwina was 
killed when she tried to escape from a violent relationship.  Rather, the judge's comment that there 
may have been an unequal sharing of household chores hints at some fault on the part of Edwina.  
If Kevin was overburdened by doing more than his fair share of household chores, the relevance of 
this to the disposition of the case remains unexplained.  The judge's construction of Kevin as a 
loving, caring, father and family man also fails to acknowledge a wealth of research on the 
detrimental effects to children of living with and/or witnessing violence against their primary 
caregiver.  Although the judge noted without further discussion that the Crown did not seek an 
extended non-parole period,58 no application is necessary before a minimum period may be 
imposed.59  The appropriate course is to invite submissions on the point before making an order.60  
                                                 
56    Ibid [5]. 
57    This statement indicates that the perception of separation violence in terms of empathy for the offender whose wife 
has defected is engrained in the criminal justice system.  
58     R v T (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Venning J, 10 June 2004) [3]. 
59     R v Y [1996] CA 261/96 (Unreported, Richardson P, Gault, Henry, Thomas and Barker JJ, 23 October 1996).  
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According to the probation report, Kevin was at risk of serial offending.  The judge also noted that 
it was in Kevin's nature to be violent when he could not cope.61  Consideration might therefore 
have been given to the s 103 purpose of protecting the community from the offender when deciding 
whether the circumstances were sufficiently serious to impose a minimum non parole period.  If 
Kevin's uninvited presence in Edwina's home had been regarded as unlawful, the judge would have 
been required to consider imposing a non parole period under s 104.  While the home invasion 
aspect of this case may be arguable, Edwina was a battered woman attempting to escape an abuser, 
and, as recognised in national domestic violence policy, was an especially vulnerable victim.62  
However, there is no discussion of the applicability of s 104 in this context.  After dousing her 
home with petrol, Kevin lay in wait for Edwina.  Again, there is no discussion of whether the 
requirement of calculation under s 104 was present.  Throwing fuel upon a person and igniting it 
was described by the police officer in charge of this case as 'everybody's worst nightmare to 
imagine dying like that'.  The pain and suffering occasioned to Edwina up until the time her nerve 
endings were destroyed must have been excruciating.  Yet this murder was not perceived as 
involving 'a high level of brutality, cruelty, depravity, or callousness' under s 104.   
 
Since courts are unable to perceive the burning alive of a woman attempting to escape from a 
violent relationship as warranting the strongest possible condemnation and punishment, separation 
per se is unlikely to attract an extended non-parole period.  Thus in the more recent case of R v B,63 
the 45 year-old woman was murdered after she ended her three year relationship with her 48 year-
old de facto partner and requested he leave her home.  The woman was strangled until she 'frothed 
at the mouth and lost consciousness'.  The offender then placed the woman in a wooden chest and 
nailed it shut.  After unsuccessfully attempting to bury the chest in at least two locations, he 
eventually left the chest in long grass.  The offender denied any knowledge of the woman's 
whereabouts to her family.  He was arrested after making admissions to a former partner.  At 
sentencing, the judge noted that the murder occurred in the context of the victim's decision to end 
                                                                                                                                                                 
60    R v Rongonui [2001] CA 321/00 (Unreported, Richardson P, Keith, Blanchard, Tipping and McGrath JJ, 9 May 
2001) [40]. 
61     R v T (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Venning J, 10 June 2004) [7]. 
62     Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) 24. 
63     (Unreported, High Court, Christchurch, Fogarty J, 6 April 2006). 
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the relationship.64  The Crown did not seek an extended non-parole period,65 and the judge did not 
impose one.66   
 
The following section further examines sentencing responses to sub-lethal separation assaults. 
  
IV   SUB-LETHAL SEPARATION ASSAULTS 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the present research found the crime of passion analysis and 
character enhancement of the offender generally resulted in a sympathetic judicial response to sub-
lethal separation violence.  While the context of separation may sometimes coincide with severe 
sanctions, circumstances of the offending and the offender other than the relational status of the 
parties appear more likely to be predictive of sentencing outcomes.   
 
A   The Coincidence of Separation Violence and Punishment Severity 
As demonstrated by the following case study, separation offenders who initially receive lenient 
sentences may escalate their violence in the absence of appropriate intervention.67    
 
Separation Violence and Punishment Severity: Case Study S/01/2(S)  
The offender was convicted of assaulting a female, threatening to kill, breaching a protection order and 
driving charges.  The Court heard that the couple's relationship was in 'difficulties' - the victim had taken out 
a protection order, and was sleeping in a separate bedroom.  After entering the woman's room to discuss 'a 
property matter' the offender suddenly lunged at her, placed both hands around her neck, and throttled her.  
He released his grip, and as the woman gasped for breath told her '[t]his is what I am going to do to you'.  
After pressing his thumbs against her windpipe and releasing her again, he locked the woman's legs between 
his own and told her he planned to strangle her and kill himself.  The woman was kept for one and a half 
hours before the offender released her and swallowed sleeping pills.  He was arrested after a police chase, 
and admitted charges of assaulting a female, threatening to kill, breaching a protection order, driving 
                                                 
64    Ibid [2].  
65    Ibid [6].  
66   The deceased woman's sister told reporters domestic violence has a number of faces.  In this case 'it was actually 
mental, not physical.  It was only at the point that [the victim] said "no" that the violence occurred' she said.  
67    In a further example, the 18 year-old offender in Case Study T/99/5(S) was described by the sentencing judge as 
becoming 'quite possessive' of a 16 year-old girl.  Upon finding the girl and another male in a tent, he assaulted the 
male and head-butted the girl in the face.  He was sentenced to one months' imprisonment. About fifteen months' later, 
the offender broke into the young woman's home and remained hidden when she arrived home with her boyfriend, and 
the pair prepared and ate a meal and went to bed.  Subsequently, he lured the woman out of the bedroom and attacked 
her with the knife, cutting her at least 27 times in the abdomen and the throat.  The sentencing judge noted it was 'a 
miracle the woman survived'.  A psychiatric report indicated that while the offender was not suffering from a mental 
illness, he 'was suffering emotional distress over accepting his relationship with the victim was over'.   
 252
recklessly and failure to stop.  The sentencing judge described this prolonged attack, which involved 
strangulation of the victim, as 'one of the worst cases of a man assaulting a woman he had come across for 
many years'.  The victim, who had been afraid she was going to lose her life, had been 'very adversely' 
affected by it.  However defence counsel stated that the offender committed the behaviour during a personal 
crisis and his depression escalated to the point of attempted suicide.  The offender was well thought of by 
his employer and friends, was deeply remorseful and the offending was 'uncharacteristic'.  The offender was 
sentenced to imprisonment for one year and granted leave to apply for home detention.   
 
While still under supervision for this offence, the offender broke into the same woman's home and 
attempted to murder her.  On this occasion he made a series of unanswered telephone calls to her home 
which the sentencing judge noted had a 'whining, self-possessed and bullying tone'.  In one call he 
threatened to kill himself that night.  Around 6 am the woman heard the offender breaking into her home 
and telephoned the police.  Before she could speak, the offender ran into her bedroom and attacked her.  
Police were able to listen in and trace the call.  The tape recorded the offender telling the woman 'I didn't get 
to finish the job last time, but I'm going to do it now'.  He then punched the woman, cutting her face, tried to 
strangle her while shouting abuse at her, and struck her with the telephone.  The woman stated she could 
feel herself passing out and the tape recorded the offender telling her 'You are dying now.  This time I have 
got you.  We are both dying'.  The offender then dragged the woman into her bathroom and ordered her to 
swallow every pill she had.  Police burst into the house in time to find the offender choking the woman with 
a towel and dragged him away from her.  He needed to be pepper-sprayed and handcuffed before being 
removed from the house.  The offender reportedly told police 'I came around here to kill her.  I wanted her 
to die'.   
 
Defence counsel claimed suicide was uppermost in the offender's mind and he had not intended to kill the 
woman.  However, the sentencing judge told the offender 'I guess it is uncertain whether in the end you 
would have killed her, but I rather think you would have.  I think the police probably saved [the victim's] 
life'.  The judge also remarked that 'courts can contribute to a general climate of opinion in which such 
behaviour is recognised for what it is - completely unacceptable'. 68   
 
Martha Mahoney points out that in order to expose the struggle for control at the heart of 
separation violence, we need to recognise the potential for violence at the moment the woman 
                                                 
68   In R v S [2003] CA 105/03 (Unreported, McGrath, Panckhurst and Doogue JJ, 5 June 2003) the Court of Appeal 
upheld the offender's sentence of 10 year's imprisonment with a non-parole period of 6 years and 8 months.  The 
Court's description of the harm occasioned to the woman victim makes harrowing reading.   
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decides on a separation, or begins to prepare for one.69  Unless the initial assault in the above case 
was identified as separation violence, research would record only the second attack - supporting the 
thesis that separation violence is punished severely.  However, a sentence of one years' 
imprisonment and home detention for an assault which the judge described as 'one of the worst 
cases of a man assaulting a woman he had come across for many years' provides little support for 
the notion that the judiciary recognise violence in the context of a deteriorating relationship as 
especially serious.  Rather, as demonstrated below, the crime of passion analysis and associated 
victim blaming mask this structural pattern of offending. 
 
B   The 'Out-of-Control/ In-Control' Crime of Passion Analysis 
While an admission by an accused charged with murder that he intended to kill the victim will not 
be fatal to a provocation defence; such admission of intent by an accused charged with attempted 
murder would likely secure his conviction.  Consequently, when separation violence fell short of 
homicide and the offender was charged with attempted murder, the concept of self-control was 
substantially modified.  As in the following case study, men whose violence takes women to the 
brink of death are depicted as both in, and out of, control.  
 
The 'Out-of-Control/In-Control' Crime of Passion Analysis: Case Study W/00/11(S) 
A few months after the woman victim obtained a protection order against her partner, the couple argued and 
the male picked up a 7kg starter motor and brought it down with both hands on the woman's face.  As a 
result of this attack, the woman was in a coma for some time, and later, while able to respond to some 
stimuli, could not speak.  She suffered severe traumatic brain injury and massive bruising around her right 
eye and eye socket.  A surgeon stated fractures around the woman's eye socket required the insertion of 
several titanium plates, with cuts to her face requiring some 100 stitches.  There was some permanent 
deformity because of the injuries.  At the time of the trial, the woman had re-established normal sleep 
patterns, but could only communicate 'at a very basic level'.  The sentencing judge noted she was 
permanently injured and likely to require residential care for the rest of her life.   
 
The offender was charged with attempted murder and, in the alternative, the Crown laid the lesser charge of 
assault with intent to cause grievous bodily injury.  The offender denied both charges but pleaded guilty to a 
charge of breaching the victim's protection order by physically abusing her.  A witness who spoke to the 
offender shortly after the attack stated that the offender spoke of being provoked by his partner who had 
                                                 
69    Martha Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation' (1991) 90 Mich.L.Rev. 1, 
65. 
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threatened to take the children away.  The witness said the offender had been distraught at the thought of 
losing his children.  In a police interview, the offender told police he lost control of himself after his partner 
'tormented' him by saying he would not be part of the family once she found another man.   
  
The Court heard conflicting opinions from two expert witnesses about the number of blows that were struck.   
A forensic psychiatrist told the Court that the offender was not insane at the time of the assault, but was 
under 'tremendous psychological stress'.  This made it difficult for him to cope with a relationship that was 
deteriorating and in almost constant conflict. Prison visits 'had revealed he was suffering from delusions, 
hallucinations and suicidal thoughts, consistent with post-traumatic stress disorder'.  The offender had been 
treated and prescribed anti-depressants. 
 
The Crown pointed to photographic evidence showing that there were no car parts in the lounge as the 
offender had claimed.  Rather, the offender had made a conscious decision to fetch the starter motor and the 
attack was premeditated. Defence counsel responded that after hours of arguing which left the couple tired 
and at the end of their tether, the offender 'just snapped'.  He grabbed the starter motor, bringing it down on 
the woman, not realising what he was doing.  The offender was horrified at what he had done to the person 
he loved, and it was 'nonsensical' to suggest he would cold-bloodedly attempt to kill the children's mother 
while they slept in the same room.  The 'sad reality' was that if the offender had wanted to kill his partner, he 
could have done so. 'All that was needed was one more blow - that he hold on to that large hunk of metal for 
two more seconds.  But he didn't.  He had a choice.'  The jury acquitted the offender of attempted murder. 
 
At sentencing, the judge is reported as stating that 'there had been some provocation by [the victim] which 
caused [the offender] to simply "snap" momentarily, bringing the starter motor down with both hands on 
[the victim's] head'.  The judge noted that apart from some minor offences, the offender had not offended 
before.  Nor had he been physically violent toward the victim before the incident.  The offender was 
sentenced to five years' imprisonment.  The judge observed that he had taken the further step of ordering a 
copy of his decision be made available to the couple's oldest child, if she requested it.  This would enable 
her to explain the situation to her younger siblings. 
 
Although an offender's violence may be crucially related to the status of the relationship as 
'deteriorating', in many cases this social reality remained unrecognised.   In the above case, the 
sentencing judge notes that the offender had not previously used violence toward his partner - 
despite the existence of the victim's protection order.70  The case also demonstrates that an offender 
                                                 
70  Helena Barwick, Alison Gray and Roger Macky, Domestic Violence Act 1995: Process Evaluation (2000) 53, found 
84 per cent of applications for protection orders were based on physical abuse (88% for Maori). 
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who perpetrates gross acts of violence while supposedly 'out of control', is presumed to be 
sufficiently 'in control' to determine the exact level of violence he may inflict before bringing 
about, or stopping short of achieving, the victim's death.71  Defence counsel told the jury that the 
offender could easily have inflicted one more blow - the one required to kill the victim.  'But he 
didn't.  He had a choice'.  This 'out of control' offender is apparently capable of exercising a 
considerable amount of self-control.   
 
The above account of an ordinarily non-violent offender who 'snaps' in response to a woman's 
taunts demonstrates that abolition of the provocation defence will not rid the law of its gender 
biased assumptions.  The offender's statement to police reveals his understanding of the concept of 
provocation and how it might partially excuse his behaviour.  The provision of the sentencing 
remarks to the victim's daughter ensured that she also would understand how criminal law mirrors 
the perceptions of violent men that female 'misconduct' induces men to lose control and 
permanently disfigure and maim persons they 'love'.   
 
Case studies of lethal and sub-lethal assaults in the present research do not support the thesis that 
the status of the parties as separating/separated is regarded as an aggravating feature of domestic 
violence at sentencing.   
 
V   RENDERING SEPARATION VIOLENCE INVISIBLE 
A   Leaving in Law: The Invisibility of Separation Violence in Legal Culture 
The New Zealand Law Commission notes expert evidence on separation violence could assist 
juries in battered defendant cases to understand that the defendant's claim she had no safe 
alternative to the use of lethal force may be reasonable.72  Although the Commission acknowledges 
that the provocation defence is used to partially excuse 'killings arising from sexual jealousy and 
possessiveness',73 its discussion of expert evidence on separation violence is limited to cases 
involving battered defendants.  While jurors in battered defendant cases would likely benefit from 
knowledge of the risk of violence when women seek help from the legal system, family, or friends; 
jurors in intimate femicide cases, who are invited to view these situations through the lens of 
female infidelity, appear no less in need of such education.  Since many more battered women are 
                                                 
71    This issue is further discussed in the following chapter. 
72    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 6, [46]. 
73    Ibid [117]. 
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killed by their batterers than kill them in self-defence, it seems contrary to the interests of justice to 
limit education on this issue to cases in which the batterer is the victim. 
 
More importantly, it is difficult to understand the assumption that judges and juries are not well 
aware of this pattern of offending.  As demonstrated above, judges have not perceived intimate 
femicide in the context of separation to be 'out of the ordinary range of offending of the particular 
kind'.74  Extensive media coverage of these trials also makes it unlikely that members of the public 
are unfamiliar with this pattern of violence against women.  Expert testimony is 'admissible to 
furnish the Court with scientific information which is likely to be outside the experience and 
knowledge of a Judge or jury.  If on the proven facts a Judge or jury can form their own conclusion 
without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary.'75  R v Turner is authority that it is 
within the common knowledge of jurors that men may respond with lethal force to women who 
reject them.76   
 
The contradiction inherent in the Law Commission's recommendation that juries receive education 
on a pattern of behaviour which features prominently in the courts, and is highly publicised in the 
media, demonstrates how the myth of romantic love and crime of passion analysis has rendered 
separation violence invisible in legal and popular culture.   
 
B   The Myth of Romantic Love and Crime of Passion Analysis 
Shelley Wright observes that as the physical exchange of women as property declined in the West - 
at least for white middle class women - romantic love, rather than simple exchange, became the 
basis of heterosexual relations.77  A US survey of university students found participants were likely 
to view a man who abused his wife as romantically loving her as much as the man who did not 
abuse her.  If the jealous man sexually assaulted his wife, participants were also far less likely to 
consider the crime was rape.78  Moreover, in some cultural milieux female loyalty may be expected 
in the face of such aggression and the woman who stays may be perceived more positively than the 
                                                 
74    Section 80 Criminal Justice Act 1985. 
75   R v Turner [1975] QB 834, 844 per Lawton LJ, cited with approval by Lord Wilberforce in DPP v Jordan [1977] 
AC 699, 718 (HL). 
76    R v Turner [1975] QB 834, 844, noting that jurors do not need expert evidence 'to tell them how ordinary folk who 
are not suffering from mental illness are likely to react to the stresses and strains of life'. 
77    Shelley Wright, 'Patriarchal Feminism and the Law of the Father' (1993) 1 Fem.L.S. 115. 
78     Puente and Cohen, above n 2, 453.  These researchers note that 'because people may implicitly equate jealousy 
with love, this may lead them to discount, minimize, and perhaps even look at jealousy-related violence through "love-
colored" glasses'.   
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woman who leaves.79  It is therefore unsurprising that feminists emphasise the role of the 
relationship in excusing male violence against women.  Men who are 'swept up in their feelings 
suddenly become less culpable of rape or battering in the same way that they are less culpable of 
killing'.80   
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission observes that 'part of the reason why a "hot-blooded" 
killing may be seen to be excusable is because of a widely accepted cultural myth of "romantic 
passion".  In books and movies we often see the man who is "driven crazy" by love, lashing out at 
his lover who has betrayed him.'81  Graeme Coss draws attention to a lingering sentiment 
apparently felt by many judges that jealous offenders who kill female intimates, male rivals or 
children, 'really loved' their victims and could not bear losing them.82  Ironically, New Zealand 
legal commentary on the provocation defence also suggests that an offender's love for his wife and 
children may qualify as a relevant characteristic in 'appropriate cases'.83  This re-presentation of 
separation violence in the guise of romantic love highlights a disjunction between consciously 
articulated and explicit condemnation of domestic violence, and acceptance of norms and roles that 
lead to violence.84  
 
C   Separation Violence/Home Invasion as a Norm of Intimate Relationships 
Some legal commentators observe that an offender's stalking, death threats, unlawful entry into the 
victim's home (and as in Case Study W/94/1 kidnapping of the victim's flatmate) are, in reality, 
                                                 
79    Joseph Vandello and Dov Cohen, 'Male Honor and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts that Perpetuate 
Domestic Violence' (2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 997, noting studies indicating that in 
addition to economic and safety reasons, social-psychological influences may keep women in abusive relationships by 
suggesting that it is the proper thing to do: at 1008. 
80    Nourse, above n 38, 1388-1389.  Elizabeth Stanko, 'Should I Stay or Should I Go?' (1997) 3 Violence Against 
Women 629, 630, notes: 'Date rape and physical abuse are but two examples of how men (sometimes very young men) 
use and abuse women under the guise of romance'.  Sue Lees, 'Naggers, Whores and Libbers: Provoking Men to Kill' 
in Jill Radford and Diane Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 267, illustrates cultural 
understandings of the relationship as excuse expressed in the lyrics of Blake Morrison's, The Ballad of the Yorkshire 
Ripper (1987): 'Our Pete were nivver a nutter; E'd allus a smile on t'face; that Sonia nagged him rotten, till a killed 
ooors in er place.  Cos that's the rub wi women; they push us blokes too far; till us can't be eld responsible, for being 
what we are'. (Sonia is Peter Sutcliffe's wife).   
81  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Options Paper (2003)[3.81].  Tom Jones' ballad, 
'Delilah' written from the perspective of a jealous male who stabbed his ex?-girlfriend to death, became a smash hit 
around the Western world.  Nan Seuffert, 'Domestic Violence, Discourses of Romantic Love and Complex Personhood 
in the Law' (1999) 23 MULR 211, 224-225, notes the hit song 'Every Breath You Take' has been dubbed 'The 
Batterer's Song' by domestic violence advocates.   
82    Graeme Coss, 'Provocation, Law Reform and the Medea Syndrome' (2004) 18 Crim LJ 133, 136.   
83    Gerald Orchard, 'Culpable Homicide' in AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks (eds), Principles of Criminal Law (2nd 
ed, 2002) 507, 538.  
84    See, eg, Puente and Cohen, above n 2; Vandello and Cohen, above n 79.  
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provocations to the offender's girlfriend, not to him.  Accordingly, cases in which jealous men 
pursue their victims, invade their homes and engineer a confrontation should be read as those in 
which the provocation is self-induced.85  However, in the same way that the habitual batterer with 
'unclean hands' is permitted to access the provocation defence, this partial excuse is also available 
to the defendant who, in order to accomplish the final confrontation, enters uninvited into the 
woman's home, often having armed himself before doing so.  While under s 169(5) Crimes Act 
1961 the defence is not available to an accused who incites the victim to act in the way he or she 
did so as to provide the offender with an excuse to kill, the present study found this statutory 
provision was not applied to cases in which armed, jealous men invaded the homes of estranged 
partners and subsequently asserted they were provoked to kill by some words of their victims. 
 
Trivialisation of the trauma and injury to women whose homes are invaded by estranged male 
partners is also evident in media concerns regarding legislation providing for harsher sanctions for 
offending in the context of home invasion.  Editorials expressed alarm that the statute might be 
applied to 'people's friends and lovers' so as to 'cover close relationships that turn ugly'.  This 
scenario was contrasted with 'the conventional idea of "home invasion" such as the murder [of a 
woman farmer] by four armed men who burst into her home'.86  Although home invasion is 
frequently an aspect of separation violence, recognition of this social reality is also missing from 
legal commentary which criticised the political and media focus on home invasion for increasing 
community fear of this crime when the chances of it happening to anyone in this country were 
described as 'minuscule'.87  
 
Given that separated women reside in homes that are not shared with male partners, denunciation 
by the Court of Appeal of the killing of a cohabiting wife in the 'sanctity of her home'88 seems 
especially apposite to home invasion and lethal separation violence.  However, while it might be 
argued that courts make no distinction between unlawful entry into a dwelling place by a stranger 
                                                 
85    See, eg, Michael Detmold, 'Provocation to Murder: Sovereignty and Multiculture' (1997) 19 Syd LR 5, 19; Ian 
Leader-Elliott, 'Sex, Race and Provocation: In Defence of Stingel' (1996) 20 Crim LJ 72, 85.  Cf Stephen Odgers, 
'Contemporary Provocation Law - Is Substantially Impaired Self-Control Enough?' in Stanley Yeo (ed), Partial 
Excuses to Murder (1991) 101, 106. 
86  Fish-hooks in Home Invasion Law, the New Zealand Herald, 2 March 1999.  In 'Family Violence is Home Invasion', 
Waikato Times, 3 March 1999, the acting chief executive of the National Collective of Independent Refuges responded 
that home invasion legislation must also apply to domestic violence cases. 
87    When Violence Comes to the Home, Evening Post, 28 December 1999.   
88    Case Study L/00/11.  See, discussion of this case above, at p 245. 
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and a person known to the victim,89 judicial acceptance that home invasion is more serious when 
perpetrated against a stranger than against an estranged partner is explicit in R v Burns (No 2).90  In 
this case, the relational status of the parties as strangers was overtly recognised as aggravating the 
offending.  Other aggravating factors were: (a) the victim was killed in her own home; (b) the 
attack was unusually savage and brutal; (c) young children were present; (d) the crime was 
elaborately planned.  Aside from the stranger relationship, these circumstances are not uncommon 
in cases of separation killings.   
 
Since assertions of love and intimacy rhetorically efface the violence of sexual and physical 
assaults,91 implicit in the Burns distinction between home invasion by a stranger, and 'domestically 
motivated' murders in which the killer and the deceased had a known previous connection,92 is the 
notion that women whose homes are invaded by estranged male partners do not experience 'real' 
home invasions.  However, cases in the present study graphically underscore the reality that home 
invasions are no less terrifying, and the violence no less serious, simply because perpetrators knew 
the women they injured or killed.93  Trivialisation of the terror involved is painfully evident in 
Case Study W/94/1.94  As discussed above, after invading the home of his estranged partner and 
stabbing her, the offender cut off the woman's jeans and underclothes with a knife when she 
complained of the cold.  Although the legal report states that the offender proceeded to have 
'consensual intercourse' with the terrified woman before he cut her throat, given that courts would 
                                                 
89    In R v Kretzschmann & Carroll [2000] CA 113, 116/00 (Unreported, Thomas, Anderson and Panckhurst JJ, 1 June 
2000) [19] the two offenders adopted stand-over tactics to ensure the payment of a debt by entering the victim's house, 
threatening him with a gun, physically attacking him and stabbing him with a knife.  The Court noted that 'the home 
invasion element may be even more serious by virtue of the relationship of the intruder to the victim.  Each case must 
turn on its own circumstances'. 
90    (2000) 18 CRNZ 220.  
91    Reva Siegal, '"The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy' (1996) 105 Yale L.J. 2117, 2205.  In R 
v Thibert (1996) 104 C.C.C. (3d) 1, 22, involving provocation in the context of male sexual proprietariness, Major J, 
dissenting, noted that the emphasis of the majority on the husband's desire to speak privately to his estranged wife 
ignored the 'real world' reality that his wife was afraid of him, and 'had made it clear on a number of occasions that she 
did not wish to be alone with him'. 
92   (2000) 18 CRNZ 220 [22], where the Court noted that:  'This was a callous and cold-blooded killing of a young 
mother who had  no connection with her attacker.  It was, in addition, completely unprovoked'. 
93    For the relevance of this point to sub-lethal separation assaults, see, R v Oran [2003] CA 184/02 (Unreported, 
Gault P, Blanchard and McGrath JJ, 13 February 2003); R v T [2000] CA 296/00 (Unreported, Tipping, McGechan and 
Fisher JJ, 21 September 2000); R v Panine [2003] 2 NZLR 63 (CA); R v W [1999] CA 157/99 (Unreported, Keith, 
Tipping and Gallen JJ, 27 July 1999); R v Gibbons [1996] CA 180/96 (Unreported, Thomas, Keith and Blanchard JJ, 
26 September 1996). 
94      See, discussion of this case above, at p 241.  
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reject the possibility of 'free' consent to a commercial contract under these circumstances, the 
comparative poverty of this construction of consent is palpable.95   
 
The following case study points to an apparently limitless capacity to view separation violence and 
festering male jealousy compassionately, even when the violence occurs many years after the 
parties have separated. 
 
Separation and the 'Crime of Passion' Analysis: Case Study P/02/6 
Tim, the 66 year-old offender and Dawn, his 65 year-old wife, separated after a six-year marriage and lived 
apart for 11 years.  Dawn had two children from a previous marriage, including an autistic son who was 
'dependent on his mother'.96  After leaving the couple's Northland home, Dawn eventually settled in a large 
pensioner complex in Auckland.  During the 11-year period of separation, Dawn attempted to maintain an 
amicable post-separation relationship with Tim, providing accommodation when he travelled to Auckland 
for medical treatment, and occasionally delivering goods from Auckland to Northland in response to his 
requests.  This arrangement broke down when Tim developed a 'jealous fixation' over Dawn's association 
with another man.  Despite Dawn's refusal to continue providing accommodation or assistance to Tim, he 
persisted in his efforts to maintain contact with her, even to the extent of obtaining accommodation in the 
complex in which she lived.   
 
Tim made a number of threats to kill his estranged wife including telling one witness that she 'needed a 
bullet'.  Tim also made threats to kill the male whom he believed to be romantically associated with Dawn.  
(Friends of Dawn vehemently rejected any such romantic association.)  The sentencing judge noted Tim had 
become 'obsessive' about Dawn, to the point where he was 'in effect stalking her and making her life a 
misery'.  The judge had no doubt that matters had reached a point where Dawn was terrified of Tim, not 
least because of his interest in, and use of, firearms. The judge also found Dawn's fears were communicated 
to members of Tim's family, some of whom took steps to ensure his firearms were locked away from him.97   
                                                 
95   Mary Heath and Ngaire Naffine, 'Men's Needs and Women's Desires: Feminist Dilemmas About Rape Law 
"Reform"' (1993) 3 A Fem LJ 30, 37, note the present 'feeble' standard of consent in rape law 'does not mean free, 
uncoerced agreement to engage in intercourse.  It does not demand the full volition of the subject - her positive desire 
for sexual relations'.  Ngaire Naffine, 'Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape' (1994) 57 MLR 10, also observes 
that the sexuality presupposed in the law of rape (both judicially and academically) 'is still a traditional compelling, 
coercive sexuality'. Aileen McColgan, 'Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence' (1996) 16 OJLS 
275, 278, notes rape within the context of an intimate relationship is notoriously difficult to establish as it does not 
conform to the idealised model of rape in which 'the victim is sexually inexperienced and has a 'respectable' lifestyle, 
whose assailant is a stranger and whose company she had not willingly found herself in'. See, also, Katherine 
O'Donovan, 'With Sense, Consent, or Just a Con?'  in Ngaire Naffine and Rosemary Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of 
Law (1997) 47, 55.  
96     R v P (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Laurenson J, 11 July 2003) [28]. 
97    Ibid [2-3]. 
 261
 
On the day of the murder, Tim cleaned and tested the loading mechanism of one of his firearms, a 30/30 
Winchester rifle.  Taking the gun with him, he drove from Northland to his estranged wife's pensioner unit 
in Auckland. The sentencing judge notes that the gun was loaded either at this time, or some time before he 
entered the unit.  Upon entering the unit armed with the loaded rifle, Tim confronted his estranged wife who 
was speaking on the telephone to her daughter in Australia.  The daughter gave evidence that she heard her 
mother twice say 'No, Tim. Please, Tim, don't do it' and heard the offender respond: 'You knew this was 
coming to you.'  The daughter then heard a sound like a 'sickening scream' before the phone went quiet.  
Evidence showed Dawn remained alive for 50 minutes following the shooting, during which time Tim made 
no attempt to summon medical assistance.   
 
Dawn's daughter, who had 'become terrified by what she heard over the phone',98 made a number of calls to 
get help to her mother.  A woman friend drove to the unit and found Dawn, who was apparently still alive.  
On instructions from ambulance officers, Dawn's friend worked to keep her alive while emergency services 
travelled to the scene.  The judge commented on this woman's efforts:  'Her actions in going into the unit, 
apparently without any regard for her own safety, without knowing what might meet her, and solely out of 
concern for her friend, were extraordinarily brave and selfless.  I do not think she can be commended 
enough.  [Dawn] had a very brave friend indeed.'99    
 
Following the homicide, Tim drove to the home of his brother and informed him that he had killed his 
estranged wife.  At this time he made no mention either to his brother, his sister-in-law or to the police, that 
the killing was accidental.100  However, at trial, defence counsel claimed that during an argument over 
Dawn's 'infidelities', Dawn grabbed the gun, a 'tug-of-war' followed, during which the gun went off 
accidentally.  The sentencing judge noted this version of events was 'entirely rejected' by the jury as apart 
from the daughter's evidence, it was quite clear from other evidence that Tim could not have been in the unit 
long enough for events to take place as he described.  Tim was convicted of murder. 
 
Although the sentencing remarks record that Dawn's purported romantic association had aroused the 
offender's jealousy 'quite unjustifiably'; the judge accepted that mitigating circumstances of this offending 
included the fact that 'the murder had been committed against a background of passion, namely feelings for 
your wife, an inability to accept the separation…exacerbated by jealousy or an inability to accept her 
                                                 
98    Ibid [11]. 
99    Ibid [12]. 
100   Ibid [15]. 
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involvement with another person.' 101  The Court of Appeal cites without comment, the judge's view that 
mitigating factors included 'the suggestion that the murder was in the nature of a crime of passion.'102  
 
After the trial, Dawn's friends stated that they had 'listened in disbelief and anger' as the 65 year-old victim 
'was portrayed in Court as the Jezebel of her pensioner village'.103  Dawn's friend, who was highly praised 
by the sentencing judge, reiterated that notwithstanding assertions by defence counsel, Dawn was not 
involved in a romantic relationship.   
 
Although the defence in the above case was ostensibly based on an accidental killing, the crime of 
passion analysis with its connotations of female infidelity and betrayal dominated at trial.  It must 
be a matter of concern for all women that the legal system can respond to the murder of a woman 
by a jealous, obsessive male eleven years after the couple have separated, with victim-blaming 
narratives of female  'infidelity' at trial, and mitigating discourses of male 'passion' at sentencing.104   
The case, like so many of its kind, involved an offender who announced his murderous intentions 
well before the homicide, stalked his victim, travelled some distance to her home, and unlawfully 
entered it, bringing with him the murder weapon.  These elements of planning and premeditation 
are patently inconsistent with the spontaneity that is widely associated with a so-called crime of 
passion.    
 
The sentencing judge acknowledged that at least four of the prescribed circumstances in s 104 were 
relevant.  These were calculated planning; unlawful entry into the victim's unit; a high level of 
brutality; and the vulnerability of the victim due to her age.  The judge was therefore required to 
impose a minimum period of at least 17 years unless such sentence was considered manifestly 
unjust.  Factors identified as mitigating were the offender's previous good character, ill health of 
some years, the fact that he made no attempt to flee, and that the murder was in the nature of a 
crime of passion.  The offender was sentenced to an extended non-parole period of 13 years' 
imprisonment.  However, the Court of Appeal subsequently concluded that there were no 
circumstances of this offending that could have justified a departure from the mandatory minimum 
                                                 
101  Ibid [37]. 
102  R v P (2003) 21 CRNZ 571 [8].  
103  The report notes that '"Jezebel" means a shameless or immoral woman.  In the Bible, Jezebel was the wife of Ahab'.  
104  In Case Study W/02/10, the offender, who had previous convictions for assault and injuring with intent, admitted 
assaulting his partner by throttling her.  Defence counsel stated a combination of alcohol, tiredness and the victim's 
provocation caused the offender to 'snap'.  The offender was fined, ordered to have counselling and placed under 12 
months' supervision.  In 2002, he murdered his partner when she ended the relationship because of his violence. 
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term of 17 years.105  Although the Court had the power to increase the offender's sentence, it chose 
not to disturb the 13-year term.  Acceptance of the sentencing judge's 'crime of passion' analysis 
may supply the explanation.  
 
The paradox inherent in the Law Commission's recommendation that courts receive education on 
separation attacks, notwithstanding that judges and juries frequently encounter this violence in 
courts, in newspapers, and on television, underlines the suppression of a structural pattern of 
violence through the dominant rhetoric of romantic love and male passion.  The social reality of 
separation violence as an illegitimate constraint on women's freedom and autonomy and a barrier to 
safe escape from violent relationships therefore remains unacknowledged.   
 
VI   THE CONSEQUENCES FOR BATTERED DEFENDANTS:   
WHY DIDN'T SHE LEAVE? 
The masculinist construction of homicide involving a fight between two similarly physically-
endowed and socially conditioned individuals underpinning the criminal law defences of 
provocation and self-defence has been criticised by feminists as unrepresentative of the 
circumstances in which many women kill.  While lack of data and time constraints prevented an in-
depth analysis of female-perpetrated homicide cases, the research indicates that the closer the 
homicide conforms to this masculinist construct of killings in the course of a fight, the greater the 
likelihood that the battered defendant may take advantage of present defences.106  Since women's 
actions are judged in accordance with a male standard, when the circumstances of the homicide fall 
outside this stereotypical conflict model, the battered woman's access to the defence of self-defence 
is much more tightly restricted.      
 
Given the unequal size and physical strength of the woman and her abuser (studies show that when 
battered women do use force against violent partners the result is usually an escalation of violence 
                                                 
105    R v P (2003) 21 CRNZ 571 [20].  
106   These cases typically involve a claim of self-defence by the battered defendant; in response to which the Crown 
argues that the male victim had disengaged from the conflict, turned away, or was otherwise unprepared at the time the 
fatal blow was struck.   In the five homicides in this category, four women were acquitted and a further woman was 
convicted of manslaughter despite a previous history of violence by the male victim.  In a further case in which the 
couple were living together but an intimate relationship could not be confirmed, the woman argued that the male victim 
was the aggressor and had repeatedly punched and kicked her.  However, she was convicted of murder on the basis that 
she had chased after the victim and stabbed him.  
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against them),107 her lack of training in aggression, and her belief well substantiated by homicide 
research that escape may provoke further violence, the 'battered woman may come to believe that 
her only options are killing herself, letting [her abuser] kill her, or killing him - and, in addition, 
that her only opportunity to kill him is in a non-confrontational setting'.108  However, despite 
feminist criticism of the assumption that the battered woman has a responsibility, on her own, to 
leave her home and successfully accomplish a permanent separation, the proposition that she can, 
and should do so, continues to be advanced in the US,109 the UK110 and New Zealand,111 to resist 
acquittal or reduction of murder charges when battered women plead self-defence or provocation 
after killing their partners at a time when the abuser apparently posed no imminent threat.112  A 
battered woman's claims to have acted under duress,113 or compulsion,114 are similarly sabotaged 
by assumptions that battered women are free to pack their bags and leave.115  This engrained view 
of departure as unproblematic is currently passed from judge to jury.116  The following judicial 
remarks to a battered defendant in an earlier study typify this response: 
 
The law itself is not without remedy and was not without remedy to you.  There are friends: there 
are relations: there are community and Church and other avenues of advice: there are policemen, 
                                                 
107  See, eg, Lee Bowker, 'A Battered Woman's Problems Are Social, Not Psychological' in Richard Gelles and 
Donileen Loseke (eds), Current Controversies on Family Violence (1993) 154, 156; Alison Young, 'Conjugal 
Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis' (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 761, 772; Neil Jacobson and 
John Gottman, When Men Batter Women: New Insights into Ending Abusive Relationships (1998).  
108    Kit Kinports, 'Defending Battered Women's Self-Defense Claims' (1988) 67 Or.L.Rev. 393, 435.  For example, at 
a time when the abuser is incapacitated by alcohol or sleep. 
109   McColgan, above n 95, 521-522, cites State v Stewart 243 Kan. 639, 648 where the Court ruled as a matter of law 
that the defendant could not plead self defence when she killed her sleeping husband, as this would amount to a 'leap 
into the abyss of anarchy'.   
110   Ibid 522, citing the unreported case of HM Advocate v Greig in which Lord Dunpark commented: 'There is 
evidence before you that the deceased was a bully, that he assaulted his wife from time to time and that he made her 
life a misery.  The remedy of divorce or judicial separation is available to end this torment.'  In R v Thornton [1992] All 
ER 306, 312, the trial judge directed the jury that:  'There are…many unhappy, indeed miserable, husbands and wives.  
It is a fact of life.  It has to be faced, members of the jury.  But on the whole it is hardly reasonable, you may think, to 
stab them fatally when there are other alternatives available, like walking out or going upstairs'.  
111     R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529 (CA).   
112   A perceived failure to take advantage of opportunities to retreat is relevant both to whether the force was 
reasonable and whether the defendant was entitled to launch a pre-emptive strike when the harm or danger was not 
imminent.  The requirements of a sudden and temporary loss of self-control and an identifiable provocative act 
immediately before the killing in the defence of provocation, and the self-defence requirement of immediacy of 
response to an imminent act, frequently place these defences outside the reach of female defendants.  
113    As with self defence, the defence of duress of circumstances or necessity requires the peril be imminent and that 
there be no realistic alternatives available. 
114    The functional equivalent of imminent danger in the defence of compulsion (duress by threats) is the requirement 
under s 24 of the Crimes Act of 'immediate' death or grievous bodily harm.  
115   See Kevin Dawkins, 'Criminal Law and Procedure' (1994) 48 NZRL Rev 48, 63; Elisabeth McDonald, 'Women 
Offenders and Compulsion' [1997] NZLJ 402. 
116    R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 529. 
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there are Chamber Magistrates: there are solicitors: there are means of protection in the 
community.117 
 
The persistence of the belief that rather than resort to self-defence a battered woman could instead 
'summon help or simply walk out the door'118 has resulted in judicial interpretation of current self-
defence law as implying a duty to escape from, rather than kill a male batterer.119  Legal academics 
similarly conclude that killing an abusive partner during a lull in the violence could never be 
viewed as objectively reasonable.120  The battered woman's psychological inadequacy thus 
becomes the sole impediment to departure.  Since she has elected not to pursue avenues of escape 
that were reasonably open to her, her claim of self-defence following the killing of her partner 
during a lull in the violence 'smacks of self-help', and fails to merit an acquittal.121  Others posit 
that the real motive behind these killings is revenge.  Acceptance of the battered woman's self-
defence claim would therefore give rise to an 'open season' on men.    
 
Elisabeth McDonald sums up both sides of the well traversed arguments in this area: 
 
For the woman it is argued that…in the circumstances as she believed them to be (that he would kill 
her when he woke up, in the morning, or some time soon) she had no reasonable alternative to avoid 
her own death (or the death of her children) than to kill him, by means of a 'pre-emptive strike'.  For 
the Crown it is argued that it is unreasonable to kill him when it is possible to retreat by going to the 
police, to a neighbour, to a Women's Refuge or simply to sleep.  To date, the Crown has had the 
best of the argument.  The Court of Appeal has affirmed that to allow women in these situations to 
rely on self defence is to 'return to the law of the jungle'.122   
 
                                                 
117   Lees, above n 80, 286, citing E Bochnak, Women's Self-defense Cases: Theory and Practice (1986).   
118    Cato, above n 7, 39.  
119    See, eg,  R v Wang [1990] 2 NZLR 59, where the Court of Appeal endorsed the trial judge's view that launching a 
lethal attack on an unconscious husband could never be viewed as objectively reasonable when other alternatives such 
as leaving the house, seeking the aid of friends, or the police were available.   
120    This appears to be assumed as a matter of 'common sense'.  See, eg, Jeremy Finn, 'R v Xiao Jing Wang' (1990) 14 
Crim LJ 200.  Similarly, Fran Wright, 'The Circumstances as She Believed Them to Be: A Reappraisal of Section 48 of 
the Crimes Act 1961' (1998) 7 Waikato L.Rev. 109, appears to assume that a battered woman's perception she cannot 
safely retreat is a 'mistaken belief' involving a departure from the way an 'ordinary person' in the same circumstances 
would perceive their options.  This distinction between the circumstances as the defendant saw them and the 
circumstances as they 'really' were undermines the self-defence hypothesis that the woman's actions were reasonable. 
C/f Elisabeth McDonald, 'Defending Abused Women: Beginning a Critique of New Zealand Criminal Law' (1997) 27 
VUWLR 673, 681-684.   
121    Cato, above n 7.   
122    McDonald, above n 120, 680. 
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As Leader-Elliot points out, the image of the petit traitor haunts the metaphors of anarchy and 
insurrection invoked by courts when battered women kill abusive men.123  While not explicitly 
acknowledged, 'it is assumed that the sexual relationship, which engenders the partial defence of 
provocation for men, deprives women of rights of self-defence which they would have against any 
other violent assailant'.124   
 
Warren Brookbanks alludes to the 'calm and vengeful deliberation' apparent when battered women 
kill during a lull in the violence, which purportedly suggests a motive of revenge as opposed to a 
disparity in physical strength between the sexes.125  Since Brookbanks' discussion is limited 'to the 
specific ways in which developments in provocation have impacted battered defendants',126 his 
recommendations regarding reform of the defence do not address their potential to increase the 
availability of the defence to jealous, proprietary men.  As Nourse remarks:  
  
[W]hat of the men who kill their sleeping wives?  If one is going to discuss intimate 'executions' 
what about the numerous cases in which men pursue and kill wives who are trying to leave them?  
To emphasise cases involving battered women who kill their partners in fear without even 
mentioning cases involving men who kill their partners in anger seems almost calculated to 
distort.127 
 
The criminal law emphasis on the battered defendant's failure to leave, while the battered victim's 
departure is re-presented as a provocation to the jealous lover, boyfriend, or husband, maintains 
and perpetuates a dissonance between the concrete reality of separation violence and abstract legal 
constructions of easy departure.   Accordingly, the terrible irony of a legal system which demands 
                                                 
123    Leader-Elliott, above n 8, 165. 
124    Ibid 166. 
125   Warren Brookbanks, 'English Law Commission Project on Partial Defences to Murder' in England and Wales Law 
Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, Consultation Paper 173 (2003) Appendix D 28, [49], noting such 
appearances may be illusory as battered women may be driven into a state of despair by violent abuse.  Even so, 
'despair which is an exceptional and abnormal emotional state of mind, is not easily accommodated within the 
provocation defence's focus on anger.  It is less likely to lead to a sudden explosive reaction immediately following the 
provocation'.     
126    Ibid [46].  Brookbanks notes the New Zealand Law Commission drew attention to the irony of a defence which is 
successfully used by perpetrators of domestic violence, but is beyond the reach of victims of domestic violence.  
However, this is not followed up with a discussion of the circumstances in which men kill female intimates.  
127    Victoria Nourse, 'The New Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law' 
(1998) 50 Stan.L.Rev. 1435,1453-1454.  Ironically, Easteal, above n 4, 197, found the fact that the woman victim was 
asleep when she was shot and killed by her male partner was perceived as mitigating as opposed to aggravating the 
offending.  Rather than connoting revenge as the motive, the sentencing judge noted that the woman was not tortured 
and did not suffer the added terror of realising that she was about to be shot.      
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that battered women leave an abusive partner rather than resort to lethal force, but fails to punish 
and deter separation violence - even permitting habitual batterers who pursue and kill separating 
women to advance a provocation defence - remains unacknowledged.   
   
VII   NATIONAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE POLICY Versus LEGAL ANALYSES  
New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy seeks an integrated, co-ordinated, collaborative 
response to domestic violence across the various sectors, and consistency in law, policy and service 
delivery.128  However, criminal law responses to violence in intimate relationships are not merely 
inconsistent with national policy, they operate to undermine it.     
 
A   Victim Safety 
National domestic violence policy requires the safety and well-being of victims to be given 
paramount consideration in prevention initiatives.129  Citing '[r]esearch showing women and 
children are at increased risk of violence at the time of, and in the period immediately after, 
separation',130 the policy notes that ignoring barriers to escape from violent relationships heightens 
people's vulnerability to violence and repeat victimisation, affects society's actions and responses, 
and creates additional barriers to accessing essential services.131   
 
In comparison, the legal system continues to promote the view that an abused woman is free to 
leave a violent situation if she chooses.  The dangers which national prevention strategy warns are 
associated with ignoring barriers to escape are inherent in this legal response.   
 
B   Batterer Accountability 
Family Violence Prevention Strategy acknowledges the importance of holding perpetrators 
accountable for their violent behaviour.132  Court-ordered batterer treatment is also predicated on 
accountability.  '[O]ne of the main goals of all reputable batterer intervention programmes is to get 
the batterer to become accountable for his abusive behaviour.'133  The importance of the 
accountability principle is reflected in a large body of research showing battering men typically 
                                                 
128    Ministry of Social Development, above n 62, 15. 
129    Ibid 12. 
130    Ibid 24. 
131    Ibid 10. 
132    Ibid 12. 
133   Kerry Healey, Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal 
Justice Strategies (1998) 45. 
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deny or minimise their violence, and blame the abuse on the victim.134  The insistence of the 
battering offender in Case Study P/98/3135 that his wife take responsibility for his violence ('you 
make me hit you') is typical of men who refuse to view battering as a choice.   
 
Even in situations of the most horrific violence, abusive men…characterize themselves as the real 
victims and view their partner's self-protection measures as attacks that must be defended against.  
If the woman gets a restraining order, she is doing something to him.  A woman's decision to 
separate is characterized as 'abandonment'- a charged word implying she has treated her partner 
unjustly, maybe even abusively.  The result is that a woman who attempts to separate from an 
abusive man is entrapped in a web of the man's making, in which every action she takes to protect 
herself threatens to reinforce his view that she's attacking him; thus, actions taken to increase her 
safety also have the potential to increase her danger.136 
 
Since legal responses mirror the batterer's justifications for violence, a woman's strategies to 
protect her own and her children's safety by separating, obtaining a protection order, and seeking 
structured access arrangements, are re-interpreted as potential insults to the batterer.  Publicly 
funded advice to battered women to 'stand up' to their abusers137 therefore coexists with the 
provision of a partial excuse for men who kill women when they do so.  
 
C   Promotion of Healthy Gender Roles and Non-Violent Concepts of Masculinity 
Family Violence Prevention Strategy notes the importance of eliminating damaging sex-role 
stereotypes which help to perpetuate violence against women and promoting 'healthy gender roles 
and responsibilities, and non-violent concepts of masculinity.138   
 
However, rather than inculcate new values of mutual respect in intimate relationships, the legal 
system reinforces old patriarchal norms of female subjugation to the authority of men.  This model 
of heterosexual relations undermines the ability of the legal system to recognise and respond 
proactively to red flags for dangerousness/lethality.  
                                                 
134   See, eg, Ibid; Damian O'Neill, 'Domestically Violent Men Speak: A Post-Structuralist Critique' (2000) 15 New 
Zealand Sociology 1;  Peter Adams, Alison Towns and Nicola Gavey, 'Dominance and Entitlement: The Rhetoric Men 
Use to Discuss Their Violence Towards Women' (1995) 6 Discourse and Society 387. 
135    See, discussion of this case above, at p 215. 
136    Coker, above n 37, 107. 
137  See, eg, 'Standing Up to Domestic Violence: A Guide to Protection Orders and the Domestic Violence Act' 
(Wellington, Department for Courts, 1996). 
138    Ministry of Social Development, above n 62, 14. 
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VIII   COMPROMISING RISK ASSESSMENT 
A   Male Sexual Proprietariness/Masculine Control 
As discussed in Part I,139 male sexual proprietariness, which encompasses the theme of masculine 
control including jealous, obsessive and sexually possessive attitudes toward women, features as a 
primary risk marker for serious violence and lethality in all domestic violence risk assessment 
instruments.  Research shows violence is typically instrumental or purposive conduct.140  Rather 
than unconnected episodes of rage, or the result of an inability to manage anger, violence is a 
calculated and purposeful means to control the life of an intimate partner.141  Polk's research 
revealed the majority of intimate femicide cases to be 'planned homicides rather than a swift 
upswelling of passionate rage'.142  Even in cases that conformed to a pattern of rage boiling over to 
the point of homicide, Polk found a 'foundation of marital discord…including previous threats to 
separate on the part of the female, and prior violence on the part of the male'.143 
 
By contrast, provocation doctrine continues to assert that men retain an ongoing proprietary interest 
in women who have repudiated the relationship.  Consequently, law has responded to feminist 
demands for greater protection of domestic violence victims through the provision of protection 
orders, but permits these orders and other attempts by the victim to seek help to be advanced in 
support of a defence for the batterer who kills.  Although research has revealed masculine control 
to be the major theme of intimate femicide, this understanding of control is also subverted by legal 
analyses in which men who perpetrate serious and lethal violence against women are said to do so 
while 'out of control'.  Mechanistic constructions of emotion, and perpetrators who are 
simultaneously 'in' and 'out' of control, may not only compromise risk assessment in the criminal 
                                                 
139    See, Chapter Three. 
140    See, eg, Richard Gelles, The Violent Home: A Study of Physical Aggression Between Husbands and Wives (1974);  
Russell Dobash and R Emerson Dobash, Violence Against Wives: A Case Against the Patriarchy (1979); Sally Lloyd, 
'The Interpersonal and Communication Dynamics of Wife Battering' in Ximena Arriaga and Stuart Oskamp (eds), 
Violence in Intimate Relationships (1999) 91; Margo Wilson and Martin Daly, 'Till Death Us Do Part' in Jill Radford 
and Diana Russell (eds), Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing (1992) 83, 93, citing a number of studies. 
141   Lisa Sanctis, 'Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence' 
(1996) 8 Yale J.L.& Feminism 359, 388-389.  See, also, Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First 
Report (2006) 4. 
142    Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 31. 
143    Ibid 42-43. 
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justice sector,144 but also undermine the protection and risk assessment strategies of other 
institutions and agencies. 
 
B   Systematic Undermining of Risk Assessment  
In accordance with Family Violence Prevention Strategy,145 the Ministry of Health developed risk 
assessment guidelines for use by health professionals.146  Included in the guidelines is a Safety 
Plan for use as a patient resource.  The Plan has three parts: safety to avoid serious injury and to 
escape an incident of violence; preparation for separation; and long term safety after separation.  
When preparing for their safety, women are advised inter alia to start secret savings accounts and 
make other secret arrangements while trying to avoid arousing their partners' suspicions.147   
                                                
 
However, the Ministry's prior and post-separation safety strategies appear to provide fertile 
grounds for allegations of sexual provocation.  Behaviour such as locking doors to slow down 
abusers, maintaining secret savings accounts, and devising secret departure plans may readily be 
woven into a provocation narrative of female duplicity and deceit when the woman who employs 
them is killed.  
 
IX   CONCLUSION 
The thesis that law punishes men who perpetrate separation violence more severely in recognition 
of the relational status of the parties is not supported by the present research.  As Nourse points out, 
'[i]f separation is a fact of intimate homicide, it is a fact likely to surprise lawyers.  The law's vision 
of a crime of passion, a view reflected in treatises, casebooks, and scholarly work, focuses on 
sexual infidelity, not departure'.148  The present tendency to inscribe estrangement killings with an 
air of inevitability in depictions of 'classic' or 'eternal' love triangles also sends the message that 
intimate femicide is a regrettable, but timeless concomitant of romantic love and male passion 
which the legal system can do little to prevent.         
 
Dawson acknowledges that her findings may reflect the greater degree of planning and calculation 
involved in estrangement homicides, but suggests this explanation is unlikely.  '[T]here was no 
 
144   In Courts Cop Flak Over Domestic Violence, Waikato Times, 4 July 2000, a Women's Refuge representative 
expressed concern that the trivialisation of domestic violence by courts could have 'a "trickle-down" effect on police'.  
145    Ministry of Social Development, above n 62, 36-37. 
146    Ministry of Health, Family Violence Intervention Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse (2002). 
147    Ibid 69-71. 
148    Nourse, above n 38.  
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indication in Polk's analysis that premeditation was any more likely to occur in cases that involved 
estranged partners compared to current partners'.149  However, while Polk's work certainly 
shattered the stereotype of intimate femicide as typically unplanned, spontaneous offending, the 
'careful tracking' of the victim and 'scouting out of her movements to determine where and when 
she will be vulnerable to attack' which Polk found to be present in estrangement cases150 is unlikely 
to be necessary when the couple are living together.   
 
Stalking behaviours and threats may be perceived by juries as indicating a pre-planned or 
calculated attack resulting in a murder, rather than manslaughter conviction.151  Premeditation is 
also an aggravating feature of offending at sentencing.152  Case Study P/02/6153 illustrates that the 
compassionate construction of separation homicide as a 'crime of passion' may not obviate harsher 
sanctions due to other circumstances of offending.  If, as research indicates, killings in the context 
of estrangement are more likely to involve home invasion, and use of a gun,154 or other weapon, 
these are further aggravating factors.155  'Abandonment rage', which appears to be implicated in the 
killings of estranged female partners,156 is associated with prolonged violence or 'overkill'.157  Such 
gratuitous violence normally invokes a sterner response from courts.158  Thus behaviours 
commonly associated with separation assaults may ensure the coincidence of this offending with 
punishment severity. 
 
Legal narratives of romantic love and male passion have masked the devastating toll on battered 
women and children of violence in the context of separation.  As Rapaport points out: 
                                                 
149    Dawson, above n 5, 705. 
150    Polk, above n 142, 30. 
151   For example, the offender in Case Study G/01/7 who stalked his estranged partner in his 'snoop wagon' and killed 
her in the presence of the couple's child, was convicted of murder despite his provocation claim. 
152  Geoff Hall, 'Sentencing (I): Matters of Aggravation and Mitigation' [1985] NZLJ 139, 141.  See also, s 9 
Sentencing Act 2002 specifying premeditation on the part of the offender as an aggravating factor. 
153     See above, at p 260. 
154   Dawson, above n 5, 692, cites research finding men who killed women from whom they were separated or 
divorced were more likely to use a gun than those who killed current partners.  Of the confirmed intimate femicides in 
the present study, the ten offenders who used firearms as the method of killing all killed women who were separated or 
attempting to separate at the time.  Four offenders committed suicide, and the remaining six were convicted of murder. 
155   Under s 104 of the Sentencing Act 2002 unlawful entry into, or unlawful presence in, a dwelling place is a 
qualifying circumstance for a minimum period of imprisonment of 17 or more years.  Section 9 specifies the actual use 
of, or threatened use of, a weapon, as an aggravating factor at sentencing.    
156    Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton, 'Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A 20-Year Review' in 
M Dwayne Smith and Margaret Zahn (eds) Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research (1999) 149, 160.  See, also, 
Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 133, 22. 
157     Browne, Williams and Dutton, above n 156, 161. 
158    Hall, above n 152, 141, notes that '[a]s a general rule, the more extreme the violence, the closer the sentence will 
be to the statutory maximum penalty'.   See also,  R v W [1996] 1 NZLR 147, 152; s 9 Sentencing Act 2002. 
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[S]eparation murder can be seen as the extreme of domestic tyranny, the refusal to acknowledge the 
independence of a woman from the will of her husband or lover at any price.  If consuming a human 
life in appropriating the property of another is ranked among the most reprehensible murders, then 
deliberate destruction of another's life that cannot any longer otherwise be controlled is no less 
reprehensible.159  
 
While it is sometimes asserted that social norms and values are the province of the jury and not the 
substantive law, patriarchal values of male dominance and female submission are deeply embedded 
in legal norms of relationship.  The invisibility of separation violence therefore requires statutory 
intervention to denounce and deter this violence, affirm women and children's fundamental right to 
leave abusive relationships, and achieve justice for battered defendants and victims.  This 
legislative initiative would also have a much needed educative function in transforming cultural 
and legal attitudes which facilitate and partially excuse male violence toward women. 
                                                 
159     Rapaport, above n 13, 229-230. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT:  THE 'RED FLAG' OF REPEAT VICTIMISATION 
MODUS OPERANDI AND THE  
(IR)RELEVANCE OF A HISTORY OF VIOLENCE AT TRIAL  
It is time to dismantle the hegemony, legitimation and exclusive 
privilege accorded to those questions which are deliberated, 
articulated and decided on by judges and defined as the only 
relevant and 'real' knowledge about law and to explore common 
sense 'doxa' as a decisive element in shaping legal knowledge and 
outcomes, which exists often in opposition to explicit legal rules 
and to acknowledge the hitherto hidden force of facts and agency 
of jurors in the shaping of law.1 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
When the habitual batterer enters a not-guilty plea to a charge of murder and provocation is not in 
issue, the jury is required to determine from all the relevant circumstances whether he possessed 
the requisite mens rea of murder.  The Latin term 'mens rea' refers to the mental element of an 
offence which is 'usually one of the essential ingredients of a crime'.2  When determining whether 
the defendant had the requisite knowledge and intent, the 'golden rule' stipulates that in most cases, 
judges need not elaborate on the meaning of intention as this issue can be left to the 'good sense' of 
juries.3  Susan Edwards argues that the preoccupation of judges and legal academics with 
substantive legal doctrine has silenced consideration and debate on the role of 'common sense' in 
judicial and jury decision-making.  Rather than basing their findings on esoteric legal concepts of 
mens rea, jurors in murder trials will focus 'on the evidence and on the facts through applying their 
common sense and morality'.4  
 
Edwards argues that when manual assault is the method of killing or modus operandi, 'common 
sense' perceptions that unarmed assaults are less dangerous than those involving use of a weapon 
trivialise the dangerousness/lethality potential of battering at the trials of batterers who kill.  By 
ignoring women's greater vulnerability to physical assaults, the couple are re-presented as equal 
warring parties.  Death by battering is thereby constructed as an unintended, almost accidental 
event, resulting in a manslaughter outcome for the abuser.  Edwards' analysis of method of killing 
                                                 
1   Susan Edwards, 'Ascribing Intention - The Neglected Role of Modus Operandi - Implications for Gender' 
[1999/2000] CIL 235, 239 (citations omitted).  The term 'doxa' describes the way in which the social world appears 
self-evident - it refers to a taken for granted world which 'everyone knows': at 238 fn 23. 
2     Peter Spiller, New Zealand Law Dictionary (5th ed, 2002) 186. 
3    R v Moloney [1985] 1 All ER 1025, 1036, (HL) per Lord Bridge: 'The golden rule should be that…the judge should 
avoid any elaboration or paraphrase of what is meant by intent, and leave it to the jury's good sense to decide whether 
the accused acted with the necessary intent'. 
4    Edwards, above n 1, 238.  
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in spousal homicide and legal outcomes in England and Wales over a five year period confirmed 
that men were less likely to be convicted of murder if they used body force than if they used a 
weapon.5    
 
This minimisation of the lethality potential of men's unarmed assaults has disturbing implications 
for criminal law analyses of the red flag of repeat victimisation.  Feminists point out that despite 
intense social science and legal activity in the domestic violence field, law and society remain in 
denial of high rates of domestic violence and its links to women killing.6  Consequently, 
understanding that a history of domestic violence cannot be isolated from the final lethal incident 
'is frequently absent from the legal analysis when a man's beatings escalate to murder'.7   
 
Failure to acknowledge the gendered 'inequality of arms'8 and related disappearance of the red flag 
of repeat victimisation is also evident in a criminological stereotype of domestic homicide 
discussed by Kenneth Polk.   This analysis posits 'two basic varieties' of homicide.  In the first 
variety, the victim and offender are strangers.  In the second, 
 
people who are known to one another argue over some trivial matter, as they have argued frequently 
in the past.  In fact, in the past their argument had on occasion led to physical violence, sometimes 
on the part of the offender, sometimes on the part of the victim…The individuals then find 
themselves in the present situation, in which: 'one of them decides that he has had enough, and he 
hits a little harder or with what turns out to be a lethal instrument'.9   
 
Polk found scant support for this stereotype of domestic homicide as a spontaneous event, during 
which one or other of the parties hits a little harder, or in the wrong place, or in a moment of rage 
picks up what turns out to be a lethal weapon: 
 
[A] relatively small proportion of homicides fits a pattern of people who know each other well, who 
have argued in the past, and then on this occasion the argument goes out of control.  This happens in 
                                                 
5    Susan Edwards, 'Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self-Defence - the Law Commission's Options for Reform' 
[2004] Crim.L.R. 181, 192-196. 
6  See, eg, Myrna Raeder, 'The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond' (1996) 69 
S.Cal.L.Rev. 1463,1466.  
7   Donna Coker, 'Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill' (1992) 2 S.Cal.Rev.L.& Women's 
Stud. 71,75. 
8    Edwards, above n 5, 188. 
9  Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 197, citing the theoretical writing of 
Gottfredson and Hirschi, 1990. 
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a few cases of domestic homicide, perhaps most noticeably in the one or two cases where a woman 
offender is defending herself against the violence of her male partner.  A very large percentage of 
homicides involving sexual intimacy where males kill females are clearly planned in advance 
(including cases where elderly males commit suicide afterwards), and thus do not correspond to this 
portrait of a 'typical' homicide.10  
 
As discussed in this chapter, notwithstanding lack of empirical support for the above stereotype of 
domestic homicide, and inherent flaws in this analysis, case studies indicate that the construct 
underpins legal responses to habitual batterers who kill.   
 
The research review of method of killing and legal outcome for intimate femicide over the period 
1995 to 2002 supports Edwards' contention that men who kill women intimates by manual assault 
are less likely to be convicted of murder than if they use weapons.11  Case studies demonstrate that 
a high level of violence toward deceased victims can be encompassed within 'common sense' 
constructions of death by battering as unlucky and unintended.  Since the offender's history of 
violence is isolated from the lethal event the red flag of repeat victimisation is rendered irrelevant 
to the issue of mens rea.  A manslaughter outcome is thereby available for the habitual batterer who 
kills his partner in a vicious, prolonged, attack.  This finding is contrasted with Australian research 
indicating that 'lack of intent appears to be used as a defacto defence of "domestic violence"' in 
cases involving battered defendants.12      
 
The chapter concludes that a legislative response to battering escalating to intimate femicide is 
necessary to signal society's opprobrium of a pattern of domestic violence culminating in death and 
to achieve justice for victims at the trials of battering men.     
 
II   THE MENS REA OF MURDER 
A homicide which is not committed under provocation will be murder if the jury determine that the 
killing was accompanied by the requisite murderous intent.  As Christopher Slobogin points out, 
legally relevant past states of mind 'are not objective facts the existence of which can be proven in 
the same way the occurrence of an act can be proven'.  Accordingly, the jury's task is essentially 
                                                 
10    Ibid 198. 
11     See Appendix II. 
12   Rebecca Bradfield, 'Women Who Kill: Lack of Intent and Diminished Responsibility as the Other 'Defences' to 
Spousal Homicide' (2001) 13 CICJ 143, 144. 
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one of interpretation.13  Examples of evidence that may support an inference the accused intended 
to kill the victim include advance planning; the accused's knowledge that the gun was loaded at the 
time he levelled it; and/or that the accused deliberately aimed the gun at the victim's heart before 
firing it.  '[S]uch inferences are a matter of evidence only.  They are neither irrebuttable nor 
substantive rules of criminal law.'14  Conversely, the defendant may point to evidence suggesting 
that she or he lacked the requisite murderous intent, and although not technically a defence, such a 
claim, if successful, will obviate a murder conviction.  
 
The requisite states of mind for murder, which the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable 
doubt, are specified in s 167 of the Crimes Act 1961 and in a further definition of murder in s 168.  
These statutory provisions 'are alternatives so that, subject to any defences, an unlawful killing is 
murder if any one of them applies'.15  Section 167(a) conforms to the paradigm case of intentional 
killings by requiring that the defendant means to cause the death of the person killed.  'This 
requires "an actual intent to kill"'.16  Gerald Orchard notes that the word ' means' 'in its ordinary 
sense would appear to require that the killing be a purpose and object of the offender'.17  However, 
knowledge that death would be 'an inseparable consequence' of the defendant's purpose and object 
may constitute a second category of intention.18   
 
Paragraph (c) of s 167 incorporates the principle of transferred mens rea so that if the defendant 
acts with one of the specified states of mind, but kills another person by accident or mistake, it will 
be murder although the defendant did not intend to hurt that individual.  Under s 167(d), it is also 
murder where, in pursuit of an unlawful object, the defendant does an act that he knows to be likely 
to cause death, and thereby kills a person, even though neither death nor injury was intended.  
Although earlier New Zealand codes included the words 'or ought to have known' these words were 
dropped in 1961 'it being evidently decided that objective tests…should be eschewed'.19  
 
                                                 
13   Christopher  Slobogin, 'Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or not to Junk? (1998) 40 Wm. & Mary 
L.Rev 1, 11. 
14    AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks (eds), Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2002) 41. 
15   Gerald Orchard, 'Culpable Homicide' in AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks (eds), Principles of Criminal Law (2nd 
ed, 2002) 507, 517. 
16    R v Aramakutu [1991] 3 NZLR 429, 432 (CA). 
17    Orchard, above n 15. 
18   Simester and Brookbanks above n 14, 107-110.  Cf Orchard, above  n 15, 517, noting that if the killing is not a 
purpose or object of the offender, 'it may be that mere knowledge that death is virtually certain to result will not bring 
the case within s 167, although such knowledge would be sufficient mens rea for murder at common law'. 
19     Orchard, above n 15, 520. 
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Common law applied an objective test if a homicide was committed in the course of committing a 
felony.  Thus under the felony-murder rule it was murder whether or not actual malice was present.  
Although felony-murder is out of line with the principle of subjective fault, a modified version of 
the rule can be found in s 168 of the Crimes Act 1961.   
 
A principal offender accused of murder under the further definition of murder in s 168 Crimes Act 
1961 may be guilty of murder although the essential ingredient of death was neither intended nor 
foreseen as likely to ensue…To this extent strict liability is imposed in respect of culpable 
homicide.20 
 
The offences enumerated in s 168 are: treason; sabotage; piracy and piratical acts; offences related 
to escape or rescue from penal institutions or lawful detention; rape; murder; abduction; 
kidnapping; robbery; burglary and arson.  Unlike the position at common law, it is not enough 
under s 168 that the defendant killed while committing one of the specified offences.  The 
defendant must have meant to cause grievous bodily injury or 'really serious bodily harm'21 or 
commit one of the other acts (administering stupefying things or wilfully stopping breath) for a 
prescribed purpose.  
 
The private nature of domestic violence and general absence of witnesses render attempts to prove 
the killer intended to cause the victim's death especially difficult in intimate femicide cases.  If a 
defendant exercises his right not to testify, the Crown cannot cross-examine him.  In the absence of 
witnesses it is extremely difficult for the jury to ascertain what an offender was thinking when he 
beat his partner to death.  Consequently, the Crown may choose to rely on the mens rea of 
recklessness under s 167(b) to establish murderous intent.  Pursuant to s 167(b), a killing is also 
murder if the offender means to cause bodily injury known to be likely to cause death and is 
reckless whether death ensues.  Although at common law, it is sufficient that death was caused by 
an act done with intent to cause serious bodily harm, under s 167(b), the intended injury 'must be 
known to the offender to be likely to cause death'.  This requires that the defendant actually 
appreciate the likelihood of causing death.  It is not sufficient that the defendant ought to have been 
                                                 
20    Gerald Orchard, 'Strict Liability and Parties to Murder and Manslaughter' [1997] NZLJ 93, 93-94. 
21    Orchard, above n 15, 522. 
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aware of death as the likely outcome.22  Rather, there must be a conscious taking of the risk of 
causing death.23   
 
III   'COMMON SENSE' UNDERSTANDINGS OF MENS REA 
The 'objective truth' about an offender's past mental state cannot be ascertained in the same way 
that it is possible to discover whether or not an event actually occurred.  Slobogin points out that 
the actor himself may not 'know' his mental state at the time it is occurring.  He may be 
'ambivalent…or deceiving himself out of fear, guilt or self-protection…where the factfinder is a 
third party rather than the subject, the truth about mental states becomes even more contingent'.24  
Although it is often suggested that these difficulties can be resolved by entrusting questions of 
knowledge and intent to the 'common sense inferences' of juries,25 '[t]riers of fact attempting to 
discern the individual's mental state add their own interpretative gloss to the evidence presented'.  
Consequently, when 'jurors name a mental state… they are crafting an interpretation that partly 
embodies their own assumptions, attitudes and beliefs.'26   
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission has extensively canvassed pervasive societal myths and 
misconceptions about the dynamics of violent relationships.27  Although these 'assumptions, 
attitudes and beliefs' are likely to play a crucial role in jury deliberations, Edwards observes that 
judicial and academic preoccupation with substantive law and the boundaries which distinguish 
law from fact has silenced 'any consideration or debate of the role played by common sense 
constructs, both in shaping judicial and jury deliberation'.28  Paradoxically, while academic and 
judicial attention is focused on legal rules,  
 
the law denies its own gravitas with the 'golden rule' requirement which deems that the judge should 
'avoid elaboration and leave intention to the jury's good sense'.  It is impossible to divine with any 
certainty what factors inform that good or 'common sense'.  Thus juries may reach different 
conclusions on the same facts.29 
 
                                                 
22    R v Dixon [1979] 1 NZLR 641, 647 (CA). 
23    R v Harney [1987] 2 NZLR 576 (CA). 
24    Slobogin, above n 13. 
25    See, eg, Nicola Lacey, 'A Clear Concept of Intention: Elusive or Illusory?' (1993) 56 MLR 621, 629. 
26    Slobogin, above n 13 (citations omitted). 
27    The Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report (2004) 161-169. 
28    Edwards, above n 1, 238. 
29    Ibid 239. 
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Although appeals to 'common sense' apparently assume some universal standard 'out there' which 
juries, no matter what their composition, can invariably access each time they are called upon to do 
so, modern juries are comprised of people with different cultural backgrounds, social norms, 
philosophical beliefs and attitudes toward domestic violence.  Reliance on the 'common sense' of 
juries therefore posits a fictional homogeneity of societal attitudes and beliefs.  Nor are legal 
professionals immune from engrained gender-differentiated cultural notions about appropriate 
social and moral behaviour.30   
 
Nicola Lacey has also criticised judicial and academic preoccupation with doctrinal elements in 
orthodox case analysis.  Lacey observes that judicial appeals to 'ordinary usage' assume a settled, 
widely shared understanding of legal principles which masks uncertainty and disagreements over 
doctrinal concepts such as intention.  These debates challenge traditional values of 'coherence and 
consistency of principle in criminal law'.31  The problematic combination of doctrinal stipulation 
and ordinary usage/common sense constantly pushes 'judges back towards the other, in a kind of 
endless dialectic'.32   William Wilson cites the decisions in R v Hyam33 and R v Woollin34 as 
possible examples of this juridical dialectic.  
 
In Hyam, the jealous woman poured petrol and then put a lighted newspaper through her rival's 
letter box.  Two children died in the resulting fire.  H testified that she did not intend to kill or 
cause grievous bodily harm, but rather to frighten her rival into leaving the neighbourhood.  She 
had established that her lover was absent, but did not know whether there were other persons in the 
house.  The majority of the House of Lords upheld her murder conviction.  By contrast, Woollin 
concerned a father who lost his temper with his baby son and threw the child with much force 
across the room.  The infant died as a consequence of his injuries.  W admitted that he realised 
serious injury might be caused.  The judge instructed the jury inter alia that if W knew there was a 
substantial risk of serious injury, then the jury could find that he intended to cause serious injury.  
The House of Lords rejected the argument that foresight of a substantial risk of death or serious 
bodily harm could be an alternative mens rea to intention and overturned the murder conviction.  
                                                 
30   See, eg, Elizabeth Schneider, 'Resistance to Equality' (1996) 57 U.Pitt.L.Rev 477; Celia Wells, 'The Impact of 
Feminist Thinking on Criminal Law and Justice: Contradiction, Complexity, Conviction and Connection' [2004] 
Crim.L.R. 503, 515.   
31    Lacey, above n 25, 628. 
32    Ibid  639.  
33    [1975] AC 55 (HL). 
34    [1998] 4 All ER 103 (HL). 
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The Court held that the jury was not entitled to find the necessary intention unless they felt sure 
that death or serious bodily harm was a virtual certainty as a result of the defendant's actions and 
that the defendant appreciated such was the case.   
 
Woollin appeared to have ended a long-standing debate regarding the meaning of intention in 
criminal law.  However, Wilson points out that the requirement of virtual certainty is under-
inclusive as it fails to capture cases where 'there is a clear-sighted decision to subject another, by 
violence or otherwise, to the serious risk of death'.35  Consequently, another case, with different 
moral facts, may see the virtual certainty test revisited.36  Wilson suggests that the House in 
Woollin may have reasoned that trial judges were not bound to give the special direction in cases of 
murderous risk-taking.  Thus where the accused's motive is morally inconsistent with definitional 
intention, judges may feel encouraged tactfully not to put such directions to the jury, and instead 
trust in their common sense.37  Juries may therefore continue 'to draw inferences of direct intention 
from degrees of probability and so moral judgments will still play a part in juries' determinations of 
fault'.38      
 
The likelihood that judges may give or withhold jury directions according to moral as opposed to 
legal evaluations, and potentially relevant categories of offending, is not addressed in academic 
teachings and texts.  However, Wilson suggests that 'Woollin, unlike Hyam, was a classic case of 
"act first think afterwards".  While judges have no business skewing doctrine to convict such killers 
of murder the same cannot necessarily be said for the likes of Mrs Hyam'.39  This observation 
assumes a shared understanding that the moral culpability of the defendant in Hyam greatly 
exceeded that of the defendant in Woollin.  Yet the present research found men who set women's 
homes on fire in the context of estrangement were not regarded by judges as especially morally 
                                                 
35    William Wilson, 'Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin' (1999) 62 MLR 448, 463.  Wilson notes that the test is also 
over-inclusive in cases involving a justifying motive.  He gives as an example, the Law Commission scenario in which 
F throws S off the top of a blazing block of flats in a vain attempt to save S's life, although F foresees death as a 
virtually certain consequence: at 457.  See, also, Alan Norrie, 'After Woollin' [1999] Crim.L.R. 532, 539, defining good 
motive cases as those 'where there is a "moral threshold" such that even though the accused could foresee a result as 
virtually certain, it is so at odds with his moral conception of what he was doing that it could not be conceived as a 
result that he intended'.  In such cases, 'judges and juries would be "entitled to find", in terms of principle and without 
strain, that the moral threshold between what the accused intended and what she foresaw as virtually certain was 
sufficiently large to avoid attribution of fault': at 539. 
36     See, also, Norrie, above n 35, 544. 
37   Wilson, above n 35, 458, notes the Court accepted that the trial judge is in the best position to determine what 
direction is required, depending on the circumstances of the case.  
38     Ibid 461. 
39     Ibid 460. 
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reprehensible.  This was the case even when, unlike Mrs Hyam, the offender knew that the victim 
was asleep in the house at the time the fire was set.40       
 
If, contrary to empirical research revealing intimate femicide cases exhibit a pattern of careful and 
thoughtful premeditation,41 lethal male violence toward women and children is constructed as a 
matter of 'common sense' as typically involving an unplanned, momentary loss of self-control, this 
would influence legal narratives of battering escalating to lethality.  Indeed, as discussed below, 
where the sole evidence of the accused's knowledge and intent is evidence of his violence and its 
consequences to the victim, 'common sense' understandings of domestic violence may play a 
greater role in the identification of homicide as either murder or manslaughter than rules of law. 
 
IV   'COMMON SENSE' UNDERSTANDINGS OF INTIMATE FEMICIDE 
A  The Gendered Inequality of Arms 
Edwards argues that rather than view male violence toward women as disproportionate and 
excessive whether weapons or body force are used, 
 
 the law has ignored the physical disparity between the sexes so that when men kill women, using 
body force…instead of this force being regarded as excessive when used against a person of smaller 
frame and when that person is also disabled from using physical force through social conditioning, 
the law construes body force as a mitigating factor.  Again the law reifies context such that body 
force per se is rendered less serious and sometimes even rendered benign.42  
 
This failure to acknowledge gender inequalities in size and physical strength is evident in Lord 
Simon's observation in Mancini v DPP that, when considering the common law requirement of 
proportionality, the instrument with which the homicide was effected is relevant:  '[F]or to 
retort…by a simple blow, is a very different thing from making use of a deadly instrument'.43  
Earlier legal commentary also suggests that 'a defendant who would have had a defence if he or she 
had retaliated with bare hands might be guilty of murder if he or she fatally shoots or stabs the 
                                                 
40     See, eg, Case Study M/01/3(S), discussed above at p 122 fn 151, where the offender entered his estranged partner's 
house, turned on a stove element, draped the woman's clothes over it and dropped a lit cigarette on her bed.  The 
woman was awoken by the smoke and escaped from the house before fire-fighters arrived.  The offender's sentence of 
18 months' imprisonment was suspended for two years. 
41    Kenneth Polk and David Ranson, 'The Role of Gender in Intimate Homicide' (1991) 24 ANZJ Crim 15, 21-22.  
42    Edwards, above n 5, 190-191.   
43   Mancini v DPP [1942] AC 1, 9 (HL). 
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unarmed victim'.44  New Zealand research also found a tendency to treat weapon use as 
constituting more serious offending than manual assaults: 
                                                
 
[M]ost of the assaults described in the case studies did not involve instruments yet inflicted 
significant physical and emotional damage.  Compared with their victims, male abusers are typically 
taller, heavier, and have greater upper body strength and longer arms.  Unlike their victims, they are 
very likely to have learnt how to fight.  Distinguishing assaults with instruments from bare handed 
assaults seems to reflect a notion of 'fair fighting'.  Given the disparities just described, it is difficult to 
imagine how this can be applied to most domestic assaults.  Simply warning abusers for slapping or 
pushing their partners is incompatible with an understanding of the power and control dynamics of 
abuse and its terrorist nature.45  
 
New Zealand homicide research also links manual assault (punching, strangulation and kicking) 
with spontaneous and unpremeditated (and therefore less culpable) homicide.46  This gender 
discrimination is also evident in sentencing legislation which codifies the common law position 
that weapon use is an aggravating feature of offending.47  In Case Study R/01/8, involving a 
habitual batterer who killed his partner during 'a violent and sustained assault', the Court of Appeal 
noted that the offender's culpability was reduced due to the fact that no weapons were involved.48   
 
Edwards points out that since men kill women partners with body force - using fists, hands and feet 
- while gender disparities in size and strength generally require women to resort to a weapon, a 
'presumption which attributes more or less intent and seriousness to the use of body force as 
compared with a weapon has specific consequences for gender justice'.49   
 
 
 
 
44  Finbarr McAuley, 'Provocation: Partial Justification, Not Partial Excuse' in Stanley Yeo (ed), Partial Excuses to 
Murder (1991) 19, 29. 
45   Ruth Busch, Neville Robertson and Hilary Lapsley, Domestic Violence and the Justice System: A Study of Breaches 
of Protection Orders (1992) 162-163. 
46   Ian Miller and Nestar Russell, Homicide in New Zealand 1988-94: Patterns and Relationships (Paper presented at 
the 11th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 29 January-1 February 1996) 16. 
47    See, eg, s 9(1)(a) Sentencing Act 2002.  
48    See, discussion of this case below, at p 295; See, also, R v Stephens [2001] CA 272/01 (Unreported, Keith, Doogue 
and Gendall JJ, 6 December 2001) [4] in relation to sub-lethal assaults. 
49    Edwards, above n 1, 242.  Edwards notes that 'the legal presumption that particular methods of killing are more or 
less dangerous in terms of outcomes has been the subject of constitutional challenge in the United States': at 255. 
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B  The Relevance of Body Force to Constructions of Intention 
The private nature of domestic homicide and general absence of witnesses may require the Crown 
to rely on s 167(b) to support the murder charge.  As discussed above, under s 167(b) it is murder if 
'the offender means to cause to the person killed any bodily injury that is known to the offender to 
be likely to cause death, and is reckless whether death ensues'.  In a leading judgment, Cooke P 
considered the meaning of bodily injury known to the offender to be 'likely' to cause death and in a 
passage subsequently approved by the Court of Appeal as of equal application to the words in s 
167(b)50 the judge noted:  
 
[W]ith the words 'likely' and 'probable' there are occasions when it is unnecessary for the Judge to 
expand on their meaning; the Judge can simply leave the case to the jury without elaboration in this 
respect.  But where a critical issue as to the degree of likelihood or probability clearly arises, that 
may not do.  The jury may then be entitled to more guidance, and so it was here… 
 
If the risk of the death of the victim was truly no more than negligible or remote in the offender's 
eyes, the stigma of murder should be withheld.  To be distinguished from that, however, are cases 
where the risk is so appreciable that to indulge in the conduct is seen by society as the virtual 
equivalent of intentional killing.  Every Judge who tries to formulate a test for the distinction in 
precise and simple terms, suitable for directing a jury, soon realises that no single formula is 
preferable or adequate.  Expressions commonly used to indicate the degree of foresight of death 
required to be proved against the accused are a real risk, a substantial risk, something that might 
well happen.51 
 
A habitual batterer who culminates his history of violence with a deliberate, violent and prolonged 
lethal attack might be presumed to have engaged in actions 'where the risk is so appreciable that to 
indulge in the conduct is seen by society as the virtual equivalent of intentional killing'.  However,  
 
given that s 167(b) needs to be relied on only if D might not have meant to kill, it will often be at 
least arguable that D lacked the requisite knowledge, even if a weapon was used, especially if the 
act may have been an instinctive, unthinking reaction in the heat of the moment.  If the injury 
intended was not of a kind which would normally be expected to kill it is likely that the inference of 
knowledge will not be possible.52   
                                                 
50     R v Meynell [2004] 1 NZLR 507, 516.  
51     R v Piri [1987] 1 NZLR 66, 79 (CA) (emphasis added). 
52     Orchard, above n 15, 518 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
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A 'common sense' understanding that intimate femicide typically involves an 'instinctive, 
unthinking reaction in the heat of the moment'53 would impede the Crown's efforts to establish 
murderous intent.  This difficulty would be compounded by a further 'common sense' assumption 
that manual assaults are inherently less dangerous than weapon use.  In other words, even violent 
and prolonged battering may not be perceived as likely to inflict the kind of injury 'which would 
normally be expected to kill'.   In the UK, Edwards suggests that  
 
where the method of killing involves the use of the body, punching, hitting, or kicking, the 
prosecution usually accepts the defence submission that death was the result of a 'tragic accident' or 
if the case goes to trial the jury usually returns a verdict of involuntary manslaughter.54 
 
The following case studies demonstrate that trivialisation of the lethality potential inherent in male 
violence toward women permits a high level of violence to be inflicted on victims without 
displacing the presumption that battering as the modus operandi denotes lack of the requisite 
knowledge.  By isolating the batterer's history of violence from his final lethal attack this approach 
also renders the red flag of repeat victimisation benign.  These misunderstandings currently provide 
the route by which habitual batterers may escape a murder conviction.55 
 
V   CASE STUDIES 
A    Mens Rea of Attempted Murder: Drawing the Line between 'Good Hidings' and Intimate 
Femicide 
The offence of attempting to commit a crime can only be done intentionally.56  Central to the 
construction of intention in the following case is the assumption that a habitual batterer, who 
repeatedly strikes a prostrate woman with a weapon, can simultaneously calculate the precise 
                                                 
53     See, eg, A-G's Reference (No 33 of 1996) (1997) 2 Cr App R (S) 10, 16, where the English Court of Appeal held 
that the sentencing tariff on a conviction for manslaughter by reason of provocation should be increased where a knife 
which had been carried for use as a weapon was used; but not if the killing arose from a domestic relationship as these 
cases fall in 'a separate category'.    
54    Edwards, above n 1, 248.  Where a provocation defence is at issue, the picking up of a weapon comes to signify a 
break in the accused's emotive response which facilitates an interpretation of the homicide as a deliberate and planned 
course of action.  By contrast, where body force is used, it becomes more difficult 'to identify a point in the trajectory 
of the provoked reaction when it can be inferred that there was an opportunity to cool down'.  Furthermore, it is 
generally reasoned that individuals can exercise less conscious control over a bodily reaction, than they can over the 
use of a weapon: at 246-247. 
55    As previously discussed, minimisation of male violence toward women also militates against battered women's 
self-defence claims due to a pervasive assumption that all that is necessary to escape an abusive relationship is for the 
woman to simply 'walk out the door'.   
56    See, s 72 Crimes Act 1961 and commentary in Simester and Brookbanks, above n 14, 100, 122. 
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amount of violence - how many strikes with boots, fists, or in this case, a baseball bat - will be 
required to inflict grievous injury without bringing about the woman's death.  
 
Drawing the Line between 'Good Hidings' and Intimate Femicide: Case Study K/08/9(S) 
At about 7 am, police received three 111 calls from neighbours who heard screaming from a nearby house.  
When police arrived at the house, they smashed a window pane in the door, entered the house and were 
confronted by a male wielding a baseball bat.  After using pepper spray to subdue him, police found a 
woman lying on the floor in a bedroom.  The woman had suffered severe injuries to her head, hands and 
legs as a result of being beaten with the bat.  She was taken to the local hospital, but was then airlifted to 
another hospital due to the seriousness of her injuries.  Police reported that the victim and offender were 
husband and wife who had recently separated. 
 
The following year, the offender appeared in Court on a charge of attempted murder.  At the time of the 
trial, the woman's jaw was still wired.  The Court heard the offender and victim had separated several times 
because of the offender's violence.  Two weeks before the attack, the offender agreed to leave.  However, he 
continued to 'pester' his wife, who took out a protection order against him.  On several occasions before the 
attack, the offender 'told his wife that if he could not have her no one would'.  The day before the attack, a 
male friend of the woman spent the day at her house while she was at work.  She returned from work and 
the male stayed the night.  At about 1.30 am the woman was awoken by knocking on the front door and then 
on her bedroom window.  She looked out the window and saw her estranged husband, who left shortly after.  
He returned at 7.am.   
 
At this time, the woman's friend was waiting in his vehicle to take her to work.  The front door was open.  
The woman's estranged husband entered the house, shut and locked the door.  He proceeded to his wife's 
bedroom, and informed her 'I know what you've been doing'.  After pushing her onto the bed, he seized a 
baseball bat and began hitting her with it.  The woman was knocked to the floor and covered her head with 
her hands to try to protect herself.  She was beaten around the head, arms and legs until she became 
unconscious. The wife's male friend heard thuds and screaming and ran to a neighbour's house and called 
the police.  When he returned to the house the offender threatened him with the bat. 
 
The Crown pointed to the offender's repeated threats to kill his wife and told the jury that it was only 'good 
fortune' the woman had not died and the offender was not facing a murder charge.  However, defence 
counsel argued that the offender had been frustrated at his estranged wife's failure to sign transfer of 
ownership papers.  This frustration, and his upset and anger that another man had stayed at the house 
prompted the attack.  While accepting that the offender's intention was obviously to cause serious harm to 
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the woman, defence counsel stated his client had no intention to kill her.  If he had such intention, the 
victim's injuries would be far more serious.  Instead, the offender just wanted to give his wife a 'good 
hiding'.  The jury acquitted the offender.   
 
While media reports provide only snapshots of the entire trial process, the argument in these cases 
appears to be that juries may infer defendants' intentions from the amount of violence inflicted.  A 
defendant who holds back from striking the last lethal blow can be presumed to lack the requisite 
murderous intent.57   
 
If mens rea can be inferred according to whether or not the violence was sufficient to kill the victim 
it would logically follow that batterers who beat their partners to death would not escape a murder 
conviction.  However, as discussed below, no such logic is employed in intimate femicide cases.  
Rather, the assumption that habitual batterers consciously inflict a level of violence falling short of 
that necessary to cause death supports legal constructions of death by battering as 'unlucky', as 
opposed to intentional.  Furthermore, just as the focus is on the victim in separation violence cases 
(her provocation), the focus in death by battering cases is often on some characteristic of the victim 
which contributed to her death. 
 
The Crown contention in the above case that it was mere 'good fortune' that the woman survived is 
borne out by a wealth of social science research showing repeat victimisation, separation from a 
controlling male, threats to kill - especially the wife killer's mantra: 'If I can't have you, no one will' 
- and stalking, are major red flags for lethality.  This social reality is subverted by courtroom 
constructions of domestic violence as a series of discrete incidents and batterers as deliberately 
measuring the precise amount of violence necessary to inflict 'good hidings' without consciously 
running the risk of death.  
 
B   Disregarding the Red Flag of Repeat Victimisation and Inequality of Arms 
Jury deliberations are secret and where the particular 'ground' or defence upon which the verdict is 
based remains unclear, the trial judge is not permitted to seek clarification from the jury.58  In the 
following case studies, the basis for the verdicts was generally evident from the sentencing 
                                                 
57    See, also, Case Study W/00/11 discussed above, at p 253, where the defendant was depicted by defence counsel as 
deliberately choosing not to deliver one more blow with the starter motor - the blow that was necessary to kill his 
partner - indicating a lack of murderous intent. 
58    R v Allison (No 35) (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Williams J, 29 July 2003). 
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remarks.  However, lack of detailed information precluded attribution of a particular argument or 
construction of the homicide to the manslaughter outcome in some cases.   
 
As demonstrated below, the presumption that men's unarmed attacks on women carry a low risk of 
lethality is not displaced by evidence that the violence was 'extreme', 'prolonged' and 'vicious'.  
Significantly, the judge in the following case directly acknowledged that the successful 
construction of this woman's death as 'unlucky' and accompanying manslaughter conviction  was 
achieved despite contradictory medical evidence regarding the level of violence inflicted.  
 
An 'Unlucky' Death:  Case Study D/00/759 
The jury in this case heard evidence of a ten-year history of assaults on his partner by the offender, who had 
three previous convictions for assaulting the deceased woman.  The offender persisted in his use of violence 
towards his partner despite repeated warnings from family, friends and associates that his assaults would 
one day culminate in her death.  The final lethal attack occurred two months after the offender was released 
from a four-month sentence of imprisonment for a previous assault on the same woman, and 17 days after 
the victim attempted to escape from the offender.  
 
The method of killing involved 'a prolonged savage beating, involving extreme violence' which included 15 
punches to the woman's head, around 70 bruises to various parts of her body, and a bruised liver. Any one of 
six blows to the victim's head could have caused the bleeding and swelling of her brain which resulted in her 
death.  Blows to her legs had apparently been inflicted by a long length of bamboo while other blows, 
including those to her head and face had been inflicted by a fist.  The offender acknowledged that there had 
been two assaults, the first some 24 hours prior with the weapon and the other, on the morning of the 
woman's death.60   
 
As the woman lay dying, the offender wrapped her in blankets leaving only her battered face exposed and 
placed a photograph of two of her children in her hands.  A stack of religious books, photographs, a wooden 
21st birthday key from her mother and a white candle were placed at her head.  The offender left the dying 
woman in the house and presented at hospital with a single gun shot wound to his chest which he told police 
was self-inflicted.  The police were suspicious and broke into the couple's home looking for the gun.  
Instead, they found the bruised, swollen body of the 25 year-old victim. 
 
                                                 
59    See, discussion of this case above, at p 157. 
60    R v D (Unreported, High Court, New Plymouth, Laurenson J, 29 October 2001) [19]. 
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The offender was charged with murder and the Crown relied on s 167(b).  The only issue at trial was the 
defendant's state of mind at the time of the lethal attack.61  Defence counsel conceded that the offender had 
intended to cause bodily injury to the victim, but denied he intended to kill her.  This claim was bolstered by 
medical evidence that 'anybody suffering death in those circumstances was unlucky'.62  Defence counsel 
told the jury that they must be sure that at the time, and in the circumstances, the offender knew that the 
beating was likely to kill the victim - 'not that he should have, not that you would have'.  
                                                
 
The judge is reported as directing the jury that it was the Crown's contention that the ferocity of the lethal 
assault, and earlier warnings to the offender from his friends that his violence would one day result in his 
partner's death, constituted evidence that the offender knew there was a real and substantial risk of death 
when he punched the victim up to 15 times about her face.  However, defence counsel argued that the 
offender was a heavy alcohol and drug user, which may have meant he was not really conscious of the 
possible results of his attack.  'Violence in the household had been as common an event as breakfast and 
there was something of the Once Were Warriors syndrome about the family'.  The judge noted that while the 
Crown argued the offender's 'remorse was irrelevant to the case; the defence had said his remorse and 
attempted suicide was a startling revelation of something totally unexpected'.   
 
The jury acquitted the offender of murder.   
 
The offender's probation officer stated that the offender believed he was a 'victim of the system'.  The 
offender also had difficulty accepting that his persistent violence towards his partner was either 
unacceptable or unwarranted.  The sentencing judge noted the jury finding indicated that '[t]his was an 
unintended and unexpected death'.  The doctor described the woman's death as 'unlucky' and the Crown 
accepted that the killing was unintended.  However, the judge responded:  
 
From my point of view that may be the correct analysis, based on those two perspectives.  I have  to 
say that in a case where a man strikes a woman 15 times around the head, and any one of six blows 
could cause death, I don't find that an unlucky death.  There were six chances that death could have 
been caused at least.63 
 
A police detective told the media 'this was a tragic case and one that could have been avoided…Firstly, the 
young lady could have got out of the relationship and secondly [the offender] could have resisted the 
 
61     Ibid [2].  
62     Ibid [30]. 
63     Ibid. 
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temptation to beat her.  Unfortunately he didn’t and as a result she's deceased, he's in prison and their four 
children don’t have any parents'.  
 
Joan Williams notes the abiding persuasiveness of arguments that women choose their own 
oppression.64  It is disappointing to find a senior police officer implicating the victim in her own 
death rather than acknowledging barriers to escape.  Portraying the 'Once Were Warriors' 
syndrome as a 'family' problem and the victim as freely choosing to remain in a relationship in 
which violence was as 'common an event as breakfast' normalises the violence and implicates the 
victim in the offending.  The probative force of evidence that persons close to the couple feared the 
offender would kill the victim and repeatedly warned him to that effect is thereby diminished.   
 
Following the murder trial and acquittal, Crown counsel in this case reportedly told the media that 
'it was always difficult to get a murder conviction [in intimate femicide cases] because it was often 
hard to prove murder was the intent':   
                                                                                                                             
When your talking about a bashing, the problem is many bashings don't kill.  In order to show the 
person knew it was likely to kill you've really got to have something more.  In this case we did, we 
had some warnings…(but) he tried to commit suicide afterward which shows a certain amount of 
remorse about what happened. 
 
Jurors who do not have specialised knowledge of the dynamics of domestic violence have no tools 
to deconstruct courtroom portrayals of battering relationships.  Domestic homicide research 
indicates that 'an unplanned suicide out of remorse appears to be an extremely rare act'.  Often the 
                                                 
64   Joan Williams, 'Deconstructing Gender' in Patricia Smith (ed), Feminist Jurisprudence (1993) 531,545, noting:  
'The professional who removes herself from the fast track is only part of the syndrome by which women systematically 
"choose" economic marginalization.'   George Buzash, 'The "Rough Sex" Defense' (1989) 80 J.Crim.L.&Criminology 
557, 558, discusses the contention that women choose their own oppression in the context of a 'rough sex' defence.  
This defence 'asserts that the victim literally "asked for" the conduct that led to the homicide and that the homicide was 
the result of sexual practices to which the victim consented, and may have even demanded'.  Cheryl Hanna, 'No Right 
to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' (1996) 109 Harv.L.Rev. 1849, 1876, 
describes how the operation of this analysis in sub-lethal domestic assault cases has a chilling effect upon a woman 
victim's willingness to testify.  Kevin Dawkins, 'Criminal Law' [1997] NZ Law Review 20, 46, discusses the English 
Court of Appeal decision in R v Wilson [1996] 3 WLR 125 in which the husband branded his wife on her buttocks with 
a hot knife.  He concludes that the Wilson Court was 'entirely right in principle' to hold that consensual activity 
between husband and wife in the home is not normally a proper matter for criminal investigation, let alone criminal 
prosecution.  Dawkins' discussion illustrates the way systemic gender inequalities disappear once male violence in the 
context of intimacy is equated with romantic love.   
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killer will leave instructions, notes, or other evidence showing the murder/suicide was planned.65  
Most suicides or attempted suicides in intimate relationships occur in the context of estrangement 
and an inability by the men to accept what they perceive to be a rejection of them and their role of 
dominance over the victim.66  Murder of multiple victims and suicide is an almost exclusively male 
activity and this is also consistent with feelings of possessiveness and control which can extend to 
children, men who are perceived as sexual rivals, other people who are killed while trying to 
protect the woman, as well as the woman herself.67  Suicide attempts are 'a frequent response by 
batterers when they have killed the object of their control with whom their identity is intertwined.  
Simply put, this loss brings with it inevitable feelings of rejection and abandonment which are the 
twin terrors at the root of many batterer's abusive personalities.68  Since suicide attempts and 
threats are established risk factors for lethal violence against a woman partner, legal constructions 
of this behaviour as supporting an inference that batterers lacked the necessary murderous intent 
should be highly controversial.   
 
The three-stage cycle theory of violence identified by Lenore Walker is characterised by a build-up 
of violence in the first two stages, and following an eruption of violence, remorse, apologies and 
promises to change during the third stage.69  Women are thereby persuaded to extend multiple 
opportunities to abusers to repent and perpetrate further abuse.  Since remorse and apologies are 
integral to this cycle of violence, linking the killer's remorse to the issue of mens rea appears 
patently inappropriate.  The offender in the above case was not so remorseful that he endeavoured 
to seek medical help for the victim as she lay unconscious for several hours.  The woman's father 
expressed his anger that the offender failed to call an ambulance for his daughter, and instead left 
her to die alone in the house.  The sentencing judge also noted that the offender appeared more 
concerned about what would happen to him as a result of the killing, and it was difficult to 
ascertain whether his remorse was real or contrived.70   
 
                                                 
65    Gerris Serran and Philip Firestone, 'Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the Male Proprietariness and the Self-
Defense Theories' (2004) 9 Aggression and Violent Behaviour 1, 5. 
66    Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton, 'Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A 20-Year Review' in 
M Dwayne Smith and Margaret Zahn (eds) Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research (1999) 149, 159, discussing 
research on estrangement homicide.  
67    Serran and Firestone, above n 65, 5. 
68    Raeder, above n 6, 1469-1470 (citations omitted). 
69    See, eg, Lenore Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (1984) 95-104. 
70    R v D (Unreported, High Court, New Plymouth, Laurenson J, 29 October 2001) [9]. 
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Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett note a longstanding belief among legal practitioners that the 
lower classes take a certain amount of violence for granted.  Wives were even believed to 'regard 
an occasional thrashing as a sign of their husband's affection'.71  Considerable latitude was 
therefore afforded to violent husbands when the parties came from the poorer classes where marital 
violence might be construed as 'horseplay' or mere 'rough and tumble'.72  Contemporary depictions 
of battering as 'common an event as breakfast' also invite juries to consider wife battering as a 
normal feature of certain households.  In a further case of battering escalating to lethality the jury 
were told by defence counsel to eschew standards of 'political correctness' and evaluate the 
offending according to the geographical location of the couple's home.  The jury were informed 
that: '[This] was not your politically correct family.  We are talking about a Glen Innes family.  It is 
a tougher lifestyle…real life here'.  Once 'real life' is presented as synonymous with wife beating 
the significance of repeat victimisation as a red flag for dangerousness/lethality disappears.73  
 
An Unlucky Death: Case Study T/00/5  
Andrew, the 29 year-old male offender was charged with murder after beating Eliza, his 45 year-old wife to 
death.  Andrew denied the murder charge and a further charge of sexual violation by unlawful sexual 
connection.  At trial Andrew elected not to give or call any evidence.  At the completion of Crown evidence, 
Andrew pleaded guilty to the sexual violation charge.  
 
The Court heard that Andrew had been drinking at a local hotel on the day of the killing and later joined 
Eliza at her Christmas staff function.  The couple went with a group of Eliza's co-workers to continue 
drinking at the hotel.  Eliza became 'grossly intoxicated' and her sister and a friend put her in a car outside 
the hotel where she 'flaked out' on the back seat.  Andrew arranged for a friend to drive himself and his wife 
to his brother's house.  Once there, Andrew took Eliza into a room and beat her about the head and body.  
Eliza was struck about the head at least 10 times sending shockwaves through her brain which caused the 
massive haemorrhaging that killed her.  The jury also heard that there were bite marks matching Andrew's 
teeth over his wife's pubic, inner thigh, and shin areas.  After being encouraged by family members to 
                                                 
71    Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law (1984) 128. 
72   Ibid 129.  Reva Siegal, '"The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy' (1996) 105 Yale LJ 2117, 
2133-2134, notes that US law traditionally harboured the belief that working class and poor women tolerate a certain 
level of violence at the hands of their husbands.  '[J]udges reasoned about the propriety of violence in the relationship 
with attention to the economic status of the married couple, with the result that the evidence required to prove 'extreme 
cruelty' varied by class, on the doctrinally explicit assumption that violence was a common part of life among the 
married poor'.  
73    The perception that certain families should not be judged by the standards of middle class Pakeha society was 
explicitly rejected by the Family Court in P v P  (2000) 19 FRNZ 637. 
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contact the police, Andrew reported his wife's death.  He originally stated Eliza's injuries were the result of 
her falling and striking her head on concrete.   
 
Crown counsel told the jury that there was no doubt from the evidence heard during the trial that Andrew 
intended to kill his wife.  Eliza was violently struck in the head at least 10 times.  'This was a grossly 
intoxicated and defenceless woman who was savagely attacked.'  Although Andrew was drunk, he was still 
able to act logically and form an intention to kill.  However, defence counsel responded that Andrew never 
intended to kill his wife.  While there was an empty bottle found in the room where the beating took place, 
there was no evidence that Andrew used the bottle during the attack.  In a police interview, Andrew stated 
that he thought his wife was asleep after he beat her and put her in the car before driving to their home.  
Andrew's brother gave evidence that Andrew informed him that he had killed his wife, but not intentionally.  
Counsel told the jury that while the couple's relationship had been stormy and violent, 'this situation was 
never meant to happen'. The jury acquitted Andrew of murder.  
 
The jury appear to have been invited by defence counsel to draw inferences about Andrew's state of 
mind from the fact that he had not used the empty bottle as a weapon during the lethal attack.  Yet 
Eliza was violently struck in the head at least 10 times.  As discussed above, in Case Study D/00/7 
the victim was punched around 15 times in the head and any one of six blows could have killed 
her.  Although the Crown in the latter case explained that 'something more' than a prolonged 
bashing is necessary to establish the requisite knowledge and intent, it is not possible for a man to 
repeatedly punch a woman in the head without running the risk of killing her - many women die as 
a result of such assaults.  Consequently, the need for 'something more' than a protracted and savage 
assault involving 'extreme' violence before the necessary inference of knowledge can be drawn is 
deeply problematic. 
 
C   The 'Respectable' Habitual Batterer 
Edwards observes that the way modus operandi and especially male body force has been 
constituted in law reveals implicit assumptions about male violence toward women.74  As 
demonstrated in the following case, failure to acknowledge the power and control dynamics of 
battering facilitates the re-presentation of the habitual batterer as a 'respectable' person.  
 
 
 
                                                 
74    Edwards, above n 1. 
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The 'Respectable' Habitual Batterer: Case Study S/99/1  
On New Year's Eve, 36 year-old Jason left the hotel where he had been drinking to visit Della, his 31 year-
old girlfriend, who had been drinking rum at home.  He returned to the hotel and continued to drink until he 
returned to Della's home after midnight.   
 
 The pair had an argument, after which [Jason] pushed and punched [Della] then picked her up and 
threw her across the bed, striking her head on the wardrobe door.  When she continued to argue, 
[Jason] punched her twice and threw her out of the bedroom.  She was then in a subdued state of 
semi-consciousness, [the judge] said.   
 
Jason pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter.  He acknowledged that he had struck Della several times.  
After cleaning her blood from walls, carpet and bed, he picked her up from the floor, placed her on the bed 
and fell asleep beside her.  The next morning, Della was in the same position in bed and he assumed she was 
sleeping off the effects of the rum.  He left her for that day, and that night he again slept beside the 
unconscious woman.  On the morning of January 2, Jason bathed Della, cleaned her injuries, and 
unsuccessfully attempted to revive her.  He then called Della's family.  An ambulance was called and Della 
was taken to hospital, where she died three days later.  The prosecutor told the court Jason had cooperated 
with the police when questioned and was 'visibly upset' when he heard how ill his partner was.  The couple 
had a 'close relationship' and Jason 'often baby-sat [Della's] five children'.   
 
The sentencing judge is reported as stating that both parties had been drinking, and Della 'was seriously 
affected by alcohol'.  The killing was described as a 'disgraceful episode'.  However, the judge accepted that 
Jason was considered 'a respectable person' who was truly sorry for what he had done.  Although the offence 
called for a sentence of six years' imprisonment, having regard to Jason's 'good points' this could be 
discounted to four years' imprisonment.  (Details of Jason's 'good points' were not available.)  The judge is 
reported as expressing 'concern' at Jason's earlier statement that 'it normally took a couple of punches before 
[Della] quietened down'.  
 
The basis for the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to charge Jason with manslaughter rather than 
murder is unknown.  A 'common sense' assumption that repeat victimisation has little or no 
potential for lethality, and related inference that Jason lacked the requisite murderous knowledge 
and intent may supply the explanation.  
 
Domestic violence programme providers note violent men do not believe female partners have the 
right to argue, negotiate or debate with them.  In these circumstances, physical force is used to 
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silence debate and reassert male authority.75  However, Jason's use of violence to silence Della's 
dissent is obscured by judicial acceptance that Jason could reasonably be described as a 
'respectable' habitual batterer.  As discussed above, this character enhancement of domestic 
violence offenders also masks the theme of control in cases of separation violence.76  
 
Jason's failure to promptly seek medical assistance for Della was not reported as a factor which was 
taken into consideration at sentencing.  In many, if not most cases involving battering escalating to 
lethal violence offenders failed to seek immediate medical assistance for their victims.  While this 
raises the issue of potential liability under s 151 Crimes Act 1961, which imposes a duty to provide 
the necessaries of life and could found a murder conviction if the offender comes within any of the 
provisions of s 167, this aspect of intimate femicide often went unremarked.   
 
VI   MANIPULATING THE RED FLAG OF REPEAT VICTIMISATION  
FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE BATTERER 
Since courtroom constructions of battering escalating to lethality steer understanding away from 
women's greater vulnerability to physical assaults, and the abuser's history of violence as a red flag 
for lethality, law provides opportunities for unjust, even perverse responses to batterers who kill.  
 
A   Using the Harmful Effects of Battering to Exculpate the Habitual Batterer 
A large body of research has demonstrated the physical, emotional and mental harm which can 
accrue to women in battering relationships.77  Sue Griffith's study of women's reactions to violence 
found three distinct response stages.  The women's initial reaction was anger:  at themselves for 
allowing the abuse; at the legal system which failed to punish the men with any degree of 
seriousness; and at the outcomes of the violence.  This response ceased mainly as a result of the 
men's behaviour.  The batterer's greater strength prevented the women from fighting back, while 
their use of apologies and promises to reform ensured women who left subsequently returned to the 
relationship.  This triggered the shift into the second response stage in which use of tranquillisers, 
alcohol and/or illicit drugs as a means of blocking out the effects of the violence and the mental 
strategy of 'blanking out' represented the least potentially lethal responses for the men, but the most 
                                                 
75    R Emerson Dobash and Russell Dobash, 'Men's Violence and Programs Focused on Change' (1997) 8 CICJ 243, 
250. 
76     See, above, at p 122. 
77    See, eg, Illeana Arias, 'Women's Responses to Physical and Psychological Abuse' in Ximena Arriaga and Stuart 
Oskamp (eds), Violence in Intimate Relationships (1999) 139 
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damaging for the women.  Potentially lethal resistance as the final response stage represented the 
women's determination to survive in the face of continued violence and diminishing response 
choices.78   
 
However, as illustrated by the following case study, the relief and numbing that some battered 
women seek through drink or drugs may be exploited by defence counsel to the advantage of the 
habitual batterer who kills.  
 
Exploiting the Harmful Effects of Battering:  Case Study R/01/8  
Grant, the 45 year-old offender and Polly, his 39 year-old de facto partner of 20 years had two adult 
children, a son age 21 and daughter age 20 years.  Grant had a number of prior convictions but none 'in the 
adult Court'.  The sentencing judge noted Grant had a history of violence towards Polly.  Evidence from a 
medical practitioner revealed Polly had previously sought medical attention for injuries arising from his 
assaults. The couple's children also knew that their father beat their mother.79  Polly's father 'explicitly' 
detailed past incidents of violence and serious injuries his daughter had sustained at Grant's hands over the 
years.  The judge noted Polly's father feared for his daughter's life and safety but could not get her to leave 
Grant.80  Despite a long history of assaults against Polly, none were apparently reported.   
 
The salient features of this homicide were recited by the judge from the police summary of facts.  The 
couple attended an all day party at the home of Polly's brother.  Grant was drinking beer and rum or whisky.  
He went home in the early afternoon 'for a sleep' and Polly stayed on at the party.  Grant returned towards 
the end of the day and began drinking again.  He argued with Polly, apparently because she had not returned 
home with him on the earlier occasion, and 'slapped her under the chin'.  Polly's brothers stepped in 'to calm 
things down'.  Grant went home about 10.00 pm and Polly's brother took her home an hour later.  Her 
brother, on whose opinion the judge placed some weight, stated at depositions and in a victim impact report 
that because of the prior argument, Polly was afraid to return home and feared she would be subjected to 
further violence by Grant.  Nevertheless, she was driven home.  
 
Upon her arrival, Grant is described as slapping Polly several times about the head, causing her nose to 
bleed, pushing her outside and locking the door.  Polly then tried to sleep in the wash-house but Grant went 
out and forced open the door.  The judge stated Polly's head might possibly have been hit at this point.  
                                                 
78   Sue Griffith, 'Women, Anger and Domestic Violence: The Implications for Legal Defences to Murder' in Jalna 
Hanmer and Catherine Itzen (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice.  
A Reader (2000) 133, 141-142.    
79    R v R (Unreported, High Court, Napier, Durie J, 18 October 2001) [15]. 
80    Ibid [10]. 
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Polly told Grant to leave and he apparently did.  Later, Polly sought re-entry into the house.  The couple 
argued again and Grant 'slapped' Polly about the head, knocking her to the ground.  While Polly was lying 
on the ground, Grant 'slapped' her about the face.  He then dragged her down the passageway to the 
bedroom, grazing her back and shoulder.  Polly collapsed on the bedroom floor.   
 
Polly's son arrived home about 1.00 am and saw his mother lying on the bedroom floor, breathing, but with 
some blood evident on her face.  He was unconcerned, apparently because his mother had slept on the floor 
in the past.  At 7.00 am, the son returned to his mother who was still breathing, but he could not wake her.  
He left the house and when he returned a short time later, his mother was dead.  Death had resulted from a 
haemorrhage to the brain.  Grant was charged with murder. 
 
Grant denied punching or kicking Polly, and also denied he had cleaned blood from the floor or walls.  
However, scientific evidence showed blood had been wiped off a wall in the bedroom and, as Polly was 
dragged along the hallway, bloodstains were left on the carpet.  At depositions, a pathologist gave evidence 
of external injuries to Polly's head which included extensive bruising, abrasions and grazing.  Polly also had 
numerous cuts and bruises about her body, arms, legs and hands.  The pathologist concluded Polly had died 
from a subdural haemorrhage resulting from force being applied to her head causing a relatively violent 
rotational movement.  He was unable to say which of the injuries resulted in the haemorrhaging but 
identified any one of four blows which might have caused the necessary rotational movement of Polly's 
head.  These were: an injury to the left side of Polly's temple; one to her jaw; an injury on the point of the 
jaw; and a graze to the edge of Polly's eyebrow.81   
 
Shortly before the trial, defence counsel produced a report from a neuropathologist stating that it was 
possible Polly may have had a susceptibility to tearing of veins draining the brain due to a degree of brain 
shrinkage.  Heavy alcohol intake over many years can lead to brain shrinkage.  Since there were no fractures 
of the skull or facial bones, this was consistent with the fatal injury to Polly being 'moderately severe'.  Such 
'moderately severe' blows may not have been deadly to a person without that susceptibility.82   
 
The Crown accepted the defence medical evidence, and as a consequence, the indictment for murder did not 
proceed.  Grant pleaded guilty to a charge of manslaughter.  The sentencing judge noted, and the Court of 
Appeal later accepted, that the violence associated with Polly's death was part of a continual series of 
assaults and in those circumstances it was a 'violent and sustained assault'.83  However, the judge also noted 
                                                 
81    R v R [2002] CA 371/01 (Unreported, Gault, Blanchard and McGrath JJ, 12 February 2002) [9].  
82    Ibid [12, 23]. 
83    Ibid [20]. 
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that Grant had 'slapped' Polly, and medical evidence did not suggest 'the strong exertion of force'.84  The 
judge noted a previous case involving a woman who died after being 'pushed' against a door where it was 
held that the appropriate starting point for the sentence must have regard to the almost accidental cause of 
death.85   
 
Given the lack of evidence of 'extreme violence' the judge noted the more aggravating feature was Grant's 
ongoing violence over years and sustained violence on the particular night in question.  Although Grant did 
not know of the possible shrinking of Polly's brain, he did know that she suffered from diabetes, yet his 
assaults against her continued.  After noting the Court of Appeal had accepted that sterner sentences were 
required for domestic violence, the judge discounted the sentence by one year for Grant's guilty plea, and 
sentenced him to seven years' imprisonment.  As he did so, the judge stated: 'A sentence significantly more 
than 7 years' imprisonment would in my view be excessive and crushing, depriving you of all hope and that 
is the sentence of the Court'.86   
 
On appeal, the Court of Appeal noted that even without the issue of Polly's possible susceptibility to injury, 
the Crown had acknowledged this was always going to be a case in which a charge of murder would be 
difficult to prove.87  The Court noted Grant knew Polly was not in good health, and overall, the 
circumstances of the assaults could not be treated as unlawful acts of violence, which, although having fatal 
consequences, were 'comparatively minor'.  Since the penalty must reflect the Court's denunciation of a 
pattern of domestic violence associated with excessive alcohol consumption, while the eight year starting 
point was 'stern', and the reduction of twelve months 'not generous', the sentence was 'within the range open 
to the judge' and the appeal was dismissed.88   
 
Edwards notes men's use of body force becomes a highly decisive factor in cases where the defence 
seeks to rebut an intention to kill by arguing that the method of killing was not the cause of death.  
For example, strangulation may be accompanied by vagal inhibition when, as a result of 
strangulation, the heart suddenly stop and asphyxia results.  Since vagal inhibition may occur 
suddenly upon the first few seconds of strangulation, the defence uses this supervening event to 
undermine prosecution efforts to establish intention.    
 
                                                 
84    R v R (Unreported, High Court, Napier, Durie J, 18 October 2001) [6].  
85  By contrast, research by Loretta Stalans and J Arthur Lurigio, 'Public Preferences for the Court's Handling of 
Domestic Violence Situations' (1995) 41 Crime and Delinquency 399 found women victims of violence were fearful of 
a 'push' by a male partner as a result of the injuries envisaged. 
86    R v R (Unreported, High Court, Napier, Durie J, 18 October 2001) [34]. 
87    R v R [2002] CA 371/01 (Unreported, Gault, Blanchard and McGrath JJ, 12 February 2002) [12, 26]. 
88    Ibid [23, 24, 28]. 
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The defence strategy employs a language which renders an atrocious act benign, stripping it of 
intent, design and dangerousness.  The language 'pressure to the neck' supported by cardiac 
arrest/vagal inhibition as cause of death robs the act of its violence, heinousness and dangerousness 
and its lethality potential.89    
 
A similar strategy is evident in defence counsel's submission that Polly may have had a pre-
existing condition (brain shrinkage) of which Grant was unaware.  While it remains uncertain 
whether this possible condition played a role in Polly's death, what is certain is that Grant knew 
Polly suffered from diabetes, yet his violence toward her continued.   
 
Legal descriptions of women being 'slapped' rather than beaten to death rhetorically efface the 
lethality potential of male violence toward women.  Although habitual batterers frequently claim 
(and courts accept) that they failed to appreciate the lethality risks associated with their violence; 
family,  friends, as well as deceased victims, were often well aware of the risk to life and limb that 
these men posed.  Polly's family knew the risk of Grant's violence to Polly and 'feared for her life 
and safety'.90  The family of the deceased woman and friends of the offender in Case Study D/00/7 
not only recognised the real or substantial risk of death occurring as a result of the offender's 
violence, but repeatedly warned him to that effect.91  Nor was it uncommon to find deceased 
victims had predicted their own demise at the batterers' hands.92   
 
The Court of Appeal noted that the penalty imposed on Grant reflected the need to denounce a 
pattern of domestic violence associated with excessive alcohol consumption culminating in 
death.93  However, if no minimum period of imprisonment is imposed; those serving a sentence of 
imprisonment of more than two years may generally be released after serving one-third of their 
sentence.94  It is doubtful whether habitual batterers who kill and then become eligible for parole 
after serving one third of their sentence - in some cases little more than one or two years' 
                                                 
89    Edwards, above n 1, 250.   See, also,  discussion of Case Study M/02/8 below. 
90    R v R (Unreported, High Court, Napier, Durie J, 18 October 2001) [10]. 
91    See discussion of this case above, at p 287. 
92    These cases are discussed in the following chapter. 
93    R v R [2002] CA 371/01 (Unreported, Gault, Blanchard and McGrath JJ, 12 February 2002) [24]. 
94    Sections 20 and 84 Parole Act 2002; Warren Young and Neville Trendle, 'Developing the Sentencing Framework: 
The Sentencing Act and Beyond' in J Bruce Robertson (ed) Essays on Criminal Law: A Tribute to Professor Gerald 
Orchard (2004) 50, 68. 
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imprisonment - are likely to recognise such sentences as implying denunciation of killings in the 
context of a history of violence toward the victim.95  
 
Rather than acknowledge the devastating emotional and psychic effects of battering on women, 
there are strong hints in these cases that courts view battered women who drink or take drugs as not 
completely 'innocent' victims.  In Case Study S/99/196 the victim was described by the sentencing 
judge as 'seriously affected by alcohol'.  Yet there is no evidence of violence on her part.  In the 
above case, the sentencing judge described Polly's own way of life as making her more susceptible 
to severe injuries.  No connection is made between Polly's drinking and Grant's violence.  The 
Court of Appeal also describes drinking as 'common in the failures of the couple'.97  This analysis 
inculpates Polly in the offending although there is no evidence at all that she was violent.  Indeed, 
the sentencing judge notes a description of Polly as the 'breadwinner' of the family, and Grant, as 
'the one who beat her'.98  In Case Study H/00/9, discussed below, the offender beat his partner to 
death when she demanded he leave her home.  Rather than acknowledge this as a separation 
violence scenario, the Court of Appeal notes that the attack occurred 'in the course of an argument 
after the deceased had returned home intoxicated from a party'.99  These cases point to an unspoken 
assumption that intoxicated women are provocative or at least problematic victims.    
   
B   Using Injuries Inflicted During a Previous Assault to Exculpate the Habitual Batterer 
In an extraordinary manipulation of the red flag of repeat victimisation, law permits batterers to 
capitalise on an injury their victims may have sustained during a previous assault to avoid a murder 
conviction.  In the following case, the offender served a period of imprisonment for a previous 
assault on the victim and killed her shortly after he was released on parole.  No complaint was laid 
in relation to an assault which was apparently perpetrated a few days before the final lethal attack.  
Defence counsel argued that an injury occasioned during the earlier assault may have increased the 
victim's vulnerability to a further attack.  
 
 
                                                 
95   The New Zealand Law Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, Report 94 (2006) recently 
recommended parole eligibility for long-term sentences should be 12 months, or two-thirds of the nominal sentence, 
whichever is the greater.  However, the Commission envisaged a compensatory judicial adjustment in sentencing 
practice so that prisoners would not serve more actual time as a result of parole changes. 
96    See, discussion of this case above, at p 293. 
97    R v R [2002] CA 371/01 (Unreported, Gault, Blanchard and McGrath JJ, 12 February 2002) [15]. 
98    R v R (Unreported, High Court, Napier, Durie J, 18 October 2001) [10]. 
99    R v H [2002] CA 28/02 (Unreported, McGrath, Williams and Salmon JJ, 20 June 2002) [13]. 
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Exploiting an Injury from a Prior Assault: Case Study H/00/9  
Terry, the 34 year old offender, had a history of violence against Margaret, his 42 year old partner.  
Margaret took out a Domestic Protection Order against Terry on 7 April 2000.  On 27 July 2000, Terry was 
convicted of assaulting Margaret and imprisoned for nine months.  The agreed statement of facts relating to 
this assault recorded that Terry launched an attack on Margaret, punching her in the head with a closed fist.  
When Margaret fell, Terry continued to punch her in the head and body and drag her about by her hair.  As a 
result of this attack Margaret received 'numerous injuries' including two fractured ribs and contusions about 
the body.100  According to police evidence, on the morning of the day Terry was sentenced to imprisonment 
for this assault, he launched a further attack on Margaret.  It appears no formal action was taken regarding 
the latter assault and breach of the protection order although the Crown sought to admit police evidence of 
these offences at Terry's homicide trial.101   
 
After serving six months of the prison sentence Terry was released on parole.  Despite his previous assaults 
on Margaret, and the existence of a protection order, it appears Terry was paroled to Margaret's home.102  
Less than three weeks after his release (19 days) Terry beat Margaret to death.  Terry was charged with 
murder.  However, a charge of manslaughter was substituted prior to the trial.103    
 
The Court heard that Margaret arrived home from a function at a friend's house around 11 pm.  Neighbours 
heard her 'yelling and screaming at [Terry] to get out of her house'.  They heard Terry complain that 
Margaret had spent money he had given her and later heard household items being smashed.  At this stage, a 
neighbour called the police.  Meantime, neighbours heard Terry 'yelling and screaming' at Margaret and 
then heard a series of punches and four or five loud thumps.  Terry was heard to say: 'Is that what you 
wanted, look at you lying there…I don't feel sorry for you'.  Terry then swore and said he would move out 
of Margaret's home the following morning.  The police arrived some five minutes after the punching noises 
were heard to find Margaret unconscious on the floor.  She died in hospital.  Terry maintained that he had 
not assaulted Margaret on the night she died and refused to make a statement about the events that occurred.  
He elected not to give evidence at his trial.  
 
                                                 
100     Ibid [17]. 
101    R v H (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Williams J, 18 September 2001) concerned a bail application by the 
accused.  The judge noted that the Crown had applied under s 344A Crimes Act 1961 to introduce police evidence that 
the offender had committed a further assault on the victim on the same day he was convicted and sentenced for the 
earlier assault.  The outcome of this application is unknown.  
102    R v H [2002] CA 28/02 (Unreported, McGrath, Williams and Salmon JJ, 20 June 2002) [2], notes the offender 
was living with the victim at the time he killed her. 
103    R v H (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Williams J, 18 September 2001) [2], where the judge notes, without 
further discussion, that the manslaughter charge was substituted some four months after Margaret's death. 
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A pathologist stated that Margaret's injuries were not consistent with one blow or fall or injury but were 
probably the result of several blows. However there were no fractures and 'moderate force' rather than 'really 
major force' had caused the injury.104  A neuropathologist gave evidence that 'second impact syndrome' was 
a 'rare but well recognised possibility' when a person suffers two separate head injuries some time apart.  In 
her opinion, Margaret had suffered an earlier injury to her head some 10 to 15 days before the final assault.  
The cumulative effect of the original subdural haematoma and subsequent 'moderate' use of force could 
result in swelling of the brain, coupled with bleeding and blood clotting inside Margaret's skull, which was 
the immediate cause of her lapsing into a coma and dying.  The expert witness did not express an opinion on 
whether Margaret's death was due to second impact syndrome or not.  The jury convicted Terry of 
manslaughter.   
 
At sentencing, the judge noted that the violence 'did not go beyond slapping or punching' Margaret.  There 
was also 'some speculation during the trial that Terry might have thrown her against a wall'.105  The judge 
declined to take into account evidence of previous incidents of violence by Terry toward Margaret as it was 
hearsay, and too limited to found inferences which the Court could rely on.106   However, the judge did take 
into account Terry's prior conviction for assaulting Margaret, and the fact that he was on parole at the time 
of the offending.  Defence counsel argued that since Terry had no knowledge of the pre-existing subdural 
haematoma, he could not have foreseen Margaret's death as the likely consequence of his final lethal assault.  
Although the Crown argued that the earlier brain injury had also been caused by Terry, defence counsel 
dismissed this assertion as 'pure speculation'.  The judge noted that while there was 'room for suspicion' that 
Terry had also caused the earlier injury, there was insufficient evidence.  The Court of Appeal dismissed 
Terry's appeal against his sentence of nine years' imprisonment.   
 
The police detective in charge of the case told reporters that the case 'highlights that domestic violence can 
end up with really tragic consequences'. 
 
Terry's lethal retaliation in response to Margaret's demand that he leave her home was a predictable 
response, given his past history of violence towards Margaret. While as noted by the police 
detective, Margaret's death highlights the 'tragic consequences' of domestic violence, the case also 
highlights the tragic consequences of decisions that it is safe for habitual batterers to be paroled to 
the homes of their former victims.107   
 
                                                 
104    R v H [2002] CA 28/02 (Unreported, McGrath, Williams and Salmon JJ, 20 June 2002) [5]. 
105    Ibid [10]. 
106    Ibid [8]. 
107    See, discussion of this practice in Chapter Five. 
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Although social science research reveals habitual batterers who refuse to desist are highly 
dangerous men,108 minimisation of the lethality potential of male violence toward women renders 
the male body benign.109  Consequently, despite an acknowledgement that the assault on Margaret 
was sustained and involved a number of blows; the violence is trivialised as not going 'beyond 
slapping or punching of the deceased'.  Habitual batterers may therefore exploit an injury 
previously inflicted, and defence counsel can capitalise on the low reporting rate of domestic 
assaults by dismissing prosecution assertions that the batterer was responsible as 'mere speculation'.   
 
C   The 'De Facto "Habitual Batterer" Defence' 
The habitual batterer in the above case chose not to admit responsibility for any prior injury to the 
victim.  However, legal analyses which trivialise the dangers inherent in battering and ignore the 
red flag of repeat victimisation have created the potential for batterers to positively advance their 
histories of violence as negating an intention to kill.  The researcher has termed this strategy the 'de 
facto "habitual batterer" defence'.  This extraordinary, albeit uncontroversial (in the sense of 
absence of challenge or critique) legal analysis permits an offender who repeatedly assaults, 
terrorises, and finally kills his partner in a vicious attack involving use of two weapons, to rely on 
his past violent behaviour to avoid a murder conviction. 
 
The absence of systematic indexing of domestic violence cases and related difficulties accessing 
data prevented an investigation into the popularity of the habitual batterer defence, either on its 
own, or in combination with other defences.  Francis Dolan observes that US society pays scant 
attention to the 'story of a man who beats his wife to death and is charged with manslaughter 
because a record of beatings suggests that he did not intend to kill her this time'.110  This 
observation suggests that assumptions underpinning cases of battering escalating to lethality are not 
unique to New Zealand law.   
  
 
 
                                                 
108  See, eg, Kerry Healey, Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and 
Criminal Justice Strategies (1998) 62. 
109   Edwards, above n 1, 256. 
110   Francis Dolan, 'Battered Women, Petty Traitors and the Legacy of Coverture' (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 249, 250, 
noting that the 'story of a man who beats his wife to death, and is charged with manslaughter because a record of 
beatings suggests that he did not intend to kill her this time, does not command our attention.  However, the story of 
the wife who kills her brutally abusive husband can at least make it to the Lifetime channel'. 
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The De Facto Habitual Batterer Defence: Case Study M/02/8  
Barbara was aged 13 years when she and Allen, the 20 year-old offender, commenced living together.  
Barbara had a child to Allen just before her 15th birthday and another child the following year.  Barbara was 
17 years old when she was killed by Allen in March 2002.   
 
At the time of Barbara's death, Allen was serving a term of periodic detention and was subject to 
supervision.  He was also on bail awaiting disposal of charges of assaulting Barbara's father with a weapon; 
possession of an offensive weapon on the same date; and common assault of the father on that date.  
(Whether the police opposed bail on the charge of assaulting Barbara's father, and details of earlier 
offending which resulted in periodic detention and supervision could not be established.)  During the assault 
on Barbara's father, Allen allegedly attacked him with fists and knees, beat him with a broken piece of 
furniture, and menaced him with a knife, pricking the point of the knife into the father's head and shoulders.  
When defending the charges, Allen claimed the allegations were part of a conspiracy by Barbara's father to 
have him imprisoned.  A statement from Barbara in support of this claim was presented to the Court.  
However, Allen was convicted on the charges and sentenced to 21 months' imprisonment.  The jury at his 
murder trial were not permitted to hear evidence of this assault. 
 
At his trial on a charge of murder, Allen pleaded not guilty to a representative charge of male assaults 
female.  This charge related to assaults against Barbara between 1998 and 2001 and the sentencing judge 
noted that at the start of this period Barbara would have been only 13 years old.  Some assaults covered by 
this charge possibly occurred when Barbara was pregnant.111  However, Allen pleaded guilty to a 
representative charge of male assaults female covering prior assaults between April 2001 and March 2002. 
The sentencing judge noted these assaults included an 'extensive incident involving pulling [Barbara] 
around by the hair, kicking her in her head and elsewhere with [Allen's boots] and bashing her head against 
the wall'.112  Barbara was admitted to hospital in March 2002 and was due to have a CT scan in April 2002.   
 
The police had been called to the house some three months before the homicide and returned to the couple's 
home on the day of the killing to find Allen on the telephone, and Barbara lying dead in the hallway. They 
were informed by Allen that Barbara's father and an accomplice had killed her.  The first police officer on 
the scene told the Court that Barbara was lying on her back, naked apart from a singlet top, with a white 
sock around her right elbow 'tourniquet fashion'.  A pathologist later gave evidence of 44 injuries that 
Barbara had sustained, including a black eye and 11 injuries to her head and neck, 14 torso injuries, nine 
arm injuries and a variety of fresh and partly healed cuts and abrasions to her back.  Barbara also had three 
injuries to her scalp, two of which reached the bone of her skull.  In one the bone was chipped, and in the 
                                                 
111    R v M (Unreported, High Court, Palmerston North, France J, 28 April 2003) [6]. 
112    Ibid [7]. 
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other it was indented.  Barbara's arm was cut with a sharp object and her rib was fractured.  She had older 
multiple bruising on various parts of her body and two broken ribs due to violence on an earlier occasion or 
occasions.113   
 
During a videoed police interview, Allen was shown photographs of the three head injuries understood to 
have caused Barbara's death.  The wounds were believed to have been inflicted with a broken length of 
broom handle used in a stabbing motion.  Allen told police 'I've got nothing to say about it…I couldn't do 
that, man, not to my missus'.  He denied there was violence in the relationship, stating that there were 'just 
disagreements'.  Barbara, he said, was a 'very easy girl to bruise'.  Allen could not explain the many injuries 
to Barbara's body and repeatedly accused the police of trying to confuse him:  'Honestly do you want me to 
turn round and say I murdered my girlfriend?  I loved my missus too much and she loved me.  There's no 
way…I would do any such bloody thing to my missus'.  
 
Subsequently, in a voluntary videotaped statement, Allen admitted assaulting Barbara on the night of her 
death.  He stated that the pair had been to a family outing where he 'got on the piss'.  After being informed 
that an aunt he formerly lived with was shortly to arrive from Auckland he became angry and was still angry 
when the couple arrived home.  Allen said he 'just lost it' and assaulted Barbara after she attempted to hug 
him.  'All I remember is sitting on the bed pretty angry…annoyed, angry, frustrated because my whole past 
was coming back, which I didn't want…I can't remember exactly what I did, but I can remember I was 
hitting her'.  When asked why he had attacked Barbara, Allen responded that: 'She was the one that was 
there and I took it out on her'.   
 
Allen claimed that following the assault, Barbara picked herself up from the floor and went to the bathroom 
crying - whereupon he then left the house.  In response to a suggestion by police that Barbara was in fact 
lying in the hallway at the time Allen left, he replied: 'Prove it…I have nothing to say about it…when I left 
she was in the bathroom…why don't you go and ask the ghost okay?'  Allen is also reported as accusing a 
police interviewer of trying to frame him for Barbara's death.  'I know what you are trying to do, so don't 
screw with my f***ing head mate…I know what you piglets are like…you don't know how much I loved 
her'.  When asked about a broken rib Barbara had sustained, Allen replied his partner did not tell him much, 
and when questioned about the injuries she received on the night of her death, he responded that the police 
should 'go and ask the hospital'.    
 
At trial, Allen elected not to give or call evidence in his defence.  The Crown described Barbara as a 'fragile 
waif' weighing just 41 kilograms at the time of her death.   A male witness who lived with the couple gave 
                                                 
113    Ibid [4]. 
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evidence of verbal and physical violence perpetrated by Allen against Barbara.  Following one assault, he 
and his friends physically restrained Allen to prevent further violence.  Another male witness stated Allen 
regularly abused Barbara and would 'just beat her, pretty much, from head to toe' using 'fists, hands and 
sticks'.  He said the injuries inflicted included bruising to Barbara's face and arms, 'fat lips' and 'black eyes'.  
Barbara's physical condition deteriorated in the time he knew the couple and Barbara went from 'skinnier to 
skinnier' and 'looked anorexic by the end'.  To defence counsel, the witness acknowledged that he had done 
nothing to stop the abuse, although he had told his parents.  
 
Barbara's mother gave evidence of an assault on her daughter by Allen during the time she lived with the 
couple around Christmas 2001.  Barbara had taken Allen's dogs for a longer walk than Allen had anticipated 
and upon her return he became abusive and began throwing Barbara's clothes in the street.  This episode 
attracted considerable attention in the neighbourhood and police were called.  The police arrived, spoke with 
Allen, and left.  Immediately afterward, Allen pulled the curtains, locked the doors and began to beat 
Barbara.  Her mother told the Court she tried to intervene but was pushed back:  'He said that I had to sit 
there and watch and he was holding us hostage…he got numerous knives from the drawer and held them to 
her throat saying he would kill her.  She was so frightened, she wasn't able to fight back'.  As Allen was 
beating Barbara 'he was yelling, saying she couldn't be trusted…I really thought he was going to kill her at 
that point'.  Barbara was admitted to hospital.  Barbara's mother stated her daughter was unable to walk 
properly and developed a paralysis down the left side of her body.  Although Barbara's condition improved 
she still had a profound limp, and experienced spasms down her left side, in her arm and her face.  Barbara 
had been 'quite stressed' about the injuries which 'frightened her'.  Under cross-examination, the mother was 
asked by defence counsel whether Allen's rage on the day of the beating was 'like something had taken him 
over'.  The mother replied that it was 'something like that, just absolute rage'.   
 
Defence counsel urged the jury to set aside prejudice, bias and emotion and to consider Allen's state of mind 
when he assaulted Barbara and what Allen believed might have happened to Barbara as a result of the 
attack.  Reminding the jury that Allen had assaulted Barbara on a number of occasions in the past, counsel 
inquired of the jury: 'Why on this particular occasion, would he think that death might follow?'114  The jury 
acquitted Allen of murder.   
 
The sentencing judge accepted that the manslaughter verdict was based on the claim that Allen had inflicted 
similar injuries on Barbara in the past without death ensuing, so could not have known that the injuries he 
inflicted during the final lethal assault were likely to cause her death.  The judge noted that: 'Whilst that may 
                                                 
114  Defence counsel also suggested that it was possible an irregular heartbeat or a stroke could have reduced 
consciousness inhibiting the laryngeal reflex, causing Barbara to choke.  Under cross-examination the pathologist 
regarded this possibility as 'highly unlikely'. 
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be a legitimate defence to murder, it equally must operate as a significantly aggravating factor when it 
comes to sentencing for manslaughter'.115    
 
The pre-sentence report assessed Allen as at high risk of re-offending due to the combination of low 
motivation to change; lack of remorse; and lack of insight into his behaviour.  Allen was sentenced to ten 
years' imprisonment with a minimum term of six years' imprisonment.  On the first representative charge of 
assault relating to the period between 1 January 1998 and 1 April 2001 he was sentenced to six months' 
imprisonment.  On the second representative charge, taking into account the guilty plea, Allen was 
sentenced to 12 months' imprisonment.  All sentences to be served concurrently.116   
 
The sentencing judge acknowledged Allen's lethal attack on Barbara was a sustained and violent 
one which involved use of two weapons, probably the jagged edge of a broomstick and a knife.  
Barbara's arm had been cut with a sharp instrument and her rib had been fractured.  'Considerable 
force' was used for the blow that chipped her skull and 'fairly considerable force' was required for 
the blow that led to indentation of her skull.117  The judge noted Allen knew at the time of his 
attack that Barbara was vulnerable because of her health and frailty.  Allen had also acknowledged 
to police that he was present when Barbara was examined at hospital and an appointment made for 
a head scan.118  If such a prolonged and vicious attack on a young vulnerable woman cannot give 
rise to an inference that the habitual batterer knowingly engaged in actions 'where the risk is so 
appreciable that to indulge in the conduct is seen by society as the virtual equivalent of intentional 
killing',119 then it is difficult to know what kind of sustained violence would be sufficient to rebut 
the claims of habitual batterers that they lacked the requisite knowledge and intent.   
 
Although the judge accepted that the de facto habitual batterer defence constitutes 'a legitimate 
defence to murder',120 no reference is made to the body of knowledge from which this approach 
derives its legitimacy.  Social science research does not support it.  Indeed, the analysis directly 
contradicts empirical evidence regarding a pattern of masculine control and intentionality in 
                                                 
115     R v M (Unreported, High Court, Palmerston North, France J, 28 April 2003) [15]. 
116    Approximately seven months after Allen was convicted and sentenced for manslaughter and previous assaults on 
Barbara, he was convicted of the rape of a 12 year-old girl, the sexual violation of a seven year-old girl, the rape and 
other sexual violation of a 14 year-old girl and two charges of sex with under-age girls.   
117    R v M (Unreported, High Court, Palmerston North, France J, 28 April 2003) [14]. 
118    Ibid [16].  
119    R v Piri [1987] 1 NZLR 66, 79 (CA). 
120    R v M (Unreported, High Court, Palmerston North, France J, 28 April 2003) [15]. 
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intimate femicide cases,121 and the potential for lethality inherent in a history of battering.122  The 
assertion that Allen could not have known his lethal attack would be likely to cause Barbara's death 
because he had inflicted similar injuries in the past without death occurring also appears patently ill 
founded.  Allen had not inflicted this particular violence, in this particular way, with these 
particular weapon(s) on Barbara previously.  If he had, Barbara would have died.  Since men 
presently kill women without the aid of a weapon, the added factor of weapon use might be 
expected to support an inference of murderous intent.  However, trivialisation of the dangers 
inherent in male violence toward women is so profound that in R v W, where the offender invaded 
his estranged partner's home and attacked her with a metal bar, the Court of Appeal attached 'some 
importance' to the shape and weight of the bar,123 with no apparent recognition that men need not 
resort to a weapon - of whatever weight or shape - to beat a woman to death.  
 
Permitting the red flag of repeat victimisation to be manipulated in this way highlights the 
importance of educating legal professionals about the dynamics of violent relationships and the 
interrelationship between domestic violence and domestic homicide.124   The Victorian Law 
Reform Commission has also cautioned that progress in addressing gender bias through abolition 
of the provocation defence might be undermined by a substitute 'no intent' analysis under which 
violent men rely on extreme anger as negating an intention to kill.   
 
[R]ecasting men's rage as a no intent defence is even more dangerous to women than the defence of 
provocation since it suggests that those people in a state of rage do not intend their actions, whereas 
                                                 
121     See, eg, Polk, above n 9, 178-179. 
122   Sylvia Walby and Andrew Myhill, 'Assessing and Managing Risk' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in 
Reducing Domestic Violence: A Comprehensive Guide for Professionals (2001) 315; Metropolitan Police Service, 
Findings from the Multi-agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in London (2003) 16;  Jeremy Travis, Research 
Preview (1998) citing research by Susan Keilitz, et al, Civil Protection Orders: Victims' Views on Effectiveness, 
National Center for State Courts (1998), finding 'the longer women experience abuse, the more intense the behaviour is 
likely to become and the more likely women are to be severely injured by their abusers'.   See also, Desmond Ellis and 
Walter DeKeseredy, 'Rethinking Estrangement, Interventions and Intimate Femicide' (1997) 3 Violence Against 
Women 590 discussing the risks to women posed by antisocial and sociopathic batterers. 
123  [1999] CA 157/99 (Unreported, Keith, Tipping and Gallen JJ, 27 July 1999) [7] where the Court of Appeal 
suggested the fact that the metal bar with which the offender armed himself before entering the woman's home was 
'four-sided and hollow' had 'some importance because it certainly did not have the weight of a solid implement of 
metal'.  The Court also attached significance to the fact that the offender stated he did not bring the bar with him, but 
removed it from a fence he crossed in order to enter the property.  However, since many victims of intimate femicide 
are literally killed at the hands of men, whose greater size and physical strength render a weapon unnecessary, the fact 
that the offender armed himself before entering the woman's home could alternatively be construed as evidence of 
deliberation and intentionality.     
124  Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 27, [4.154], noting such understanding would have a significant 
impact at a number of stages in the legal process. 
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the defence of provocation acknowledged the intention but excused it on 'compassionate' 
grounds.125 
 
he Commission's warning may have proved prophetic.  Defence counsel's inquiry of the mother in 
VII   CONSTRUCTIONS OF MENS REA IN BATTERED DEFENDANT CASES 
Rebec e of 
iting earlier research suggesting a tendency in criminal law to pathologise female defendants who 
                                                
T
the above case whether the offender's rage during an earlier episode of violence was 'like 
something had taken him over' may mark the recasting of men's rage as a 'de facto no intent 
defence'.   
 
ca Bradfield's New South Wales study found a no intent analysis or 'de facto defenc
"domestic violence"'126 was the most frequent basis for a manslaughter conviction for battered 
women who killed violent male intimates.  The deceased's violence was constructed in terms of its 
impact on the accused's psychological/emotional state.  This effect, together with the accused's fear 
or anger before the killing, was advanced in support of a claim that the battered defendant lacked 
murderous intent.  Since the emphasis at trial was on the woman's internal emotional or mental 
state, the 'external' (the deceased's violence toward the victim) was 'not seen directly - it does not 
itself provide a rational and reasonable account of the killing'.127  Accordingly, while a 
manslaughter outcome in these cases appeared compassionate, this defence strategy came at the 
cost of a self-defence argument and possible acquittal for battered defendants.128   
 
C
commit serious crimes, while law supposedly treats men as rational agents,129 Bradfield concludes 
that '[t]he challenge remains for the law to recognise the diversity of the experiences of women 
who kill, and the connection between their offending behaviour and their victimisation in a way 
that is not dependent on the pathologising or psychologising of women's experiences'.130  However, 
the present research found the defence strategies identified by Bradfield in battered defendant cases 
 
125  Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Options Paper (2003) [3.193], citing National 
Association of Women and the Law, Stop Excusing Violence Against Women, NAWL's Position Paper on the Defence 
of Provocation (2000) 45. .  
126     Bradfield, above n 12, 151. 
127     Ibid 156. 
128     Ibid. 
129    Hilary Allen, 'Rendering Them Harmless: The Professional Portrayal of Women Charged with Serious Violence 
Crimes' in Pat Carlen and Anne Worrall (eds) Gender, Crime and Justice (1987) 81. 
130     Bradfield, above n 12, 158. 
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are also utilised on behalf of men who perpetrate intimate femicide.131  Thus while not disputing a 
tendency in criminal law to inappropriately pathologise the experiences of battered women; a 
similar tendency to pathologise men's domestic violence toward women appears to have been 
overlooked.   
 
Ian Freckleton has denounced a 'forensic abuse syndrome' whereby diagnostic labels are taken 
from the clinical process in order to excuse criminal conduct.132  Citing Freckleton, Kevin Dawkins 
suggests that the challenge to orthodoxy posed by battered women who kill is whether present legal 
concepts such as reasonable force, 'can be understood and applied in a way that takes account of 
women's experiences of violence without rendering general defences to individuated exemptions 
based on psychological profiles and diagnostic stereotypes'.133  This analysis of course overlooks 
the 'psychological profiles and diagnostic stereotypes' that routinely enter the courtroom when men 
perpetrate violence against women.  Psychiatric evidence of pathological jealousy (the 'Othello 
syndrome'),134 obsessive possessiveness, and fear of rejection are currently and uncontroversially 
accepted as evidence of psychological disabilities which render male offenders helpless victims of 
their emotions.135   
 
                                                 
131   For example, claims that death arose from the highly charged emotional situation in which the killing took place, 
rather than any intention to inflict lethal violence, and suggestions that an accused obtained the weapon with some 
other less blameworthy intent, such as an intention to scare, are not gender specific.  Representations of accused as 
'tragic figures'; who are 'swept away, without volition'; or who continue to 'suffer considerable psychological pain as a 
result of the death of the deceased'; or who are experiencing 'retrospective amnesia' are also employed at the trials and 
sentencing of male offenders.   
132     Ian Freckleton, 'When Plight Makes Right - The Forensic Abuse Syndrome' (1994) 18 Crim LJ 29. 
133   Kevin Dawkins, 'Criminal Law and Procedure' [1994] NZRL Rev 48, 62, lists what he describes as a 'litany' of 
syndromes.  Those commonly employed when men kill women and claim provocation are missing from the list. 
134    See, eg, G Leong, J A Silva, E Garza-Trevino, 'The Dangerousness of Persons with the Othello Syndrome' (1994) 
39 J Forensic Sci 1445. 
135   A male accused's depression, post-traumatic stress disorder or other mental disorder short of insanity is often 
central to the inquiry into the characteristics of the accused when the provocation defence is at issue.  See, eg, R v 
Dixon (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Chilwell J, 1 October 1982) where the judge ruled there was a credible 
narrative that the offender was suffering from a major depressive illness due to his wife's decision to separate from him 
and gain custody of the children.  Mitigating narratives of male pathology continue to be employed when sentencing 
offenders who perpetrate serious and serial violence against women.  For example, in R v W [1999] CA 157/99 
(Unreported, Keith, Tipping and Gallen JJ, 27 July 1999) [15] where the offender's history of serious violence against 
women who attempted to leave him was attributed to his 'unusual family background which made it difficult for him to 
develop and maintain enduring relationships', his social isolation, his substance abuse and a car accident, the totality of 
which had 'left him at risk of behaving badly when relationships broke down'.  See, also, Victoria Nourse, 'The New 
Normativity: The Abuse Excuse and the Resurgence of Judgment in the Criminal Law' (1998) 50 Stan.L.Rev. 
1435,1454, challenging the notion that criminal law limits its pathologising discourses to women.  Nourse points out 
that, 'men have claimed for decades that they should be partially excused from spousal homicide when their emotions 
get the better of them.  Few scholars, however, have urged that we eliminate the provocation defense because it 
diminishes men's moral agency' (citations omitted). 
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Bradfield dismisses any suggestion that her research endorses the proposition that battered women 
are 'getting away with murder'.136  This indicates awareness that the study could be utilised in 
support of demands that abused women are punished as rational agents, rather than partially 
excused as pathological victims.  However, by locating the battered defendant's problem within 
'pervasive gendered stereotypes that construct violent female offenders as lacking agency and 
rationality',137 Bradfield's study may become trapped within oppositional discourses of victim 
pathology and agent rationality, neither of which captures battered women's experiences.   
 
Studies indicate that women's inability to effectively protect themselves from severe aggression 
and a lack of safe alternatives are common factor in incidents of lethal violence by women.138  
Thus rather than invoke the victim/agent dichotomy, it is important to focus upon Bradfield's 
finding that the emphasis on the battered woman's internal or mental state allows the 'external' - the 
deceased's history of violence and potential for future violence - to fade into the background.  The 
battered woman's lethal response is thereby constructed in law as unreasonable.  On this analysis, 
the battered defendant's lack of access to the defence of self-defence is not the result of 
acknowledging any actual mental or emotional harm the woman may have experienced as a 
consequence of battering.139  Instead, the problem lies in law's failure to acknowledge the dangers 
inherent in battering relationships which deprives both battered defendants and battered victims of 
justice.   
 
VIII   CONCLUSION 
Legal responses to habitual battering escalating to lethality fail to acknowledge the lethality 
potential of male violence toward women.  Rather than acknowledge that men's fists are potentially 
lethal weapons, the present, almost macabre preoccupation with the number and type of blows 
struck, and whether batterers used 'light', 'moderate' or 'extreme' force to beat a woman to death 
                                                 
136    Bradfield, above n 12, 144, notes her research 'is not an endorsement of the view advanced by those who would 
argue that stereotyped construction of female offenders means that women are "getting away with murder"' (citations 
omitted). 
137     Ibid 153. 
138     Browne, Williams and Dutton, above n 66, 158. 
139    The Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 27, [4.117], notes general agreement among domestic violence 
researchers concerning the considerable psychological impact upon women who have been subjected to domestic 
violence.  See, also, Tony Ward, et al, 'Explaining Some Characteristics of Battered Women: A Cognitive 
Deconstructionist Approach' (1995) 24 New Zealand Journal of Psychology 26; Paula Nurious, et al, 'Contextualising 
Depression and Physical Functioning in Battered Women: Adding Vulnerability and Resources to the Analyses' (2003) 
18 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1411; Randye Semple, 'Psychological Abuse in Intimate Relationships: A New 
Zealand Perspective' (2001) 30 New Zealand Journal of Psychology 60, discussing effects of battering. 
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trivialise the potential for lethality inherent in 'prolonged' and 'extreme' male violence toward 
women.  It is now well established that the majority of women who are killed by current or 
estranged partners were previously beaten by their killers.  Accordingly, repeat victimisation 
features in all domestic violence risk assessment instruments as a red flag for 
dangerousness/lethality.  However, the assumption that batterers routinely measure their violence 
so as to inflict 'good hidings' without running the risk of death also permits the lethal incident to be 
isolated from its violent antecedents.  By ignoring the gendered 'inequality of arms' and red flag of 
repeat victimisation battered women's deaths are constructed as unlucky or accidental.  The 
'socially approved vocabulary'140 of intimate femicide as typically spontaneous, unpremeditated 
offending is thereby maintained and perpetuated. 
 
While domestic violence is often referred to as covering a spectrum of conduct on a continuum 
from 'hitting, kicking, punching, sexual violence including rape, manslaughter and murder',141 
many women in the present study were 'slapped', hit, kicked, and punched to death.  Consequently, 
assessments of risk based on any such continuum are unlikely to capture the dangers inherent in 
battering relationships.  Sexism, cultural and class bias evident in depictions of wife-battering as 
'normal' in certain households also have the potential to compromise risk assessment in the 
criminal justice sector.   
 
Legal scholars who argue against combining the separate offences of murder and manslaughter into 
a single crime of culpable homicide frequently do so, inter alia, on the basis that 'in the eyes of 
society, these are two different types of wrongdoing, and the communicative function of the law 
would be impaired were the law to blur that difference'.142  However, an arbitrary and indefensible 
delineation of the different levels of culpability is evident in the provision of a partial excuse for 
habitual batterers whose violence culminates in the deaths of their victims.  Since it is the duty of 
Parliament to ensure that legal distinctions between murder and manslaughter are cogent and 
just143 a domestic homicide statute is recommended.  The following chapter addresses further 
problems associated with law's failure to acknowledge the interrelationship between lethal and sub-
lethal domestic assaults.      
                                                 
140   Coker, above n 7, 98-99. 
141   Department of Justice, The Domestic Protection Act 1982: A Discussion Paper (1993) 4. 
142   Simester and Brookbanks, above n 14, 32. 
143  William Wilson, 'Murder and the Structure of Homicide' in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds), Rethinking 
English Homicide Law (2000) 21, 21. 
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CHAPTER NINE:  ADMISSION OF RED FLAG EVIDENCE AT TRIAL  
It is time to ask why relationship evidence is not automatically assumed to 
be as relevant to the prosecution's case as any other evidence of identity or 
motive in cases involving strangers.  The simple answer may be that, 
previously…we did not recognize the common themes which were 
interspersed amid the intermittent violence punctuating the lives of women 
who have been murdered by their intimates.  Today, we no longer can fall 
back on the excuse of ignorance when evaluating the probity of domestic 
violence history in proving femicide.  Doing nothing is the equivalent of 
affirming the past inequities in evidentiary policy.1 
 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
Since in intimate femicide cases the victim is dead, and therefore unable to refute an accused's 
claims that she engaged in provocative behaviour or launched an attack to which he responded in 
self defence, the jury's understanding that this individual woman's death conforms to a larger, 
structural pattern of offending may be crucial to set the lethal act in its context.  However, the 
extent to which the jury is permitted to learn the truth about the victim's death through knowledge 
of its violent antecedents turns on judicial interpretation of current rules of evidence. 
 
The law of evidence, which began its development with the decisions of common law judges in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,2 governs the type and extent of domestic violence evidence 
which may be adduced at trial.  In intimate femicide cases,3  evidence of prior domestic violence 
may include: 
 
• evidence of friends, family, neighbours and professionals (such as doctors, social workers and 
counsellors) and others who have witnessed or heard the violence, have seen physical signs of it 
(such as cuts or bruising), or have been told about it by the accused or the deceased; 
 
• documentary evidence, including previous or existing intervention orders or criminal court 
proceedings;4 
 
                                                 
1    Myrna Raeder, 'The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond' (1996) 69 
S.Cal.L.Rev. 1463, 1503 
2   Donald Mathieson (ed), Cross on Evidence (7th New Zealand ed, 2001) 11, notes evidence law can be traced to the 
Middle Ages although its development really began in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 
3   This chapter is concerned with cases in which the accused is the perpetrator of the prior violence.  See, eg, Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report, (2004) for a discussion of evidence law in relation to 
cases in which the accused is the victim of prior violence.  
4    Ibid [4.5]. 
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• Evidence the offender used violence toward other family members and previous intimate partners.  
 
Myrna Raeder notes that it is only now being acknowledged that evidentiary rules evolved when 
women's voices were ignored or disregarded in criminal law.  In a male-centred universe, domestic 
violence was not regarded as a pressing social problem and allegations of violence short of murder 
might be dismissed as the fabrication of a vengeful woman, or the overreaction of a male provoked 
by his victim's shrewish words or faithless deeds.  Nor was intimate femicide perceived as 'a 
particular species of murder with dynamics transcending the individual conflict.'5 
 
Raeder's US study found judges omitted to identify the structural themes that are played out in 
specific relationship settings when evaluating the probity of domestic violence evidence.  In the 
absence of a framework to link prior abusive acts to the homicide event, decisions about the 
relevance and admissibility of domestic violence evidence lacked intellectual content:   
 
All one could glean from the opinions was whether the judge was more concerned about the rights 
of criminal defendants to a fair trial, or whether the judge believed in the truth-finding function of 
trials regardless of the cost in an individual case.  There could be no real debate because there was 
no real analysis.  Whether courts cavalierly upheld the admission of the prior acts or rejected it, they 
generally declared that the evidence was probative or prejudicial without explaining why.6 
 
This chapter canvasses barriers to admissibility of domestic violence evidence.  Case studies 
explore judicial interpretations of the relevance and reliability of evidence of red flag behaviours 
known to be associated with intimate femicide.  The study found misapprehensions about the 
dynamics of violent relationships result in exclusion or limitation of red flag evidence at trial.  
These misunderstandings include a tendency to view abusive behaviours as a series of discrete, 
unconnected incidents, rather than part of a strategy aimed at exerting dominance and control7 and 
isolation of the batterer's history of violence from the final lethal event.  Since patriarchal 
relationship norms obstruct development of a principled response to red flag evidence, statutory 
intervention is recommended. 
 
 
                                                 
5    Raeder,above n 1, 1513. 
6    Ibid 1498 (citations omitted). 
7    See, eg, Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report (2006) 4. 
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II   BARRIERS TO ADMISSIBILITY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE EVIDENCE 
Major obstacles to admissibility of domestic violence evidence are rules controlling admission of 
propensity evidence;8 the hearsay rule, which prevents or restricts the use of out of court 
statements made by persons who are not called to give evidence; and the discretion to exclude 
evidence if its prejudicial effect would outweigh its probative value.  Although it is highly 
debatable whether juries are 'such fools as they are very often thought to be',9 these rules are linked 
by a common assumption that fact-finders, in particular juries, are unable to properly gauge the 
probative value of this kind of evidence, and may accord it too much weight, resulting in unfairness 
to the accused.10   
                                                
 
In the absence of systematic reporting of domestic violence cases, or a digest category directed 
toward domestic violence evidence, it is impossible to gain a comprehensive picture of the amount 
and nature of evidence that courts are currently excluding.  Raeder notes that  
 
[t]his absence is telling because it confirms the hidden nature of patterns which reoccur in battering 
relationships and the undue emphasis on victim blaming which ignores such commonality.  Until a 
category is established for domestic violence evidence it will be impossible to obtain a complete 
picture of how courts analyze prior bad acts evidence, or to provide a ready source which lawyers 
and judges can consult when facing these issues in their own jurisdictions.11 
 
III   THE PROHIBITION ON PROPENSITY EVIDENCE 
A party, (usually the prosecution) may be prevented from leading evidence 'which tends to show 
the accused has been guilty of other criminal acts (such as other assaults) if that evidence tends to 
show the accused had a propensity to "commit crime, or crime of a particular kind, or was the sort 
of person likely to have committed the crime charged"'.12  The exclusion of evidence of a 
defendant's previous convictions, misconduct or general bad character is intended to bolster the 
 
8    Section 40(1) Evidence Act 2006 defines propensity evidence as 'evidence that tends to show a person's propensity 
to act in a particular way or to have a particular state of mind, being evidence of acts, omissions, events, or 
circumstances with which a person is alleged to have been involved'. 
9     R v Kritz [1950] 1 KB 82, 89 per Lord Goddard CJ. 
10   Stephen Silber, 'The Law Commission's Work on Hearsay and Previous Misconduct' (1997) 37 Med.Sci.Law 125, 
125.   New Zealand Law Commission, Evidence: Reform of the Law, Report 55, Vol I (1999) [63-64], noting one legal 
commentator drew attention to the absence of empirical data indicating that juries are unable to gauge the proper value 
of hearsay evidence.  However, most commentators, and judges in particular, perceived hearsay to be of concern in 
jury trials and opposed abolishing the hearsay restriction. 
11    Raeder, above n 1, 1494. 
12    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 3, [4.36], citing J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (6th ed) (2000) 567. 
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presumption of innocence13 by ensuring that criminal trials focus on the offence charged, rather 
than on the character of the defendant.14  To allow evidence of the accused's past misconduct raises 
the possibility that the jury may convict the accused for a number of illegitimate reasons: 
 
Knowledge of a defendant's prior criminal conduct may curtail a juror's worry of punishing an 
innocent person.  Further, if the defendant was not criminally charged or convicted for the prior 
conduct, the jury may use this as justification for punishing the accused in the instant matter.  
Lastly, juror animosity may be created toward the defendant because of what he had done in the 
past.  Another policy reason for not admitting evidence of other crimes is that it forces the defendant 
to explain conduct other than that which he is being charged for at trial.  Consequently, a defendant 
may have to defend actions for which he has already answered, and for which he has already served 
his sentence.15    
 
Exclusion of this evidence is also rationalised on the basis that the accused's prior misconduct is 
irrelevant to the present charge.   
 
The Law Commission identifies the general irrelevance of bad character as a reason for not 
admitting it, and this rationale features in the case law too.  In DPP v Boardman, one of the leading 
cases, Lord Hailsham stated that '[w]hen there is nothing to connect the accused with a particular 
crime except bad character or similar crimes, the probative value of the evidence is nil'.16  
 
A significant exception to the general bar on propensity evidence is described as the 'similar fact' 
rule.  Legal commentators note this terminology is misleading since it describes the rule in terms 
'more apt to describe one of the principle exceptions to it'.17  The 'similar fact' exception permits 
propensity evidence to be adduced where the prior misconduct has 'some significant additional 
feature which lifts the evidence above showing only bad character or disposition to offend 
generally'.18  There must be 'some special characteristic or pattern', or 'some underlying unity 
                                                 
13    Section 25(c) Bill of Rights Act 1990 affirms the right of a defendant 'to be presumed innocent until proved guilty 
according to law'.   
14     Mathieson, above n 2, 474. 
15    Sarah Lee, 'The Search for the Truth: Admitting Evidence of Prior Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence' (1998) 
20 U.Haw.L.Rev. 221, 224-225.  
16     Mike Redmayne, 'The Relevance of Bad Character' (2002) 61 CLJ 684, 685 (citations omitted). 
17   Mathieson, above n 2, 450, noting the similar fact terminology is less common in the United States.  See also, 
Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 3, 143, n 423, citing J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (6th ed) (2000) 439.   
18    Cf s43 Evidence Act 2006 which appears to permit evidence of 'mere' or general propensity provided the probative 
force of the evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. 
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between the separate events'.19  The 'real question is always whether, as a matter of common sense, 
the evidence is sufficiently supportive of the prosecution case to justify allowing it to go to the jury 
notwithstanding any illegitimate prejudicial effect it might have'.20   
 
The similar fact exception may be particularly problematic in domestic violence cases.  The 
requirement that prior abusive acts share a high level of similarity to the charged offence may 
demand similarity on the facts, as opposed to conceptual similarity.  Lacking recognition of 
violence as a pattern of abuse and control, diverse acts of abuse leading up to the homicide may be 
treated by courts as separate, discrete, incidents, unrelated to the final lethal assault.    
 
Because domestic violence crimes are so diverse in their facts, it is less likely that they will be 
admitted under this theory.  For example, it is unlikely that the act of killing a former girlfriend's pet 
would be sufficiently similar to slapping a current girlfriend, or stalking an ex wife.  Even though 
they are conceptually similar - violent acts upon an intimate partner for the purpose of maintaining 
power, dominance and control - they are factually dissimilar and therefore likely to be held 
inadmissible.21   
 
Although admission by the prosecution of evidence of the accused's prior convictions or 
misconduct is generally barred, where this evidence is advanced as relevant to the defendant's 
credibility as opposed to propensity some leeway is permitted.  For example, the prosecution may 
seek leave to adduce this evidence where the defendant advances his own good character, or 
attacks the character of a prosecution witness.  If the probative value of the evidence is regarded as 
greater than its potential prejudicial effect, the jury must be warned both at the time leave to cross-
examine is granted, and during the summing-up, that evidence of the defendant's bad character may 
only be taken into account on the issue of credibility and is not relevant to the likelihood that the 
defendant committed the offence.22  However, the distinction between evidence which may go to 
credibility and evidence which may go to propensity is a subtle one.23   
                                                 
19     R v Accused (1998) 15 CRNZ 674, 680 (CA) per Gault J. 
20     R v Accused [1992] 2 NZLR 187, 191 (CA) per Cooke P (emphasis added). 
21   Lisa Sanctis, 'Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence' 
(1996) 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 359, 376. 
22     R v Kalo [1985] 1 NZLR 219, 220, 221 (CA). 
23    R v M (2001) 19 CRNZ 300, 304 (CA).   See, also, R v Rakuraku [2002] CA 321/01 (Unreported, Gault P, Ellis 
and Paterson JJ, 26 August 2002) [27-28] where the Court noted the violence convictions might go to propensity rather 
than credibility.  In other circumstances, 'the subtleties of the distinction' might have been examined more closely.  
However, in this case, adduction of the evidence could not realistically have influenced the verdict.  
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In R v Meynell24 the accused was charged with murdering his partner's child.  The Crown accepted 
that evidence the accused had also used violence against the child's mother would not be 
admissible as evidence-in-chief.  During the trial, defence counsel cross-examined the mother inter 
alia on her written statement to the police on the morning of the homicide in which she claimed she 
had never witnessed the defendant hit the child.  The judge gave leave to re-examine the mother on 
acts of violence by the defendant committed against her on occasions when she had remonstrated 
with the defendant concerning his conduct towards the child.  On appeal, defence counsel 
unsuccessfully submitted that evidence-in-chief of two prior acts of violence by the defendant 
against the child victim had been wrongly admitted under the res gestae doctrine.25  (The assaults 
were made subject to charges to which the accused pleaded guilty and evidence of the incidents but 
not the fact that the accused pleaded guilty was adduced at trial.)  Defence counsel also argued that 
prejudicial evidence of the defendant's prior violence toward the child's mother which was not 
admissible in-chief, should not have been elicited in cross-examination.   
 
However, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that having a full picture of the relationship between 
the child and the defendant would be advantageous where it was almost certain that one of the two 
people (the accused and the child's mother) who were present at the time the child was killed was 
responsible for the death.  This evidence tended to explain the mother's change of story and the 
impact on her of the threats could not properly be understood unless this evidence was before the 
jury.  Defence counsel had been fully aware of the probable result of cross-examining the mother 
on her statement and evidence of past violence towards the mother was correctly admitted in re-
examination.   
 
The assumption that evidence of prior misconduct may increase its probative value according to the 
direction taken by the defence in cross-examining a witness has been criticised as illogical.  Jenny 
McEwan notes the UK Law Commission has observed  
 
that it is illogical to exclude evidence of previous conduct on the ground that its prejudicial effect 
outweighs its probative value, but then let it in later at the trial.  'The probative value of evidence of 
previous conduct cannot be altered by virtue of the reason for the attack on the prosecution witness.'  
                                                 
24    [2004] 1 NZLR 507, 511. 
25   Peter Spiller, New Zealand Law Dictionary (5th ed, 2002) 264, notes: 'Where a fact is relevant to a fact in issue, 
because it is proximate in time, place or circumstance, it is said to be part of the res gestae'. 
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This stance is subsequently abandoned entirely.  Yet its logic is unassailable.26  
 
Meynell illustrates that admissibility of evidence that the accused's violence extended to other 
family members will largely depend upon how the defence case is run.  Had defence counsel 
chosen not to cross-examine the mother on her statement, evidence that the accused had also 
perpetrated acts of violence against the child's mother would not have been heard by the jury.    
 
IV   PROPENSITY EVIDENCE IN INTIMATE FEMICIDE CASES 
The New Zealand Law Commission found the present test for evidence of prior misconduct which 
strikes a balance between making this evidence available if it is useful, and excluding it where it is 
unfairly prejudicial or of only marginal relevance27 was operating well, and providing the desired 
consistency and flexibility.28  This test of probative value versus illegitimate prejudicial effect 
requires courts to consider questions of degree, discretion and judgment that are not susceptible to 
exact codification as 'logic and common-sense' cannot be codified.29  However, as discussed above, 
'common sense' understandings are problematic in domestic violence cases as these are likely to 
reflect 'the myths and misconceptions about family violence we all share'.30   
 
The decision in R v P illustrates the present 'common sense' approach to evidence revealing the 
accused to be a serial domestic violence offender.31  P killed his wife in 1998 following a ten year 
history of violence in the relationship.  The trial judge ruled evidence of violence by P toward two 
of his sisters inadmissible.32  The dates of these alleged assaults are unknown.  However, evidence 
that P had used violence against four other women with whom he had a sexual relationship was 
held admissible both as similar fact evidence and as res gestae or 'part of the story'.   
 
Violence alleged in the first relationship occurred in 1980 when P was 16 years old.  This included 
frequent acts of violence and abuse by P in ways similar to that he had inflicted on his wife, 
including efforts to ensure his violence would not be witnessed by others, and accusations of sexual 
                                                 
26    Jenny McEwan, 'Law Commission Dodges the Nettles in Consultation Paper No. 141' [1997] Crim.L.R. 93, 103 
(citations omitted). 
27    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 10, [87]. 
28    Ibid [175] affirming its previous view in NZLC, Evidence Law: Character and Credibility, PP 27 (1997) 268-271.  
29    R v Davis [1980] 1 NZLR 257, 263 (CA); DPP v Boardman [1975] AC 421, 452 (HL).  
30    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 3, xxxvii. 
31    This case is discussed in full as Case Study P/98/3 above, at p 215.  
32   R v P [1999] CA 65/99 (Unreported, Richardson P, Heron and Goddard JJ, 18 March 1999) [6].  The basis of the 
trial judge's decision to exclude this evidence is unknown. 
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relationships with other men.  Evidence of the second witness was of violence in her relationship 
with P in 1983-1984 similar to that alleged by the first witness.  The third witness, whose 
relationship with P existed for almost two years from about 1984, would give evidence of violence 
by P similar to that of the other women, with the addition that on one occasion, in a violent 
outburst following her refusal to drive the car because of intoxication, P 'stomped on her and broke 
her leg'.33  The fourth woman, with whom P apparently committed adultery around 1989 while he 
was living with his wife, described 'similar violence for similar reasons'.34  The judge held this 
evidence would be relevant to whether P actually lost his self-control when confronted with what 
he believed to be his wife's adultery, and whether the type of violence, and the circumstances in 
which it was administered, had a pattern or characteristics or some underlying unity bearing on the 
offender's state of mind.  P appealed. 
 
Although the fact that many years may have passed between the different incidents does not 
require exclusion of similar fact evidence,35 the Court of Appeal held evidence of P's violence 
towards women other than his wife was inadmissible as too distant in time, place and circumstance.  
P's conduct as a youth and young man could not be compared to his behaviour 'as a mature man in 
his thirties'.36  Nor were the circumstances in which each was assaulted by P 'comparable with the 
events on the night in question'.37   
 
The latter observation may reflect the Court's view that P's earlier assaults could be distinguished 
from the present offending as on the 'night in question' the victim was killed.  This analysis would 
logically preclude all prior acts of violence from qualifying as similar fact evidence in intimate 
femicide cases.  Alternatively, or additionally, the different circumstances to which the Court 
alludes may be based on the allegation that P was provoked on the occasion he killed his wife.  Yet 
evidence in his wife's letters adduced at his first trial made it clear that P believed his wife was 
responsible for his prior acts of violence toward her ('you make me hit you').  Given that 'most 
batterers deny or avoid accepting responsibility for their actions',38 P may well have believed that 
                                                 
33   Ibid [8]. 
34   Ibid [8]. 
35   Gerald Orchard, 'Similar Fact Evidence' in J Bruce Robertson (ed), Essays on Criminal Law: A Tribute to Professor 
Gerald Orchard (2004) 7, 17, noting however, that a relatively short space of time is often mentioned as assisting 
admissibility.  
36    R v P [1999] CA 65/99 (Unreported, Richardson P, Heron and Goddard JJ, 18 March 1999) [24].  
37    Ibid. 
38  Kerry Healey, Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal 
Justice Strategies (1998) 45. 
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his violence toward previous partners was also provoked by his victims.  Consequently, P's assaults 
cannot be distinguished on the basis that on one occasion or another, P was provoked into acting 
violently.  Given that an accused's provocation claim may be rejected at trial, this is a tenuous basis 
for excluding domestic violence evidence.   
 
The end result in this case was the exclusion of evidence demonstrating a continuing pattern of 
violence by P from 1980 up to two years before he commenced a ten year relationship with his 
wife, during which time he continued this pattern of violence, not only toward his wife, but also 
toward another woman during the time he was married.    
 
V   THE HEARSAY RULE 
A non-testifying witness's out of court statement which is offered for the truth of the matter 
asserted in the statement is hearsay and prima facie inadmissible.  In intimate femicide cases, such 
evidence may include a deceased woman's statements of prior violence and fear of the accused 
which are hearsay and inadmissible unless they fall within one of several exceptions to the hearsay 
rule.  Although the line between evidence tendered as proof that the declarant's statement was made 
and an implied assertion of the truth of the statement is sometimes difficult to draw,39 if the 
evidence is led for some purpose other than to establish the truth of the statement, the hearsay 
prohibition is not breached.40   
 
Most authorities concur with the following formulation of the hearsay rule: 
 
Evidence of a statement made to a witness by a person who is not himself called as a witness may or 
may not be hearsay.  It is hearsay and inadmissible when the object of the evidence is to establish 
the truth of what is contained in the statement.  It is not hearsay and is admissible when it is 
proposed to establish by the evidence, not the truth of the statement, but the fact that it was made.41 
 
                                                 
39   This duality arose in R v Howse [2003] 3 NZLR 767, where the Court of Appeal noted that when the evidence can 
be used both to prove the fact the words were spoken and as proof of the truth of the words this engages the hearsay 
rule. 
40    See, eg, R v Gibbons [1996] CA 180/96 (Unreported, Thomas, Keith and Blanchard JJ, 26 September 1996) where 
the evidence was not admitted to prove the truth of the statement, but to prove that a police officer was told of certain 
matters. 
41   Subramaniam v Public Prosecutor [1956] 1 WLR 965, 970 (PC).  See also, Mathieson, above n 2, 568-569.  
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The hearsay rule has been widely criticised as 'one of the oldest, most complex and most confusing 
of the exclusionary rules of evidence'.42  It is generally agreed that the main justification for the 
exclusion of hearsay is the lack of opportunity to test a witness's evidence in cross-examination.43  
Such statements are not made under oath, and the jury cannot observe the declarant's demeanour 
while giving evidence.  In a leading case, Lord Bridge provided the following rationale for the 
hearsay prohibition:  
 
The rationale of excluding [hearsay] as inadmissible, rooted as it is in the system of trial by jury, is a 
recognition of the great difficulty, even more acute for a juror than for a trained judicial mind, of 
assessing what, if any, weight can properly be given to a statement by a person whom the jury have 
not seen or heard, and which has not been subject to any test of reliability by cross-examination… 
The danger against which this fundamental rule provides a safeguard is that untested hearsay 
evidence will be treated as having a probative force which it does not deserve. 44 
 
A number of recognised exceptions to the rule exist at common law and under statute.  Admissions 
made by an accused are a principle incursion upon the hearsay rule.  Dying declarations and 
statements that are part of the res gestae are said to possess sufficient circumstantial reliability to 
justify their admission notwithstanding the dangers against which the hearsay rule guards.  The res 
gestae exception extends to statements accompanying and explaining an act relevant to an issue in 
the case; spontaneous exclamations made by a victim of an offence or a bystander; and declarations 
of a person's own contemporaneous state of mind or emotion which may be admitted as proof of 
the fact intended to be asserted by the representation.45  However, the test for res gestae evidence is 
extremely unclear.   
 
What is meant by saying that a document or act is admissible because it is part of res gestae has 
never so far as I am aware been explained in a satisfactory manner.  I suspect it of being a phrase 
                                                 
42    Mathieson above n 2, 567.   
43    See, eg, New Zealand Law Commission, above n 10, [50].  
44    R v Blastland (1986) 1 AC 41, 54 (HL). 
45   R v M [1997] CA 17/97 (Unreported, Richardson P, Gault and Hammond JJ, 17 March 1997) where the domestic 
violence victim married the accused following the assault and refused to testify against him.  The Crown wished to 
pursue the prosecution and sought to introduce evidence of a female shop assistant under the res gestae exception.  The 
Court of Appeal held this evidence was admissible with an appropriate warning to the jury.  Although not mentioned in 
the judgment, the Court's decision may have been influenced by the fact that this was reportedly the accused's 10th 
charge of assaulting the victim. 
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adopted to provide a respectable legal cloak for a variety of cases to which no formula of precision 
can be applied.46 
 
During the period of the research, s 3 of the Evidence Amendment Act (No2) 1980 governed the 
admission of documentary hearsay (a hearsay statement contained in a written document).  
Documentary hearsay in intimate femicide cases may consist of letters written by the deceased 
victim, diary entries, or statements in an affidavit sworn by her, for example in support of an 
application for custody, or a protection order.  The declarant must have personal knowledge of the 
matters dealt with in the statement and be 'unavailable' to give evidence.   Sections 9 to 14 of the 
Act set out the conditions for admissibility of oral hearsay evidence.  Section 18 provided a 
discretion to reject any hearsay statement that would otherwise be admissible if 'the prejudicial 
effect of the admission of the statement would outweigh its probative value, or if, for any other 
reason, the Court is satisfied that it is not necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to admit 
the statement'.  Sections 16 and 17 required consideration of the circumstances in which the 
statement was made, the time the statement was made, and the extent to which the maker of the 
statement may have a motive to misrepresent any fact or opinion about the subject matter of the 
statement.  
  
The court also has a residual common law discretion to accept hearsay evidence.  Admissibility 
turns on three distinct requirements: relevance, inability and reliability.  The evidence must be 
relevant, the primary witness must be unable for some reason to be called to give the primary 
evidence and the evidence must have sufficient apparent reliability, either inherent or 
circumstantial, or both, to justify its admission in spite of the risk of prejudice to the defendant.  As 
a final check, the Court must consider whether hearsay evidence which might otherwise qualify for 
admission should nevertheless be excluded because its probative value is outweighed by its 
illegitimate prejudicial effect.47    
 
Hearsay and evidence of prior misconduct are not exclusive categories.48  Noting a trend since R v 
Foreman49, Fisher J in R v H observed that it is no longer remarkable for hearsay statements from 
                                                 
46    Ibid [7] citing Homes v Newman [1931] 2 Ch 112 per Lord Thomlin. 
47    R v Manase [2001] 2 NZLR 197 (CA). 
48    See, eg, R v Foreman (1990) 6 CRNZ 328.  
49    Ibid.  
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the deceased as to a prior violent relationship with the accused to be admitted.50  Where the 
evidence is part of a continuous family history relevant to the offence charged it may be admissible 
as background evidence although it may establish the commission of an offence(s) with which the 
accused is not charged.  The value of background evidence 'is not that a specific fact in issue can be 
inferred from it, but simply that if the fact-finders did not hear of it they would find it harder to 
understand the nature of what is alleged'.51  Donald Mathieson suggests that the 'debate as to 
whether evidence of prior misconduct should be classified as essential "background" evidence, or 
as similar fact evidence, should not obscure the need to assess the evidence in terms of probative 
value and prejudicial effect'.52  In R v P the Court of Appeal warned of the prejudice involved and 
significantly limited the quantity of the proposed evidence of violence by the accused toward the 
deceased.53   
 
VI   HEARSAY REQUIREMENTS IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CASES 
The following case studies illustrate how the hearsay requirements that the witness is unavailable 
to testify, and that the evidence is sufficiently reliable, are applied in cases involving recanting or 
uncooperative domestic violence complainants. 
 
A   The Requirement of Unavailability 
A victim of domestic violence may be physically unavailable to testify at trial because she has been 
killed, or because she is unwilling to testify for some reason, or is otherwise unavailable.  In 
intimate femicide cases, the Crown will usually have little difficulty establishing that the victim is 
unavailable to appear in Court and be cross-examined.  In sub-lethal assault cases, high rates of 
victim withdrawal (studies show up to one half or more of complainants in domestic violence cases 
withdraw their support for prosecution),54 and the typically secretive nature of domestic assaults, 
pose significant problems for prosecutors.  Consequently, 'a victim's hearsay statements can 
                                                 
50     (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Fisher J, 15 November 2000) [4]. 
51   England and Wales Law Commission, Evidence of Bad Character in Criminal Proceedings, Report 273, (2001) 
[10.7]. 
52     Mathieson above n 2, 463-464.  
53     R v P [1999] CA 65/99 (Unreported, Richardson P, Heron and Goddard JJ, 18 March 1999).   
54    Louise Ellison, 'Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim Participation' (2002) 65 MLR 834, 834.  See, also, 
Lauren Bennett, Lisa Goodman and Mary Ann Dutton, 'Systematic Obstacles to the Criminal Prosecution of a 
Battering Partner: A Victim Perspective' (1999) 14 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 761, 763, citing various 
empirical studies; Linelle Letrende, 'Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of 
Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence (2000) 75 Wash.L.Rev. 973, 979, citing statistics from Seattle's 
Battered Women's Project. 
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become the only opportunity for the prosecutor to bring in the victim's "voice" at trial'.55  However, 
the Court of Appeal has ruled the unavailability inquiry would seldom, if ever, be satisfied where 
the witness would simply prefer not to face the ordeal of giving evidence or would find it difficult 
to do so.56   
 
In R v M-T,57 the Court adopted a narrow view of the circumstances in which a domestic violence 
complainant may be considered unavailable to testify.  Under s 352 of the Crimes Act 1961 the 
judge is empowered to excuse a witness who has 'just excuse' not to testify.  The complainant in 
this case swore an affidavit in support of an application to set aside the summons requiring her 
appearance in court.  The complainant stated inter alia that she was shortly due to give birth, had an 
abnormal pregnancy, and wanted to avoid further stress which might affect her child or her 
relationship with her partner.  The trial judge excused the woman from giving evidence on health 
grounds, and ruled her hearsay statement of violence by the defendant admissible.58  On appeal, the 
Court of Appeal ruled the statement inadmissible.  Although the hearsay had been tested under 
cross-examination at depositions, the Court held this was the type of situation where it would 
seldom, if ever, be appropriate to admit hearsay evidence in substitution for the complainant giving 
evidence in person.   
 
While acknowledging that its decision may contribute to evidential problems in prosecuting 
domestic violence cases,59 the Court held any change to the current rules, if appropriate, must 
await the intervention of Parliament.60  As a result, the prosecution case against the defendant (who 
had a prior conviction for assault against a former partner) collapsed.  Since the Court's assumption 
that the complainant was 'personally able to give evidence' failed to acknowledge that she had been 
excused on health grounds from doing so, the case could easily have been decided differently.61   
                                                 
55   Neal Hudders, 'The Problem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases: Is A New Exception the Answer?' 
(2000) 49 Duke L.J. 1041, 1044, noting that if the victim recants her original evidence, her voice is obviously heard at 
trial, and in these situations it is the earlier statements of the victim, contradicting her evidence in court, which the 
prosecution seeks to introduce.   
56    R v Manese [2001] 2 NZLR 197 (CA) [30]. 
57    [2003] 1 NZLR 63 (CA). 
58  The judge accepted the Crown argument that the complainant's hearsay statement of abuse was admissible as 
cogent, relevant and sufficiently contemporaneous and spontaneous to avoid any real possibility of concoction.  It had 
been willingly given and its veracity tested under cross-examination at depositions.   
59   Ministry of Justice, Responses to Crime: Annual Review 1999 (1999) 30, indicates police are facing increased 
difficulties in finding enough evidence to prosecute and convict domestic violence offenders. 
60    R v M-T [2003] 1 NZLR 63, 71.   
61    See, Elisabeth McDonald, 'Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases' [2003] NZLJ 174, for a discussion of the case. 
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While the Evidence Act 2006 simplified the hearsay provisions, under s 18(1) admissibility is 
subject to a requirement that 'the maker of the statement is unavailable as a witness'.  On the view 
of 'unavailability' taken in M-T, a hearsay statement to police by a domestic violent complainant 
who is excused from testifying is likely to remain inadmissible.  Douglas Beloof and Joel Shapiro 
suggest exclusion of a recanting domestic violence victim's original statement of violence places 
wishful thinking ahead of reality.   
 
This is because it is highly probable that a domestic violence victim's initial disclosure, not allowed 
into evidence, is more reliable than the victim's recantation…Clinging to the requirement of the oath 
as predicate for admissibility of the domestic violence victim's initial report requires naively 
blinding oneself to the greater forces at work upon the victim.62      
 
If a battered woman elects, for whatever reason, not to cooperate with criminal justice intervention, 
and the charges are dropped, or the case results in dismissal, the woman is likely to be beaten 
again.63  The batterer is likely to interpret this lack of accountability as a licence to continue to 
abuse his partner without consequence, and any children of the household will suffer harm from 
experiencing or witnessing physical and/or psychological abuse.   
 
The Evidence Act 2006 abolished the rule that the spouse of a defendant is a competent but not 
compellable witness for the prosecution in criminal proceedings.64  As previously discussed,65 
Clause 71 of the Bill provided for a judicial discretion to excuse persons in a 'close relationship' 
with the defendant from giving evidence where 'the public interest in the evidence being given is 
outweighed by the public interest in preventing harm to the relationship resulting from the giving 
of that evidence'.  The provision was deleted at the Select Committee stage on the basis that:  a) it 
may provide encouragement to complainants to decline to give evidence because of intimidation or 
guilt; b) the arbitrariness of determining what constitutes a 'close relationship'; and c) the 
anomalous consequences for the hearsay rule, especially the admissibility of a witness statement 
without the opportunity for cross-examination.66  Consequently, victims of domestic violence will 
                                                 
62  Douglas Beloof and Joel Shapiro, 'Let the Truth be Told: Proposed Hearsay Exceptions to Admit Domestic 
Violence Victims' Out of Court Statements as Substantive Evidence' (2002) 11 Colum.J.Gender & L. 1, 6. 
63    Cheryl Hanna, 'No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions'  (1996) 
109 Harv.L.Rev. 1849, 1895.    
64    Section 71 provides that any person is eligible to give evidence in a civil or criminal proceeding.  Under s 71(1)(b) 
'a  person who is eligible to give evidence is compellable to give that evidence.' 
65    See, discussion above, at p 94. 
66    Justice and Electoral Committee, 'Evidence Bill: Commentary' 9. 
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be compellable witnesses for the prosecution.   Since the legislation provides that prior out of court 
statements by a testifying witness are non-hearsay,67 the victim's earlier statement to police will be 
admissible in evidence for its truth.    
 
However, while accepting that citizens in a civilised society have a duty to be available to give 
evidence,68 and a paternalistic focus upon the wishes of individual women risks reinforcing 
negative stereotypes of battered women and ultimately disempowering all women, it is 
unacceptable to provide a blanket policy of compellability in the absence of provisions to ensure 
women's safety.  As discussed below, the persistent failure in criminal law to acknowledge the 
dangers inherent in battering relationships is likely to further endanger women by requiring victim 
testimony in cases which clearly call for a discretion to excuse the domestic violence complainant 
from giving evidence.   
 
While no hearsay objection applies, Scott Optican and Peter Sankoff note that where the 
complainant recants at trial and refuses to answer questions, or testifies that the defendant's 
violence was accidental, or in self defence, the prosecution will be barred from introducing her 
prior inconsistent statement because to do so would result in cross-examining its own witness.69  
Therefore, in order to have the statement admitted, the prosecution must satisfy the trial judge that 
the complainant should be declared 'hostile'.70  In addition to failing to protect victims of violence, 
this situation provides no guarantee of batterer accountability.  Although at first glance the relevant 
tests for hostility under s 4(1) of the Act present no additional restriction on admissibility of the 
statement,  
 
it can never be a completely inevitable result when Courts confront suddenly exculpatory testimony 
by the victim of an alleged domestic assault.  There will always remain the possibility that, on the 
facts as they are presented in Court and despite a prior inconsistent complaint to police, a Judge will 
make no finding of hostility…As a result, the previous statement of the testifying victim will be 
blocked from admissibility not because of any inherent indicia of unreliability, but simply because a 
Judge failed to make the requisite finding of hostility permitting the Crown to challenge its own 
                                                 
67    Section 4 Evidence Act 2006 defines a hearsay statement as that 'made by a person other than a witness' which is 
'offered in evidence at the proceeding to prove the truth of its contents'. 
68    Judge David Harvey, 'Spousal Non-Compellability' [1997] NZLJ 114, 117. 
69    See ss 37(4) and 94. 
70    Scott Optican and Peter Sankoff, 'The Evidence Bill 2005: A New Approach to Hearsay' [2005] NZLJ 446, 447.   
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witness.  Indeed, the prior complaint of assault may be completely reliable and still not qualify for 
admission in the case!71  
 
These legal commentators argue that the judge's perception whether the witness is manifesting a 
hostile demeanour indicative of her unwillingness to testify truthfully 'seems a thin and not 
particularly cogent reed' on which to base the admissibility of out of court statements which would 
otherwise present no problems of admissibility.72  As previously discussed, courts have tended to 
prioritise preservation of the relationship over batterer accountability when victims express 
reluctance to cooperate with domestic violence prosecutions.73  Furthermore, despite a wealth of 
evidence showing victims' initial statements of violence are more reliable than victims' recantation, 
as discussed in the following section, courts may be predisposed toward the opposite view.  
 
B   The Requirement of Reliability 
Hearsay evidence is generally admissible under the Evidence Act 2006 provided it is sufficiently 
reliable and the maker of the statement is unavailable as a witness.74  The requirement of 
unavailability has been discussed above.  The following case study provides an insight into judicial 
approaches to the issue of reliability.  The decision in this case to exclude hearsay and propensity 
evidence provided the route by which the killer escaped a potential murder conviction.    
 
The Reliability Inquiry: Case Study H/02/11 
On 8 February 2002, Ron the 45 year-old male offender, and Hasnah, his 38 year-old partner were at home 
alone.  Ron, who was a drug addict and on a methadone programme, accused Hasnah of sexual infidelity 
and the pair argued.  During the night Hasnah ingested between 100-150 mgs of Ron's methadone.  Fifty 
mgs of methadone can be fatal for a non tolerant user.  After ingesting the drug, Hasnah became 
unconscious, and although he was by profession a qualified general and psychiatric nurse, Ron did not seek 
medical help for her until some time after 6 pm the following day.  Paramedics found Hasnah lying naked 
on the bed, cold to the touch, and uncovered apart from a sheet over the lower part of her legs.  She had also 
been propped up by at least five pillows placed behind her head which partially occluded or blocked her 
airways.  After attempts to stabilise her failed, Hasnah was admitted to an intensive care unit at the hospital 
                                                 
71    Ibid 448. 
72    Ibid. 
73   As discussed above, although spousal non-compellability under s 5(6) of the Evidence Act 1908 did not extend to 
unmarried parties, a de facto policy of non-compellability was apparently adopted in these cases. 
74    Section 18. 
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where she remained unconscious for some days.  A CT scan revealed she was suffering from severe brain 
damage together with a number of other serious disorders including acute liver failure.   
 
Subsequently Hasnah's condition improved and on 19 February she was well enough to speak to police.  A 
police constable recorded the conversation in his notebook.  Hasnah stated she had not taken the methadone 
willingly, nor did she want to kill herself.  She said Ron had offered her the methadone which she believed 
was medicine and told her 'if you love me you will take this'.75  Ron was arrested that day and charged with 
attempted murder and with failing to provide the necessaries of life.  On 20 February, Hasnah was 
interviewed for a four hour period.  A police constable wrote out a ten page statement which Hasnah signed 
on each page and wrote on the last page that she had read the statement which was true and correct.  Her 
signature was witnessed by the constable.   
 
Hasnah stated she had married Ron in 2001 after arriving in New Zealand on a visitor's permit.  The 
marriage was never lawful because she had previously married in Thailand.  She stated that prior to her 
marriage to Ron she informed him she was already married and Ron responded by asking her 'Why don't 
you do something about that?'  So after her marriage to Ron, Hasnah filed for a divorce from her lawful 
husband.  Hasnah further stated that a few days before she took 'the medicine', Ron noticed her looking at 
two men in a supermarket became jealous and would not let the matter rest.  He also accused her of sleeping 
with her brother-in-law which she denied and questioned her about a credit card she had been given some 
years earlier.  Ron allegedly shouted 'I've married a whore' and told Hasnah he was going to send her back 
to Malaysia.  She said she did not want to return to Malaysia and the pair argued for one or two days until 
the night she ingested the methadone.  (At trial, one witness gave evidence that Ron used particularly 
vitriolic and unpleasant language towards Hasnah and persuaded her to deface her own passport by writing 
demeaning and humiliating words about her sexual activity.)76   
 
Hasnah stated Ron told her to take the methadone as it would help her sleep.  When she refused, he pushed 
her cheeks together with one hand so hard it made her mouth open and then tipped methadone from the 
bottle into her mouth.  At this stage she was lying flat on her back and could not get up and run past Ron out 
the door.  However, she thought Ron would look after her and she would be 'ok'.77  On 21 February, Hasnah 
informed a social worker at the hospital that she and her husband had an argument and he told her to take 
the methadone as it would help her sleep.  On 22 February she told a medical registrar that Ron had told her 
to take 'the medicine'.   
                                                 
75    R v H [2003] 3 NZLR [3]. 
76   In R v H (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Harrison J, 15 December 2003) [6], the sentencing judge notes these 
words may have been more a reflection of the offender's own warped thinking than of the truth.  
77   R v H (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Chambers J, 5 June 2003) [24]. 
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Ron was released on bail.  Despite a condition of non-association, a number of telephone calls were made 
which originated both from Hasnah and from Ron.  On 27 February, a police constable returned to the 
hospital with a view to having Hasnah sign a brief of evidence which was substantially the same as the 
earlier written statement.  Although she signed the last page, and began signing the preceding pages, Hasnah 
refused to sign the first two pages of the statement telling the officer she wanted to change her statement so 
that she could see Ron and be with him.  Later that day, Ron contacted a solicitor and told him that his wife 
needed to speak to a lawyer.  The solicitor spoke to Hasnah by telephone and later attended at the hospital.  
Hasnah advised the solicitor that she had taken the methadone voluntarily.  The solicitor later described 
Hasnah's explanations that she did not want to hurt herself and also that she did wish to hurt herself as 
'confused'.  Hasnah also informed the solicitor that Ron had discovered she was lawfully married to another 
man and had threatened to send her back to Malaysia.  However she did not want to go back to Malaysia 
and wanted to be with her husband.  She stated Ron had not told her to change her story or threatened her in 
this regard.   
 
On 1 March, Ron collected Hasnah from the hospital and they resumed living together.  Over the next 
weekend her condition deteriorated.  The pair went to the Court to arrange for Ron's bail conditions to be 
varied to permit them to live together.  When they left the courthouse, Ron was carrying Hasnah, who was 
seen to fall and land on the back of her head on the road.  She was readmitted to hospital the same day and 
her state of health rapidly deteriorated.  From that point on, Hasnah was unresponsive, unable to 
communicate, and was diagnosed as suffering from progressive and severe brain damage as a result of 
oxygen deprivation consequent upon ingestion of the methadone.  On 13 May 2002, she was transferred to a 
hospital in Malaysia where she died on 1 June 2002. 
 
Ron was charged with murder and the Crown sought to introduce evidence of Hasnah's statement made on 
20 February.  The judge noted that if the statement was excluded then all oral statements made by Hasnah 
following the incident would be inadmissible.  On the other hand, if the statement was admissible, then all 
oral statements made by Hasnah, including those made to others at the hospital should also be admitted.   
 
To assist in proving Ron's guilt, and to overcome Hasnah's recantation, the Crown sought to introduce 
evidence from Ron's former wife that Ron had injected her with illegal drugs against her will.  This woman 
would give evidence that Ron was jealous and controlling and she was forced to keep her eyes on the 
ground when she attended the supermarket as he would accuse her of adultery if she looked at a male 
customer.  Ron was also obsessed with relationships she had before she met him and when he was injecting 
her with his drugs would tell her: 'If you don't agree, you don't love me'.  On one occasion, she alleged Ron 
forced her at knifepoint to take 30 Panadeine tablets telling her: 'You are going to commit suicide.  You're 
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just too evil to live.  You're a slut.'  For the next few days she was violently ill and not long after that, she 
ended the relationship.78  If Hasnah's statement were excluded, this evidence would also be excluded and the 
Crown's murder case would collapse.   
 
Arguing against admission of Hasnah's statement, defence counsel first suggested that spousal non-
compellability was relevant to the discretion to exclude the statement. The judge held s 5(6) of the Evidence 
Act had no relevance to the case and should be confined to the situation of a spouse giving evidence on oath 
in court.  Defence counsel also objected to the section of the statement in which Hasnah stated Ron had 
forcibly administered the methadone, submitting that the 'major probative value' of the evidence was 
outweighed by its prejudicial effect.  This was particularly the case since Hasnah later refused to sign the 
brief of evidence based on the statement.  However the judge noted Ron's 'extraordinary' delay in seeking 
emergency help for Hasnah was strongly probative of her account that he was involved in her ingestion of 
the methadone rather than his account that he played no part in it.  Ron claimed Hasnah had ingested the 
methadone as a declaration of her love for him.  However, the judge noted the 'sheer improbability' that a 
woman who was not herself a drug user, would suddenly decide to drink Ron's methadone as proof of her 
love for him.  This amounted to a bizarre and irrational act and there was no evidence that Hasnah had been 
acting irrationally prior to this event.  
 
Hasnah had stated on 19 February that she did not take the methadone willingly and also had conversations 
with medical personnel in which she claimed the defendant had told her to take the methadone - although 
she did not mention that he forced her to do so.  While her later refusal to sign the brief of evidence and 
conversations with the solicitor were in conflict with her earlier statement, and threw doubts on its 
reliability, there had been significant discussions between Hasnah and the defendant in breach of his bail 
conditions, and her change of story might reflect pressure from Ron.  Moreover, it was clear from the 
solicitor's account that Hasnah's primary concern was her ability to remain in New Zealand and she 
perceived the defendant and his attitude toward her as being of great significance in that respect: '[T]he sole 
basis of her application for residency was her marriage to [the offender].  He now had the means of 
exposing that as a sham'.79    
 
The judge further noted that if the evidence of Ron's former partner were true, this evidence was highly 
probative of the Crown's essential allegation in the present case that Ron had caused Hasnah to take drugs 
by force.  The common features were:  a) each woman was the wife or partner of the defendant; b) each 
complained he exhibited extreme jealousy; c) neither could look at a man in the supermarket without being 
accused of wanting to have sex with him; d) each complained the defendant forced his drugs on them in a 
                                                 
78    Ibid. 
79    Ibid [46]. 
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context of fury while accusing the victim in this case of being 'a whore' and a 'slut' and his former partner of 
being 'a slut'.  There was no suggestion of collusion between the women as the former wife lived in 
Australia and had never met the victim in this case.  There was undoubtedly a 'special characteristic or 
pattern' which emerged from the similar fact evidence and an 'underlying unity between the separate 
events'.80  The judge noted it was legitimate to look at all the relevant evidence when determining the 
admissibility of Hasnah's statement and this included the evidence of the defendant's former wife.   
 
The judge held the probative value of Hasnah's evidence was not so weakened that it was outweighed by the 
alleged prejudice to Ron.  The Crown would put all statements before the Court and the defence would be 
able to highlight to the jury the differences in the various statements.  In this way the fairness of the trial 
could be preserved.  Hasnah's inability to testify would in this case render the absence of cross-examination 
less important, as the defence could make strong submissions regarding inconsistencies and Hasnah would 
not be present to give an explanation.  It followed that the evidence of the defendant's former wife was also 
admissible.  There was no doubt as to its relevance and it met accepted tests for similar fact evidence.  The 
prejudice involved in allowing the jury to learn that the defendant had been capable of similar conduct in the 
past was easily outweighed by the high probative value with respect to the matter in issue, namely whether 
the defendant forced his partner to ingest his methadone.  Ron appealed. 
 
The Court of Appeal held by a majority that all the contested evidence was inadmissible.  In doing so, the 
Court stated that the judge had underestimated the importance and potential effect which cross-examination 
of the deceased could have had, and therefore underestimated the prejudice to the defendant.  The judge had 
also overestimated the degree of probative value of the statement given other material which contradicted it.  
On the basis of what the deceased had said to others, particularly to the solicitor, she may well have 
retracted her statement that the defendant forced her to drink his methadone.  Although there was room for 
suspicion that Hasnah had other reasons for wanting to withdraw her statement apart from the falsity of this 
assertion: for example, pressure from the defendant or a desire to retain her immigration status and remain 
in New Zealand, the possibility that her recantation was motivated by a desire to tell the truth could not be 
dismissed.  Had Hasnah lived, and been called to give evidence against Ron on a charge of attempted 
murder, and maintained her position that she had taken the methadone voluntarily, that would have become 
her evidence, unless the Crown were successful in declaring her a hostile witness.  Even if she were in the 
position to affirm her statement, a skilled cross-examiner could have used Hasnah's inconsistent statements 
and the circumstances of her relationship with the defendant to impeach her evidence and raise a reasonable 
doubt.81   
 
                                                 
80    Ibid [35], citing R v M [1999] 1 NZLR 315, 320 (CA). 
81    R v H [2003] 3 NZLR 757 [33]. 
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The Court noted that where, as in this case, there are substantial issues of credibility, admission of testimony 
without any opportunity to test the witness by cross-examination must affect the fairness of trial.  Since the 
prejudicial effect of the statement outweighed its probative value, the various oral statements and the 
evidence of Ron's former wife were also inadmissible.  The former because it was accepted that these were 
only admissible to provide balance for Hasnah's statement of 20 February, and the latter because it could not 
be probative of any similar fact evidence, now that Hasnah's account, to which it is said there was similarity, 
would not be before the Court.82  
 
However, the minority of the Court favoured admission of Hasnah's statement 'because the subsequent 
events, which caused the majority to find it did not have a sufficient apparent reliability, required separate 
consideration'.83  If this was correct, there would be evidence to show the later events were both explicable 
in the particular circumstances and consistent with the inherent reliability of the statement at the time it was 
made.  Furthermore, the extent of the evidence available to examine these issues was such that the defendant 
would not be unduly prejudiced by the inability to cross-examine the deceased.   
 
As a consequence of the majority decision, the Crown murder case collapsed and the defendant was charged 
with manslaughter on the basis that he had omitted without lawful excuse to provide Hasnah with the 
necessaries of life and thereby caused her death. 
 
At trial, the Crown called a specialist in anaesthetics and intensive care who told the Court that in his 
opinion, it would have been 'very obvious' to anyone with medical knowledge that Hasnah's condition 
following ingestion of the methadone was serious and she required medical treatment.  A consulting 
neurologist stated the circulatory and respiratory effects of the drug overdose were compounded by two 
'baleful influences'.  One was the long delay in receiving medical attention; the other was Ron's action in 
placing Hasnah in a 'propped up position, partially obstructing her airway and aggravating the adverse 
effects of failing circulation on blood flow to the brain'.  Another intensive care specialist concluded that 
Hasnah would not have died or suffered serious brain damage if Ron had called for emergency medical 
assistance immediately after she consumed the methadone.  He identified five major failures by Ron, 
including: failure to seek help; failure to maintain the deceased under constant observation; failure to 
administer CPR and summon help after noticing the deceased was cyanosed; leaving her naked and poorly 
covered for many hours; and maintaining her in a propped up position.84  Ron was convicted of 
manslaughter.   
 
                                                 
82    Ibid [34]. 
83    Ibid [35]. 
84    R v H (No 1) (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Harrison J, 3 December 2003) [8-9]. 
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At sentencing, the judge refused to accept Ron's claim that he fell asleep for 12 hours after Hasnah had 
taken a potentially fatal dose of methadone.  Ron told the specialist that he knew his wife was suffering 
from cyanosis and was not responsive to tactile stimulus and the specialist had recorded these comments 
because they struck him as most unusual.  Anyone with medical knowledge would know that blue or 
cyanosed lips provided evidence that the bloodstream was being starved of oxygen.  Nor did the judge 
accept Ron's explanation that he propped the deceased up to assist her breathing, and expressed his 
satisfaction that Ron knew that positioning Hasnah in this way would aggravate any brain damage, and had 
deliberately taken this step.  No other inference could be drawn from his decision to place Hasnah in that 
position and leave her cold and uncovered.  Ron knew of his partner's dire medical condition and knew that 
the longer he waited to summon medical assistance the more likely she was to deteriorate and die.  The 
judge told Ron: 'I repeat that you are a nurse both by training and experience.  Anybody with elementary 
medical knowledge knows that to place a seriously ill person in this position would inevitably have an 
adverse, not a beneficial, effect upon her ability to inhale oxygen.  Again, you know, just as any qualified 
nurse, that she should have been placed immediately in the recovery position….I am satisfied your 
prolonged failure to call an ambulance was not only grossly negligent, it was more than reckless; it was 
deliberate'.85    
 
Ron was sentenced to ten years and ordered to serve a minimum term of five years' imprisonment.  His 
subsequent appeal against conviction and sentence was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.86 
  
While the focus of the majority of the Court of Appeal in this case was on the victim's capacity for 
mendacity, '[i]n no other class of cases is recantation, including recantation by memory loss, 
commonplace and even expected'.87  Since as time passes, the abuser has increased opportunities to 
reassert control and pressure the victim to withdraw, enhanced evidence gathering techniques in 
overseas jurisdictions are based on the assumption that evidence of domestic violence collected at 
the time the assault occurred is more reliable as this is the time the victim is most likely to 
cooperate with law enforcement.88  Investigating officers are specifically instructed to investigate 
domestic violence crimes on the assumption that the victim will withdraw, recant or otherwise fail 
                                                 
85    R v H (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Harrison J, 15 December 2003) [17].  
86    R v H [2005] 2 NZLR 81. 
87    Beloof and Shapiro, above n 62, 24. 
88  Tonya McCormack, 'Convicting Domestic Violence Abusers When the Victim Remains Silent' (1998-1999) 13 
B.Y.U.J.Pub.L. 427, citing San Diego and Maryland domestic violence intervention initiatives at: 439-431.   
Paradoxically, the 'recent complaint' rule in sexual offences cases is frequently justified on the (sexist and incorrect) 
assumption that a prompt complaint is more likely to be true than one made some time after the alleged offending.  
See, eg, Annabel Markham, 'Recent Complaint Evidence' [1997] NZLJ 79, 79. 
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to cooperate at any subsequent trial.89  Thus '[w]hile out of court statements are generally 
considered an inferior kind of proof, in cases of domestic violence the victim's out of court 
statements are typically a superior form of proof'.90   
 
As illustrated above, judicial opinions regarding the probity and reliability of hearsay evidence may 
differ.  Significantly, these differences may depend more upon judges' understandings of the 
dynamics of domestic violence than upon any clear guideline principles.  The exclusion of 
Hasnah's hearsay statements and evidence that Ron had behaved in a similar manner toward a 
previous partner meant crucial information about the circumstances of Hasnah's death never 
reached the jury. 
 
VII   'RED FLAGS' FOR INTIMATE FEMICIDE: WHAT THE JURY WAS NEVER 
TOLD 
A   Prior Threats to Kill 
Although threats to kill, especially those involving use of a weapon, carry a high risk of serious 
violence and lethality,91 the jury in the following case were not permitted to hear evidence that 
shortly before the homicide, the deceased woman's estranged partner threatened to kill her with the 
murder weapon he subsequently employed to carry out his threat.   
 
Prior Threats to Kill with a Weapon: Case Study B/97/492  
The relationship between Michael, the 25 year-old male offender, and Stephine his partner, was 
characterised by arguments and physical violence by Michael toward Stephine on a number of occasions.93  
Stephine left the relationship three times and following her final departure, was granted a protection order 
which covered herself and her two children.  Michael fatally stabbed Stephine with a kitchen knife when she 
dropped off their child for an access visit.  After stabbing Stephine repeatedly in her throat and back, 
Michael made an attempt to kill himself by slashing his wrists and stabbing himself in the abdomen.  The 
Crown argued the background to the offending was a history of violence by Michael, who wanted total 
control of his partner.  However, Michael claimed he had been provoked by an alleged remark from 
Stephine. 
                                                 
89    Louise Ellison, 'Responding to Victim Withdrawal in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' [2003] Crim.L.R. 760, 762-
763. 
90     Beloof and Shapiro, above n 62, 6 (emphasis in original). 
91     See, eg, Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Assessing Risk Factors for Intimate Partner Homicide' [2003] NIJ Journal 14. 
92     See, discussion of this case above, at p 161.  
93     R v B (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua,  Randerson J, 24 March 1998) 2.  
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In a pre-trial application, the Crown sought admission of an affidavit sworn by Stephine in support of the 
protection order, together with oral statements made by her to some nine witnesses regarding the nature of 
her relationship with Michael.  The judge noted the disputed evidence could be broken down into three sub-
categories.  1) statements by Stephine in her affidavit or to identified witnesses regarding the general nature 
of her relationship with Michael; 2) statements in her affidavit and to others of 'what took place at the 
incident at the accused's parent's home; 3) specific evidence by Stephine in her affidavit and in oral 
statements made to witnesses of an incident when during an argument Michael 'grabbed her, pulled her head 
right back by her hair and held a kitchen knife to her throat'.94   
 
The 'general evidence' in category 1 related to the length of the relationship, the fact of separation, the 
naming of the children, 'general evidence of physical and psychological abuse, evidence the accused used a 
drug (Prozac) to help him cope with depression, restrictions on the deceased seeing friends and using the 
telephone, and evidence that she had left the accused twice previously'.95  The Court held this part of the 
affidavit was admissible as a clear and straight forward account of the couple's 'difficult' relationship which 
was supported by and consistent with the evidence of a number of other witnesses.96  The evidence was part 
of the history relating to the charge faced by the accused and also relevant to the state of mind of the 
deceased, including whether she was fearful of the accused and was therefore likely to have provoked the 
incident which led to her death.  Nor were there any grounds under s 18 of the Act for rejecting it.  
Moreover, if the evidence were relied upon solely to prove the state of mind of the deceased then it was 
admissible in any event and not excluded by the hearsay rule.  Since Stephine's state of mind 'in the period 
immediately before the murder' was relevant, evidence in the affidavit of the need for a protection order and 
the deceased's fears about the accused consistent with other direct and admissible evidence was also 
admitted.   
 
Evidence of the incident at the home of the accused's parents was also admissible as much of it was 
corroborated by witnesses, including the accused's parents.  (Little is known of this evidence apart from the 
judge's observation that the accused assaulted both his parents at this time.)  Michael's parents would also 
give evidence that Michael had previously threatened to kill himself and Stephine.    
 
However, specific evidence in category 3 regarding the knife assault which Stephine had repeated orally to 
witnesses was excluded.  The judge accepted the Crown submission that this evidence was relevant in 
rebutting the allegation of verbal provocation.  First, it showed Stephine was afraid of Michael as a result of 
                                                 
94    Ibid 4.  
95    Ibid 7-8. 
96    Ibid 8.   
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the previous violence and was therefore unlikely to have used the alleged provoking words at the access 
changeover.  Second, use of the knife showed it was not the first time Michael had suddenly lost his temper 
and that there had been recent on-going violence towards Stephine.  Moreover, a domestic violence 
programme provider who had spoken to Michael about the contents of Stephine's affidavit was able to say 
that Michael had the affidavit with him when he was interviewed, and had acknowledged the entirety of its 
contents to be true.  The judge nevertheless pointed to the possibility that Stephine's evidence had been 
exaggerated or embellished; bearing in mind that she had sworn the affidavit in support of an application for 
a protection order.97   
 
The judge held s 43(3) of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 amounted to a statutory bar to admissibility of 
evidence of Michael's conversation with the programme provider.98  In the absence of independent evidence 
to support the knife assault, there being no complaint made to the police and no medical evidence (no injury 
having been caused), the fact Stephine had told friends and relatives of the knife assault did no more than 
indicate consistency with the affidavit.  The judge noted his concern that Stephine was not available to be 
cross-examined. (Michael was thereby able to benefit from his victim's non-appearance although he was 
responsible for it.)  The judge also observed that 'the manner in which the knife was allegedly presented on 
the June occasion was plainly different from the later occasion when it was used with tragic 
consequences'.99  As a point of clarification, the judge stated that had evidence from the programme 
provider been admissible, he would have taken the opposite view about the admissibility of the knife 
incident in view of the accused's apparent acknowledgement of its truth.100   
                                                
   
Michael's threat to kill Stephine with the murder weapon; his prior threats to kill; his past violence; 
and controlling behaviour, including suicide threats; all in the context of separation, highlight the 
risk of lethality Michael posed.  It is not known whether this risk was recognised by the Court at 
the time of granting the protection order, or by the programme provider, and whether this resulted 
in a warning to Stephine accompanied by safety planning.   
 
Evidence of the knife incident was acknowledged by the judge to be relevant both to Stephine's 
state of mind, and as background evidence.  Focusing on the possibility that Stephine exaggerated 
or embellished this incident and pointing to the lack of independent evidence to support her 
allegation appears paradoxical given the judge's acceptance that the programme provider could 
 
97    Ibid 10. 
98    Ibid 11. 
99    Ibid 10. 
100   Ibid 11. 
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testify to the reliability of Stephine's claims.  But for the statutory bar, this evidence was 
acknowledged as reliable and would have been admitted.     
 
The judge's contention that 'the manner in which the knife was allegedly presented on the June 
occasion was plainly different from the later occasion when it was used with tragic consequences', 
may have been based on Michael's allegation that he was provoked on the occasion of the fatal 
attack.  As in this case, such claims are frequently rejected by juries.  Consequently, this is an 
unconvincing basis for excluding domestic violence evidence.  Alternatively, the 'plain difference' 
between the assaults may refer to the fact that on the second occasion, Stephine was killed.  As 
previously discussed, the latter distinction would operate to exclude all prior acts of violence in 
intimate femicide cases on the basis that none of them resulted in the victim's death.    
 
The research was greatly hindered by a general lack of detailed discussion of the evidence 
excluded, and reasons for excluding it.  For example, three paragraphs of Stephine's affidavit 
setting out the reasons she required protection from Michael were excluded without any discussion 
as to their content.101  While two paragraphs of Stephine's affidavit concerning 'her fears about the 
accused' were held to be admissible and relevant to Stephine's state of mind in the period 
immediately before the murder, there is no discussion of the nature of this evidence, or how its 
probative value and prejudicial effect differed from excluded evidence relevant to Stephine's state 
of mind (the knife assault).102   
 
B   Controlling Behaviour and Stalking 
Polk chillingly reveals how stalking an estranged partner points to a calculated and planned course 
of action:     
 
The careful tracking of the movements of the victim as part of the plan illustrates the intentioned 
character of many of these homicides.  When the rage has reached the point where the male is ready 
to kill, he often scouts out the movements of his victim, determining where and when she will be 
vulnerable to attack.103     
 
                                                 
101     Ibid 12. 
102     Evidence of the knife assault was excluded on the grounds that its prejudicial effect outweighed its probative 
value and it was not necessary or expedient in the interests of justice to admit it. 
103     Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 30. 
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Five paragraphs in Stephine's affidavit dealt with 'an incident when the deceased visited her 
solicitor' and it was alleged the accused 'was hanging about at the time of this interview'.104  If 
Michael was stalking Stephine before he killed her, this evidence would be highly probative of 
calculation and planning as opposed to Michael's version of the homicide as a spontaneous outburst 
of violence.  However, the judge excluded this evidence as neither relevant nor probative.  Since the 
excluded paragraphs contained information considered legally relevant to Stephine's application for 
a protection order, some discussion of their content and reasons for exclusion might have been 
expected.   
 
C   Prior Violence toward the Deceased 
In the great majority of intimate femicides, the woman has experienced violence at the hands of her 
partner in the past year.  The number of days since the last act of violence is also an important risk 
factor.  In one study, half the women killed, and three-fourths of the battered women who killed, 
had experienced violence within 30 days of the homicide.105  By contrast, legal analyses generally 
overlook the interrelationship between battering and intimate femicide.  Consequently, evidence of 
a previous assault with the murder weapon may be excluded as neither relevant, nor probative. 
 
Prior Violence toward the Deceased: Case Study U/02/7 
Ben, the 27 year-old offender, attacked Jessica, his 26 year-old partner, by striking her four or five times 
around the head with an iron dumb bell.  When Jessica fell on a sofa unconscious, Ben struck her two more 
times with the weapon.  Immediately afterwards, he walked to the local police station and advised officers 
of the circumstances of Jessica's death and his participation in it.  Ben told police the couple were planning 
to marry but Jessica had taken off the engagement ring he bought her.  He said she put the ring in a drawer, 
laughed at him, and said 'it's called see you later'.  He became angry and killed her with the dumb bell.106   
 
Ben was charged with murder 'in the alternative under the first two limbs of s 167 Crimes Act 1961; that is, 
that he meant to cause (a) [the victim's] death or (b) any bodily injury to her that was known to him to be 
likely to cause death'.107  The Crown sought leave to adduce evidence that Ben had assaulted Jessica with 
the murder weapon less than two months before he killed her.  On the earlier occasion, Jessica is reported as 
                                                 
104    R v B (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua,  Randerson J, 24 March 1998) 12.  
105    Campbell, et al, above n 91, 14. 
106    Transcript of Proceedings, R v U (High Court, Harrison J, 7 July 2003).  
107    R v U (Trial Ruling No. 1, Unreported, High Court, Gisborne, Harrison J, 7 July 2003) [7].   
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suffering a broken arm and serious head injuries.108  The Crown produced supplementary briefs from a 
number of witnesses, including Jessica's friends and relatives who encountered her after the earlier assault at 
which time she 'presented in a physically and emotionally distressed state [and] was obviously suffering the 
consequences of injuries to her arm and the back of her head'.109  The judge notes Jessica was reticent about 
disclosing the cause of her injuries but told at least one friend that Ben was responsible.  Her friends 
persuaded her to seek medical assistance and Jessica told the doctor who treated her broken arm that she had 
fallen in a horse riding accident.  However, in the doctor's opinion, her injury was consistent with a heavy 
blow.110  During a police interview following her killing, Ben admitted that he had previously beaten Jessica 
with the dumb bell.111   
 
The Crown emphasised that it 'did not seek to lead [this] evidence within the general rubric of similar fact or 
to establish a propensity for bad conduct'.  Rather, the Crown submitted that evidence of the previous assault 
was relevant to the second alternative under s 167(b) in that it was probative of the fact that Ben knew the 
murder weapon could cause injury to Jessica and that such injury was likely to cause her death.112  
However, the judge ruled evidence of Ben's prior assault with the murder weapon was 'not at all probative 
on the charge of murder'.  There was no relevant causal nexus between the two events and the fact that Ben 
had employed the same weapon on both occasions was immaterial.  All the evidence would establish was 
that Ben knew or must have known that striking Jessica's arm with an iron dumb bell would be likely to 
break a bone in that region. This would tell the jury nothing about whether Ben knew that striking her 
elsewhere on her body with the same weapon was likely to cause her death.113   
                                                
 
Further, the judge noted that even if satisfied that the evidence had some probative value, he would still 
exclude it, as any such value was 'far exceeded by its potentially prejudicial effect.'114  While accepting the 
Crown's submission that an appropriate direction could be given to the jury, the judge held that the risk 
remained that evidence of the prior assault would be treated by the jury as showing a propensity for bad 
conduct.  Accordingly, all evidence relating to Ben's prior assault on Jessica was excluded. 
 
The nature of Ben's defence could not be ascertained from the available information.  Defence 
counsel appeared to focus on provocation (Jessica's comment regarding removal of the ring that 'it's 
 
108    Although the pre-trial ruling focuses on Jessica's broken arm and refers only in passing to injuries Jessica suffered 
to the back of her head, newspaper reports and the judge's remarks at sentencing describe her earlier head injuries as 
'serious'.  See, R v U (Unreported, High Court, Gisborne, Harrison J, 11 July 2003) [5]. 
109    R v U (Trial Ruling No. 1, Unreported, High Court, Gisborne, Harrison J, 7 July 2003) [4].   
110    Ibid [4-5]. 
111    Ibid [6]. 
112    Ibid [7].   
113    Ibid [8].  
114    Ibid [8-9]. 
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called see you later').  If so, as in Case Study B/97/4 above, evidence of Ben's prior violence toward 
Jessica would appear to be relevant to whether she was afraid of Ben, and thus unlikely to have 
made the alleged comment.   
 
The Crown sought leave to adduce evidence of the earlier assault to assist in establishing the 
requisite knowledge and intent.  This evidence could assist in 'showing the state of knowledge of 
the accused as a step on the way to showing his or her intent'.115  Although the judge's decision to 
exclude this evidence focused on the irrelevance of past injuries to Jessica's arm, Jessica also 
received a serious head injury during the course of the earlier assault.116  If Ben knew that striking 
Jessica in the head with the dumb bell could cause serious injury, 'common sense' suggests he was 
more than likely to know that striking her repeatedly in the head with the same weapon could well 
prove fatal.  However, in the absence of a principled framework for determining the admissibility 
of domestic violence evidence, an accused's prior history of violence may be viewed as a series of 
discrete incidents, rather than an escalating course of volitional conduct indicative of motive, 
planning and intent.    
 
The judge in this case noted that Jessica had good cause to end this violent relationship.  For the 
benefit of those in Jessica's whanau who felt they could have done more for her, the judge 
remarked that in his experience, even if Jessica had left Ben, the couple would 'inevitably' have 
reconciled at some stage, and Ben would 'inevitably' have killed Jessica or 'inflicted horrid 
injuries'.117  The belief that male violence toward women is somehow natural or 'inevitable' is an 
attitude that public institutions seek to eradicate.118  As feminists point out, judicial assumptions 
about the 'inevitability' of male violence construct battering as women's destiny.  
 
 In Thornton the trial judge refers to miserable marriages as being 'a fact of life'.  This accords to the  
 violent marriage the immutable nature of, for example, the daily facts of dawn and dusk.119 
 
The red flag of male sexual proprietariness is also revealed by the judge's acknowledgement that 
Ben was 'consumed by a mixture of blind passion, jealousy and possessiveness' and if he 'could not 
                                                 
115     Mathieson, above n 2, 486. 
116     R v U (Unreported, High Court, Gisborne, Harrison J, 11 July 2003) [5]. 
117     Ibid. 
118     See, eg, Jeremy Horder, Provocation and Responsibility (1992) 194. 
119   Alison Young, 'Conjugal Homicide and Legal Violence: A Comparative Analysis' (1993) 31 Osgoode Hall L.J. 
761, 780. 
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have Jessica, no-one else could'.120   However, Ben is simultaneously described by the judge as 'by 
nature a gentle, shy, loving and loyal person' who loved Jessica, and may have been dealt 'a 
dreadful emotional blow' by her decision not to marry him.121  This equation of possessive, 
proprietary male attitudes toward women with romantic love fails to confront and challenge the 
very attitudes that have permitted separation violence to become endemic in our culture.122  The 
assumption that a batterer, who would 'inevitably' have killed his partner or 'inflicted horrid 
injuries', could reasonably be described as by nature, gentle, shy, and loving also demonstrates how 
criminal law norms of relationship and character enhancement of the batterer overwhelm 
recognition of a structural pattern of violence toward women attempting to separate from violent 
men.   
 
The Epicurean metaphor of courts 'having their cake and eating it too' is apposite.  Battered women 
who remain in violent relationships must face further 'inevitable' violence and 'horrid injuries'.  
However, women attempting to terminate such relationships deal their 'loving' abusers a 'dreadful 
emotional blow', which may well form the basis of a provocation defence.     
 
D   Prior Violence toward Previous Intimate Partners 
In the following case, the jury were not told that the offender had previously killed his second wife, 
had stabbed his first wife in the throat, and allegedly beaten a third woman who was too afraid to 
complain to police at the time.  No decisions were found relating to an application by the Crown to 
adduce this history as similar fact evidence, which may indicate an assumption that leave was 
unlikely to be granted. 
 
Violence toward Past Intimate Partners: Case Study F/01/6 
Karl, the 54 year-old offender, had been in a relationship with 37 year-old Wathanak for a period during the 
second half of 2001.  Karl had a long history of alcoholism and 'this was thought to be a factor, and possibly 
the principal factor, in [Wathanak] ending their relationship'.123  Wathanak, who had been living with Karl 
in his house, returned to live in her rental home and became 'friendly with another man'.  Karl knew of this 
development.124  Wathanak went out with the 'other man' on 26 December and he subsequently tried 
                                                 
120    R  v U (Unreported, High Court, Gisborne, Harrison J, 11 July 2003) [4] (emphasis added). 
121    Ibid. 
122  See, eg, Martha Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation' (1991) 90 
Mich.L.Rev. 1, 77. 
123    R v F [2004] CA 186/03 (Unreported, McGrath, Paterson and Doogue JJ, 7 July 2004) [2]. 
124    Ibid [3]. 
 342
unsuccessfully to contact her.  Karl admitted to seeing [Wathanak] on 27 December 2001.  There was no 
evidence of anyone else seeing her after that date.  Wathanak's EFTPOS account was not operated from that 
time.  Nor did she return to her place of employment on 16 January 2002, as she had arranged'.125  After 
telling others that Wathanak had left New Zealand, Karl reported her disappearance to the police.   
 
Police drove Karl to Wathanak's home.  During the drive, Karl reportedly informed police that he would 
'brain the bitch if she's just been mucking us around'.  Karl let the police into Wathanak's home with a key 
and showed them into the smaller of two bedrooms which he claimed his estranged partner had used.  
However police suspected Karl had staged the room to divert police attention from the main bedroom.  In 
the latter room, police found evidence of blood spatters on the headboard of the bed, on the walls behind, on 
one of the walls to the side of the bed, and on the wall opposite the foot of the bed near the doorway.   
Traces of blood were found on the topside of the mattress and more traces of blood and several heavy 
bloodstains were found on the underside of the mattress together with traces of other clear fluid.  This 
evidence was consistent with Wathanak being killed by blows to her head as she lay on her bed.    
 
A bloody palm print was found on the architrave of the bedroom door and as a result of 'circumstances 
unconnected to the alleged homicide' the ESR already had a sample of Karl's blood in its possession.126  
Forensic evidence showed the palm print was Karl's and the blood, which belonged to Wathanak, must have 
been on his hands when the print was made.  A forensic examination of Karl's car identified Wathanak's 
blood on a panel inside the boot area.  A neighbour later gave evidence of seeing a man carrying what 
appeared to be a heavy bag.  Bags of a similar kind to those described were found in Karl's possession.  
Another witness described Karl doing something in the boot area of his car for about 10 minutes but could 
not see precisely what.    
 
Although Karl denied all knowledge of her death, he was charged with Wathanak's murder.  The case 
against him was circumstantial.  Following eight days of evidence, the defence successfully contended that 
if the jury concluded Wathanak was dead and that her death was caused by Karl, there was no basis 
whatsoever upon which it could conclude her death was murder.  Although the Crown argued the jury were 
entitled to draw a reasonable inference as to intent, defence counsel argued that a finding of intent would be 
speculative since there was no material on which a jury properly directed could make such a finding.  
Accordingly, the trial judge ruled that only a charge of manslaughter could be put before the jury.  
 
Karl elected not to give evidence at his trial.  He was convicted of manslaughter.  Despite appeals to Karl 
from Wathanak's family, her body has never been found.  
                                                 
125    Ibid. 
126    Ibid [7]. 
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The principle in this case, that a serial domestic violence offender may escape a conviction for 
murder by successfully disposing of the victim's body is disturbing.127   
 
After the trial, it was revealed that Karl killed his second wife in 1983.  Medical evidence showed 
the woman had been violently struck in the stomach causing intestinal damage and shattered blood 
vessels.  She had bruises to her head, one of which caused bleeding to her brain, her throat had 
cartilage damage and there were five bruises on her face.  Police concluded that Karl had also 
staged this homicide scene; in this case to make it appear that his wife had stumbled and hit her 
head on a coffee table.  Karl was acquitted of murder and sentenced to four years' imprisonment.  
At his trial, evidence he had previously been convicted of maliciously wounding his first wife in 
1975 was excluded.   
 
On the earlier occasion, Karl, who had given an undertaking that he would not molest his estranged 
wife, or enter her home, burst into the woman's home and cut her throat.  Defence counsel 
submitted Karl had not intended to hurt his estranged wife and was desperate to speak to her about 
matrimonial matters, including access to his children.  Karl was sentenced to nine months 
imprisonment, suspended for two years for this assault.  A year earlier, in 1974, Karl had been 
convicted of assault causing grievous bodily harm.  The records of this case have been sealed and 
little is known of the circumstances of this offending.  At his sentencing for killing Wathanak, 
defence counsel submitted that the sentences imposed in relation to Karl's previous offending, 
including the manslaughter conviction, showed that this violence 'was treated as being at the lower 
end of the scale'.128   
 
Although the Crown may not generally lead evidence of bad character, a defendant who puts his 
own character in issue or casts imputations on a prosecution witness may be cross-examined 
regarding his prior convictions with leave of the judge.  This discretion to permit the defendant to 
be cross-examined about his own bad character, including past criminal convictions, is exercised 
largely within the limits of the English statutory position.129  The judge may refuse to grant leave 
                                                 
127   For a similar example see: Case Study M/01/5 where the accused was charged with murder but the Crown accepted 
a guilty plea to the lesser charge of manslaughter as the woman's body was so badly decomposed when it was found 
that the cause of death could not be fully investigated.   
128    R v F (Unreported, High Court, Wellington, France J, 2 May 2003) [18]. 
129    R v Clark [1953] NZLR 823 (CA).    
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or restrict the evidence that may be adduced.  However, an accused can avoid disclosure of his 
prior convictions by not giving evidence, thereby making himself unavailable for cross-
examination.130   
ffending in the context of separation, and the accused's staging of the homicide 
cenes.132   
 
ich introduce underlying facts that 
rm the basis for the victim's belief are generally excluded.134   
                                                
 
As one legal scholar observes, it is as if the jury are 'required to critique a movie based on a 
viewing of only the last five minutes without being able to appreciate the events leading to the 
climax'.131  In the above case, Karl was apparently permitted to create a false impression of his 
character as non-violent.  During his trial for Wathanak's death, a witness who lived briefly with 
Karl is reported as agreeing with defence counsel under cross-examination that her relationship 
with Karl had not ended because of any violence by him.  While the jury were permitted to take 
whatever inference they might from this evidence, they were never told of a clearly discernible 
pattern of o
s
E   The Deceased's Fear of the Abuser and Premonitions of Death 
Although research suggests that a woman's level of fear of her partner is a reliable predictor of his 
future violence, grim evidence that women have accurately predicted their demise at the hands of a 
current or estranged partner may be excluded at trial.  While the pre-death premonitions of victims 
such as: 'Everywhere I go, he shows up.  I really think he's going to kill me'133 appear indisputably 
reliable - the victim is eventually killed - statements of belief wh
fo
 
The principle danger of victim's pre-death premonitions appears to be a concern that this evidence 
will go beyond merely illustrating the victim's state of mind by creating an inference that the 
 
130    R v Butterwasser [1948] 1 KB 4; R v Kino and Mete [1997] 3 NZLR 24 (CA). 
131    Lee, above n 15, 259. 
132   Karl subsequently appealed his conviction principally on the ground that his trial counsel should have called him 
to give evidence, or at least warned him of the risks of not testifying.  The responding affidavit by his senior trial 
counsel lists a number of risks attached to a decision by the accused to expose himself to cross-examination.  The risk 
of cross-examination on his prior convictions was not included.  
133   Karleen Murphy, 'A Hearsay Exception for Physical Abuse' (1997) 27 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 497, 522, citing 
People v Simpson No BA097211, 1995 WL 21768 at 4-5, notes this was one of seven hearsay statements made by 
deceased victim Nicole Brown Simpson, which was excluded from the trial of her estranged partner who was charged 
with her murder, as it did not conform to any recognised hearsay exception.  Simpson was acquitted. 
134     See, eg, Mathieson, above n 2, 596-597 noting that while the decision in R v Baker [1989] 1 NZLR 738 (CA) that 
evidence of witnesses to whom the deceased confided her fear of the accused was subsequently restricted to state of 
mind evidence, the ruling 'permitted evidence to be adduced of the reason for the state of mind, ie the accused's threats 
to the deceased - a classic example of the dangerous type of evidence which the rule [against hearsay] at its best was 
concerned to exclude'.   
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statement of belief can be used to prove the fact believed.  'To permit a statement of memory or 
belief into evidence would threaten to swallow up the hearsay rule by "allowing state of mind, 
provable by a hearsay statement, to serve as the basis for an inference of the happening of the event 
which produced the state of mind".'135  Neal Hudders notes some US jurisdictions ignore this rule 
where the facts contained in the victim's statement demonstrate the basis for her state of mind.  
Thus where a victim's statement of fear is accompanied by statements that the defendant caused her 
juries in the past, the statement of fear is not excluded.136   
the child's state of mind and it could not be used 
s evidence of the conduct of the defendant.139     
discretion to refuse to admit evidence it regards as unduly 
rejudicial.  Mathieson observes that  
 
it can have no purpose other than to prove the truth of what the person knew or believed or was 
                                                
in
 
While a victim's hearsay statements of fear may be admissible under the common law exception for 
state of mind evidence,137 to qualify under this exception, the deceased's state of mind must be a 
relevant issue at trial.138  Where relevant, use of this evidence is limited.  For example, just prior to 
being killed by her stepfather, the 11 year-old child victim in R v Howse wrote in her diary 'my dad 
is going to kill me'.  At issue was the identity of the killer, and the Court of Appeal held that the 
statement was relevant and admissible as it went to the child's state of mind and illustrated her fear 
of her stepfather.  However, the Court was critical of the trial judge's instruction to the jury on the 
proper use of this evidence.  The judge had not made it clear that the jury could only use the 
statement for the limited purpose of establishing 
a
 
A domestic violence victim's pre-death premonitions may also be admitted as res gestae evidence.  
However, this exception may not apply to statements which are more remote in time.  Moreover, 
even if this evidence qualifies under a particular hearsay exception, it is not automatically 
admissible.  The court has a residual 
p
the crucial question is, as always in cases of borderline admissibility: what is the real purpose for 
which the evidence is tendered?  If the person's state of mind as such is irrelevant, the admission of 
 
135    Hudders, above n 55, 1053, citing Federal Rules of Evidence 803 Advisory Committee's Note.   
136    Ibid 1054. 
137    Averson v Kinnaird (1805) 102 ER 1258, 1262. 
138  See, eg, R v Blastland 1 AC 41 (HL) where the statements made by a third party to a number of witnesses 
indicating he knew of the child's death before the body was discovered were held inadmissible as the maker's state of 
mind was not a fact in issue at the trial. 
139    R v Howse [2003] 3 NZLR 767 [35]. 
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thinking or was anxious about.  If so, the evidence is then hearsay, but its hearsay character is 
disguised by advancing it on a spurious theory as to what it is designed to prove.140 
 
Citing the hearsay exception for co-conspirators,141 Raeder questions why no similar exception 
evolved to admit domestic violence victims' pre-death premonitions.  Hearsay exceptions exist to 
help the process of proof at trials, and the conspiracy exception evolved in large part due to the 
difficulty of proving conspiracies, and as a result of their hidden nature.  Intimate femicide is also a 
private crime and woman killing undoubtedly resulted in more trials than conspiracy prosecutions.  
However, the pre-death premonitions of victims were treated with disdain by accurately classifying 
them as expressions of the victim's state of mind which were irrelevant unless the defendant 
opened the door to their admissibility.  
 
I can recall my own blind acceptance of this analytical approach without even questioning why the 
largest category of hearsay being rejected consisted of Cassandra-like predictions by women that 
their batterers would kill them if they left.  Even if this exclusion did not stem from misogynistic 
views of women, or misguided fears that any man could be provoked to kill by his wife's infidelity, 
the absence of female concerns in evidentiary policy resulted in the voices of female victims being 
stifled at trial.142  
 
The present research found evidence of victims' pre-death statements of fear could be excluded 
with little, or no, discussion or explanation.  In 'Trial Ruling (No 1)', the sentencing judge in R v 
U143 noted persons close to the deceased victim feared the offender would kill her. As an aside, the 
judge observed that '[i]ndeed, evidence which did not go to the jury indicated that she had a 
premonition of her fate'.144  There is no discussion of the content of this pre-death premonition, and 
no other judgment relating to its exclusion was found.   
 
In R v H,145 the victim, who separated from her husband and took out a protection order, was killed 
shortly after she contacted the police for assistance. The contested documentary hearsay consisted 
of a letter written by the deceased to the offender some two and a half months before her death 
                                                 
140    Mathieson, above n 2, 583. 
141    See, Ibid 675, for discussion of this exception. 
142    Raeder, above n 1, 1514. 
143    See discussion of this Case Study U/02/7 above, at p 338. 
144    R v U (Unreported, High Court, Gisborne, Harrison J, 11 July 2003) [3]. 
145    See, discussion of this Case Study H/00/8 above, at p 175. 
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which spoke of 'difficulties in the marriage, reasons for separation, the accused's violence towards 
her and the deceased's current attitude towards the accused'.   The other evidence was a custody 
affidavit sworn by the deceased around the same time which dealt with 'the deceased's attitude to 
custody of the child, the accused's violence towards her and her fears as to his possible 
behaviour'.146  The Court held the letter, subject to deletion of four sentences was admissible, but 
the affidavit evidence was excluded.  The victim's 'rhetorical statements in the affidavit about the 
risk posed by the accused' created a greater risk of prejudice.147  No details of the nature of the 
victim's 'fear as to [the accused's] possible behaviour' were provided.  
 
When excluding the affidavit evidence, the judge in R v H observed that the affidavit had been 
made 'for the specific purpose of supporting the deceased's side in a family law dispute' and this 
lessened its probative value.148   This view is concerning.  Affidavits sworn in support of custody 
or protection orders are a feature of separation from a violent partner.  Therefore, the suggestion 
that these are inherently unreliable casts doubt on a great deal of domestic violence evidence in 
estrangement femicide cases.  Although in this case, the deceased's affidavit was perceived to be 
less reliable than her letter intended by her for the accused's eyes only; in P, the Court of Appeal 
did not disagree with defence counsel's submission that the wife's letters may have less probative 
value than the affidavit in support of her protection order, as the latter was sworn evidence which 
might add to the weight a jury attached to it.149   
 
F   Evidence of Forced Sex150 
In P,151 the Crown sought to have evidence from 40 witnesses as to earlier episodes of violence by 
P ruled admissible.  The Crown wished to establish that P was not a man suddenly provoked, and 
rather than a sudden loss of self control, the lethal attack was an extreme version of a course of 
violent conduct by P aimed at exerting control and dominance over his wife.152  At the hearing, the 
Crown did not pursue its claim to adduce evidence from six witnesses and the judge held 
                                                 
146    (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Fisher J, 15 November 2000) [1-2].  
147    Ibid [15].  
148    Ibid.  
149    [2000] 1 NZLR 234 [13]. 
150   See, eg, Jacquelyn Campbell, et al, 'Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite 
Case Control Study (2003) 93 American Journal of Public Health 1089, citing forced sex as a risk factor for intimate 
femicide. Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 38, 41, noting that incidents of forced sex are warning signs for 
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151    See, discussion of Case Study P/98/3 above, at p 215. 
152    [1999] CA 65/99 (Unreported, Richardson P, Heron and Goddard JJ, 18 March 1999) [17]. 
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admissible, but subject to one qualification, the tendered evidence of violence by P toward his wife 
throughout the course of their relationship.  A statement to the police signed by P's wife which led 
to P being prosecuted and pleading guilty to a charge of assault was also ruled admissible.  An 
affidavit sworn by P's wife that led to a temporary protection order being made against P on behalf 
of herself and the couple's four children was also held admissible.153  (Following her death, the 
victim's protection order arrived in the mail.)  P appealed. 
 
When considering the nature and history of the relationship between P and his wife in the context 
of P's provocation claim, the Court of Appeal held the essential question was whether this evidence 
was sufficiently material and probative as to outweigh any illegitimate prejudice to P.154  On this 
analysis, his wife's affidavit and witness statement were regarded as relevant and admissible, but 
evidence of witnesses who saw bruising and other injuries on the deceased woman was excluded as 
peripheral.  Evidence of witnesses who could testify to seeing P assault his wife was limited to 
three witnesses and the remaining evidence excluded.  As discussed above, evidence that P had 
inflicted violence on his sisters and other women with whom he had an intimate relationship was 
also ruled inadmissible.  
 
Following his trial and conviction for murder, P's defence counsel argued in the Court of Appeal 
that hearsay evidence consisting of his wife's letters detailing P's violence towards her, which 
included past sexual assaults, had been wrongly admitted at trial.  The Crown argued this evidence 
was relevant to whether the lethal assault was, as P claimed, a spontaneous and unpredictable act 
arising from his loss of the power of self-control, or a purposeful escalation of the violence.  
Although the initial decision to admit these letters appeared to significantly influence the jury's 
decision to convict P of murder, the Court of Appeal found considerable strength in defence 
arguments that in so far as the letters were relevant, they added little to the information already 
available to the jury.  The Court also observed that allegations in his deceased wife's letters of P's 
sexual violence toward her introduced elements of potential illegitimate prejudice.155  This analysis 
                                                 
153    Ibid [6]. 
154    Ibid [12]. 
155   R v P [2000] 1 NZLR 234 [16].  The Court of Appeal was not required to decide whether the trial judge's decision 
to admit the letters warranted a retrial as it overturned P's murder conviction on the basis that the cousin's attempt to 
prevent P from inflicting further violence on his wife constituted a provocation to P.   
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appears premised on a hierarchy of domestically violent behaviours with allegations of sexual 
assaults as especially prejudicial to battering defendants.156   
 
By contrast, the statutory definition of domestic violence does not isolate sexual violence from 
physical or psychological violence.157  Domestic violence is widely conceptualised and researched 
as a pattern of controlling behaviours which includes physically, sexually and psychologically 
abusive acts that are not artificially divorced from each other.158  Even if a particular incident is 
particularly distressing, its atrocious quality can indicate the lengths to which the abuser will go to 
control his partner.159   
 
As Lisa Sanctis points out,  
 
[i]f we fail to address the very nature of domestic violence we will continue to see cases where a 
man beats his intimate partner, even kills her, and goes on to beat or kill his next intimate partner.  
Since criminal prosecution is one of the few processes that can interrupt the escalation pattern so 
common in domestic violence, we must be willing to look at patterned behaviour during the 
criminal prosecution or we will miss our opportunity to address the problem at all.160 
 
The various decisions in P demonstrate that a batterer's violence may be met with lenient treatment 
at every stage of his interactions with the legal system.  P escaped a sentence of imprisonment for a 
previous assault on his wife three months before he killed her.  His conviction for murder was 
overturned by the Court of Appeal, and his second trial was aborted when a newspaper published 
'background material not presented at the trial'.  This 'background material' apparently related to 
publication by the newspaper of the content of one of his wife's letters.  No further reports of legal 
proceedings against P were found.   
 
 
 
                                                 
156     See, also, M v R (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Randerson J, 3 August 2000).   
157     Section 3 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
158   See, eg, Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 38, 3; See, also, research by Allison Morris, Women's Safety 
Survey 1996 (1997) which was commissioned by the Victimisation Survey Committee consisting of representatives 
from the New Zealand Police, Ministry of Justice, Crime Prevention Unit, Department of Social Welfare, Te Puni 
Kokiri, Ministries of Youth and Women's Affairs. 
159     Raeder, above n 1, 1503. 
160     Sanctis, above n 21, 388-389 (citations omitted). 
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VIII   A PRINCIPLED RESPONSE TO ADMISSIBILITY: 
 RECOGNISING THE THEME OF CONTROL 
Although criminal law generally regards each act of domestic violence as unique, and acts of prior 
abuse as constituting little more than propensity evidence, s 3 of the Domestic Violence Act 1995 
recognises domestic violence as a dynamic mix of abusive behaviours which may include multiple 
victimisations across a continuum of physical, sexual, emotional and psychological violence.161   
Psychological abuse includes, but is not limited to: intimidation; harassment; damage to property; 
threats of physical abuse, sexual abuse or psychological abuse.   
 
[A]buse must be considered as multidimensional, containing emotional, physical, sexual, familial 
and property aspects set against a framework of a systematic pattern of control and 
domination…'control is also maintained, and fear is intensified, through the extensive use of 
humiliation, ridicule, criticism, and other forms of emotional abuse, financial abuse, and social 
isolation'.162 
 
Benjamin Bowling, a British criminologist, notes the tendency to view a pattern of abuse as 
separate, discrete incidents163 masks essential elements of the process of victimisation: 
 
This means that the offence cannot be set in context as part of a sustained campaign…In court, as  
with policing, the focus on a single event renders the process of victimization invisible…strips it of 
meaning for the victim and for those to whom the incident must be described (such as a police 
officer, judge, or jury).  By rendering earlier episodes in the process of victimization 'inadmissible 
evidence' or irrelevant to police investigation, neither the effect on the victim nor the implications 
for the rest of the 'community' may be described.164 
 
                                                 
161   Julie Stubbs, 'Domestic Violence and Women's Safety: Feminist Challenges to Restorative Justice' in Heather 
Strang and John Braithwaite (eds), Restorative Justice and Family Violence (2002) 42, noting this pattern of repeat 
victimisation is one reason why assumptions of a discrete incident underpinning restorative justice processes are not 
valid in domestic violence cases. 
162    Raeder, above n 1, 1484. 
163   The New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, 
Report 73 (2001) [26], cites one submission noting that the defence of self-defence is constructed in a way which 
inclines the court 'to look for a one-off attack and to measure the defendant's use of force in relation to that attack.  
Such approach is based on a view of domestic violence as a series of discrete acts of physical violence between which 
the woman is not being abused and is free to leave'. 
164  Benjamin Bowling, 'Racial Harrassment and the Process of Victimization: Conceptual and Methodological 
Implications for the Local Crime Survey' (1993) 33 Brit.J.Criminol. 231, 243-244.  While Bowling focuses on racial 
violence he notes his analysis is also applicable to domestic violence. 
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When control as the theme which links a multidimensional pattern of abuse is overlooked,165 a 
domestic violence victim who alleges numerous breaches of her protection order by a single 
offender may find the various counts are severed, requiring her to give evidence against the abuser 
and undergo cross-examination by him at each separate trial.166  Violence and threats toward other 
family members167 may be excluded as merely demonstrating propensity rather than part of a 
pattern of control.168  Failure to recognise domestic violence as a pattern of controlling behaviours 
may also ensure that judges differentiate property damage from physical assault; artificially isolate 
an abuser's threat to kill with a weapon from his successful accomplishment of the threat; and 
forced sex may be distinguished from physical violence in order to find dissimilarity.   
 
The probative value of evidence that the accused escalated his use of violence post-separation, for 
example by stalking his estranged partner,  threatening to kill her, assaulting/injuring her with the 
murder weapon, and the victim's prophetic premonitions of death may also remain 
unacknowledged.  While a commonly reported pattern of domestic violence is the limited use of 
physical assaults once a climate of fear and the threat of violence is established,169 judges may lack 
understanding that the nature of an accused's violence toward current and previous partners may 
differ according to the success or failure of other tactics of control.170   
 
The decision in R v Goldberg171 further demonstrates how failure to acknowledge the theme of 
control can jeopardise women's safety.  In this case, a Visiting Judge found the offender, who was 
serving a 27-month sentence of imprisonment for assaulting his estranged partner, guilty of gross 
misconduct by telephoning the woman from prison in breach of her protection order.  The offender 
sought judicial review of the decision, arguing that the complainant's hearsay statement was 
incorrectly admitted.  Although the Crown contended that the woman's evidence was not pivotal to 
                                                 
165   See, eg, Kevin Dawkins, 'Criminal Law' [1997] NZ Law Review 20, 23-24, arguing that persistent or on-going 
conduct can be met with separate charges for each type of behaviour under existing law.   
166    In Case Study K/99/16(S) the sentencing judge reportedly remarked that the offender had pleaded not guilty to 
five charges of breaching the woman's protection order.  Following his conviction after a defended hearing on one 
charge, the offender reversed his not guilty plea on the others.  The judge stated that 'it was clear the complainant had 
been severely upset by [the offender] and by having to give evidence against him.  She had been living in dread of 
having to give evidence in four other hearings'.  
167    See, eg, Case Study M/02/8 where the 'habitual batterer defence' succeeded, but evidence of the accused's violence 
towards the deceased's father was excluded. 
168    See, eg, Case Study K/00/21(S) where the battered woman who had suffered shocking injuries told the Court she 
did not ask her family for help because she feared for their safety.  
169    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 3, 161. 
170    See, eg, M v R (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua,  Randerson J, 3 August 2000). 
171    (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Baragwanath J, 30 May 2003). 
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the earlier ruling, the judge held her evidence was a material factor in the decision to convict the 
offender and fairness required that she be called to give evidence.  When rationalising this decision 
that the victim of a domestic assault, whose assailant contacts her from prison in breach of her 
protection order, must travel to the prison and confront and be cross-examined by her abuser, the 
judge remarked:  
 
I am acutely conscious of the difficulties presented by this conclusion…If a man did in fact use a 
prison telephone to call a woman protected by a protection order, the breach of which could be the 
very reason why he is in prison, to require her to enter the prison to give evidence and be exposed to 
cross-examination by the prisoner or his counsel would have very unhappy consequences. 
Nevertheless the right to cross-examine one's accuser lies so deep that…the remedy lies beyond the  
judicial power to modify the Judge-made rules of evidence; any reform must…be a matter for 
Parliament.  Under the present law the prosecution must therefore rely on evidence other than that 
of the complainant if she is not able or willing to appear.172 
 
The power and control dynamics of violent relationships as well as the twin red flags of separation 
and repeat victimisation remain invisible in this analysis.  Since the judge accepted that neither 
legislation nor any blanket common law rule excluded the admission of hearsay evidence in 
disciplinary proceedings, this case could also have been decided differently.  The alternative 
decision provides an opportunity for abusers to use the criminal justice system to further control 
and intimidate their victims.   
 
IX   CONCLUSION 
Myths and misunderstandings about domestic violence can affect decisions made at every stage in 
the legal process, including whether and how pre-trial applications are formulated, and the rulings 
of trial judges.173  In the absence of a principled framework for determining admissibility, 
decisions about whether domestic violence evidence is mere character assassination and should be 
limited or excluded, or whether it is highly probative, turn on the individual judge's understanding 
of the dynamics of violent relationships.  Furthermore, without a systematic means of accessing 
judgments in domestic violence cases, opportunities to challenge misunderstandings, educate the 
legal profession, and enhance judicial accountability are limited.   
 
                                                 
172    Ibid [68] (citations omitted). 
173    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 3, [4.154]. 
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Some jurisdictions are prepared to explore the defendant's character in a criminal trial.174  Recent 
empirical studies also suggest character evidence may be more probative than it has traditionally 
been assumed to be.175  Where certain types of offending are involved, legislation in the UK176 and 
New Zealand177 leave it open to the prosecution to lead evidence of a defendant's propensity to 
commit the type of offence charged.178  It is also taken for granted in other legal contexts that past 
criminal misconduct is predictive of subsequent criminal offending.  For example,   
 
 the defendant's criminal history weighs heavily in pre-trial release determinations and in sentencing 
decisions, both as a statutory matter and as a matter of judicial discretion...This is primarily because 
what a defendant has done in the past is taken as a good indication of what he's likely to do in the 
future if not adequately restrained or deterred.179 
 
While it is sometimes suggested that development and modification of evidence law is 'particularly 
a matter with which the Judges should be entrusted',180 this view of judges as genderless, objective 
beings who are immune from prevailing cultural norms and values serves to instantiate and 
legitimise existing power relations.181  Allowing the full story of the violent relationship to be told 
when battered women are killed would counter the present emphasis on victim blaming, refocus 
legal and public attention on reoccurring patterns of behaviour in battering relationships, and put 
society on notice of the need for effective action to prevent battering escalating to lethality.   
 
  
 
                                                 
174   For example, David Karp, 'Response to Professor Imwinkelried's Comments' (1994) 70 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 49, 50, 
notes information regarding the accused's history, including his criminal record, is provided to French judges and 
jurors as a matter of course. 
175    Redmayne, above n 16, 685.  See also, Edward Imwinkelried, 'Some Comments About Mr David Karp's Remarks 
on Propensity Evidence' (1994) 70 Chi-Kent L.Rev. 37, 37 n 5, citing research.  Susan Davies, 'Evidence of Character 
to Prove Conduct: A Reassessment of Relevancy' (1991) 27 Crim.L.Bull. 504, 519-520, noting that whilst legal 
commentators argue one or two incidents do not support an inference of behavioural consistency, 'where situations are 
similar, past behavior is an excellent indicator of a person's likely future behavior'.   
176    Theft Act 1968. 
177     Section 258(2) Crimes Act 1961 in relation to receivers; Section 23 Evidence Act 1908 in relation to poisoners.  
178    The New Zealand Law Commission, above n 10, [176], considered the statutory provision relating to poisoners to 
be unnecessary, but thought the exception which allows evidence of previous possession of stolen goods, or previous 
convictions for receiving to prove guilty knowledge, was working well and should be retained.  
179     Karp, above n 174, 51. 
180    Jorgenson v News Media (Auckland) Limited [1969] NZLR 961 (CA) per Turner J. 
181   See, eg, Stella Tarrant, 'Something is Pushing Them to the Side of Their Own Lives: A Feminist Critique of Law 
and Laws' (1990) 20 West.Aust.L.Rev. 573, 576. 
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CHAPTER TEN:   
CONFRONTING THEORETICAL BARRIERS  
TO PRINCIPLED INTERVENTION   
[A]bove the veneer of awareness and zero tolerance hover the ghosts of old 
attitudes about abuse.  They haunt us especially in the form of latent 
ambivalence about battered women…Current ideas about domestic violence 
have also been complicated and ambivalence compounded by often competing 
contemporary discourses on victims and victimization, sexual politics in/after 
feminism, theories of female subjectivity and agency,  and the meaning and 
politics of difference.  As a result, responses to domestic violence in the new 
millennium are at once reformed and recidivist, outwardly resolute yet 
internally conflicted, more open yet just as frequently displaced and/or 
repressed.1 
 
I   INTRODUCTION 
New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy seeks an integrated, consistent, comprehensive 
response to domestic violence.  However, theoretical dichotomies and disagreements among 
scholars, researchers and activists over the nature of battering, gender of perpetrators, 
characteristics of violence and extent to which the legal system should defer to the choices of 
individual victims discussed in this chapter continue to inhibit development of principled domestic 
violence intervention.2  The power of these oppositional discourses to mask victims' concrete 
social reality is compellingly demonstrated by the absence of inquiry into harms to women who 
seek help from the legal system despite the express paramountcy of victim safety in Family 
Violence Prevention Strategy.3    
                                                
 
II   MAJOR THEORETICAL DILEMMAS 
Cheryl Hanna notes that while feminist theory has many strands, certain issues repeatedly surface 
as feminists attempt to move the domestic violence debate forward from thought to action. 
 
First, the complex and often ambiguous concept of privacy has been central to our understanding of 
women's roles in the family, and more recently, of the relationship between family violence and 
women's affirmative autonomy.  Do we characterize family violence as a purely public 
phenomenon, or is there some place for preserving a more privacy-based model of intervention? 
 
1   Diane Shoos, 'Representing Domestic Violence: Ambivalence and Difference in What's Love Got to Do with It' 
(2003) 15 National Women's Studies Association Journal 57, 59-60 (emphasis in original; citations omitted). 
2   Kerry Healey, Christine Smith and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal 
Justice Strategies (1998) 15, noting that '[m]ore than in most fields, the theoretical debate affects practice'. 
3     Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) 12. 
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Second, a tension runs through feminist theory about the proper focus of our policy choices.  Should 
individual women and their experiences guide our policymaking, or should we widen the lens to 
include aggregate social goals?  Finally, we continue to struggle over what role women play in their 
own oppression.  Are women purely passive victims, or are they blameworthy agents in their violent 
relationships?  There are no easy answers to these questions, but coming to grips with these 
lingering tensions is critical to developing an effective prosecution strategy.4 
 
The above divisions and disagreements which are further discussed in the following section have 
permitted domestic violence theory and practice to paralyse each other.5 
 
A   The Victim/Agent Dichotomy 
1   The Battered Woman:  Victim or Agent? 
The tension between victim blaming arguments and arguments which call upon women to 
overcome their victim status is often described as the 'agency/victimization dichotomy.'6  'Anti-
victim' feminists criticise stereotypical images of battered women as helpless, dependent and 
pathological.  These patronising images of female victimisation harm all women's interests and 
may encourage individual abused women to abdicate responsibility for their own welfare and 
independence.7  The fear that women will evade responsibility for their actions by claiming 
victimisation is also reflected in popular and legal commentary on battered women who kill their 
abusers. 
  
The 'hidden premise' of anti-victim arguments that battered women are freely choosing individuals, 
or 'if we are not, the main obstacle is our own consciousness', is deeply problematic.8  
Representations of battered women as autonomous agents ignore structural constraints on women's 
mobility which inhibit opportunities for women to simply pack their belongings and disappear.  
Economic, social and cultural factors, including the connectedness of mothers to their children,9  
                                                 
4  Cheryl Hanna, 'No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' (1996) 109 
Harv.L.Rev. 1849, 1868. 
5   Ibid 1856. 
6   Ibid 1882. 
7   See, eg, Naomi Wolfe, Fire with Fire: The New Female Power and How It Will Change the Twenty-First Century 
(1993) denouncing 'victim feminism' and advocating 'power feminism'. 
8  Martha Mahoney, 'Victimization or Oppression? Women's Lives, Violence, and Agency' in Martha Fineman and 
Roxanne Mykitiuk (eds) The Public Nature of Private Violence: The Discovery of Domestic Abuse (1994) 59, 63.  
9    Ibid. 
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frequently operate to curtail the options of women who are grappling with violence in their lives.10  
The woman may face her own and her children's economic deprivation, loss of her home, 
connections to a network of friends, and emotional/financial support from extended family should 
she attempt to flee.11  Research shows contact with the court seldom leaves women feeling 
protected,12 and fear of retaliation is a major factor in women's decisions not to make a formal 
statement, to withdraw, or to consider withdrawal after the statement is made.13  Since the chances 
that chronic abusers will suddenly choose to desist are negligible, the violent pursuit by batterers of 
women who attempt to flee is well documented, and the battered woman cannot rely on the police 
to hold the offender in custody, or the courts to impose a lengthy period of detention, atomistic 
notions of agency and choice fail to capture her social reality. 
 
Although intervention based on the 'choices' of battered women may presume an autonomy that is 
more theoretical than real, Hanna's experience as a prosecutor found judges often strove to uphold 
women's choices when determining outcomes for battering men.  Even judges who were highly 
committed to domestic violence reform could hesitate to proceed, or to find a defendant guilty, if 
the complainant was uncooperative or stated at the outset that she did not want to continue with the 
case.  'Like prosecutors, judges may reason that if the woman wants to live in a violent relationship, 
it is her choice.'14  The batterer may thereby avoid any, or significant criminal law sanctions, and 
the next time the judge or prosecutor is confronted with the complainant she has further physical 
injuries.15 
 
While women's liberation cannot be properly conceived or actualised if women are considered 
nothing more than victims, Diane Shoos points out that the problem cannot be resolved by simply 
ignoring women's experiences of oppression.16  Case studies in the present research reveal 
                                                 
10  Lee Bowker, 'A Battered Woman's Problems Are Social, Not Psychological' in Richard Gelles and Donileen Loseke 
(eds), Current Controversies on Family Violence (1993) 154, 158-160, identified the six principles barriers to escape 
as: fear of worse battering; fear of harm to the children; retaliation against parents or other close relatives; poverty and 
homelessness; shame, failure and public sin; loss of social identity and one's entire way of life. 
11  See, eg, Jennifer Hand, et al, Free From Abuse: What Women Say and What Can Be Done (2002); Martha 
Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation' (1991) 90 Mich.L.Rev. 1; Linda 
Williams, 'Understanding Child Abuse and Violence Against Women: A Life Course Perspective' (2003) 18 Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 441. 
12  Lauren Bennett, Lisa Goodman and Mary Ann Dutton, 'Systemic Obstacles to the Criminal Prosecution of a 
Battering Partner' (1999) 14 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 761, 768. 
13    Carolyn Hoyle and Andrew Saunders, 'Police Response to Domestic Violence' (2000) 40 Brit.J.Criminol. 14, 24. 
14    Hanna, above n 4, 1874. 
15    Ibid 1875. 
16    Shoos, above n 1, 63.  
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women's altruistic responses to battering men often take place in the context of serious and life-
threatening violence.  Representations of this social reality in terms of a dichotomous opposition of 
battered women as 'pure victims' or 'pure agents' reinforce the subordination of women by either 
denying battered women's agency, or ignoring the harmful effects of violence and domination.  
Nevertheless, the study found this binary opposition pervades criminal justice responses to intimate 
partner violence.   
 
Following their deaths, battered women were frequently stereotyped in the media and by criminal 
justice personnel as passive victims, whose debilitating images of love or other personal pathology 
rendered them unable to leave abusive relationships.  These discourses of victimisation masked the 
social reality that the women were killed following attempts to exercise their agency by seeking 
protection and attempting to escape from violent men.  Conversely, constructions of battered 
women as autonomous, freely choosing agents ignored structural patterns of risk, resulting in 
inappropriate interventions which failed to promote victim safety.  Furthermore, women's 
expressions of love and forgiveness were manipulated by defence counsel on behalf of abusive 
men;17 while courts validated these altruistic responses when sentencing their batterers, thus failing 
to provide a consistent, coherent response.   
 
Dichotomous stereotypes of abused women as either masochistic or emotionally disturbed victims 
or agents who provoked their own deaths promote a culture of victim blaming which operates to 
camouflage gaps and shortcomings in agency interventions.  These stereotypical constructions of 
battered women as either vengeful killers or mentally or emotionally impaired victims also obscure 
the reality that women are often unable to leave safely or permanently.  Consequently, legal 
discourses of violence in intimate relationships continue to be dominated by the question, or more 
accurately the accusation: 'Why Didn't She Leave?'  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
17   For example, in Case Study D/00/7 the fact that the deceased 'kept coming back' to the offender was advanced by 
defence counsel as a mitigating feature of the offending.  In Case Study P/01/6(S) defence counsel for an offender who 
admitted multiple assaults and breaches of a protection order described 'the relationship' as 'bizarre' as the woman 
victim was continually renewing contact with the offender.  In Case Study C/01/7(S) the offender was convicted on 
four charges of rape and breaching a protection order.  Defence counsel noted that during the time frame of three of the 
rapes the complainant made a conscious choice to remain in the relationship. 
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2.   The Gendered Victim/Agent Dichotomy 
A gendered version of the victim/agent dichotomy is 'captured in the criminological cliché "women 
are mad and men are bad"'.18  This theory posits that women and men are regulated differently by 
criminal justice interventions which position female defendants within psychiatric discourses of 
victimisation and male defendants within criminal discourses of agency and wrongdoing.19  As a 
consequence male offenders are said to be typically sanctioned more harshly than women.20 
 
The theory that violent men are generally denied excuses for their offending due to their 
positioning within legal discourses of agency and blame is not supported by the present research.  
Discourses of male pathology are routinely advanced on behalf of male abusers.  These 
'psychologising' narratives enter the courtroom in cases of sub-lethal domestic violence and when 
habitual batterers kill.  Victoria Nourse's US research also found men's provocation claims were 
frequently bolstered with psychiatric testimony.21  Similarly, Elizabeth Rapaport's study of US 
capital murder convictions found an emphasis upon the mental/emotional life of men who killed 
female intimates.22  Nor is the proposition that female defendants benefit from their positioning 
within discourses of victimisation and pathology supported by Australian research which indicates 
that an emphasis upon the battered woman's pathology operates to deprive women of access to the 
defence of self-defence.23   
 
Joan Busfield has criticised the criminological cliché 'women are mad, and men are bad'.  Busfield 
notes that men feature prominently in certain psychiatric patient populations such as alcoholism, 
sexual disorders and anti-social psychopathy.  Accordingly, more subtle and complex forms of 
                                                 
18   Fiona Raitt and M Suzanne Zeedyke, 'The Implicit Relation of Psychology and Law' (2000) 49. 
19   See, eg, Hilary Allen, Justice Unbalanced: Gender, Psychiatry and Judicial Decisions (1987). 
20  See, eg, Samantha Jeffries, 'Just or Unjust?  Problematising the Gendered Nature of Criminal Justice' (2002) 18 
Women's Studies Journal 24. 
21   Victoria Nourse, 'Passion's Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation Defense' (1997) 106 Yale L.J. 1331, 
1336. 
22  Donna Coker, 'Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill' (1992) 2 S.Calif.Rev.L.& 
Women's Stud. 71, 128 n253, citing Elizabeth Rapaport, 'When is Domestic Homicide a Capital Crime?: Gender 
Differences in America's Death Rows in the Post-Furman Era' (Presentation for Law & Society Meeting May 28-31, 
1992). 
23  See, eg, Rebecca Bradfield, 'Women Who Kill: Lack of Intent and Diminished Responsibility as the Other 
'Defences' to Spousal Homicide' (2001) 13 CICJ 143.  Donald Nicolson, 'Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender 
Construction and Battered Women Who Kill' (1995) 3 Fem.L.S. 185, 204, notes that whether battered women are 
treated as weak, neurotic and pathological victims or as active agents and doubly deviant, gender constructions are 
reinforced and the actual experiences of battered women are excluded from the courtroom.  If the battered woman is 
seen as passive and mentally impaired she is deprived access to defences which depend upon legal notions of 
'reasonable' behaviour, whereas if she is viewed as an autonomous agent she is punished harshly in order to perform 
'the educative function of demarcating the proper from the improper woman'. 
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analyses are necessary to allow for the ways in which mental health discourses regulate the 
behaviour of both women and men.24   
 
B   The Sameness/Difference Dichotomy 
Competing feminist visions of sexual equality have resulted in feminist demands for formal 
equality - women must be treated 'the same' as men - which are opposed by feminists who point to 
differences between the sexes - social and/or biological - and argue women should be treated 
differently from men.  This equal treatment versus special treatment or sameness/difference debate 
'while perhaps not the most crucial in feminist legal scholarship, has probably absorbed the most 
energy'.25  Catharine MacKinnon notes that concealed within the terms of the debate is the 
substantive way in which man has become the measure of all things.  When male experience is the 
norm, the range of issues that feminists term violence against women are silenced out of the debate 
as these experiences happen almost exclusively to women.26   
 
For example, gender disparities in physical size and strength mean a woman's perception of danger 
is likely to differ from that of a man's.  Although sex differences in perceptions of harm do not 
render women's perceptions less reasonable, it is men's perceptions of harm or danger which serves 
as the legal standard.  Silencing of issues of male violence against women is also evident in the 
'crime of passion' analysis and myth of romantic love which mask the social reality of a structural 
pattern of violence against women who attempt to leave violent men.  Since these analyses have 
rendered separation violence invisible, law continues to demand that rather than resort to self-
defence, battered defendants should leave violent relationships.   
 
The invisibility of the red flag of repeat victimisation, and its re-presentation in defence of the 
batterer further demonstrates the power of masculinist discourses to mask a pattern of battering 
escalating to lethality and the interrelationship between domestic violence and intimate femicide.  
Consequently, responses to recidivist abusers may be repeatedly rehabilitative in the absence of 
monitoring and accountability.  Silence surrounding harm to women following interventions with 
                                                 
24    Joan Busfield, Men, Women and Madness: Understanding Gender and Mental Disorder (1996).    
25    Julia Sohrab, 'Avoiding the "Exquisite Trap": A Critical Look at the Equal Treatment/Special Treatment Debate in 
Law' (1993) 1 Fem.L.S. 141, 142. 
26   Catharine MacKinnon, 'Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination' in D Kelly Weisberg (ed), Feminist 
Legal Theory: Foundations (1993) 276, 282.  'Approaching sex discrimination in this way - as if sex questions are 
difference questions and equality questions are sameness questions - provides two ways for the law to hold women to a 
male standard and call that sex equality': at 278. 
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batterers further highlights the subjugation of women's concrete social reality.  This silencing of 
stories of male violence toward women maintains and perpetuates existing distributions of power.   
 
Feminist legal theorists note that the very terms of the sameness/difference debate create a dilemma 
or impossible choice: 
 
[These] are not alternative strategies and…they miss the point…Instead of accepting this 
representation of the issue…the task is to show how it is manipulated to defend the social status 
quo.  This means that feminists would accomplish more by refusing to take up positions 
within…[this] dichotomy.27 
 
In New Zealand, Samantha Jeffries posits the 'equality versus difference' debate in terms of 
feminist organisations such as Women's Refuge and Rape Crisis whose concern 'with raising public 
awareness about and punishing more harshly, the violent and sexual victimisation of women by 
men' has contributed to a climate in which men are punished harshly.  By comparison, judges 
supposedly adopt an 'ethic of care' or 'female' model of justice when sentencing female defendants.  
'Thus, while we must "get tough" on criminal men, we must "care more" about offending 
women.'28    
 
This perception that male violence against women is sanctioned harshly is widely held, and 
sometimes propounded by judges.29  However, it overlooks the New Zealand legislative and 
judicial emphasis on rehabilitating domestically violent men.  New Zealand research found a high 
probability of supervision or community programme for domestic violence offenders.30  Overseas 
research also reveals sanctions for domestic violence offending are typically less penal in style than 
responses to violence between strangers.31  Researchers note that by not prosecuting domestic 
violence cases, or sanctioning offenders too severely, 'justice in the eyes of court officials is served 
                                                 
27   Lisa Sarmas, 'A Step in the Wrong Direction: The Emergence of Gender 'Neutrality' in the Equitable Presumption 
of Advancement' (1994) 19 MULR 758,759, citing Carol Bacchi, 'Do Women Need Equal Treatment or Different 
Treatment?' (1992) 8 Australian Journal of Law and Society 80, 94. 
28    Jeffries, above n 20, 34.  
29    See, eg, Judge Fuels Controversy, Waikato Times, 12 October 2005. 
30    Sue Triggs, Sentencing in New Zealand: A Statistical Analysis (1999). 
31    'Sentencing for Manslaughter by Provocation' [2004] Crim.L.R. 501, 502, noting a recent review of English Court 
of Appeal decisions by the UK Sentencing Advisory Panel found a tendency for domestic cases to receive a lower 
sentence than non-domestic cases.  In A-G's Reference (No 33 of 1996) [1997] 2 Cr App R(s) 10, 16, the English Court 
excluded domestic violence cases from the ambit of an increased tariff for crimes of manslaughter where a knife had 
been carried and used as a weapon.  The Court noted, without explanation, that domestic violence cases should be 
treated as a separate category.   
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by not severing relationships and by not penalising personal grievances too heavily...What is 
troubling is how, for some types of crimes and particular victim-offender relations (e.g. familial or 
intimate violence, rape), this ethic of care may be expressed by not hurting offenders, which can 
lead to continued harm and danger for victims'.32  As previously discussed, the present research 
found recidivist abusers are repeatedly sentenced to batterer treatment programmes.  Some 
offenders so treated, went on to seriously injure and kill their victims.      
  
C   The Public/Private Dichotomy and Women's Autonomy 
Feminism has exposed the dichotomy of public and private spheres as illusory as the state through 
its public rule-making authority determines what private 'family' forms are entitled to legal 
recognition, and how relations between family members should be structured.33  Susan Edwards 
notes that the state has maintained its retreat from controlling or regulating abusive behaviours 
between heterosexual intimates through domestic violence initiatives such as the creation of dual 
jurisdictions, and divisions of civil and criminal law remedies for domestic violence, which carry 
the clear symbolic message that private violence is in certain ways distinct from violence towards 
non-family members.  This affirmation of violence as not incompatible with social mores and 
values concerning the family can operate to reaffirm the hegemony of men's power within it.34 
 
State objectives of victim safety and batterer accountability35 are expressed in police domestic 
violence policy which notes that '[v]ictim protection is best attained by stopping the violence, and 
implementing a process that brings the offender into the criminal justice system.'36  However, 
feminist theorising has failed to articulate why it may be necessary for abused women to continue 
with domestic violence prosecutions despite their personal reluctance.37  Consequently, mandatory 
                                                 
32   Kathleen Daly, 'Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions About 
Justice' (1989) 17 Int.J.Sociol.Law 1, 11.  See, also, Antonia Cretney and Gwynn Davis, 'Prosecuting Domestic 
Assault: Victims Failing Courts, or Courts Failing Victims?' (1997) 36 How.L.J. 146, 152.  
33   Frances Olsen, 'The Myth of State Intervention in the Family' (1985) 18 U.Mich.J.L.Reform 837, 846, notes 'a great 
deal of family law doctrine can be seen as a response to the problems caused by the disjunction between legally 
recognised or de jure families and de facto families - the gap between the legal definition of family and the sense 
people have of what a family is.'   See also, Quilter v Attorney-General [1998] NZFLR 196 (CA) interpreting the 
Marriage Act 1955 as restricting the right to marry to heterosexual couples.   
34  Susan Edwards, 'Violence Against Women: Feminism and the Law' in Loraine Gelsthorpe and Allison Morris (eds), 
Feminist Perspectives in Criminology (1990) 141, 154. 
35  See, eg, Ministry of Social Development, above n 3, 12; Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The 
First Report (2006) 2. 
36   Dick Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand (11th ed, 2003) vol 2, 1513. 
37  Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (2000) 184, describes a deep division among 
feminists over whether mandatory intervention in domestic violence is a better policy choice than the courts' practice of 
dismissing cases when the battered woman refuses to participate.  See, also, Hanna, above n 4, 1870. 
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legal intervention in domestic violence is frequently criticised for failing to prioritise the autonomy 
and individual choices of battered women.38  Helene Carbonatto argues that: 
 
What many fail to acknowledge is that spousal abuse occurs in the context of an on-going 
relationship, and that a woman may desire to continue a relationship for its positive and affective 
dimensions despite its darker side.  Many of these women have emotional ties, economic ties, 
moments of calm, and shared histories which they experience in the course of their relationship with 
violent partners….these women often want the violence to stop, to be protected and to feel safe, to 
have access to information, support and assistance - but there is no clear evidence to suggest that 
arrest and punishment is what all women want.39 
 
On this view, '[t]he issue of choice is paramount - intervention must be flexible enough to be 
tailored to each woman's individual needs.  This may or may not involve legal remedies.'40  
Proponents of this position argue that battered women are best empowered by being permitted to 
use the criminal justice system strategically, in ways defined by individual victims as appropriate 
to their needs assessments.41  Taking away the choice of prosecution disempowers women by 
removing their autonomy, re-victimises women by subjecting them to state coercion, and increases 
the risk of batterer retaliation.42  Intervention against women's wishes may also align the victim 
with the batterer, deprive victims of financial support due to the incarceration of offenders, and 
compromise women's safety by removing the only power resource women have in bargaining for 
their security.43 
 
However, critics of this model of intervention observe that if feminists 'seek to promote an ethic of 
justice, dignity and equality in public life, it is counterintuitive to invoke an ethic of privacy as a 
                                                 
38   See, eg, Lucy Berliner, 'Making Domestic Violence Victims Testify' (2003) 18 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 
666, 668, suggesting that taking the choice of whether or not to give evidence against a batterer away from the battered 
woman risks infantilising her and reinforcing negative stereotypes that women are incapable of making informed 
decisions about their lives.  Bill Atkin, 'An Early Stocktake on Domestic Violence' (1996) 2 BFLJ, 82, 83, suggests 
that: 'bypassing the views of a victim of domestic violence should surely be done sparingly and only where the 
indications of danger are thoroughly compelling'.  
39  Helene Carbonatto, 'Dilemmas in the Criminalisation of Spousal Abuse' [1994] Social Policy Journal of New 
Zealand 21, 25 (citations omitted). 
40    Ibid 29. 
41  David Ford, 'Prosecution as a Victim Power Resource: A Note on Empowering Women in Violent Conjugal 
Relationships' (1991) 25 Law and Society Review 313. 
42  See, eg, Linda Mills, 'Killing Her Softly: Intimate Abuse and the Violence of State Intervention' (1999) 113 
Harv.L.Rev. 551. 
43    Carbonatto, above n 39. 
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shield against extending such norms to family life.'44  The cultural association of domestic violence 
with romantic love normalises violence against women.45  A structural failure of batterer 
accountability (victim withdrawal of support for the prosecution occurs more frequently in 
domestic violence than in other kinds of criminal cases)46  fails to acknowledge the immense 
public costs of domestic violence,47 as well as the personal, emotional, social and financial costs to 
battered women and children.48 
 
Permitting victim safety and batterer accountability to turn on the 'choices' of individual 
complainants also subverts New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy aimed at consistent, 
comprehensive intervention.  Such policy creates the potential for unjust and inconsistent outcomes 
as offenders who commit the same crime may receive very different treatment.  Furthermore, since 
victims of domestic violence are often being manipulated or threatened by the offender, 'if we hand 
over control of the criminal case to the victim, we will, in many cases, be handing control directly 
to the offender.'49  Making it clear to abusers that coercing victims to withdraw will be pointless 
may therefore provide greater protection for individual women.   
 
Complainant-reliant intervention also fails to acknowledge the dangers inherent in battering 
relationships and the disastrous consequences for battered defendants of this policy choice.  
Frances Olsen points out that a criminal justice system which treats violence against sexual 
intimates as private, but leaves homicide fully outlawed is especially disempowering to women if 
battery is not recognised as a justification for, or defence to, homicide.50  In other words, it is 
difficult to argue that domestic violence is sufficiently serious to warrant lethal self-defence when 
there is widespread acceptance that repeated crimes of violence may be overlooked in the interests 
of preserving abusive relationships.   
 
                                                 
44   Barbara Woodhouse, 'The Dark Side of Family Privacy' (1999) 67 Geo Wash L Rev 1247, 1256. 
45  Joseph Vandello and Dov Cohen, 'Male Honor and Female Fidelity: Implicit Cultural Scripts That Perpetuate 
Domestic Violence' (2003) 84 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 997; Sylvia Puente and Dov Cohen, 
'Jealousy and the Meaning (or Nonmeaning) of Violence' (2003) 29 Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 449. 
46   Bennett, Goodman and Dutton, above n 12, 763.   
47  Ministry of Social Development, above n 3, 7, cites Suzanne Snively, 'New Zealand Economic Cost of Family 
Violence' (1994) as conservatively estimating the potential economic cost at $1.2 billion per year.  
48   Rebecca Dobash and Russell Dobash, 'Men's Violence and Programs Focused on Change' (1997) 8 CICJ 243, 243-
244, provide a chilling account of the public and private costs of violence against women and children in the home. 
49  Barbara Flemming, 'Equal Protection for Victims of Domestic Violence' (2003) 18 Journal of Interpersonal 
Violence 685, 689. 
50    Olsen, above n 33, 856. 
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Discourses of male dominance and female submission have been eroticised in our culture and 
imposed on women in a context of social and economic inequality.  Since cultural images of 
proprietary male love and female self-abnegation for the physical and emotional benefit of men are 
difficult to defy, the legal system should recognise this pressure and seek to diminish, rather than 
add to it.51  Educating the public and professionals on red flags associated with romantic love such 
as jealousy-related aggression, possessiveness and controlling behaviours would be a potentially 
life-saving initiative.   
 
D   The Particularity/Generality Dichotomy and the Feminist Focus on the Individual 
The post modern critique of essentialism exposed a tendency in feminist theory to speak on behalf 
of the category 'woman' without acknowledging that differences such as race, class, and disability, 
profoundly interact with gender and produce different life experiences for individual women.  '[I]n 
feminist legal theory, as in the dominant culture, it is mostly white, straight, and socioeconomically 
privileged people who claim to speak for all of us.'52  At its most radical, the critique of 
essentialism posits that: 
 
To speak of any commonality among women is to commit the deconstructive-post-modern sin of 
'essentialism', the 'failure' to perceive that every single aspect of human existence is supposedly 
'socially produced' and determined in particular localized circumstances about which no 
generalizations can be made…Even to speak of common dynamics involving women in cultures 
that are patriarchal is rejected as 'totalizing'.53 
 
Diane Richardson notes that feminist recognition of knowledge as contextual and situated; the 
importance of language in constructing difference; and the need to question notions of 'truth' and 
'the self' as unitary and consistent; does not demand that the category 'woman' be deconstructed out 
of existence:  'However diverse and varied our experiences may be, women exist as a political and 
as a socially constructed category, whose lives are materially shaped by belonging to that 
category.'54 
                                                 
51   Ngaire Naffine, 'Possession: Erotic Love in the Law of Rape' (1994) 57 MLR 10, 35. 
52  Angela P Harris, 'Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory' (1990) 42 Stan.L.Rev. 581, 588.  See, also, 
Leigh Megan Leonard, 'A Missing Voice in Feminist Legal Theory: The Heterosexual Presumption' (1990) 12 
Women's Rts.L.Rep. 39. 
53  Charlene Spretnak, 'The Disembodied Worldview of Deconstructive Post-modernism' in Diane Bell and Renate 
Klein (eds), Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed (1996) 321, 322-323. 
54   Diane Richardson, '''Misguided, Dangerous and Wrong": on the Maligning of Radical Feminism' in Diane Bell and 
Renate Klein (eds), Radically Speaking: Feminism Reclaimed (1996) 143, 145-146. 
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Advocates of mandatory state intervention have been criticised as paternalistic in their presumption 
'that society knows what is right for all women'55 and 'essentialist' for underestimating the potential 
of coercive state intervention to harm poor and minority women.  Black women may fear 
intervention by a criminal justice system that has historically perpetrated racist violence more than 
they fear their partner's violence.  Women of other cultures may also fear that reporting domestic 
violence will bring shame upon themselves, their families and their communities.  Women who 
lack economic resources may find themselves and their children severely disadvantaged if the 
batterer provides the only source of family income and he is convicted and incarcerated. 
 
However, research indicates that economically disadvantaged women are more vulnerable to lethal 
and sub-lethal violence than middle or upper class women.56  Basing state intervention on the 
'choices' of individual battered women may therefore entrench marginalised women's vulnerability 
to violence.  Sandra Coney observes that while some women have achieved high levels of success 
in the political, private and state sectors in recent decades, a pattern has emerged of 'two distinct 
groups of women in New Zealand: a small elite group that is prospering and a large group of poor 
or low-income women that is struggling'.57  In this context of structural inequality, abstract, liberal 
notions of victim autonomy may construct an especially poisonous set of 'choices' for poor 
women.58  As Ngaire Naffine points out, rather than engage in the liberal pretence that we are all 
equal, abstract individuals, we need to address the realities of possessive heterosexual relations in 
the wider culture and the violence such relations do to women.59   
 
Although mandatory intervention has been criticised for exposing marginalised women to 
unwarranted intervention by the state child protection agency,60 as demonstrated by the present 
research, women are also vulnerable in jurisdictions where arrest is not mandatory.  Cases in which 
                                                 
55    Schneider, above n 37, 186. 
56   See, eg, Tony Blakely, et al, 'Socio-economic Factors and Mortality Among 25-64 Year Olds Followed from 1991 
to 1994: the New Zealand Census-Mortality Study' (2002) 115 New Zealand Medical Journal 91; Kenneth Polk, When 
Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 205-206; Vito Ciraco, 'Fighting Domestic Violence with Mandatory 
Arrest, Are We Winning?: An Analysis in New Jersey' (2001) 22 Women's Rts.L.Rep. 169, 178. 
57    Sandra Coney, Into the Fire: Writings on Women, Politics and New Zealand in the Era of the New Right (1997) 77. 
58   See, eg, Rickie Solinger, 'Poisonous Choice' in Molly Ladd-Taylor and Lauri Umansky (eds) 'Bad Mothers': The 
Politics of Blame in Twentieth Century America (1998) 381, 396. 
59    Naffine, above n 51, 34. 
60    See, eg, Donna Coker, 'Crime Control and Feminist Law Reform in Domestic Violence Law: A Critical Review' 
(2001) 4 Buff.Crim.L.R. 801, 833.   
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children of battered mothers are removed by a social worker also appear to reflect an assumption 
that the only way a mother can protect her child is by leaving the violent relationship.   
 
Mandatory arrest has also been criticised for increasing the rate of women who are arrested for 
using violence in self-defence, or in response to a pattern of abuse.  This failure to identify the 
primary aggressor disproportionately affects women of colour.61  However, as demonstrated by the 
present research, police failure to identify the primary aggressor also affects intervention where 
there is no policy of mandatory arrest.  Ellen Pence and Coral McDonnell note that the Duluth 
Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) mandatory arrest policy does not remove all discretion from 
police, and criteria have been established for police to distinguish the primary aggressor.62  The 
DAIP model carefully monitored three different arrest policies.  Arrest protocols limit police 
discretion to arrest in certain situations, thereby avoiding an increase in arrests of women, and 
reducing the rates of African-American and Native American arrests to a level more proportionate 
to their percentages in the population.63  Similar protocols could be adopted in New Zealand.     
 
Mandatory state intervention has been credited with reducing rates of intimate partner homicide in 
some US jurisdictions,64 significantly increasing the rate of domestic violence convictions,65 and 
arrests of offenders, especially those in violation of a restraining order.66  Hanna argues that while 
law, and in particular police and prosecutors, ought to be knowledgeable about, and sensitive to, 
the different needs and concerns of battered women, the feminist critique of essentialism does not 
provide a practical or theoretical justification for rejection of mandated victim participation: 
 
                                                 
61     See, eg, Ibid 831.   
62   See, eg, Ellen Pence and Coral McDonnell, 'Developing Policies and Protocols in Duluth, Minnesota' in Jalna 
Hanmer and Catherine Itzin (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice 
A Reader (2000) 249, 254. 
63    Kristen Little, et al, Assessing Justice System Responses to Violence Against Women: A Tool for Law Enforcement, 
Prosecution and the Courts to Use in Developing Effective Responses (1998)  
http://www/vaw.umn.edu/documents/promise/pplaw.htm at 15 November 2005, 30-31. 
64   Hanna, above n 4, 1864-1865, citing research from various US jurisdictions.  Cf David Ford, 'Coercing Victim 
Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' (2003) 18 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 669,678 noting several 
jurisdictions including San Diego and Nashville claim reductions in homicides due to more aggressive state 
prosecution policies but arguing that there is no reliable way to confirm the reductions are due to these policies rather 
than other community based intervention.   
65    Heather Cochran, 'Improving Prosecution of Battering Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence (1997-
1998) 7 Texas Journal of Women and the Law 89, 89.  
66  Sylvia Mignon and William Holmes, 'Police Response to Mandatory Arrest Laws' (1995) 41 Crime and 
Delinquency 430. 
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[I]n our efforts to be racially, culturally, and economically sensitive, we cannot allow violence to go 
unchecked under the rationale that state intervention is always racist, ethnocentric, or classist.  
Allowing women to step out of the criminal process can further solidify their perception that the 
criminal justice system marginalizes their concerns.  The underenforcement of domestic violence 
laws and the refusal to mandate victim participation for certain groups ultimately denies women 
legitimate state protection and enforcement of the right to be free from violence in their homes and 
in their communities.  An equal and effective response to domestic violence requires that all citizens 
be subject to the same prosecution policies.67 
 
The DAIP project, upon which the Hamilton Abuse Intervention Project (HAIP) was modelled,68 
'assume[s] that most victims of on-going abuse (intimidation, coercion and violence) are safer if the 
state or court has some level of control over the offender'.69   This project is founded on monitoring 
and scrutiny of practices to identify problems in the system, develop solutions and evaluate the 
impact of new procedures.70  In stark contrast, the present research found no evidence of 
systematic tracking and monitoring of criminal justice outcomes from the standpoint of victim 
safety.  The present silence surrounding harm to domestic violence victims who turn to the legal 
system for help is not conducive to individual or institutional accountability. 
                                                
 
E   Disappearance of the Batterer and the Tendency to Blame 
Although domestic violence was originally conceptualised as an issue of male violence toward 
women, feminists now point to the invisibility of the batterer in domestic violence discourses.71 
Davina James-Hanman describes how the disappearance of the batterer impedes attempts to 
improve inter-agency cooperation: 
 
Despite the wealth of evidence which consistently shows that domestic violence is overwhelmingly 
committed by men towards women, actually stating this leads to near apoplexy for some agency 
representatives.  In many cases, this results in a shared definition never being agreed…more 
commonly, a pragmatic course is followed, that is, a 'gender neutral' definition is adopted for the 
 
67    Hanna, above n 4, 1881-1882. 
68  See, Ruth Busch and Neville Robertson, '"What's Love Got To Do With It?" An Analysis of an Intervention 
Aproach to Domestic Violence', (1993) 1 Waikato L.Rev. 109, for a discussion of the Hamilton Abuse Intervention 
Project. 
69    Pence and McDonnell, above n 62, 252. 
70    Ibid 253. 
71   See, eg, Catherine Itzen, 'Gendering Domestic Violence: The Influence of Feminism on Policy and Practice' in 
Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzen (eds) Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and 
Practice (2000) 356, 376. 
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purposes of being able to progress.  This is done despite the fact that this leaves a Forum existing to 
address a problem which it cannot, or will not, accurately define!72 
 
Drew Humphries and Susan Caringella-MacDonald observe that the success of critical feminist 
scholarship in refuting demeaning characterisations of women in rape and domestic violence cases 
may have produced a misplaced belief that once exposed, these myths require little further 
attention.73  Startling research by Kerry Carrington and Andrew Johnson suggests that the 
sociological insight that punishment of the offender is functional in promoting social solidarity is 
reversed when women are physically and sexually assaulted by men (or boys) they know.  In this 
case, it was punishment of the deceased victim and her family through victim blaming that 
promoted the health of the 'collective conscience'.74   
 
Similarly, Louise Ellison points out that the contemporary focus in domestic violence cases is not 
why the batterer abuses, or how society can stop him.  Rather, attention is typically centred on the 
battered woman 'and the questions most often asked include "why does she stay with him?' and 
"why won't she support a prosecution?"'.75  Two male researchers capture this cultural ambivalence 
toward battered women:  
 
When we first started our research one question we heard frequently was, Why do battered women 
stay in these abusive relationships?  This question implies an accusation, namely, what is wrong 
with these crazy women for staying with these awful men?  Often what the questioner really means 
is, 'They are not like me.  I would never stay.  It's their own fault, and don't ask me to care about 
them.  Serves them right for not getting out'.76 
 
                                                 
72  Davina James-Hanman, 'Enhancing Multi-Agency Work' in Jalna Hanmer and Catherine Itzin (eds), Home Truths 
About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Police and Practice A Reader (2000) 269, 278. 
73  Drew Humphries and Susan Caringella-MacDonald, 'Murdered Mothers, Missing Wives: Reconsidering Female 
Victimization' (1990) 17 Social Justice 71. 
74  Kerry Carrington and Andrew Johnson, 'Representations of Crime, Guilt and Sexuality in the Leigh Leigh 
Rape/Murder Case' (1994) 3 A Fem LJ 3.  See, also, Donald Nicholson and Rohit Sangvi, 'Battered Women and 
Provocation: The Implications of R v Ahluwalia [1993] Crim.L.R. 728, 735, pointing to a long established tendency in 
the US and the UK to view domestic violence in terms of the personality defects of victims as well as batterers.  
Women who remain in abusive relationships elicit responses which echo the belief that sexual offence victims 'ask for 
it'.  Alternatively, the problem of domestic violence may be constructed in terms of the individual woman's personal 
pathology.  
75   Louise Ellison, 'Prosecuting Domestic Violence Without Victim Participation' (2002) 65 MLR 834, 850. 
76  Shoos, above n 1, 62, citing Neil Jacobson and John Gottman, When Men Batter Women: New Insights into Ending 
Abusive Relationships (1998) 136. 
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Ironically, the feminist preoccupation with the choices of individual victims has reinforced the 
tendency toward victim blaming.77  Joan Williams notes that refusal to see abused women as other 
than autonomous agents 'has been transposed into a blame-the-victim argument through the 
rhetoric of choice'.78  Even sympathetic commentators may adopt the position that responsibility 
for the abused woman's fate begins and ends with her.  Jane Ursel suggests that: 
 
the incredible importance of respecting the victim and giving her a voice in the system has at times 
had tragic consequences.  We can count the number of homicides that have been a result of judges 
respecting the woman's assessment that she is not in danger and that she supports her husband's bail 
request.  We can count the number of homicides that have resulted in a woman agreeing to see her 
partner despite the restraining order…When victims and the families that love them are not able to 
assess risk, there is always a danger/cost to a system that respects women's assessment and does not 
presume to know her circumstances better than she does.  This is the reality that refuge workers 
have to struggle with and agonise over, but what is the alternative?79 
 
Apart from the obvious objection that this analysis assumes a mobile, autonomous agent, whose 
interactions with her partner are free from physical, psychological, social, or economic coercion, 
the disappearance of the batterer is striking.   An abused woman's decision to support her husband's 
bail request, or to meet with her partner despite the existence of a restraining order, may or may not 
result in homicide.  The outcome is not in the battered woman's sphere of control, but in the 
battering man's.80   
 
As Martha Mahoney points out: 
 
 Recognizing the batterer's attempt at domination as the key to battering relationships allows a focus 
on his motivations rather than the psychology of the victim…The focus on the batterer's need for 
                                                 
77  In Takiari v Colmer [1997] NZFLR 538, 542, Hammond J considered the submission that the protected person's 
own conduct should be taken into account and stated:  'The question is not who promoted a given situation; it is, in 
terms of the [Domestic Violence] Act, whether a protection is needed.  However, the present research found victim 
blaming is an institutionalised criminal justice response to domestic violence.  This tactic extends to children.  For 
example, in Protect Dead Kids - McClay, Evening Post, 11 April 2002, concerning a case in which two young girls 
were killed by their stepfather shortly after their mother attempted to order the offender from the home, the 
Commissioner for Children condemned media reports of the trial for dragging the lives 'of dead little girls through the 
mud'.  Stephen Schulhofer, 'The Gender Question in Criminal Law' (1990) 7 Soc.Phil.& Pol'y 105, 117, notes the 
strategy of 'blaming the victim' is the 'oldest, most common and most successful tactic in homicide cases'.   
78   Joan Williams, 'Deconstructing Gender' in Patricia Smith (ed) Feminist Jurisprudence (1993) 531, 546. 
79  E Jane Ursel, 'The Possibilities of Criminal Justice Intervention in Domestic Violence: A Canadian Case Study' 
(1997) 8 CICJ 263, 274. 
80   See, case studies and commentary in Chapter Three.  
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control also reconciles another discrepancy in battering studies.  Bowker reports that a threat to 
leave the batterer may be very effective at ending the violence.  However, other studies show that 
separation often triggers escalated violence.  The same behavior - threatening to leave the 
relationship - might prove extremely effective or tremendously dangerous for women.  The 
difference will depend on the men with whom they are involved.  If the key to whether the violence 
escalates lies in the man's capacities, then any system examining the woman's behavior and 
psychology will poorly track the issues she faces.81 
 
The invisibility of the batterer and emphasis on victim 'choice' also fails to confront increasingly 
'public' punitive responses to battered women whose 'private' attitudes are perceived as facilitating 
abuse of their children.82 
 
F   The Correlation of Child and Women Abuse 
Feminist theorists and advocates have been criticised for not linking their responses to wife 
battering with responses to children of battered women.83  There is robust evidence of the co-
occurrence of violence against adult intimates and abuse of children in the relationship, estimated 
at between 40 and 90 percent of cases.84  Violence against adult intimates is a significant risk 
factor for pregnant mothers and unborn children.85  It is now clear that the majority of children are 
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for Professionals (2001); Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of 
Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (2002) 1-3; Neville Robertson and Ruth Busch, 'Not in Front of the Children: 
The Literature on Spousal Violence and its Effects on Children' [1994] BFLJ 107; Ruth Busch, 'Safeguarding the 
Welfare of Children' (1995) 4 MHL 46; Ewan Stark and Anne Flitcraft, 'Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist 
Perspective on Child Abuse (1988) 18 International Journal of Health Services 97. 
85  Tonya McCormack, 'Convicting Domestic Violence Abusers When the Victim Remains Silent' (1998-1999) 13 
B.Y.U.J.Pub.L. 427, 429, cites a US report indicating that 'more babies are born with birth defects as a result of 
pregnant mothers being battered than from all diseases and illnesses we now immunize pregnant women against 
combined'.  See also, Rebecca Burch and Gordon Gallup Jr, 'Pregnancy as a Stimulus for Domestic Violence' (2004) 
19 Journal of Family Violence 243; Richard Gelles, 'Violence and Pregnancy: Are Pregnant Women at Greater Risk of 
Abuse?' (1988) 50 Journal of Marriage and the Family 841, notes that women under 25 years are both more likely to 
be pregnant and more likely to be abused by husbands and partners.  See, also, Audrey Mullender, 'Meeting the Needs 
of Children' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in Reducing Domestic Violence? A Comprehensive Guide for 
Professionals (2001) 35, 37. 
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aware if their mother is being abused, seeing or hearing much of the violence that takes place.  
Information from Police and CYPFA files has revealed an average of just over two children are 
present each time the police attend a domestic violence call-out.86  There is also evidence that 
witnessing domestic violence may be more detrimental to children than violence directly 
experienced.87  Child witnesses are likely to suffer a host of mental and emotional problems,88 and 
may be more vulnerable to engaging in acts of violence in their own relationships.  In recognition 
of the costs to children of exposure to domestic violence, the Domestic Violence Act 1995 provides 
that allowing a child to see or hear physical, sexual or psychological abuse constitutes an act of 
domestic violence.89 
 
Heightened public and professional awareness of the harmful effects of domestic violence on 
children and legislative/policy reforms have resulted in active encouragement from courts, police 
and domestic violence advocates that battered women use the legal system to protect themselves 
and their children.  Sally Merry notes that a battered woman who begins a legal case, then drops it, 
then goes back for another protection order, or calls the police again but refuses to testify in court, 
earns the label of difficult or 'bad' victim.  Since 'good' domestic violence victims are those who 
follow through with their cases, criminal justice actors and community support agencies are likely 
to be less supportive of the rights of battered women who are not 'good' victims.90  Overseas 
research also indicates that if the evidence is too weak to proceed with a prosecution without the 
battered woman's active participation, a common approach is for prosecutors to file a report with 
the child protection agency.91  Thus abused women face the ultimate sanction - severance of their 
relationship with children - for failing to follow through with domestic violence complaints. 
 
Kristian Miccio notes the 'Alice in Wonderland' quality of this logic.  The battered mother's 
perceived inability to stop domestic violence justifies state intervention - but only in the form of a 
                                                 
86  Sergeant JJ Taylor, 'Child Witness Project' (Paper presented at the Children and Family Violence: Effective 
Interventions Now Conference, Wellington, 4-5 July 1999).  Ministry of Justice website:  
http://www.justice.govt.nz'pubs/reports/family_conference/author 8html at 24 February 2003. 
87  Gabrielle Maxwell and Janis Carrol-Lind, 'Distorted Childhoods: The Meaning of Violence for Children' [1998] 
Social Policy Journal of New Zealand 177. 
88   See, eg, Ibid; Bancroft and Silverman, above n 84; Audrey Mullender, et al, Children's Perspectives on Domestic 
Violence (2002). 
89    Section 3(3). 
90   Sally Merry, 'Rights Talk and the Experience of Law: Implementing Women's Human Rights to Protection' (2003) 
25 Hum.Rts.Q. 343, 349. 
91  Debra Whitcomb, Children and Domestic Violence: Challenges for Prosecutors (2000). 
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sword to sever the mother-child bond.  At the same time, state inaction to protect mothers 
facilitates the very abuse that the state uses to justify punitive intervention.92  
 
III   THE GENDER CONTROVERSY 
Recent, highly publicised New Zealand research found domestic violence most commonly involves 
violent couples who engage in mutual acts of aggression.93  Accordingly, these researchers argue 
that  
 
the original theoretical model that presented domestic violence as a gender issue involving male 
perpetrators and female victims is no longer viable as a description of the spectrum of domestic 
violence.  It is, of course, possible to save the feminist explanation by noting…that men 
predominate in cases of severe domestic violence, but this approach succeeds only if one is prepared 
to dismiss the mild to moderate domestic violence studied in our research.94 
 
In response, Michael Johnson, another domestic violence researcher, complained that the way the 
above research operationalised partner violence meant it had little to do with violence, and nothing 
at all to do with the serious form of violence that he terms 'intimate terrorism'.95   
 
Research finding men are overwhelmingly the perpetrators of domestic violence96 and research 
showing women and men are equally violent97 highlight the dissonance between 'crime studies' and 
'family conflict' research.  When domestic violence comes to the attention of police and the courts 
men are overwhelmingly represented as perpetrators.98  More than 95 per cent of applicants for 
protection orders are women, most respondents are men.99  Men predominate generally as 
                                                 
92  G Kristian Miccio, 'Notes From the Underground: Battered Women, The State, and Conceptions of Accountability' 
(2000) 23 Harv.Women's L.J. 133, 167. 
93 David Fergusson, John Horwood and Elizabeth Ridder, 'Partner Violence and Mental Health Outcomes in a New 
Zealand Birth Cohort' (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and Family 1103. 
94  David Fergusson, John Horwood and Elizabeth Ridder, 'Rejoinder' (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and Family 1131, 
1135. 
95   Michael Johnson, 'Domestic Violence: It's Not About Gender - Or Is It?' (2005) 67 Journal of Marriage and Family 
1126, 1127-1128. 
96  Demie Kurz, 'Physical Assaults by Husbands: A Major Social Problem' in Richard Gelles and Donileen Loseke 
(eds), Current Controversies on Family Violence (1993) 88, 89-93, citing studies.  See, also, Ministry of Social 
Development, above n 3, 8.   
97  See, eg, Murray Straus, Richard Gelles and Suzanne Steinmetz, Behind Closed Doors: Violence in the American 
Family (1980).  
98  The Ministry of Justice, The Age of Physical Abuse Victims and the Sentence Imposed on Their Abusers (2001) 
study of sentencing outcomes for offences against adult and child victims found 91 per cent of abusers were male.  
99   New Zealand Law Commission, Dispute Resolution in the Family Court, R 82, (2003) [540].  The offence of 'male 
assaults female' under s 194 of the Crimes Act 1961 is used as a proxy for domestic violence assaults in official 
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perpetrators of homicide by a factor of approximately 9:1,100 and when current or estranged adult 
intimate partners are killed, men are overwhelmingly the offenders.101  Red flags for 
dangerousness/lethality are also profoundly gendered.  Repeat acts of male violence are a risk 
factor for intimate femicide and a catalyst for the majority of lethal violence by women toward 
men.  Cultural myths of the scorned woman who stalks the beleaguered male intent on revenge102 
are belied by the social reality that '[m]en in all racial groups are much more likely to kill a woman 
after the couple have separated than are women.'103  
  
Since the present study dealt with violence which comes to the attention of police and the courts, 
and crime studies reveal this violence is typically perpetrated by men, it was expected that males 
would predominate as perpetrators of lethal and sub-lethal assaults.  This proved to be the case.   
Large scale annual crime surveys in the US also show high rates of male violence against intimate 
partners.  Data from the US Bureau of Justice Statistics' National Crime Victimization Surveys 
(NCVS) in which around 50,000 households are surveyed annually consistently reports about 85 
per cent of victimisations by intimate partners are perpetrated against women.104  The National 
Violence Against Women Survey, sponsored by the US National Institute of Justice and the Center 
for Disease Control and Prevention, used a nationally representative sample of 8,000 women and 
8,000 men, representing 16,000 households and found: 
 
Women are significantly more likely than men to report being victims of intimate partner violence  
                                                                                                                                                                 
statistics on crime:  See, eg, Philip Spier, Conviction and Sentencing of Offenders in New Zealand: 1989:1998 (1999); 
Sue Triggs, Sentencing in New Zealand: A Statistical Analysis (1999). 
100   Ian Miller and Nestar Russell, Homicide in New Zealand 1988-94: Patterns and Relationships (Paper presented at 
the 11th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Victoria University of 
Wellington, 29 January-1 February 1996) 12. 
101  See, eg, Janet Fanslow, David Chalmers and John Langley, 'Homicide in New Zealand: An Increasing Public 
Health Problem' (1995) 19 Australian Journal of Public Health 50; Ministry of Health, above n 84, 37, citing Janet 
Fanslow, J Kotch and David Chalmers, Partner Homicide in New Zealand 1978-1987, Unpublished; Polk, above n 56, 
7. 
102   Graeme Coss, 'Provocation, Law Reform and the Medea Syndrome' (2004) 18 Crim LJ 133, 136 fn 23, notes that 
'when Hollywood tackled a succession of films about homicidal stalkers, oversexed serial killers and crazed sexual 
harassers, in all instances Michael Douglas was the victim of Medea-like women: Glenn Close in Fatal Attraction 
(1987), Sharon Stone in Basic Instinct (1991) and Demi Moore in Disclosure (1994).  Well, they would, wouldn’t 
they?'  Frances Dolan, 'Battered Women, Petty Traitors, and the Legacy of Coverture' (2003) 29 Feminist Studies 249, 
250 notes these films do something other than document reality: 'If you relied only on newspapers, t.v. movies of the 
week, true crime fiction, novels, and films, you would think that women commit murder constantly.  Yet women who 
kill their husbands or partners are relatively rare, despite the fact that they dominate the popular imagination'. 
103   Garth Fletcher, The New Science of Intimate Relationships (2002) 244. 
104 Callie Rennison and Sarah Welchans, Intimate Partner Violence, (2002); Callie Rennison, Intimate Partner 
Violence and Age of Victim 1993-1999 (2001). 
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whether it is rape, physical assault, or stalking and whether the timeframe is the person's lifetime or 
the previous 12 months.105 
 
In comparison, 'family conflict' research reveals higher rates of assault than crime studies, and 
gender symmetry in perpetrators.106  These studies, which are based on a model of domestic 
violence as a normal, everyday response to conflict between intimate partners, usually employ the 
Conflict Tactics Scale (CTS) developed by Murray Straus and his colleagues as their unit of 
measuring assaults by partners.107   
 
The CTS has been much criticised for analyses of domestic violence that are devoid of 
consequences (whether injuries were caused) context and meaning to the parties.108  The oft-noted 
fact that women are much more likely than men to be injured in violent clashes between partners 
requires careful analysis of claims that the sexes are identically motivated to initiate assaults when 
the predictable consequences are far more damaging for women.109  Failure to acknowledge men's 
greater physical strength and social conditioning in use of force can also produce misleading 
generalisations.   For example, research which equates a slap from a female with a push by a male 
partner under the rubric of 'minor physical violence'110 may be a poor reflection of the reality of 
many violent relationships.  Cases in the present study show women are seriously injured and even 
killed following a 'push' by a male partner.111  Other research found abused women 'perceived the 
injuries to be more severe when they imagined falling from a push…than when they imagined that 
their partners attempted to hit them or had struck their faces several times.'112  The disjunction 
between crime and family conflict research is further evident in a family conflict operationalisation 
of verbal aggression which equates 'crying' and 'sulking' with such incongruent behaviours as 
                                                 
105  Patricia Tjaden and Nancy Thoennes, Extent, Nature, and Consequences of Intimate Partner Violence (2000) iii-iv. 
106 Murray Straus, 'The Controversy over Domestic Violence by Women: A Methodological, Theoretical, and 
Sociology of Science Analysis' in Ximena B Arriaga and Stuart Oskamp (eds), Violence in Intimate Relationships 
(1999) 17. 
107   Straus, Gelles and Steinmetz, above n 97. 
108   See, eg, Russell P Dobash, et al, 'The Myth of Sexual Symmetry in Marital Violence' (1992) 39 Social Problems 
71; Martin Schwartz and Walter S DeKeseredy, 'The Return of the "Battered Husband Syndrome" Through the 
Typification of Women as Violent' (1993) 20 Crime, Law and Social Change 249; Michael Kimmel, '"Gender 
Symmetry" in Domestic Violence' (2002) 8 Violence Against Women 1332. 
109    Dobash, et al, above n 108, 84. 
110    See, eg, Lynn Magdol, et al, 'Gender Differences in Partner Violence in a Birth Cohort of 21-Year Olds: Bridging 
the Gap Between Clinical and Epidemiological Approaches'  (1997) 65 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 
68. 
111   See, also R v McLeod [1994] CA 112/94, 27 May 1994. 
112   Loretta Stalans and J Arthur Lurigio, 'Public Preferences for the Court's Handling of Domestic Violence Situations' 
(1995) 41 Crime and Delinquency 399. 
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'throwing, smashing, or hitting objects'.113  This operationalisation of aggression will not capture 
criminal law distinctions. 
 
New Zealand research has revealed how different conceptualisations of violence and different 
methodologies produce findings of gender symmetry on the one hand, and alarming accounts of 
male violence against women on the other.  The longitudinal Dunedin Multidisciplinary Health and 
Development Study (the Dunedin Study) found perpetration rates of 21.8% for males and 37.2% 
for females.114  However, using the same research sample, the director of the Injury Prevention 
Unit at the University of Otago and his colleagues found approximately four times as many women 
as men reported having been assaulted by a partner at least once in the preceding 12 months.  A 
disproportionate number of partner incidents resulted in treatment: 13% of the assaults against 
women resulted in hospital, medical or first aid treatment; none of the assaults reported by men 
did.115  Describing claims of gender symmetry in the Dunedin Study as 'misleading', these 
researchers concluded that research confirms 'just how much more dominant partner abuse is in a 
woman's life compared to a man's'.116   
 
As a leading exponent of family conflict research, Murray Straus suggests that the gender 
controversy is the outcome of a failure by some analysts to distinguish between the different types 
of violence and different groups of people represented in crime and family conflict studies. 
Different prevalence rates and gender analyses are explicable as a result of the different contexts in 
which survey questions are asked.  The NCVS and similar studies are described to respondents as 
crime, personal safety, injury or violence surveys, whereas the CTS is expressed to respondents in 
terms of family problems and conflicts.  Since family conflict researchers collect data on 'the most 
minor and "harmless" slap'; 97 to 99 per cent of respondents report no injury was caused.  Given 
that assaults which result in injury are more likely to be experienced as a crime, and much of the 
abuse in family conflict studies is not 'experienced as a crime or as a threat to personal safety or 
violence', this helps explain the lower prevalence rates in crime studies.  Furthermore, since police 
officers as well as survey respondents are likely to view assaults resulting in injury as a crime, and 
                                                 
113   Magdol, et al, above n 110. 
114  Ibid; Terrie Moffitt, et al, Sex Differences in Antisocial Behaviour: Conduct Disorder, Delinquency, and Violence 
in the Dunedin Longitudinal Study (2001). 
115  J Langley, J Martin and S Nada-Raja, 'Physical Assault Among 21-Year-Olds by Partners' (1997) 12 Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 675. 
116  Otago Daily Times, Report Findings that Men are More Bashed than Bashing 'Misleading',  2 November 2000; 
Sunday Star Times, Victims of Violence, 9 November 1997. 
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injury is more likely to occur when a male is the offender, it follows that men will predominate as 
perpetrators in statistics based on crime surveys or crime reports.117    
 
Johnson's analysis also posits two distinct non-overlapping populations of domestic violence 
victims to account for the contradictory research findings.118  The first pattern involves 'common 
couple' violence in which there is no general pattern of power and control, but in which specific 
arguments sometimes escalate to use of violence by either the male or female partner.  The second 
population is characterised by 'patriarchal terrorism' which, in addition to physical abuse, involves 
economic subordination, extreme coercion and intimidation, isolation and a variety of other control 
tactics.  This violence is perpetrated by men against women in order to subdue and dominate 
women partners.119  Broad support for Johnson's discussion of two distinct subgroups of 
perpetrators has recently emerged from a British study.120 
 
However, Johnson's typology, in which the majority of domestic violence is low level or 'minor' 
violence which shows almost no tendency to escalate,121 is controversial.  Sylvia Walby and 
Andrew Myhill note the proposition that much of the violence between women and men is 
symmetrical, while not denying the existence of a small group of severely battered women, 
contradicts other studies indicating that 'there is a pattern of escalation and that any level of 
violence is a risk factor for escalation to severe and frequent violence'.122  
 
Dobash and Dobash (1979) in a study of a sample of battered women from Scottish refuges 
described a process of escalation, in which, if there was no successful intervention low levels of 
violence from a man would inexorably build into more severe violence.  Their current research is 
investigating the circumstances in which there is a homicide (Dobash et al, 1999).  Feld & Straus 
(1989) find that while desistance is possible, nonetheless, minor violence is a risk factor for an 
escalation to major violence.  Woffordt et al, (1994) found that though half of their sample showed 
                                                 
117   Straus, above n 106, 23-29. 
118  Johnson, above n 95, posits a domestic violence typology consisting of the following three types of violence: (a) 
violence enacted in the service of taking general control over one's partner (intimate terrorism); (b) violence utilised in 
response to intimate terrorism (violent resistance) and (c) violence 'that is not embedded in a general pattern of power 
and control, but is a function of the escalation of a specific conflict or series of conflicts' (situational couple violence). 
119  Michael Johnson, 'Intimate Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of Violence Against Women' 
(1995) 57 Journal of Marriage and the Family 283, 284.  
120   Nicola Graham-Kevan and John Archer, 'Intimate Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: A Test of Johnson's 
Predictions in Four British Samples' (2003) 18 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 1247. 
121   Johnson, above n 119, 286. 
122    Walby and Myhill, above n 84, 314. 
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desistance over a three year period, a prior act of violence is one of the best predictors of future 
violence.  While it is difficult to predict in individual cases, previous assault is a risk factor for 
further assault.  It is probable that assaults are likely to increase unless there is a change of 
circumstances.  The robustness and simplicity of this risk factor make it especially suitable for use 
in many professional contexts.123 
 
A 1994 study of sub-lethal domestic assaults found that while husbands and wives used verbal 
abuse and threats during escalation of an argument, only the women were fearful.  '[W]ife violence 
was largely reactive to husband violence, whereas husband violence seemed to self-escalate, often 
reaching a point at which there was nothing the wife could do to stop it'.124   
 
Straus' contention that some researchers and analysts have erroneously conflated the disparate 
findings of crime and family conflict research is deeply concerning.  As previously discussed, red 
flag indicators of serious violence and lethality are profoundly gendered.  A mistaken assumption 
that the majority of domestic violence crime is perpetrated by mutually antagonistic parties who 
engage with each other on relatively equal terms would compromise risk assessment and endanger 
the safety of abused women who turn to the legal system for help.   
 
IV   THE IMPORTANCE OF A POWER AND CONTROL ANALYSIS 
The most common misunderstandings about the nature of violent relationships include failure to 
recognise the interrelationship between domestic violence and intimate femicide; a view of 
violence as a discrete series of incidents; and failure to recognise the theme of control.125  While a 
recent US national survey found support for 'the theory that much of the violence that is perpetrated 
against women by male partners is part of a systematic pattern of dominance and control',126 the 
criminal law stereotype of spontaneous male violence by perpetrators who 'crack' or 'snap' and lose 
self-control inverts the power and control dynamics of abusive relationships.  Although research 
also reveals masculine control to be the dominant theme underpinning the red flag of separation, 
legal narratives continue to equate masculine proprietariness with romantic love and male passion.  
                                                 
123    Ibid 315. 
124   Angela Browne, Kirk Williams and Donald Dutton, 'Homicide Between Intimate Partners: A 20-Year Review' in 
M Dwayne Smith and Margaret Zahn (eds), Homicide: A Sourcebook of Social Research (1999) 149, 158-159, citing N 
Jacobson, et al, 'Affect, Verbal Content and Psychophysiology in the Arguments of Couples with a Violent Husband' 
(1994) 62 Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 982.  
125   See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report (2004) 194. 
126   Tjaden and Thoennes, above n 105, 34. 
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Victim blaming discourses of female infidelity at trial and mitigating narratives of male passion at 
sentencing ignore the reality that separation  
 
attacks take place when the batterer feels his control is eroding.  The most dangerous moment may 
come when a woman makes a decision to leave, at the moment she actually walks out, or shortly 
after she has left.  Because the key issue is control, flight might even create a temporarily enhanced 
sense of power in the batterer, which would turn to loss of control (and acts of violence to reassert 
control) later, when the woman refused to return and began building a new life.127   
 
Although repeat victimisation is also a well recognised risk factor for future violence and a red flag 
for dangerousness/lethality, absent an understanding of power and control, mitigating legal 
narratives of repeat victimisation have rendered this red flag benign.  Despite research showing risk 
is elevated when women seek formal and informal interventions, the recent introduction of a 
blanket rule of compellability was not accompanied by safety provisions in recognition of this red 
flag for dangerousness/lethality.   Failure to acknowledge these primary red flags undermines the 
ability of the legal system to promote the safety of women and children.    
 
V   DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: A WOMEN'S RIGHTS ISSUE 
The United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW) Monitoring Committee expressed concern at the prevalence of gender-based violence in 
New Zealand, including rape, sexual and domestic violence within the family.  The Committee 
called upon the government 'to create public awareness of violence against women as an 
infringement of women's human rights that has grave social costs for the whole community'.128  
However, Deborah Rhode observes that while political theorists have traditionally viewed physical 
security as citizens' most basic demand from the state; virtually never, apart from feminist work, 
has that demand been seen as encompassing women's protection from physical and sexual 
violence.129  In a society in which most serious domestic violence is perpetrated against women,130 
and almost half of murders are 'family violence-related',131 there is an urgent need to distinguish 
                                                 
127   Mahoney, above n 8, 79. 
128  United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Monitoring Committee, Fifth 
Periodic Report of New Zealand, CEDAW/C/NZL/5, 625th and 626th sess, (CEDAW/C/SR.625 AND 626) 14 July 
2003 [416]. 
129    Deborah Rhode, 'Feminism and the State' (1994) 107 Harv.L.Rev. 1181, 1193. 
130    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 35, 4. 
131    Ibid 18. 
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minimum norms of intimate relationships, such as a right to be protected against physical harm, 
that warrant legal intervention no matter what competing demands we may endorse.132  Intimate 
partner violence violates women's right to bodily integrity, and if children are also injured or 
witness the violence, their right not to be subjected to physical or psychological abuse is also 
violated.133   
 
There is also strong evidence that the cost of legal protection is prohibitive for some victims of 
violence.134 Accordingly, conceptualising violence as a human rights issue draws attention to a 
resiling by the state from its duty to protect its citizens, and the injustice of requiring women to pay 
to protect themselves from domestically violent men.  Framing domestic violence as an issue of 
human rights also offers a political strategy which encompasses protection of a woman's right to 
leave as well as form intimate relationships.  Although the former fundamental right remains 
largely unrecognised in criminal law, as demonstrated by the current research, its assertion is 
central to an understanding of the power and control dynamics of intimate partner violence and the 
need for broad economic, legal and social change.135 
 
VI   CONCLUSION 
The paramount goal of victim safety and commitment to abuser accountability in New Zealand 
Family Violence Prevention Strategy,136 contrasts with the failure of the legal system to achieve 
either of these goals.  While the risk of retaliatory violence toward women who seek criminal 
justice intervention is well established,137 the above theoretical dichotomies and disagreements 
have inhibited principled intervention, obscured failures of intervention, monitoring, and 
accountability, and deflected attention from injury and harms to victims.  
                                                 
132   Martha Minnow, 'Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language, and Family Violence' (1990) 43 
Vand.L.Rev. 1665, 1693, n 145, makes this point in relation to tolerance for cultural differences in attitudes to 
domestic violence.  
133   Elizabeth Schneider, 'The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement' in D Kelly 
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political and legal strategy that utilises rights. 
134   Legal Costs Hit Women Seeking Safety, New Zealand Herald, 4 June 2002.  Additional costs associated with the 
violence, such as housing, medical and relocation costs must also be met by victims, whose ability to pay may be 
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135   See also, Diane Polan, 'Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy' in D Kelly Weisberg (ed), Feminist Legal Theory: 
Foundations (1993) 419, 425. 
136   Ministry of Social Development, above n 3, 12. 
137   See, eg, Carolyn Block, et al, The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study: Risk of Serious Injury or Death in Intimate 
Violence A Collaborative Research Project (2000); David Ford and Mary Jean Regoli, 'The Criminal Prosecution of 
Wife Assaulters: Process, Problems and Effects' in N Zoe Hilton (ed), Legal Responses to Wife Assault: Current 
Trends and Evaluation (1993) 127; Bennet, Goodman and Dutton, above n 12.  
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Kristian Miccio urges feminists to commit to legislative action and legal strategies that 
compromise neither women's bodies nor women's personal security.138  A complainant-reliant 
intervention strategy fails to acknowledge that it is women who are overwhelmingly the victims of 
domestic violence crimes.  Consequently, it is women's rights to lead their lives free from violence 
and intimidation that are being subjugated to the interests of the family relationship.139  Since the 
right to physical security is one of the basic goals that feminists generally agree upon140 and 'the 
concept of human rights is one of the few moral visions subscribed to internationally',141 a woman's 
rights analysis offers a useful strategy to ensure that the state is held accountable for protecting its 
citizens, monitoring and evaluating its responses from the standpoint of victim safety, and the 
ongoing development of initiatives to eradicate male violence toward women. 
                                                 
138    Miccio, above n 92, 172. 
139    Dame Silvia Cartwright, 'Thoughts on Women and Violence, and Women and the Law [1993] CJQ 2, 2, notes that 
protecting the family will often mean women's right to live violence-free lives are 'seen as less important than the need 
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140   Deborah Rhode, above n 129, 1193. 
141  Dame Silvia Cartwright, 'Violence and Water: Women's Issues and the Law' (1993) 8 OLR 1, 8, citing Charlotte 
Bunch and Roxanna Carillo, Gender Violence, A Development and Human Rights Issue, Centre for Women's Global 
Leadership, 7. 
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                        CHAPTER ELEVEN:  RESEARCH SUMMARY 
  [I]t is time to admit that our criminal laws and evidentiary rules carry with  
them gender-biased views originating at a time when women's lives were 
devalued and the typical male perspective on domestic femicide was that 
the victim provoked her husband by her words and deeds.  Therefore, in 
order to redress the results of a long-term belittlement of the appalling 
domestic violence problem in this country, concerns of gender fairness 
must be factored into the policy mix.1 
  
I   INTRODUCTION 
Feminists in the 1960s and 1970s broke the silence surrounding violence against women and 
children in the home.  However, 'a new kind of silence is rooted in the institutional methods of 
processing these cases'.2  The many women who were beaten, seriously injured and killed 
following criminal justice interventions with abusers, and silence surrounding this casualty toll, 
strongly indicate that whatever the state priority in domestic violence intervention during the term 
of the present research, it was not victim safety.   
 
The compartmentalised legal response to domestic violence overlooks the interconnectedness of 
various categories of abuse and their cross-over implications for victims.  Criminal law stereotypes 
of lethal male violence toward female intimates, which manipulate the two primary red flags of 
repeat victimisation and separation violence for the benefit of abusers, are inconsistent with social 
science research and illustrate the failure of the legal system to ground its responses to intimate 
partner violence in women's concrete, social reality.  Aggressive and proprietary legal images of 
romantic love also compete with new visions of equality in heterosexual relationships.3  This 
ongoing contest is evident in legal analyses in which men have dominion over women; while 
national domestic violence policy seeks healthy gender roles, and non-violent concepts of 
masculinity.4   
 
 Domestic violence experts warn that when the reform effort shifts from a critique of the legal 
system's ability to hold an offender accountable, to a critique of the domestic violence victim, 
                                                 
1    Myrna Raeder, 'The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic Violence: Simpson and Beyond' (1996) 69 
S.Cal.L.Rev. 1463, 1465. 
2   Dennis Falk and Nancy Helgeson, 'Building Monitoring and Tracking Systems' in Melanie Shepard and Ellen Pence 
(eds), Coordinating Community Responses to Domestic Violence: Lessons from Duluth and Beyond (1999) 89, 90. 
3   See, also, Victoria Nourse, 'The "Normal" Successes and Failures of Feminism and the Criminal Law' (2000) 75 
Chi-Kent L.Rev. 951, 951, making this point in relation to commentary which asserts that the 'abuse excuse' of 
battering threatens the legal system.  
4     Ministry of Social Development, Te Rito: New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy (2002) 14. 
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'[i]neffective intervention strategies and structural problems with the law fade from view as objects 
of inquiry'.5  The following summary of recommendations addresses 'ineffective intervention 
strategies and structural problem with the law' identified in the present research.    
 
II   INCONSISTENT POLICIES AND PRINCIPLES IN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
INTERVENTION 
The Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families highlights victim safety and batterer 
accountability as the twin aims of criminal justice intervention.6  However, as discussed below, a 
number of competing ideologies and practices militate against this principled response.   
 
A   Victim Safety/Batterer Accountability versus Rehabilitation and Preserving the Family 
Relationship 
While members of the judiciary sometimes assert that intimate partner violence will not be treated 
less seriously than other forms of violent offending,7 there is good evidence that when these cases 
survive dismissal for lack of evidence they are sentenced more leniently than crimes between 
strangers.8  This reality that 'rehabilitation of domestic violence offenders is a much more 
predominant response than punishment' is frequently misrepresented by caricaturing criminal 
justice interventions 'as punitive and stigmatizing of offenders'.9  A tendency to portray legal 
intervention as unduly punitive despite the present focus on rehabilitation is also evident in the 
widely reported remarks of a specialist domestic violence court judge that New Zealand's hard line 
approach to domestic violence 'flies in the face of reality',10 and jail is not always the best option 
for men who beat their partners.11  Since this analysis may obscure an unprincipled focus on 
                                                 
5    Ellen Pence and Coral McDonnell, 'Developing Policies and Protocols in Duluth, Minnesota' in Jalna Hanmer and 
Catherine Itzen (eds), Home Truths About Domestic Violence: Feminist Influences on Policy and Practice A Reader 
(2000) 249, 249. 
6     Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report (2006) 2. 
7   See, eg, White v Police (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Barker J, 17 December 1991); Sheen v Police 
(Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Lang J, 3 February 2006) [11]. 
8      See, discussion above, at p 361. 
9    John Braithwaite and Heather Strang, 'Restorative Justice and Family Violence' in John Braithwaite and Heather 
Strang (eds), Restorative Justice and Family Violence (2002) 1, 17.  See, also, discussion of the gendered victim/agent 
dichotomy above, at p 359. 
10    Jail 'Not For All Violent Husbands', Hawkes Bay Today, 12 October 2005, notes the judge also angered women's 
groups and some media by granting an All Black permanent name suppression after he pleaded guilty to beating his 
pregnant wife.  The player was discharged without conviction. 
11    Judge Fuels Controversy, Waikato Times, 12 October 2005, reports the judge as informing the conference that 
'[j]ailing men who beat their partners is not always the best option and some should be let off without conviction'. 
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rehabilitation,12 chronically violent offenders - the category whose recidivism poses a high risk of 
dangerousness/lethality - may be repeatedly court-ordered to attend treatment programmes without 
ensuring offenders are held accountable for attending/completing programmes13 or providing 
meaningful sanctions for non-compliance.  Thus all the responsibility and danger passes to women 
victims.14   
 
In comparison, the purpose of the New York specialist domestic violence court is not rehabilitation 
or treatment.  'Without research showing that rehabilitation of batterers was possible, the court 
decided to focus on protecting victims and holding defendants accountable for their actions.'15  
This intervention approach apparently recognises that opportunities to prevent abuse narrow as 
patterns of behaviour become established.16  Recidivist abusers and those who cause bodily injury 
to their partners are likely to be resistant to rehabilitation and have an elevated propensity for 
further violence.17  Repeat offenders are especially difficult to rehabilitate as many believe they 
have a right to use violence as a means of control.18  An unprincipled focus on rehabilitating 
habitually violent men is therefore likely to prove counter-productive to national prevention goals 
of victim safety and batterer accountability.   
                                                
 
It has become the established orthodoxy to preface discussions of victim safety and batterer 
accountability with the qualification that intervention will respect women 'who want violence in the 
relationship to stop but who do not want the relationship itself to end'.19  In practice, this has 
translated into policies which focus on the victim, without any real acknowledgement that the 
decision to use violence is within the abuser's control, and not within the control of the victim - no 
matter how heroically women endure repeated acts of abuse.   
 
12     Helena Barwick, Alison Gray and Roger Macky, Domestic Violence Act 1995: Process Evaluation (2000) found 
judges, court staff, lawyers and police overwhelmingly approved of the rehabilitative focus of New Zealand legislation.    
13   Ibid 103, finding attendance at programmes was remarkably low, with only about a third of those who were 
referred to a programme and not excused, actually completing them.  
14    The Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 21, undertakes to ensure abusers who breach 
court orders will be held accountable and to enhance the ability of the police to take effective action if offenders fail to 
attend therapeutic programmes.  However, accountability also requires a meaningful response from the courts.  
15    Robert V Wolf, Liberty Aldrich and Samantha Moore, Planning a Domestic Violence Court: The New York State 
Experience (2004) Center for Court Innovation, US Bureau of Justice Assistance, Washington DC.  
16     Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 9. 
17    See, eg, Richard Johnson, 'Intensive Probation for Domestic Violence Offenders' (2001) 65 Federal Probation 36; 
Jeffrey Fagan, The Criminalization of Domestic Violence: Promises and Limitations (Adaptation of Paper presented at 
the 'What to Do About Crime?' Conference on Criminal Justice Research and Evaluation, Washington DC, 10 July 
1995) (1996) 18-19. 
18     See, eg, Johnson, above n 17. 
19     Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 20. 
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When courts and police defer to the wishes of battered victims that their abusers escape arrest, 
imprisonment, or be released on bail, they have neither the resources nor the expertise to ascertain 
the extent to which women's choices are shaped by the interaction of power and control, 
domination and subordination in battering relationships.20  A battered woman may value her 'own 
keen decision-making under pressure, yet continue to deny the cumulative harm to her self esteem 
and her safety wrought by the betrayal of trust and incidents of violence in her relationship'.21  
Consequently, her assessment of risk may be an unrealistic appraisal of her circumstances.22  
Recent research also reveals that battered women are not necessarily safer by being permitted to 
choose the extent, if any, of criminal justice intervention.   The study found nearly one-half of 
abused women who experienced an attempt on their lives by current or estranged male partners did 
not realise the level of danger they faced.23  Thus while the aim of complainant-reliant intervention 
may be family solidarity, a focus on protecting the relationship has the potential to perpetuate a 
system of domination and expose women to further danger.   
 
As one New Zealand judge has observed, conceptualising the family in terms of the adult 
relationship and affective privacy misses the crucial social function that families perform.  The 
inter-generational and multi-generational effects of violence within families point to an overriding 
public interest in conceptualising the family as a social, as opposed to emotional unit.24   
Recognition of this public interest is essential to protect children living with violence and to 
prevent battering from escalating to lethality.         
 
 
 
                                                 
20   See, eg, Tony Ward, et al, 'Explaining Some Characteristics of Battered Women: A Cognitive Deconstructionist 
Approach' (1995) 24 New Zealand Journal of Psychology 26; Paula Nurius, et al, 'Contextualizing Depression and 
Physical Functioning in Battered Women: Adding Vulnerability and Resources to the Analyses' (2003) 18 Journal of 
Interpersonal Violence 1411; Randye Semple, 'Psychological Abuse in Intimate Relationships: A New Zealand 
Perspective' (2001) 30 New Zealand Journal of Psychology 60. 
21    Martha Mahoney, 'Victimization or Opression?:  Women's Lives, Violence and Agency' in Martha Fineman and 
Roxanne Mykituk (eds) The Public Nature of Private Violence (1994) 59, 62.   
22    Antonia Cretney and Gwynn Davis, 'The Significance of Compellability in the Prosecution of Domestic Assault' 
(1997) 37 Brit.J.Criminol. 75, 87, cite Anne Viney, Assistant Director of Victim Support, HACDV 1993, vol 2, 125, 
that very often a desire for reconciliation is assumed to be the reason for victim non-cooperation with prosecution, 
when the real reason may be something like fear of the court experience, fear of threats from the alleged perpetrator, or 
fear that the man may go to prison. 
23    Amy Karan and Lauren Lazarus, 'A Lawyer's Guide to Assessing Dangerousness for Domestic Violence (2004) 78 
F.B.J. 55. 
24    Judge David Harvey, 'Spousal Non-Compellability' [1997] NZLJ 115, 117. 
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B   Failure to Acknowledge the Interrelationship between Woman and Child Abuse 
Although empirical and clinical evidence of the trauma to children caused by exposure to 
batterers25 has contributed to better coordinated policy and intervention, there remains a pervasive 
tendency to view child and woman abuse as separate, discrete categories of offending.  
Consequently, discourses of child abuse seldom acknowledge the correlation between child and 
women abuse, harms to children who witness violence against their primary caregivers, and the 
barriers to escape that women, and therefore their children face.  Cultural and legal messages 
which increasingly stress children's need for stability and relationships with both biological 
parents26 also create a tension between mothers' right to protection from violence, and children's 
right to contact with both parents.  This social reality may increase battered women's vulnerability 
to violence by conveying the message that failure to acquiesce to fathers' demands is wrong and 
contrary to the welfare of children.27  In Australia, this situation has apparently translated into 'a 
greater tendency for the non-resident parent to expect contact, even when domestic violence is an 
issue and…pressure on resident parents to agree to contact despite safety concerns'.28   
 
The Victorian Law Reform Commission notes that '[w]omen with children are often placed in a 
"no win" situation.  They are often judged bad mothers by the community if they stay in a violent 
relationship, but bad mothers if they leave and take the children with them'.29  The present research 
found women who remain in abusive relationships may be subject to prosecution,30 or have their 
                                                 
25    Janine Moss, 'World Conference on Family Violence Sharing Solutions.  Changing the World' [1999] Social Policy 
Journal of New Zealand 172, 173, notes 'there is growing evidence to suggest that witnessing adult violence may be a 
greater risk factor [for children] than suffering physical child abuse'.  Peter Jaffe, 'Foreword' in Lundy Bancroft and Jay 
Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on Family Dynamics (2002) viii, ix, 
supports a shift in terminology from 'children exposed to domestic violence' to 'children exposed to batterers' as the 
latter term 'serves to underline batterers' accountability and responsibility for the effects of domestic violence in a way 
that impersonal terms such as 'violent homes' or 'conjugal abuse' do not'.  In addition, the term draws attention to the 
fact that 'the parenting of batterers can bring multiple sources of trauma to children's lives in addition to the terror of 
violence toward their mothers'.  
26 See, eg, Ministry of Social Development, <http://www.msd.govt.nz/work-areas/families-whanau/families-
commission.html> at 2 March 2004, noting the role of the Families Commission is to 'raise public awareness and 
promote better understanding of family issues, including the importance of stable relationships (inclusive of marriage) 
and of the parenting role'.   
27     See, eg, Pauline Tapp, 'Family Law' [1994] NZRL Rev 140, 146. 
28    Linda Debenham, 'Addressing Domestic Violence in Family Law' (Paper presented at the Conference on Women, 
Feminism and the Law, Brisbane, October 2004) 2, citing Chief Justice Nicholson, Managing Family Violence in a 
Family Court Context: Lessons Learned and Challenges to be be Faced' Columbia Pilot launch and Symposium 
9/11/01.  See, also, Wendy Davis, 'Gender Bias, Fathers' Rights, Domestic Violence and the Family Court' [2004] 
BFLJ 299. 
29     Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defences to Homicide, Final Report (2004) 166. 
30      See, eg, R v Emery [1993] 14 Cr.App.R 394; R v Lunt [2004] 1 NZLR 498.  
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children removed.31 On the other hand, criticisms by politicians, child advocates32 and Father's 
Rights Groups33 of 'fatherless families', and the supposed deprivation of fathers' relationships with 
children arising from practices under the Domestic Violence Act 1995,34 put pressure on women, 
especially women with young children, to remain in abusive relationships.35  Although studies 
indicate that, if consulted, many children would tell their mothers not to stay in abusive 
relationships for their sake,36 cultural messages that the 'good' wife remains with her husband and 
children, and the 'good' mother should 'keep the family together for the sake of the children',37 send 
the message that women ought to stay or return 'for the sake of the family'.  This social pressure 
clearly contributed to the deaths of battered women and their children in the present study.38    
 
Punitive responses to battered mothers who 'stand by' while children are abused, and removal of 
children who are exposed to domestic violence, require a reciprocal obligation by state and 
community agencies to commit to strategies that support women's attempts to leave abusive men.  
The Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) recognised the value of women's unpaid work and its 
availability made it possible for women to escape violent relationships with their children.39  
However, women's economic dependence is perpetuated by stigmatising sole parent (mainly 
women-headed) families on welfare.  Researchers note that the constant identification of 'sole 
mothers' in public debates as to blame for much social malaise requiring severe deterrence against 
                                                 
31      See Part I.  
32     See, eg, Laurie O'Reilly, 'The Child's Best Interests: Balancing the Right to Parental Relationships with the Right 
to Protection' in Jon Patrick, Helen Foster and Brian Tapper (eds), Successful Practice in Family Violence in New 
Zealand (1997) 34, 53, the then Commissioner for Children, who described the issue of 'fatherless families' as one of 
the most vital social issues facing New Zealand.  
33    Fathers Victims of Gender Politics, Evening Post, 11 May 2001, suggesting the most dangerous situation for 
children is the solo mother household. 
34      O'Reilly, above n 32, 53. 
35     Martha Mahoney, 'Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation' (1991) 90 Mich.L.Rev. 
59. 
36      Audrey Mullender, et al, Children's Perspectives on Domestic Violence (2002) 170. 
37    Richard Gelles and Murray Straus, Intimate Violence: The Causes and Consequences of Abuse in the American 
Family (1988) 82. 
38    In Case Study P/98/3 the sister of the victim who was killed by a habitual batterer told the media that the deceased 
woman always put her children first and stayed in the violent relationship for their sake.  In Case Study H/01/9(S) in 
which the offender killed his partner's two daughters shortly after she told him to leave the family home, the mother 
stated that despite the offender's violence toward her throughout the relationship she felt it was important for her 
children to have a positive relationship with a father figure.  The offender's former partner, who had been seriously 
injured and hospitalised by the offender, stated she also remained in the relationship because she 'felt my kids had the 
right to a father.  I look back now and realise I made the wrong decision'.  
39    Ann Else, False Economy: New Zealanders Face the Conflict Between Paid and Unpaid Work' (1996) 106, notes 
the focus on irresponsible teenage mothers belies the reality that these mothers make up less than 3 per cent of all solo 
parents. 
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moral impropriety and financial irresponsibility ignores the reality that most sole parents are not 
'young unmarried mothers'.40   
 
Research published by the Anglican Family Centre indicating that 46 per cent of all single-parent 
families live below the poverty line provides stark evidence that the state is failing to ensure the 
welfare of mothers and children.41  Strategies aimed at the safety and healing of battered women 
will impact positively on the welfare of their children.42  By contrast, increasingly punitive 
responses to sole parent mothers - including, but not limited to, cutting benefit levels - not only 
devalue women's unpaid child caring work,43 but also add to the barriers to exit from violent 
relationships that women face.44   
 
C   Misconstructions of Victim Autonomy: Shifting the Focus to Victim Safety 
Notwithstanding incontrovertible evidence of the debilitating physical, social, emotional and 
psychological effects of battering,45 resistance to images of abused women as victims has resulted 
in equally misleading portrayals of battered women as freely-choosing, autonomous agents.46  The 
practical consequences of this victim/agent dichotomy are apparent in research on judicial 
responses to persons (usually women) who seek to discharge, or withdraw protection order 
applications soon after they are made.  Some judges and courts adopt a cautious approach, 
particularly where children are involved, while others are inclined to the position that overriding an 
abused woman's choice is an abusive act of power, especially where there are no issues relating to 
children.  The latter position may be maintained even where the judge believes further violence is 
likely to lead to a fresh protection order application.  The researchers call for a broadened debate 
about the merits of each of these positions.47   
                                                 
40   Ian Pool and Kim Johnstone, 'Family Demographic Change: 2. Sole Parent Families' [1996] BFLJ 41, 42.  
41   Single Parent Families Worst Off, Study Finds, Evening Post, 9 March 1996, noting that '[b]ecause more than 90 
per cent of single-parent households were women-led, poverty was rising among New Zealand women.'. 
42   Lundy Bancroft and Jay Silverman, The Batterer as Parent: Addressing the Impact of Domestic Violence on Family 
Dynamics (2002) cite various studies which illustrate that  the behaviour of battering men sends a set of destructive 
ripples through the lives of families that are far more complex than is commonly recognised. 
43   See, eg, Marilyn Waring, Counting for Nothing: What Men Value and What Women are Worth (2nd ed, 1992); 
Marcia Neave, 'From Difference to Sameness - Law and Women's Work' (1992) 18 MULR 768, 771. 
44   Elizabeth Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Lawmaking (2000) 197-198, notes the fact that governments 
can eliminate welfare payments to battered women while simultaneously proclaiming an end to domestic violence 
reflects the contradictions of feminist engagement with the state. 
45    See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, 180; Ward, et al, above n 20; Nurious, et al, above n 20; 
Semple, above n 20. 
46   Mahoney, above n 21, 62.  See, also, Joan Williams, 'Deconstructing Gender' in Patricia Smith (ed), Feminist 
Jurisprudence (1993) 531, 546. 
47    Barwick, Gray and Macky, above n 12, 126. 
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Principled intervention would eschew this dichotomous opposition.  To respond to stereotypical 
depictions of battered women as pathologically helpless victims by propounding an equally false 
stereotype of abused women as free-wheeling agents deflects attention from the importance of risk 
assessment in domestic violence cases.  Research suggests respondents of multiple domestic 
violence order applications are especially dangerous offenders.48  By the time the batterer appears 
in court, there is likely to have been prior contact with police and fruitless attempts to hold him 
accountable.49   Faced with batterers who refuse to accept the relationship has ended, and/or whose 
violence persists despite resort to the law for help and protection, women may see little alternative 
but to attempt to placate the abuser.50  However, the present study found that even in cases where 
victims have endured gross and repeated acts of violence the judicial response may be muted as a 
result of victims' requests for leniency at sentencing.51  This approach undermines the goals of 
victim safety and batterer accountability in national domestic violence policy. 
 
D   The Culture of Victim Blaming 
Although the question: 'Why Didn't She Leave?' continues to plague domestic violence discourses, 
it is disingenuous for members of the public and professionals to assert the existence of some 
'common sense' understanding that a reasonable woman would leave a violent relationship when 
the assumption that the abusive relationship should be ended has been strenuously resisted in other 
contexts.  Given the present legislative focus on batterer rehabilitation and treatment it would be 
surprising if abused women did not internalise the message that 'staying' is appropriate if the 
batterer gets counselling.   
 
While the present focus on rehabilitation may encourage women to reconstitute their relationships 
with batterers who engage (however half-heartedly) in some level of treatment,52 when court-
ordered batterer treatment fails, women who have staked their well-being and even their lives on 
                                                 
48     Anna Stewart, 'Who Are the Respondents of Domestic Violence Protection Orders?' (2000) 33 ANZJ Crim 77, 87. 
49   Raeder, above n 1, 1468 n 22, cites a body of research, including one study showing ninety per cent of women 
killed by their batterers previously called the police.  Fifty per cent called the police five or more times.   
50    Heather Cochrane, 'Improving Prosecution of Battering Partners: Some Innovations in the Law of Evidence' (1997) 
7 Tex.J.Women & L. 89, 100, cites research suggesting victims hesitate to help prosecute batterers as their past 
experiences with the criminal justice system have shown them that police and courts cannot keep them safe. 
51     See, examples of these cases above, at p 103. 
52    Ruth Busch and Neville Robertson, '"What's Love Got To Do With It?" An Analysis of an Intervention Approach 
to Domestic Violence' (1993) 1 Waikato L.Rev. 109, 130, note anecdotal evidence that some abusive men who attend 
programmes seem less interested in changing their behaviour, than in convincing their partners that they have changed. 
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this legal response are likely to be blamed/and or treated as dysfunctional.53  Perversely, battered 
women who do seek safety for themselves and their children are also blamed for depriving their 
children of fathers and for provoking their own deaths by: limiting abusive men's access to their 
children; attempting to protect themselves and their children by seeking structured access 
arrangements; and/or temporary protection orders.54  A chillingly ironic expression of victim 
blaming is manifest in courtroom submissions that habitual batterers who kill women following 
their attempts to escape should have their sentences mitigated because their victims chose not to 
leave.55  
 
III   PRINCIPLED INTERVENTION: SHIFTING THE FOCUS TO VICTIM SAFETY 
The terrible social reality that women are killed despite legal interventions with abusers prompted 
Kenneth Polk to conclude that law can provide 'little real protection from the jealous rage of a male 
determined and set on the course of homicide'.56  However, Patricia Easteal's research found that 
'[i]n many instances one felt strongly that the homicide or homicide-suicide did not have to be an 
inevitable outcome; that it was preventable'.57  The Ontario Domestic Violence Death Review 
Committee also found domestic violence deaths 'are not isolated incidents of violence, but rather a 
reflection of broader social and systemic issues that render women and children vulnerable and 
allow them to be targets of violence.'58  Research commissioned by the London Metropolitan 
Police Service (MPS) similarly concludes that structured criminal justice interventions can assist in 
preventing violence escalating to lethality and help to disrupt established patterns of abuse.59  
 
A   Adoption of a Corporate Domestic Violence Risk Assessment Tool 
Although courts, probation officers and prosecutors routinely make decisions concerning the 
dangerousness of domestic violence offenders, the process is not consistent, transparent or 
standardised.  As demonstrated by the present research, constructions of male sexual 
proprietariness in terms of romantic love and of batterers as routinely assessing the level of 
                                                 
53    Mahoney, above n 21, 77, notes that '[w]omen who "succeed" in stopping violence without permanently leaving 
the relationship have made decisions that are not treated as legitimate or intelligent in women who "fail" to halt the 
violence of their lovers'. 
54    See, eg, Case Study G/01/7 discussed above, at p 164. 
55    See, eg, Case Study D/00/7 discussed above, at p 157.   
56    Kenneth Polk, When Men Kill: Scenarios of Masculine Violence (1994) 37. 
57    Patricia Easteal, Killing the Beloved (1993) 182-183. 
58   Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, Annual Report to the Chief Coroner: Case Reviews of Domestic 
Violence Deaths, 2002 (2004) 39. 
59   Metropolitan Police Service, Findings from the Multi-agency Domestic Violence Murder Reviews in London: 
Prepared for the ACPO Homicide Working Group (2003) 16. 
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violence they may inflict without the risk of lethality have rendered the two primary risk markers 
of separation violence and repeat victimisation benign.  Beliefs that battered women are free to 
seek help and leave abusive relationships and failure to acknowledge the interrelationship between 
sub-lethal and lethal assaults undermine the ability of the legal system to assess and manage risk.  
Since batterers differ in their willingness or ability to desist from violent behaviour and responses 
to rehabilitative treatment,60 systematic assessment tools, based on an articulated theory of 
lethality/dangerousness offer a means of standardising diagnostic procedures and referral protocols.  
 
Routine deployment of a domestic violence risk assessment tool that is grounded in domestic 
violence research would ensure consistency in risk assessment by criminal justice personnel, social 
workers, health professionals and other persons dealing with domestic violence.  Agencies who 
deal with domestic violence may therefore work together to safeguard domestic violence victims.61  
Such instrument would also counter the tendency to treat each violent incident as unconnected to a 
pattern of abusive and controlling behaviours.  Criminal justice agencies would therefore respond 
to the context of violent incidents, enhancing opportunities to ameliorate potentially lethal 
conditions of risk.  While consistent application of national risk assessments standards would in 
some cases be a life saving institutional response,62 knowledge of red flags for 
dangerousness/lethality would also enable abused women and those close to them to make more 
informed choices in high risk situations (such as leaving an abusive partner).63 
 
It is not unusual to find discussions of risk by age group in terms of a rapidly increasing risk up 
until the mid-thirties, and then a slow decline in risk.64  However, the present and Australian 
research supports the need to adjust risk assessment protocols to take into account the increased 
risk of intimate femicide for elderly women, particularly those who are physically or mentally 
                                                 
60  See, eg, Desmond Ellis and Walter DeKeseredy, 'Rethinking Estrangement, Interventions and Intimate Femicide' 
(1997) 3 Violence Against Women 590, 593, noting sociopathic and antisocial batterers exhibit a recurring and 
increasingly serious pattern of violence toward their partners.  Unless these men receive comprehensive residential 
care, including substance abuse and mental health treatment, as well as severe restraint for their criminality, change is 
unlikely.  J Arturo Silva, et al, 'The Dangerousness of Persons with Delusional Jealousy' (1998) 26 J Am Acad 
Psychiatry Law 607, 618, notes batterer treatment may be an ineffective response to persons with obsessive jealousy: 
'In many patients, it may become necessary to institute a "geographic" treatment (i.e., physical separation of the 
delusional individual from the target of the delusion, generally the spouse'.  See, also, Kerry Healey, Christine Smith 
and Chris O'Sullivan, Batterer Intervention: Program Approaches and Criminal Justice Strategies (1998).  
61    Metropolitan Police Service, above n 59, 42.  
62    See, especially, Chapter Three. 
63  Neil Websdale, Maureen Sheeran and Byron Johnson, Reviewing Domestic Violence Fatalities: Summarizing 
National Developments (1998) 26, Violence Against Women Online Resources, http://www.vaw.umn.edu at 15 
November 2005. 
64    See, eg, Julie People, 'Trends and Patterns in Domestic Violence Assaults' [2005] Crime and Justice Bulletin 1, 6. 
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disabled.  Recent US research also warns against age bias when considering older women's risk of 
serious/lethal violence.  
 
 At many points in the 'process of violence' the CWHRS found that older women (age 41 and above) 
were at equal or greater risk of serious violence or homicide.  Women who were homicide victims, 
and especially those who were homicide offenders were much more likely to be older than age 40 
than clinic/hospital women…This suggests two things for clinicians who are screening women for 
high risk of serious injury or death.  First, make every effort to interview older women at greater 
length and with sensitivity to their situation.  Second, explore with women why they say they are 
afraid of their partner, even if they have not experienced recent violence.65 
 
Risk assessment is a work in progress.  The MPS anticipates that a risk assessment tool 'based on 
acknowledged risk factors identified from previous patterns and characteristics' for use by officers 
investigating domestic violence will eventually become electronic, and an automatic part of the 
crime reporting system.66  The Ontario Domestic Violence Death Review Committee notes that a 
risk assessment tool in a yes/no format should be accompanied by a contextually-based 
questionnaire.67  As previously discussed, risk assessment procedures should not be conducted in 
close proximity to the alleged perpetrator.  
 
B   Prioritising Victim Safety 
'Safety for women must be at the core of all activities in responding to situations in which domestic 
violence has occurred.'68  There is indisputable evidence that the legal system presents abused 
women with considerable obstacles to participation.  These obstacles include profound confusion 
when navigating the process and understanding how it works; frustration at the slow speed of the 
system when women are relying on it for their personal safety and the safety of their children; 
paralysing fear and increased vulnerability between the batterer's arrest and disposition of the case 
(contact with the court seldom leaves women feeling protected); and feelings of conflict over 
                                                 
65   Carolyn Block, et al, The Chicago Women's Health Risk Study: Risk of Serious Injury or Death in Intimate Violence 
A Collaborative Project (2000) 278. 
66    Metropolitan Police Service, Enough is Enough, Domestic Violence Strategy (2001) 3-4, 
http://www.met.police.uk/enoughisenough/strategy.htm at 25 February 2005. 
67    Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, above n 58, 9.  See, also, Appendix IV. 
68    Falk and Helgeson, above n 2, 90. 
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incarceration.69  Domestic violence advocates also report that even when the prosecution 
successfully persuades a battered woman to testify, threatening looks from the accused to the 
victim are sometimes sufficient to silence her story in the courtroom.70   
 
Since the increased risk of violence faced by women who are making active efforts to obtain 
formal interventions such as contacting the police, getting a protection order, and testifying in court 
is well established,71 rather than blaming abused women,72 the state must acknowledge and 
respond to this elevated risk when victims of domestic violence turn to the criminal justice system 
for help.  When a battered woman enters the legal system, she requires support through the court 
process, risk assessment, safety planning,73 and where necessary, access to witness protection.  
Since '[o]ver half of the murders in New Zealand are the result of domestic violence',74 and around 
ninety percent of partner homicides are perpetrated by men against current or estranged female 
partners,75 battered women are clearly among those who are most in need of witness protection.  
Given the numbers of women in New Zealand who are beaten and killed following interventions, 
the state has a responsibility to ensure such programmes are accessible, well resourced and well 
dvertised.   a
 
Many court systems in the US have established victim advocate programmes in which trained 
advocates provide support for victims.76  At least one US University has developed a domestic 
violence course with an accompanying practicum to provide a steady stream of volunteer advocates 
to the courts.77  The Hamilton Abuse Intervention Project (HAIP) found the role of the court 
advocate to be a crucial factor in supporting a woman to give evidence against an abusive 
partner.78  As noted by a Victims Task Force Report, '[w]ell treated victims will be better 
                                                 
69    See, eg, Lauren Bennet, Lisa Goodman and Mary Ann Dutton, 'Systemic Obstacles to the Criminal Prosecution of 
a Battering Partner: A Victim Perspective' (1999) 14 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 761, 766-769; Cochran, above 
/5 above, at p 211.  See, also, Judge Issues Warning After 
ing Standard, 21 December 1996. 
 no 
rch 2006. 
002) 37.   
assachusetts intervention programme. 
, 771. 
n 50. 
70    Cochran, above n 50, 92. 
71    See, eg, Block, et al, above n 65, 277. 
72   See, eg Case Studies F/02/1 above, at p 153 and T/97
Charged Dropped, Even
73     See Appendix  V. 
74   The Country's Top Family Court Judge Says New Zealand's High Rate of Domestic Violence Means we can
Longer Boast of Being the Best Country in the World to Bring Up Children, New Zealand Herald, 28 Ma
75    Ministry of Health, Family Violence Intervention Guidelines: Child and Partner Abuse (2
76    Cochran, above n 50, 92 n 24, citing the Quincy M
77    Bennet, Goodman and Dutton, above n 69
78    Busch and Robertson, above n 52, 134. 
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witnesses, improving the quality of justice and the likelihood of conviction'.79  Court advocacy, 
risk assessment and safety planning by well-trained domestic violence victim advocates should be 
stitutionalised on a national basis.80   
 
irment of health and development, 
r has been subjected to a particularly serious sexual assault'.82   
that 
terventions in domestic violence will be effective, leading to increased safety for women.'83   
 
handling of cases be scrutinized by others.  The attitude among agency directors in Duluth is that 
                                                
in
C   Monitoring and Accountability for Victim Safety 
The treatment response to habitual batterers in the absence of monitoring and meaningful sanctions 
for non-compliance constitutes strong evidence that victim safety has not been the guiding ethic of 
legal intervention.  Silence surrounding the numbers of women, other family members and children 
who are harmed following legal interventions with batterers further demonstrates the importance of 
systematic monitoring and evaluation of agency responses.  Although the recently announced 
decision to implement domestic violence fatality reviews is an important step toward 
accountability,81 it is not sufficient to monitor intervention at the extreme end of the violence 
continuum.  Monitoring of sub-lethal assaults from the standpoint of victim safety is critical to 
ascertain where gaps are occurring and to adjust approaches accordingly.  The MPS multi-agency 
murder review recommended a review should always be considered 'where a victim sustains a 
potentially life-threatening injury or serious and permanent impa
o
 
Dennis Falk and Nancy Helgeson describe the information sharing and monitoring systems 
developed by the Duluth Abuse Intervention Project (DAIP) and note these systems promote 
women's safety in two ways.   First, by sharing relevant information among the various agencies 
and practitioners the offender can be held accountable, and the risk to women of escalating 
violence can be minimised.   Second, women's safety can be promoted by holding the criminal 
justice system accountable.  'By addressing problems of the system, it is more likely 
in
Visitors to Duluth are amazed at the extent to which agencies have been open to having their 
 
79    Ruth Wilkie, 'Victims Task Force Final Report' [1993] CJQ 8, 9. 
80   The Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Every Life Lost is a Call for Change: Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2004) 8, recommends the 
employment of well-trained domestic violence advocates by prosecutors and probation offices.   
81     Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6. 
82     Metropolitan Police Service, above n 59, 7. 
83     Falk and Helgeson, above n 2, 90-91. 
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such scrutiny improves their services rather than hinders their ability to operate.  A good system is 
refined by scrutiny; an ineffective system is replaced by it.84 
 
Victim-blaming responses to domestic violence and widespread misunderstanding of patterns of 
violence in intimate relationships require independent monitoring of agency interventions.85  Since 
this monitoring is essential to ensure that the state fulfils its core responsibility to victims it is 
concerning that the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families makes no reference to 
funding for independent monitoring of agency interventions when discussing agency systems and 
processes.86  
 
IV   CRIMINAL JUSTICE INTERVENTIONS 
A   Police 
Ministry of Health intervention guidelines and legal materials suggest that where sufficient 
evidence exists, police may arrest and charge the abuser without requiring the victim to lay a 
complaint.87  This proposition is supported by police domestic violence policy which states that 
'[v]ictim protection is best attained by stopping the violence, and implementing a process that 
brings the offender into the criminal justice system'.88  However, the observations of staff at WINZ 
in Case Study T/00/6,89 and senior police personnel in Case Study F/02/1,90 that action could not be 
taken without the victims' cooperation may indicate a return to complainant-reliant intervention 
which holds the victim responsible for bringing the offender into the criminal justice system.  Since 
this intervention strategy focuses public and legal attention on the battered victim, the question 
becomes 'Why didn't she leave?' rather than why men batter women and whether domestic violence 
law and policy might facilitate their ability to do so.   
 
As previously discussed, police may have encountered judicial resistance to prosecuting domestic 
violence cases in the absence of victim cooperation.91  A Ministry report also indicates that police 
may be encountering increased difficulties finding enough evidence to prosecute and convict 
                                                 
84     Pence and McDonnell, above n 5, 253. 
85   See, eg, Falk and Helgeson, above n 2, for a detailed discussion of the benefits of independent monitoring and 
tracking of agency interventions. 
86     Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 21-22. 
87     Ministry of Health, above n 75, 51; Dick Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand (11th ed, 2003) vol 2, 1431. 
88     Dick Webb, et al, Family Law in New Zealand  (11th ed, 2003) vol 2, 1513. 
89     See, discussion of this case above, at p 143. 
90     See, discussion of this case above, at p 153. 
91     See, discussion above, at p 156.  
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domestic violence offenders.92  However, the enhanced investigative techniques used in overseas 
jurisdictions to facilitate successful prosecutions were missing in some cases in the present study.  
This absence was particularly acute in Case Study F/02/1.  US jurisdictions have set up special 
squads trained in domestic violence intervention to assist police officers in gathering all the 
necessary evidence.  'They may tape victim and witness statements at the scene and photograph the 
bruises, smashed furniture, and torn clothing to document the assault.'93  Prosecutors may 'use 
recordings of 911 calls, police observation of injuries, and defendant's admissions to police 
(comments like "What do you mean, I can't beat my wife?") as evidence'.94  Maryland drew on a 
form developed by San Diego which police officers fill out when responding to a domestic 
violence call-out.95   
 
The San Diego form has been called 'a revolutionary sheet of paper', as its use by police in 
collecting evidence has 'resulted in prosecutors winning 90% of their cases and…a 62% decline in 
domestic homicides'.96    
 
In an attempt to be more proactive, some police departments in the US screen incoming cases to 
determine whether there is a threat of danger to the victim.  The Colorado Springs Police 
Department takes referrals from advocates for battered women, specially trained police and 
prosecution personnel, judges and citizens.  Criteria for high risk cases include: perpetrator's 
previous history of domestic violence; multiple law enforcement interventions; stalking behaviour; 
threats to kill; access to weapons; and separation or divorce.  A Domestic Violence Enhanced 
Response Team  
 
focuses on the preliminary investigation, immediate and aggressive intervention for all victims 
(adults, children, and pets), and containment of the perpetrator.  The victim benefits from 'vertical 
victim advocacy' in which she is assigned one advocate who addresses any emotional, housing, 
financial, or other concerns with which she is struggling.  The team provides ongoing legal and 
                                                 
92     Ministry of Justice, Responses to Crime: Annual Review 1999 (1999) [6.2.2]. 
93    Georgia Sargeant, 'Lawmakers, Cops, Courts, and Family Violence: Some Progress' (1994) 30 Trial 95. 
94    Ibid. 
95    See Appendix VI. 
96  Tonya McCormick, 'Convicting Domestic Violence Abusers When the Victim Remains Silent' (1998-1999) 13 
B.Y.U.J.Pub.L. 427, 439. 
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advocacy counselling, shelter and support services to victims, coordinated by their appointed 
advocate.97 
 
The London Metropolitan Police recently adopted an offender-oriented approach to domestic 
violence.  Since research reveals violent offenders tend to be generalist as opposed to specialist 
offenders,98 this includes actively pursuing domestic violence offenders for other areas of crime in 
which they may be involved.  Police also 'use the full range of intelligence opportunities such as 
medical evidence, 999 tapes and photo evidence, to prosecute those who commit domestic 
violence, so that we are no longer principally reliant on the testimony of the victims'.99   
 
New Zealand police could adopt this aggressive pursuit of domestic violence offenders:   
 
Aggressive prosecution offers at least some hope for controlling violence against women and for 
ultimately reducing the physical injury and related social, economic, and personal costs caused by 
domestic violence.  Although most women may be powerless to stop the abuse on their own, 
evidence suggests that prosecution of batterers can deter future violence, especially when 
punishment includes incarceration.  Indeed, incarceration may be the most effective response 
because it completely incapacitates the batterer for a period of time.100 
 
Safety planning for the victim is essential.101  Current policy requiring the victim to outline her 
complaint in the presence of the offender while noting the offender's response102 lacks cognisance 
of the power and control dynamics of domestic violence and compromises victim safety.  As 
illustrated by Case Study T/00/6,103 police should conduct separate interviews with victims and 
offenders at the domestic violence scene.  When conducting risk assessment, police should 
'routinely ask victims about the abuser's history of making homicidal or suicidal threats'104 and any 
                                                 
97    Kristen Little, et al, Assessing Justice System Response to Violence Against Women: A Tool for Law Enforcement, 
Prosecution and the Courts to Use in Developing Effective Responses (1998) 28.  
http://www/vaw.umn.edu/documents/promise/pplaw/pplaw.htm at 15 November 2005. 
98    See, also, Philip Spier, Recidivism Patterns for People Convicted in 1995 (2001) 19.   
99    Metropolitan Police Service, 'New Approach on the Domestic Front' (2004) 37 The Job 1, 2. 
100  Cheryl Hanna, 'No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic Violence Prosecutions' (1996) 109 
Harv.L.Rev. 1849, 1887-1888. 
101    See, eg, Cochran, above n 50,  Appendix A.  See, also, Appendix V. 
102    Webb, et al, above n 88, 1515. 
103    See, discussion of this case above, at p 143. 
104  Neil Websdale, Lethality Assessment Tools: A Critical Analysis (2000) 31, National Electronic Network on 
Violence Against Women, Applied Research Forum, www.vaw.umn.edu/Vawnet/lethality.htm at 15 November 2005. 
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stalking activities.105  Petitioners for protection orders and victims of separation assaults should be 
made aware of their increased danger given these threats and supported to engage in safety 
planning.106   Case Study T/00/6 illustrates that safety problems are particularly acute for women 
who own their own homes and are unable to leave them for any extended period of time without 
experiencing substantial financial loss.  To prevent women from dying in their attempts to protect 
their property, domestic violence interventions must acknowledge and respond to this issue. 
 
Police arrests of angry and self-defending victims in Case Studies M/02/4107 and H/00/8108 indicate 
the need for police training to identify the primary aggressor.  Vito Ciraco notes police failure to 
identify the primary aggressor, resulting in dual arrests, or arrest of the woman victim acts as a 
tremendous disincentive for women to report domestic violence to police.  Consequently, 
legislation in some US jurisdictions explicitly prohibits arrest of the victim if she used reasonable 
force in self-defence.  Further, 'where both parties at the domestic violence scene exhibit signs of 
injury, [the legislation] requires the officer to compare "the extent of the injuries, the history of 
domestic violence between the parties…and any other relevant factors"'.109  Negative evaluations 
by police of 'typical' battered victims also demonstrate the need to incorporate sensitivity training 
as well as training on red flags for intimate femicide in the police training curriculum.   
 
The enhanced risk of retaliatory violence which is well-established from domestic violence 
research makes it essential that recidivist batterers are not granted police bail.  Women should not 
be subject to a lesser standard of protection, simply because, for financial or other reasons, they do 
not have a domestic violence protection order.   
 
B   Prosecution 
The 'protection provided by penal custody can be the most important element of the sentence for 
the victim of crime'.110   In the absence of appropriate sanctions, abusers are unlikely to be deterred 
from violent acts.111  Effective prosecution appears to have a dramatic impact on reducing the 
                                                 
105  Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Tell the World What Happened to Me: Findings and 
Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2002) 17. 
106    Ibid.  See also, Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 12. 
107    See, discussion of this case above, at p 171. 
108    See, discussion of this case above, at p 175. 
109    Vito Ciraco, 'Fighting Domestic Violence With Mandatory Arrest, Are We Winning?: An Analysis in New Jersey' 
(2001) 22 Women's Rts.L.Rep 169, 184. 
110    Wilkie, above n 79.   
111    See, eg, Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 71.  
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escalation in repetition and severity of domestic violence and can be measured through a fall in the 
spousal homicide rate.112  In addition to signalling that domestic violence is a crime, locating 
responses to domestic violence in the criminal justice sector provides the means to monitor and 
intervene when batterers fail to respond to rehabilitative interventions.   
 
To interrupt patterns of repeat victimisation and escalation, society must be willing to prosecute 
domestic violence offenders as aggressively as it prosecutes those who use violence toward 
strangers.113  Simply withdrawing the charge(s) because the victim is too afraid, or for some other 
reason recants or refuses to testify fails to address ongoing safety issues, and is destructive to 
batterer accountability.114  The Washington State Fatality Review Panel notes that the many 
dismissed cases simply reinforce abusers' perceptions that violence and threats are effective tools 
for deterring victims from testifying.115  However, intervention must tailor strategies to the safety 
needs of witnesses.  The recent abolition of spousal non-compellability without reciprocal 
provisions to ensure victim safety overlooks the public interest in protecting victims who testify 
from retaliatory violence,116 and fails to acknowledge the social reality that offending in this 
context constitutes a red flag for dangerousness/lethality.   
 
There should be a consequence for every act of violence and incremental penalties for further acts 
of violence.117  In 1992, domestic violence researchers recommended the creation of three new 
offences to establish a principled framework for intervention.118  First, an offence of aggravated 
breach of a protection order should apply where the perpetrator has previously been convicted of 
breach on more than one occasion over the previous five year period.  Second, an offence of 
aggravated assault on a female or child should apply where the offender has been convicted of 
assaulting the same female or child on more than one occasion in the previous two years.  The 
                                                 
112   Susan Edwards, 'New Directions in Prosecution' in Julie Taylor-Browne (ed), What Works in Reducing Domestic 
Violence: A Comprehensive Guide for Professionals (2001) 211, 219. 
113   Raeder, above n 1, 1484, noting escalating patterns of abuse provide the reason society should overcome the urge 
to forgive minor incidents of abuse.   
114    For example, in Case Study F/08/12(S) the woman was punched and kicked when she refused to have sex with the 
offender.  The police prosecutor told the court that a charge of rape was withdrawn as the complainant feared for her 
safety and could not be relied on to give evidence; In Case Study H/01/25(S) a number of assault and one intentional 
damage charges against a defendant arising from alleged violence toward his pregnant partner and her father were 
dismissed after the woman recanted her original statement.  At least two women in the present study were killed after 
withdrawing support for the prosecution of their batterers: Case Study F/02/1; Case Study H/00/2.   
115    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 71.  
116    New Zealand Law Commission, Evidence, Report 55, Vol 1 (1999) [346]. 
117    Ruth Busch, 'Editorial' (1996) 4 Waikato L.Rev. i, iii.  
118    Ruth Busch, Neville Robertson and Hilary Lapsley, Domestic Violence and the Justice System: A Study of 
Breaches of Protection Orders (1992). 
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pattern of terrorising estranged female intimates, which the present study found the abuser is able 
to maintain even from within prison walls, illustrates the importance of the researchers' third 
proposal of an offence of Terroristic Threats.  These recommendations should be adopted.  
 
Power and control tactics operating on a systemic level can legitimise abusers' perspectives of 
violence and result in the further victimisation of those who look to the justice system for 
protection.  Consequently, in 'red flag' situations, a discretion to excuse the complainant from 
testifying is essential.  Since batterers must not be permitted to profit from their own violent 
behaviour, when safety considerations require exercise of the discretion, the complainant's hearsay 
statement of violence should be admissible as evidence against the defendant.  
 
C   Courts 
Consideration should be given to legislation which eradicates the present judicial practice of 
crediting perpetrators who have no prior domestic violence convictions as 'first offenders'. Given 
extremely low reporting rates of domestic violence,119 the first time an abuser is prosecuted for a 
domestic violence crime is almost certainly not the first incident of abuse.120   
 
Case studies in which women were injured and killed while attempting to negotiate access with 
abusive fathers demonstrate the need for judges to specify safe access arrangements when granting 
custody or access awards and protection orders.  The victim should not be exposed to further 
violence by permitting the perpetrator of violence to visit children at home.  Some US jurisdictions 
specifically direct the courts to protect the child and/or the abused adult from further harm.  Model 
guidelines recommend: 'Where there is proof of domestic violence, the court should issue very 
specific, highly structured custody and visitation orders.  The court should leave no room for 
ambiguity or negotiation'.121   The protection order should clearly outline contact arrangements to 
assist the police to determine what behaviour constitutes a breach of the order.122  
 
                                                 
119   The Metropolitan Police Magazine, The Job (2004) Vol 37, 6 August 2004, reports that '[o]n average, a victim will 
be assaulted more than 30 times before they seek help'.  
120    See, eg, Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 71. 
121    Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse, Barbara J Hart's Collected Writings (1990) 121, 
http://www..mincava.umn.edu at 15 November 2005, 
122    See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Review of Family Violence Laws, Final Report Summary (2006) 8. 
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Hart notes that 'some communities have undertaken specialized domestic violence legal programs, 
pro bono projects or law school clinics to offer limited legal assistance and representation to 
abused adults seeking custody awards'.123 
 
D   Batterer Treatment 
New Zealand research revealed concern among judges and court staff regarding the lack of 
evaluation of treatment programmes and information about their ability to affect reoffending 
rates.124  US experts suggest that  
 
the greatest contribution batterer programs make may not be their work with individual offenders 
but rather their ability to bring together major actors in the criminal justice and community service 
sectors to work cooperatively to reduce domestic violence…cooperative efforts among criminal 
justice agencies, batterer interventions, victim advocates, battered women's agencies, and the 
community are likely to produce more significant reductions in battering than any single unit or 
program…Jonathan Cohen, assistant director of the Batterers Intervention Project in New City, New 
York, takes this line of reasoning further…According to Cohen:  'Once you realize that coordinated 
community response is the level at which men's violence can be changed or stopped, it's easier to let 
go of one's investment in individual men changing [the aim of most batterer programs]'.125  
 
In the context of patterns of recidivism and escalation, the legislative focus on rehabilitation and 
treatment requires an equivalent commitment to providing abused women with information about 
the potential of programmes to reform recidivist abusers.  The Washington Review Panel observes 
that prosecutors, judges and probation officers should inform victims that the effectiveness of 
batterer intervention programmes is debatable and the abuser's attendance at one is not guaranteed 
to increase her safety.   
 
Batterer intervention programs should be required…to give victims accurate information in plain 
language about the limitations of batterer's intervention and the conditions under which it is more 
likely to be effective, including complete citations to research literature on the topic.126  
 
                                                 
123    Minnesota Center Against Violence and Abuse, above n 121, 43 (citations omitted). 
124    Barwick, Gray and Macky, above n 12, 97-98. 
125    Healey, Smith and O'Sullivan, above n 60, 94. 
126    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 105, 15. 
 402
Sentencing guidelines should be developed regarding abusers who are not amenable to, or 
appropriate for, batterer treatment.127  As discussed below, a domestic violence advisory panel 
should develop sentencing policy and guidelines for use in domestic violence cases. 
 
E   Parole/Probation 
The present policy of paroling domestic violence offenders to the homes of their former victims in 
the interests of rehabilitation is extremely dangerous.  Too many women are being killed by 
abusers who have been paroled to their places of residence.  The policy facilitates opportunities for 
batterers to continue to assault their partners while simultaneously restricting women's 
opportunities for escape.  The apparent ease with which the batterer in Case Study T/00/6 was able 
to continue to threaten and intimidate his partner from prison before being paroled to her home also 
indicates insufficient recognition of, and attention to issues of power and control.   
 
Probation departments in the UK and the US have developed risk assessment tools for use when 
taking action on domestic violence cases.128  Such instrument would prohibit the 'second chance' 
analysis employed in Case Study T/00/6 which strips the immediate violent incident from its 
violent antecedents.  Richard Johnson notes the need for especially strict supervision for repeat 
domestic violence offenders and those who have perpetrated an act which caused bodily injury.129    
 
V   COORDINATING SYSTEM RESPONSES 
Case Studies T/00/6 and D/00/7 illustrate the importance of an integrated response to domestic 
violence which does not artificially severe the connection between abuse of children and abuse of 
their mothers.  Proposed training of child protection workers130 should include recognition of the 
risk to battered women and children at the point of separation and the need to craft intervention 
policy so as to best ensure the safety of both mother and child.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
127  Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, Honoring their Lives, Learning from their Deaths: 
Findings and Recommendations from the Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review (2000) 13. 
128    See Appendix IV for tool in use by the Santa Clara County Probation Department. 
129    See, eg, Johnson, above n 17. 
130    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 21. 
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VI   REFUGE FUNDING     
The present research reveals the importance of state funded protection and support to women and 
children who are attempting to separate from abusive, controlling partners.  Elizabeth Stanko 
points out that this should include: 
 
The full funding of refuges, safe networks, crisis lines, women's centres, advice centres and support 
systems which provide options for women and children to escape violence.  These women's 
networks should be considered crime prevention networks and given top priority for funding, even 
if it means diverting funds from other crime prevention efforts.131 
 
The CEDAW Monitoring Committee recommended that the number of shelters for women victims 
of violence in New Zealand be increased.132  In response to the killing of one woman in this study, 
the media described the under-funding of Women's Refuge as 'a disgrace'.  Significantly, the 
Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families has signalled an intention to ensure adequate and 
sustainable funding for crisis, post-crisis and prevention services.133   
 
VII   FATALITY REVIEWS   
A   Systems Review 
Margaret Hobart notes fatality reviews play a crucial role in refocusing public and professional 
attention from discourses that are critical of battered women, to critical examination of gaps, 
barriers, and weak points in system and community responses that continue to fail battered 
women.134   The government's recently announced intention to implement fatality reviews is 
therefore welcome.135  However, while the Minister of Health presently has the power to appoint 
one or more committees to conduct mortality reviews,136 the current lack of commitment to data 
collection, reporting and monitoring of male violence toward women illustrates the importance of 
placing domestic violence reviews on a statutory footing.   
 
                                                 
131   Elizabeth Stanko, 'When Precaution is Normal: A Feminist Critique of Crime Prevention' in Loraine Gelsthorpe 
and Allison Morris, (eds), Feminist Perspectives in Criminology (1990) 172, 182. 
132  United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Monitoring Committee, Fifth 
Periodic Report of New Zealand, CEDAW/C/NZL/5, 625th and 626th sess, (CEDAW/C/SR.625 AND 626) 14 July 
2003 [416]. 
133    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 6. 
134    Margaret Hobart, Advocates and Fatality Reviews (2004) 6. 
135    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 18. 
136    Section 18 Public Health and Disability Act 2000. 
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Fatality reviews should not be regarded as simply homicide prevention projects:  
 
A focus solely on homicide prevention can result in energy devoted to identifying women at risk for 
lethal violence (and while some risk assessment tools exist, all are flawed to some degree) versus 
generally improving response.  The aim of a DVFR is to improve community response for all 
battered women…Panels should remember that the victim's experience is shared by many women in 
her community.  The missteps and barriers that she encountered are encountered by battered women 
every day; they just haven’t been killed (yet).137 
 
The definition of a domestic violence fatality should follow the convention in the US, as adopted in 
the present study, which uses control as the fundamental criterion rather than degrees of 
relationship between victim and perpetrator.  This would ensure that the real human cost of 
domestic violence is acknowledged and all domestic violence fatalities are investigated.   
 
The process for deciding when a review should take place should include a facility for citizens to 
instigate a review.  The present research found families of deceased victims are frequently the first 
to raise issues of concern regarding agency interventions and investigations.  The Nevada 
legislation provides that on receipt of a written request within a period of one year from the fatality, 
from a person related to the victim within the third degree of consanguinity, a review shall be 
conducted.138  However, a close woman friend of the deceased victim was extremely pro-active in 
drawing attention to the suspicious nature of her friend's death in one case study, and advocates for 
battered women also highlighted the need for improved community responses in some cases.  
Therefore, a protocol which triggers a review at the written request of family members or citizens 
with particular knowledge of the victim, or the particular situation, should be adopted.   
 
Although legislative implementation of fatality reviews can potentially improve responses to 
domestic violence, enhance agency accountability and even save women's lives, their effectiveness 
will depend upon how the review process is structured.  
 
[S]tate agencies…operate in the contexts of institutions which have their own specific constraints, 
agendas and disciplinary norms which may impose debilitating limits with respect to the goals we hope 
to achieve with fatality reviews…institutions themselves are frequently self-protective and slow to 
                                                 
137    Hobart, above n 134, 7. 
138    Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 63, 15. 
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embrace change.  This characteristic of institutions poses a challenge to fatality reviews, which should 
be a tool to illuminate problems with institutional responses to domestic violence and catalyze 
change.139  
 
The US experience of fatality reviews reveals that misunderstanding the dynamics of violent 
relationships can result in panel members systematically underestimating the energy and 
commitment that abusers bring to their acts of coercion and physical violence and overestimating 
the responsibility of victims.  Information that could re-direct attention from the behaviour of 
victims to institutional accountability is therefore overlooked,140 and the potential for positive 
outcomes from fatality reviews is undermined:   
 
We have heard from advocates in various parts of the country that in some reviews, jokes about the 
victim, callousness towards the violence she and her children suffered and placing responsibility on 
the victim for making 'bad choices' go unchallenged…A lack of respect and compassion towards the 
victims of domestic violence and an over-focus on the 'flaws' in her thinking short-circuit analysis 
and opportunities for learning: if the victim made bad choices, then we need look no further for 
what could be improved.141    
 
The negative impact of victim blaming on the review process has serious implications for the 
integrity of New Zealand reviews.  As discussed throughout the present research, victim blaming is 
an engrained institutional response to domestic violence.  Hobart notes advocates for battered 
women have critical specialised knowledge which can counter this tendency toward victim 
blaming.  However, when panels are heavily populated by criminal justice professionals and social 
service providers, with only a lone advocacy voice, that voice can easily be diluted.  'Advocates on 
some panels have found it challenging to be the only person to repeatedly speak up and identify 
problems or issues that may be "invisible" to others on the review panel.  These strains can be 
minimized by ensuring the participation of multiple advocates on the panel.'142   The Minnesota 
Domestic Violence Fatality Review protocols require that three advocates sit on the panel.  Other 
                                                 
139    Hobart, above n 134, 7. 
140    Ibid 11, noting that in one fatality review, a police officer 'described the victim as '"hanging out" at a community 
event all weekend prior to her murder and flirting with another man, implying that she was "loose" and perhaps at fault 
for inciting her partner's jealousy.  However, the written documentation indicated that she was in fact working at the 
community event, and staying away from home in the evenings because of her fear of her partner.  She accepted a ride 
from another worker at the event after her abusive partner disabled her car.  The panel would not have known this if it 
had relied exclusively on the law enforcement officer's version of the events'.  
141    Ibid 8-9. 
142    Ibid 14-15. 
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panels invite an advocate from each domestic violence programme in their area, which results in 
several advocates at the table.143  Similar protocols should be adopted in New Zealand. 
 
While the participation of domestic violence advocates on panels is crucial, Hobart suggests that 
the feminist consensus model of decision making may not be the most effective way to interpret 
findings and create recommendations.   
 
In Washington, while members of review panels and advisory groups have extensive input into the 
project's findings and recommendations, the state domestic violence coalition alone ultimately takes 
responsibility for the recommendations.  This arrangement is particularly helpful to judges who 
interpret judicial canons as forbidding participation in recommendation-making bodies.  Since 
panels per se do not create the recommendations, but instead are conceived of as 'fact-finding' 
bodies, judges can participate in them freely.144  
 
The ultimate responsibility for interpreting the findings, refining and presenting the 
recommendations should be located in a body which is independent and committed to a vision of 
justice for battered women.  As discussed below, a domestic violence advisory panel could provide 
the necessary leadership and knowledge to produce challenging, focused reports, and report to 
Parliament. 
 
B   Investigative Review 
The Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review Panel notes current methods of tracking 
domestic violence cases through news accounts of homicides and official data results in 
undercounting domestic violence fatalities in five key areas.   First, in cases where children are 
killed by domestic violence abusers, information that the perpetrator was also abusive to the 
mother and/or killed the child as an act of punishment or revenge directed at their partner is not 
always available or reported.  Second, killings in same-sex relationships are likely to be 
undercounted by classifying the victim/offender relationship as 'friends' or 'other known to victim'.  
Far more women commit suicide than are murdered.  Without more thorough examination it 
remains unknown how many of these women's deaths are linked to domestic violence.  Since the 
                                                 
143    Ibid 15. 
144    Ibid 20-21. 
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count relies on the identification of homicides by law enforcement personnel, homicides 
mistakenly classified as suicides or accidents will also be missed.  In the US, fatality review teams  
 
have paid less attention to sexual competitor killings, womenas suicides, (sic) family homicides, or 
mercy killings, but these types of case reviews are also important.  Teams that form in areas with 
few or no intimate partner homicides might consider exploring cases such as womenas suicides.  
Here they might begin by exploring whether the person who killed herself had injuries consistent 
with prior domestic violence, or whether police had ever visited her home on a domestic disturbance 
call, or whether she ever was the recipient of a domestic violence injunction or restraining order.145   
 
Overseas research indicates deaths from suicide that are related to domestic violence represent a 
huge number of potential deaths, and this is an area in urgent need of systematic research and 
policy initiatives.146  As illustrated in Case Study O/98/1(I)147 improved protocols are required to 
enable Coroners to better identify domestic violence-related deaths and make recommendations for 
prevention and intervention initiatives. 
 
Many women are reported as missing each year and it is likely that a number of these cases are 
domestic violence related killings.148  The present research found a significant number of cases in 
which women died or went missing in circumstances that indicated domestic violence.  Deaths 
categorised by the New Zealand Health Information Service as 'Injury Undetermined Whether 
Accidentally or Purposely Inflicted' (E980-E989; 1997-1999) or as 'Event of Undetermined Intent' 
(Y10-Y34; 2000) should be investigated to determine any domestic violence connection.  Relevant 
information would include any prior domestic violence complaints, protection order filings, and 
statements from family and/or friends.   
 
A significant number of women in the present study died shortly after an assault, but no homicide 
charges were laid.  Fatality reviews should investigate this pattern of women's deaths to gain an 
understanding of the underlying issues involved.   
 
                                                 
145    Office on Violence Against Women, United States Department of Justice, National Domestic Violence Fatality 
Review Initiative www.ndvfri.org/index.php?id=39305 at 4 December 2006. 
146     Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 63. 
147     See discussion of this case above at p 178. 
148     Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 19. 
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In addition to the above categories, Websdale points out that if women who die from conditions 
that are by-products of domestic crimes were included in the official count, the actual death toll 
from domestic violence would be far greater than that reflected in official data.  Many female 
deaths attributed to HIV infection or its complications may be traced to battering and the same 
could be said of women who die on the streets, where roughly half of homeless women report 
'fleeing abuse' as the primary reason for their homelessness.149  Sex workers typically experience 
extensive interpersonal abuse and sometimes even death at the hands of male intimates, family 
members, and clients.150    
 
By improving the detection of domestic violence-related deaths, investigative reviews can ensure a 
more accurate count of victims, increase public awareness of the problem of domestic violence, 
and improve understanding of the issues involved.  The concerns of New Zealand pathologists that 
declining autopsy rates have the potential to leave homicides and suicides undetected151 further 
reinforce the importance of systematic review and monitoring.   
 
VIII   DATA COLLECTION       
The CEDAW Monitoring Committee expressed concern at the lack of systematic data collection on 
violence against women in New Zealand, including domestic violence.152  Data is fragmented and 
there is no detail on each case.  Consequently, it is impossible to discern patterns of offending in 
intimate femicide cases.  Police and agencies that provide information on domestic fatalities should 
investigate whether or not red flags or warning signs existed prior to the fatality.  'It is crucial to be 
able to see clearly from a domestic violence report the history of prior violence, police 
involvement, injunctions, prior criminal histories, any obsessively possessive behavior, mental 
illness, separation pending in the relationship, etc..'153   
 
                                                 
149     Neil Websdale, 'Reviewing Domestic Violence Deaths' [2003] NIJ Journal 26, 27. 
150     Ibid. 
151    Pathologists See Danger in Decline of Autopsies, Dominion, 5 February 1999; A Dying Profession, Dominion, 3 
May 2002.  A Christchurch forensic pathologist is reported as stating the decline has 'big implications' for quality 
assurance in terms of why people died, and community confidence over the accuracy of death certificates.  On 1 July 
2005 Courts Minister Rick Barker announced the Ministry of Justice had contracted the Auckland District Health 
Board to provide the services of a core group of qualified forensic pathologists for use across the country: Forensic 
Pathologists Go 24/7, Press Release, New Zealand Government, 'Scoop' Independent News, 1 July 2005.   
152   United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women Monitoring Committee, above n 
132. 
153    Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 63, 26. 
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A recent New Zealand decision to suppress the name of a habitual batterer whose violence 
escalated to lethality on the basis that this would protect the couple's children has the potential to 
compound the difficulties involved in accessing legal reports and establishing patterns in intimate 
femicide cases.154   This development is not conducive to system accountability.   
 
IX   SEPARATION VIOLENCE 
Despite a wealth of social science research revealing lethal and sub-lethal attacks often take place 
following women's exit from violent relationships, and extensive media coverage of separation 
homicides, the myth that departure will bring an end to the violence remains entrenched in legal 
and popular culture.155  Consequently, legal academics and professionals continue to assume that 
rather than resorting to self-defence, the battered woman could 'summon help or simply walk out 
the door'.156   
 
Although courts would be unlikely to accept similar claims in relation to violence between 
strangers, the 'crime of passion' analysis permits jealous men who invade the homes of estranged 
partners to claim they were provoked to use lethal violence by some words of the women whose 
homes they invaded.157  Discourses of romantic love and male passion also facilitate courtroom 
constructions of elderly women as unfaithful to men they rejected over a decade before they were 
killed, and attributions of blame regarding younger women who leave and seek protection for 
themselves and their children.   
 
                                                 
154    Secrecy Stands in Way of Open Justice, New Zealand Herald, 24 June 2006, reports that Hansen J suppressed the 
name of a convicted killer in an intimate femicide case because the children of the offender could be affected by having 
their father's name published.  The report notes: 'the name these children share with their father is quite nondescript and 
common enough not to attract comment.  They no longer live in an area where people would automatically link the 
crime and the convict to them…Justice Hansen says this case has unique features.  Yet those he lists - that the children 
are of the murderer and the dead woman, they grew up in a home racked with dissension and violence, have been 
through the trauma of the crime, grief at the loss of a good mother and bad father and have now re-established 
themselves - seem all too familiar.  Using his logic, isn’t it now the case that every father or mother or sibling who 
murders in a family environment ought to have his or her name permanently kept secret because children or siblings of 
the same surname might be affected by publication?'   
155   Mahoney, above n 21, 74, notes the issue of exit from an abusive relationship colours almost every legal and social 
inquiry about battering. 
156   Charles Cato, 'Criminal Defences and Battered Defendants' [2002] NZLJ 35, 39. 
157  Wayne Gorman, 'Provocation: The Jealous Husband Defence' (1999) 42 C.L.Q. 478, 483, notes that in intimate 
femicide cases, courts appear to lose sight of the fact that a defendant who brings a weapon to the scene and forces a 
confrontation has provoked the incident of which he complains. 
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Domestic violence research and fatality reviews frequently recommend initiatives to address 
cultural toleration of violence in intimate relationships.158  This cultural tolerance is evident in 
stereotypical constructions of separation assaults as spontaneous violence perpetrated in the heat of 
sexual passion which run contrary to social science research and mask a structural pattern of 
offending against women.  The New Zealand government has allocated $11.5 million in the 2006 
Budget and the Families Commission is contributing $2.5 million to fund a nationwide media 
campaign aimed at eliminating societal tolerance of domestic violence.159  However, while 
separation violence continues to be trivialised in law and the media through sympathetic discourses 
of 'love turned to tragedy', 'love triangles gone wrong', and offenders who 'loved too much',160 the 
social reality of these attacks as a barrier to women and children's safe escape from abusive 
relationships, and a threat to women's freedom and autonomy will remain unacknowledged.   
 
The invisibility of separation violence and its ubiquitous association with the myth of romantic 
passion requires a legislative response.  Legislative acknowledgement of separation violence would 
go some way toward halting the ongoing destruction of women, and in some cases their children, 
who are the 'inevitable' casualties of sexually aggressive and possessive constructions of 
masculinity.  A statutory declaration that these assaults constitute especially egregious offending is 
also necessary to ensure justice for battered defendants.  As Martha Mahoney points out, 
acknowledging these attacks on women's volition 'brings the ghosts of dead women - women slain 
by their abusers - into court to stand beside the woman accused of killing an abusive spouse'.161  
An offence of separation assault would also facilitate monitoring of this violence which is 
necessary for ongoing policy development.      
                                                
 
The definition of separation assault should extend beyond situations in which the victim had 
already severed the relationship with an intimate partner, or was in the process of ending the 
relationship when the assault occurred.162  It should incorporate attacks in response to women's 
 
158   See, eg, Geris Serran and Philip Firestone, 'Intimate Partner Homicide: A Review of the Male Proprietariness and 
the Self-Defense Theories' (2004) 9 Aggression and Violent Behavior 1, 10.  See, also, Easteal, above n 57, 186-187. 
159    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 16. 
160    See, eg, Double-Murder Trial Told of Love Triangle; Lonely, Depressed Accused Felt the Agony and Despair of 
Deception, Says Defence, New Zealand Herald, 4 June 2004; Guilty of Loving Too Much - Mum, Waikato Times, 8 
April 2004; Court Told Killing Stemmed From Classic Love Triangle, New Zealand Herald, 21 November 2000; 
Murder Accused in 'Love Triangle', Waikato Times, 21 November 2000.  In Case Study T/01/2 the judge reportedly 
depicted the double homicide as a crime of passion in 'the eternal triangle of love and jealousy'. 
161     Mahoney, above n 35, 83-84 (citations omitted). 
162   Myrna Dawson, 'The Cost of "Lost" Intimacy: The Effect of Relationship State on Criminal Justice Decision 
Making' (2003) 43 Brit.J.Criminol. 689, 694. 
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formal attempts to seek help (such as reporting the violence to police, and seeking formal access 
arrangements) and attacks in response to informal help seeking (for example, from family, friends 
and associates).  Legislative recognition of these scenarios as aggravating domestic violence 
offending would send a message to courts that these contexts cannot be manipulated in support of 
provocation claims, or advanced as mitigating factors at sentencing.  As demonstrated by the 
present research, once the deceased woman's alleged verbal comments are stripped of the gravitas 
law currently attaches to her departure the conduct complained of is likely to be revealed as 
transparently innocuous.  A great many provocation claims presently accepted at trial and at 
sentencing may therefore be eliminated.163       
 
While on its face gender neutral, this species of assault should operate mainly in the context of 
male violence toward women.  (Post-separation offending by a small number of women in the 
present study mainly involved property damage.)  In cases where the sub-lethal separation assault 
occurs in breach of the victim's protection order, or where the offender has a prior conviction(s) for 
separation violence, an offence of aggravated separation assault should apply.  Where separation 
violence results in the victim's death and the offender is convicted of murder, the Sentencing Act 
2002 should be amended to specify the context of separation as an aggravating feature of offending 
attracting a minimum term of imprisonment in excess of the minimum period of 10 years as 
provided in s 84(3) of the Parole Act 2002.   
 
In cases where lethal separation violence involves unlawful entry into a woman's place of 
residence, and/or breach of her protection order, a separate offence of estrangement murder should 
apply.  To be convicted of estrangement murder, the prosecution need not prove that the offender 
intended or foresaw the likelihood of the victim's death.  Liability would require proof beyond 
reasonable doubt that the offender unlawfully entered his estranged partner's home, or acted in 
breach of her protection order, and at the time of the lethal assault, the offender intended to cause 
her serious bodily injury.   
 
The decision whether to create a separate homicide offence to reflect morally and socially 
significant differences in degree of culpability, or whether to treat the relevant behaviour and 
context as aggravating the punishment, is ultimately an issue of social policy and there is no 
                                                 
163     See, eg, Case Study S/97/6 discussed above, at p 201. 
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criterion or test to be applied.164  Although legal scholars may denounce this proposed departure 
from subjective constructions of intent, some form of strict liability murder survives in the statute 
books of many common law jurisdictions.165  In New Zealand, Gerald Orchard notes that to the 
extent s 168 Crimes Act 1961 allows an accused to be convicted of murder although the essential 
ingredient of death was neither intended, nor foreseen as likely to ensue, 'strict liability is imposed 
in respect of culpable homicide'.166  At present, s 168 imputes murderous intent inter alia to the 
robber and burglar,167 but not to the separation killer, or habitual batterer whose violence escalates 
to lethality.  Rather than any quality intrinsic to the respective offences, s 168 represents a social 
choice to attribute greater seriousness to robbery and burglary than to victims of domestic violence 
crimes, who are overwhelmingly women and children.  Elizabeth Rapaport notes this elevation of 
economic crime over domestic violence 'privileges the interests of men over those of women and 
children and supports patriarchal values'.168  The assertion inherent in s 168 that the unintentional 
killing of a stranger for gain is more reprehensible than the killing of an estranged female partner 
arguably exemplifies the type of attitude which government domestic violence campaigns are 
committed to change.  
 
An offence of estrangement murder would send a clear message to legal academics, practitioners 
and judges that the community regards offenders who kill women who leave or reject them as 
deliberately placing themselves outside the human community.  Given the numbers of abusive men 
who pursue women who leave or reject them, care should be taken when drafting the offence to 
ensure battered women who use violence while in fear for their lives, and under a belief there is no 
other alternative, are not caught by the provisions.   
 
X   'MERCY' KILLINGS: A FURTHER FORM OF SEPARATION VIOLENCE? 
The absence of systematic monitoring of violence in intimate relationships has obscured patterns of 
offending in the so-called 'mercy killing' cases.169  A review of the literature in Australia, Canada 
                                                 
164    Barry Mitchell, 'Further Evidence of the Relationship Between Legal and Public Opinion on the Law of Homicide' 
[2000] Crim.L.R. 814, 827. 
165  See, eg, David Crump and Susan Crump, 'In Defense of the Felony Murder Doctrine' (1985) 8 Harv.J.L.& 
Pub.Pol'y 359.  
166  See, commentary on the section by Gerald Orchard, 'Strict Liability and Parties to Murder and Manslaughter' 
[1997] NZLJ 93, 94, noting the imposition of strict liability for murder may be thought to be wrong in principle. 
167   Under s 168 Crimes Act 1961 an offender who means to cause grievous bodily injury for the purpose of facilitating 
a number of enumerated offences, including robbery and burglary, may be guilty of murder whether or not the offender 
meant to cause death or knew that death was likely to ensue. 
168    Elizabeth Rapaport, 'The Death Penalty and Gender Discrimination' (1991) 25 Law and Society Review 367, 378. 
169    See discussion of these cases above, at pp 77-83. 
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and the US on the phenomenon of homicide followed by suicide 'showed that in all three countries, 
the majority of those who commit suicide after a homicide are male partners or ex-partners of 
female victims'.170   While the present study supports Kenneth Polk's research revealing this is a 
thoroughly gendered pattern of offending,171 unlike the Australian study, men in the present study 
who killed elderly, ailing wives were unsuccessful in their suicide attempts.  As in all intimate 
femicide cases, the way law constructs these killings is crucially related to whether the prevailing 
response is outrage and demands for accountability, or resigned helplessness.  
 
In Case Study L/02/2 defence counsel also indicated that a provocation defence was available for 
the offender who killed his elderly, mentally disabled wife.172  Paul Taylor also suggests that 'in 
cases where the defendant sees a close relation or friend suffer extensively over a long period of 
time it could be argued that each sight of the "victim" is a form of provocation in itself'.173  He 
notes that this 'cumulative provocation' argument has been accepted in other domestic violence 
contexts.174  However, this proposition that men who kill ailing wives may avoid a murder 
conviction on the basis that the suffering of their wives constitutes provocation175 should sound 
alarm bells for all women.   
 
The provocation defence was successfully advanced in New Zealand on behalf of an offender who 
socialised and drank brandy between his attempts to kill his terminally ill mother, twice injecting 
her with drugs, exposing her body to the night air by opening her bedroom windows, trying to 
suffocate her with a pillow, and eventually strangling her with the morphine bag cord.  Although 
the Crown argued that the purported provocation (the mother's begging her doctor son to do 
something about her pain) was not a request that her son kill her, but that he ease her pain with 
medication, the jury returned a verdict of manslaughter.  The sentencing judge noted that the 
mother was subjected to treatment by her son that no human being in the dying stages of life should 
                                                 
170    Myrna Dawson, 'Intimate Femicide Followed by Suicide: Examining the Role of Premeditation' (2005) 35 Suicide 
and Life-Threatening Behavior 76, 76. 
171    Polk, above n 56. 
172    See discussion of this case above, at p 81. 
173   Paul Taylor, 'Provocation and Mercy Killings' [1991] Crim.L.R. 111, 113.  While this passage refers to a wide 
category of victims, the comments follow on from Taylor's analysis of the English case of Cocker, Unreported, CA, 
Transcript No 4212/G3/88, involving a husband who killed his ailing wife after taking care of her for almost 11 years.   
174      Ibid. 
175      See, also, R v L (Unreported, High Court, Hamilton, Randerson J, 29 August 2002) [26-27].   
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be subjected to.  However, legal evaluation of the offender's culpability was reflected in the 
sentence of three years' imprisonment.176   
 
Although the New Zealand Law Commission rejected introduction of a partial defence of 
diminished responsibility,177 John Dawson posits s102 of the Sentencing Act 2002, which provides 
an alternative to life imprisonment for a defendant convicted of murder where the circumstances of 
the offence and the offender render such a sentence 'manifestly unjust', as potentially allowing a 
defence of diminished responsibility to enter New Zealand law through the back door.178  In 
England, 'mercy killing' cases are often associated with a diminished responsibility defence 
'whether or not the accused's position really fits within the parameters of the defence'.179  Charles 
Cato has criticised the Law Commission for failing to address the issue of so-called mercy killings 
and recommended that consideration 'be given to enacting a defence to murder of mercy killing 
mitigating murder to the crime perhaps of "culpable homicide - mercy killing" in cases where 
killing arises for compassionate reasons'.180  Although this recommendation may reflect popular 
and legal acceptance that mercy killings constitute the least serious or heinous form of homicide,181 
the gendered nature of this offending render the proposal problematic.   
 
Contemporary responses to offending in this category apparently reflect widespread acceptance 
that it is unjust to harshly sanction offenders who kill in these circumstances as 'in many respects, 
[offenders] are victims themselves'.182  However, depictions of men who 'reach the end of their 
tether' and kill their elderly, ill wives stretch in disturbing ways the notion of a 'death pact' or 
'mercy' killing.183  Legal understandings that the chronic mental or physical illness of an elderly 
                                                 
176     R v Simpson, (Unreported, High Court, Auckland,  Potter J, 12 October 2001). 
177   New Zealand Law Commission, Some Criminal Defences with Particular Reference to Battered Defendants, 
Report 73 (2001) [140]. 
178     John Dawson, 'Diminished Responsibility: The Difference it Makes' (2003) 11 JLM 103, 108. 
179     Ibid 106, citing S Dell, 'The Mandatory Sentence and Section 2' (1986) 12 Journal of Medical Ethics 28. 
180     Cato, above n 156, 40. 
181    Mitchell, above n 164, 817, n 22, notes research indicates the public typically perceive so-called 'mercy' killings 
as one of the least serious homicide offences 'on the ground that the deceased's quality of life is so poor that (s)he is not 
being deprived of any significant interest'.  '[R]easons for regarding euthanasia as the least serious of homicides 
included the right of the deceased to die (with dignity).'   The New Zealand Law Commission, above n 177, [114], 
discusses levels of seriousness in the crime of murder ranging from 'an aged pensioner assisting a spouse to gain 
release from an excruciatingly painful, incurable condition, to an armed robber callously killing a policeman in order to 
gain access to a bank vault'. 
182     Taylor, above n 173, 112.  See, also, R v Albury-Thomson (1998) 16 CRNZ 79, where the jury returned a verdict 
of manslaughter by reason of provocation in relation to a mother who killed her autistic daughter.  The mother was 
sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment. 
183    In R v L (Unreported, High Court, Hamilton, Randerson J, 29 August 2002) [16], the sentencing judge apparently 
accepted the opinion of a psychiatrist that the offender's actions were 'those of a loving and devoted husband who was 
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wife can incite her husband's violence and that old women who struggle unsuccessfully to save 
themselves from murderous attacks are killed by compassionate and loving husbands arguably 
demonstrate the prioritising of male interests over women's safety and well-being.  While the belief 
that such killings can properly be described as 'merciful' may stem from public feelings of 
compassion for all seriously ill people and fears of being similarly situated, case studies show 
perpetrators have sometimes refused to allow their wives to go into care, preferring instead to 
maintain control over the women.  There is also a compelling similarity between justifications 
given in 'mercy killing' cases and those in relation to killings in the context of separation.  Diseases 
such as Alzheimer's are described as 'stealing' men's wives, and offenders are depicted as bereft in 
the knowledge that their ailing wives are 'leaving them'.   
 
Research has shown male homicide/suicide or attempted suicide is significantly correlated with 
killings of intimate partners in the context of estrangement, and killings in the context of the ageing 
and ill health of a female partner.  In both situations, the woman victim is no longer able or willing 
to play the same emotional and physical caretaking role that she has in the past.184  In the same 
way that separated women who have withdrawn their sexual, emotional and physical services from 
younger men may be regarded by their male partners, and by the law as provoking lethal male 
violence; elderly, ailing women, who can no longer perform their caretaking roles may be regarded 
by their male partners, and by the law as likely candidates for 'mercy' killings.  
 
A recent review of domestic violence fatalities in the US found that so-called suicide pacts and 
mercy killings are not as simple as they might at first appear.  Indeed, the researchers note that they 
found it necessary to explore the possibility that some killings in fact constituted murder and may 
have been preceded by physical abuse.185  The US Office on Violence against Women also points 
out that as the proportion of the elderly in the population increases 
 
researchers have become increasingly aware of domestic violence among their ranks.  Old 
stereotypes die hard, and social service providers and law enforcement agencies sometimes assume 
that because people are elderly they are not capable of committing or being victimized by domestic 
                                                                                                                                                                 
profoundly distressed at his wife's condition'.  The dead woman was found with wounds to the back of her head as a 
result of being beaten with a mallet, and a heavily bloodstained pillow was also 'used to prevent the final struggles of 
the woman'.   
184     See, Easteal, above n 57, 108. 
185     Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 63, 33. 
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violence.  This attitude sometimes translates into an assumption that homicide-suicides among the 
elderly usually take the form of 'mercy killings'.  Police officers or others who investigate the 
homicide-suicide and find a note telling authorities that the couple could not live with ailing health 
might hastily label the death a 'mercy killing'.  Upon further investigation we find it is nearly always 
men who commit these killings and that in a significant number of cases their female victims had 
expressed to other family members a desire to live not die.  Indeed, Donna Cohen found that 
homicide-suicides involving elderly women in West Central Florida accounted for 20 percent of the 
total homicides of people aged over fifty-five.186 
 
Overseas, there is growing concern over the loss of women's lives in this context.187  Research also 
indicates that many intimate femicide-suicides 'are pre-planned, purposeful acts that might have 
been prevented.  In other words, they are events for which possible points of intervention can and 
should be identified'.188   
 
In New Zealand, the reporting of suicides is tightly restricted, and the public remain largely 
unaware of patterns of domestic violence-related suicides.  The Ministry of Health review of 
research explaining patterns of suicide makes no reference to research on older men who kill their 
wives and then commit, or attempt to commit suicide, and no explanation or analysis is provided 
on research revealing a pattern of jealous younger men killing younger women and committing or 
attempting to commit suicide.189  Given a steadily increasing rate of murder-suicides as a 
proportion of the total number of murder indictments in New Zealand,190 this lack of analysis is 
troubling.  The present tendency to trivialise male violence in the context of sexual intimacy make 
it essential that Parliament resist calls for a defence of mercy killing until offending in this context 
                                                 
186    Office on Violence Against Women, United States Department of Justice, National Domestic Violence Fatality 
Review Initiative www.ndvfri.org/index.php?id=39305 at 4 December 2006.  
187   Dawson, above n 170, 86, noting that '[s]ince the early 1990s, the phenomenon of intimate femicide followed by 
suicide has become a legal, professional, and public concern'. 
188   Ibid 88. 
189   Caroline Maskill, et al, Explaining Patterns of Suicide: A Selective Review of Studies Examining Social, Economic, 
Cultural and Other Population-Level Influences (2005) 40, make no reference to gendered homicide/suicide patterns 
under the heading 'Gender'.  Instead, a possible explanation for different rates of suicide among men and women is 'that 
in English-speaking Western societies male suicide is frequently regarded as a decisive, "strong" and calculated 
response to interpersonal stressors, whereas female suicide is construed as a weak, ambivalent and emotional response 
to personal relationship problems'.  No reference is made to the role of domestic violence.  No mention is made under 
the heading 'Suicidal Behaviour in Older Age' of the pattern of intimate femicide followed by suicide/attempted suicide 
among older men: at 43, 45.  Under a sub heading 'Murder and Suicide' the Report notes the strongest motive for 
murder/suicide appears to be despair and one study found 'murder-suicides usually involve spouses, particularly 
spouses who have recently left their marriage.  Men are usually the perpetrators of murder-suicides, first killing their 
wives and then going on to kill themselves'.  No attempt is made to explain this gendered phenomenon: at 88-89. 
190    Ibid 87, noting rates rose from 1.5 percent over the period 1860-71, to 8.2 percent between 1899 and 1908, and to 
19 percent between 1959 and 1962.  Lack of data for the years 1962 to the present is concerning.   
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is better understood.191  A Domestic Violence Advisory Panel, as discussed below, should develop 
policy and provide guidance to Parliament and the Sentencing Council (when established) on this 
issue.  
 
XI   ADDRESSING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND INTIMATE FEMICIDE 
PART I:  A HISTORY OF BATTERING 
A   A Domestic Homicide Statute 
The private nature of domestic violence coupled with myths and misunderstandings concerning its 
dynamics create formidable obstacles to obtaining murder convictions for batterers whose violence 
escalates to lethality.  In most cases there are no witnesses to the killing, so only two persons know 
what transpired, and one of them is dead.  Difficulties establishing the requisite knowledge and 
intent are exacerbated by the tendency to minimise the lethality potential of battering and isolate 
the abuser's history of violence from his final lethal attack.  Consequently, there may be no 
adequate basis upon which the prosecution can rebut, beyond reasonable doubt, the assertions of 
defence counsel that death was an unexpected outcome of a routine beating.  This failure to attach 
society's most profound condemnation to battering escalating to lethality involves an invidious 
subordination of the interests of women and children.192   
 
William Wilson argues that evidential problems associated with proving intention make it 
inevitable and desirable that where the evidence discloses an intention to cause someone serious 
injury, the fault element in murder should stretch outside its focal case of intentional/purposive 
killings.  'Where the criminal context is accompanied or characterized by extremely dangerous 
activity, it is arguably quite fair, assuming the degree of risk taken was already sufficient for 
manslaughter, to set this as an appropriate threshold for liability in murder.'193  Wilson notes that it 
is glib to suggest that where the definition of murder is under-inclusive, such cases pose no 
substantial difficulty, as immediately below murder there is available a verdict of manslaughter 
which may attract in the discretion of the court a life sentence.  'Conviction labels are as important 
                                                 
191    New Zealand First MP Peter Brown's 'Death with Dignity' Bill was voted down in 2003 by a 60 to 57 majority.  A 
similar Bill was rejected in 1995 by a far greater majority. 
192    See, eg, Rapaport, above n 168, 378. 
193    William Wilson, 'Murder and the Structure of Homicide' in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds) 
Rethinking English Homicide Law (eds) (2000) 21, 36. 
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as justice in the distribution of punishment.  They identify a precise social obligation dishonoured 
in the infraction.'194   
 
Minnesota has led the world in developing principled domestic violence intervention policy.195  
Legislators have responded to patterns of escalation in battering relationships by authorising a 
finding of first degree murder based on a history of battering in the relationship.196  The domestic 
abuse statute focuses upon a specific type of actus reus - death while committing abuse.  Domestic 
abuse is defined to include charged and uncharged physical and sexual assaults and terroristic 
threats.  The statute does not require proof of a pattern of domestic violence convictions.  Only the 
'past pattern of domestic abuse' and not the acts constituting the pattern must be proven beyond 
reasonable doubt.197  Although the minimum number of incidents which must be proven in order to 
find a pattern is unspecified, at a minimum the prosecution must prove more than one prior act of 
domestic abuse.198  Since a pattern of domestic violence is required, the statute permits the final 
lethal assault to be evaluated in a context which transcends the isolated event.  This eliminates the 
tendency to regard prior acts of violence as separate, discrete events, and reorients the focus to 
patterns of escalation and use of violence as a technique of control.199   
 
To counter the possibility that an accidental death could result in a first degree murder conviction, 
the statute requires the offender to have caused the death of a human being while committing 
domestic abuse, when the perpetrator has engaged in a past pattern of domestic abuse toward the 
victim, which has put the victim in fear of great bodily injury, and death occurs under 
circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human life.  Since a verdict of first degree 
murder does not require premeditation, or specific intent to kill, even if the jury finds the killing 
was manslaughter pursuant to a traditional intent analysis, it may convict the offender of domestic 
murder.  Courts have upheld the statute from constitutional challenge on the grounds of 
                                                 
194    William Wilson, 'Doctrinal Rationality after Woollin' (1999) 62 MLR 448, 462. 
195   The philosophies and practices of the Duluth, Minnesota, Abuse Intervention Project were adopted (with some 
modifications to reflect New Zealand society), by the Hamilton Abuse Intervention Project.   
196     Min. Stat. 609.185 (a) (6) (2004). 
197     State v Cross, 577 N.W.2d 721 (Minn. 1998), affirmed US 00-2940 (Fed Cir, 2001). 
198    State v Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484, 491 (Minn. 1995).  Raeder, above n 1, 1486, argues that legislatures should take 
care to require at least three prior domestic violence incidents to ensure that the killing merits additional punishment in 
the absence of a traditional finding of intent. 
199    Minn. Stat. 518B.01 stipulates that persons to whom the legislation applies include spouses and former spouses; 
parents and children; persons who are presently residing together or who have resided together in the past; persons who 
have a child in common, regardless of whether they have been married or have lived together; and persons involved in 
'a significant romantic or sexual relationship' 
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vagueness.200  In at least two cases, the defendants had been acquitted of traditional first degree 
murder, but were convicted of domestic homicide.201   
 
Myrna Raeder notes that in 'one fell swoop' the statute has eliminated the barrier against admission 
of evidence of propensity or bad character.202  The requirement of a pattern of abuse permits a 
large number of prior abusive incidents to be admitted, which would presently be excluded as 
unduly prejudicial under present rules.  Hearsay statements by the deceased victim indicating her 
fear of the abuser which may presently be excluded are also admissible because the statute requires 
the decedent to be placed in fear of the defendant.  Accordingly, the victim's state of mind 
automatically becomes relevant to the case.203  The habitual batterer's ability to advance a 
provocation defence is also negated because the homicide is regarded as the culminating event in a 
pattern of prior abusive acts which merits classification of the homicide as first degree murder.  
'Thus the statute eliminates the advantage given to men under current law, which, while seemingly 
gender-neutral, benefits the violent rages more characteristic of men, particularly when "provoked" 
by female infidelity.'204   
 
Legal commentary on the concept of indifference suggests that it does not necessarily imply 
recklessness in the sense that the defendant knew the risk of death, and went ahead and took it.  
'Extreme indifference is an attitude which "manifests" itself in the way the defendant behaves 
rather than a cognitive state'.205  Jeremy Horder suggests that the subjective element in indifference 
does not lie in any necessary advertence to possible harmful consequences, but in an uncaring 
attitude towards the victim's relevant protected interests.206  This is also how Antony Duff 
envisages its use:  
 
[I]in order to conclude that a defendant failed to notice an obvious risk because he did not care 
about it, the jury need not infer some hidden mental state or feeling (or some general character-trait) 
of indifference from his external conduct: it is rather a matter of the meaning of his particular action 
- the practical attitude which that action displayed.  A jury could usefully ask this question: 'how 
                                                 
200   State v Auchampach, 540 N.W.2d 808 (Minn. 1995); State v Robinson, 539 N.W.2d 231 (Minn. 1995); and State  v 
Grube, 531 N.W.2d 484 (Minn. 1995). 
201    Raeder, above n 1, 1485. 
202    Ibid 1486. 
203    Ibid 1488. 
204    Ibid 1486 (citations omitted). 
205    Wilson, above n 193, 30. 
206    Jeremy Horder, 'Gross Negligence and Criminal Culpability' (1997) 47 U.T.L.J. 495, 501. 
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else could a person who acted thus have failed to notice that risk if not because he did not care about 
it?'207 
 
However, it is difficult to distinguish 'ordinary' from 'extreme' indifference208 and Wilson suggests 
evidential difficulties may arise when courts attempt to gauge the quality of indifference 
displayed.209  New Zealand legal commentary also indicates that the test of 'indifference to an 
obvious risk' is likely to face strong opposition:  
 
Mens rea is not normally concerned with the attitudes of defendants; it is concerned with what they  
intended, knew, and did not know.  This …is also why, under the Cunningham approach to 
recklessness, the defendants are not to be convicted on the basis of an unworthy attitude or bad 
motive, for example for indifference 
 
…if D failed to recognise a risk, it is conceivable that his failure might have happened because he 
did not care.  But such fine nuances have no practical place in the law.  If D foresaw the possibility 
then he can be convicted anyway; if he did not, then he should not be convicted on the basis of a 
hypothetical inquiry regarding what his attitude would have been if he had seen the risk. 210   
 
However, other legal scholars argue that moral guilt need not be irrevocably linked to cognition.  
'Once one has decided to inflict a harm of a given gravity one crosses a moral threshold which 
disables one from denying responsibility for the consequences although these may be more serious 
than those intended or foreseen.'211  Jeremy Horder argues that the presumed historical authority of 
the subjectivist contention that it is not morally justified to impose criminal liability for 
consequences beyond those which were intended or foreseen overlooks rival, and equally 
historically important, mens rea principles.  The malice principle justified criminal liability for 
harm done as the result of the defendant's wrongful conduct directed at a particular interest of the 
victim, whether or not the defendant foresaw the degree of harm that resulted.  Where the 
defendant caused worse harm than that anticipated, the proportionality principle required the harm 
done must not be disproportionate to the harm intended in order to justify criminal liability. 
 
                                                 
207    R Antony Duff, Intention, Agency and Criminal Liability: Philosophy of Action and the Criminal Law (1990) 166.   
208    Wilson, above n 193, 30. 
209    Ibid 31. 
210    AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks (eds), Principles of Criminal Law (2nd ed, 2002) 120 (emphasis in original). 
211    Wilson, above n 193, 27. 
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The natural starting-point is thus that defendants ought to be held to take the rough with the smooth.  
Defendants ought to accept that criminal liability for their conduct may extend to the unforeseen 
degree, as well as to the foreseen kind, of harm that results.212  
 
Felony murder doctrine generally deemed a killing which occurred in the course of committing a 
felony as murder, even if there was no intention to cause death or personal injury.  The rule 
reflected a societal judgment that an intentionally committed felony which caused the death of a 
human being was qualitatively more serious and more closely akin to murder than to the 
underlying felony.213  As originally formulated, the rule implied malice when the homicide resulted 
from the commission of any unlawful act.  The doctrine was ultimately restricted to killings in the 
course of violent felonies.214  Despite centuries of scholarly denunciation, few US legislatures have 
repealed the doctrine,215 and, as discussed above, the rule subsists in a modified form in s 168 
Crimes Act 1961.  However, under s 168, 'it is not enough that D kills while committing one of the 
specified offences…it is also essential that D meant to cause grievous bodily injury (that is, really 
serious bodily harm)'.216    
 
Wilson argues that as a matter of labelling-propriety,217 serious injury might be defined so as to 
require that the injury intended posed some objective risk of death.   For example, the fault element 
in the Indian Code is 'the intention of causing bodily injury to any person' and the bodily injury 
must be 'sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death'.218  However, in domestic 
violence cases, such requirement would be problematic.  That is, categories of injuries that are 
sufficient ordinarily to cause death are cited as: 'a blow on the head with an iron bar', a savage 
                                                 
212    Jeremy Horder, 'Two Histories and Four Hidden Principles of Mens Rea' (1997) 113 L.Q.R. 95, 119.  'The malice 
and proportionality principles both presuppose that the defendant's conduct was wrongfully directed at the kind of 
interest that was harmed, even if the exact extent of the harm done was unintended and unforeseen.'  However, where a 
defendant's conduct is 'wrongfully directed at one kind of interest (say, a property interest), but invaded a different kind 
(say, an interest in the protection of the person)…his conduct in invading that other interest is not to be regarded as 
malicious unless he foresaw the invasion as a possible outcome of his conduct': at 115-116.   
213    Crump and Crump, above n 165, 363. 
214   Gerald Orchard, 'Culpable Homicide' in AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks (eds), Principles of Criminal Law (2nd 
ed, 2002) 507, 522, citing A-G's Reference (No 3 of 1994) [1998] AC 245, 257, 258. 
215    Crump and Crump, above n 165, 360. 
216    Orchard, above n 214, 522. 
217  The fair labelling principle, which is widely accepted as a guiding precept of criminal law, requires that the 
murder/manslaughter labels reflect a moral distinction between homicides where the label of murder should be 
withheld, and homicides where a more stigmatic label is required to reflect the circumstances of the offending.  See, 
eg, Chris Clarkson, 'Context and Culpability in Involuntary Manslaughter: Principle or Instinct?' in Andrew Ashworth 
and Barry Mitchell (eds), Rethinking English Homicide Law (2000) 133, 14; Horder, above n 212, 96-97. 
218    Wilson, above n 193, 37. 
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beating, or a knife wound to the thorax'.219  Although this analysis acknowledges a 'savage beating' 
as ordinarily sufficient to cause death, legal constructions of lethal violence against female 
intimates have ignored the gendered 'inequality of arms', downplayed the lethality potential 
inherent in male violence toward women, isolated the abuser's history of violence from his final 
lethal assault, thereby rendering 'savage beatings' benign.      
 
David and Susan Crump note that there are substantial policies, consistent with familiar limiting 
doctrines that are furthered by the felony murder rule.  These include: grading offences to reflect 
societal notions of proportionality, or 'just desert'; reaffirming the sanctity of human life; 
deterrence; clear and unambiguous definition of offences and sentencing consequences; optimal 
allocation of criminal justice resources; and minimisation of the utility of perjury.220  Given the 
private nature of intimate femicide, the improbability of witnesses, and legal analyses which 
overlook the red flag of repeat victimisation and trivialise the lethality potential of male violence 
toward women, where the accused has a history of battering the deceased, allowing him to be 
convicted of murder where the intent was to cause serious bodily injury arguably constitutes 'just 
the sort of simple, commonsense, readily enforceable, and widely known principle that is likely to 
result in deterrence'.221   
 
A domestic murder statute would directly challenge the perception, embodied in the enumerated 
offences which attract liability under s 168, that domestic homicide, from which women and 
children suffer disproportionately, is less reprehensible than unintentional killings in the course of a 
burglary or robbery.  While opponents of such a statute may draw attention to the role of the jury in 
articulating community standards,222 in a heterogeneous society with different cultural and moral 
norms, the view that juries, no matter what their composition, invariably reflect universal 'common 
sense' norms posits a fictional homogeneity of cultural attitudes and beliefs.223  Pervasive cultural 
                                                 
219    Ibid 38. 
220    Crump and Crump, above n 165.  
221    Ibid 363. 
222   Cato, above n 156, 40, suggests that the New Zealand Law Commission's recommendations relating inter alia to 
provocation may have minimised 'the importance of the jury as a fact finder in our system of criminal justice.  It is 
submitted that the collective intelligence of the jury is important in our system of criminal justice and this is so 
particularly in cases involving death.  The jury is the great leveller.'   
223    For example, in Manslaughter Verdict Outrages Dead Woman's Mother, Press, 20 November 2004; Manslaughter 
Decision 'Right and Proper, Press, 19 November 2004, the deceased woman's mother described herself as 'outraged' at 
the verdict, while her former husband, the victim's father expressed sympathy for the killer and approval of the verdict.  
In Honour Killing in the Suburbs, Melbourne Age, 6 November 2004, the successful use of the provocation defence 
prompted the brother of a woman who was killed by her ex-partner to inform the media that the defence was a great 
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myths and tolerance of domestic violence must enter into policy discussions of the role of juries in 
reflecting 'widely shared views on the moral differences implicit in different kinds of killings'.224   
 
Courtroom depictions of habitual batterers as 'loving' and 'respectable', and provision of a partial 
excuse to batterers whose violence escalates to lethality trivialise the violence involved in beating a 
woman to death.  A domestic homicide statute would acknowledge the interrelationship between 
domestic violence and intimate femicide and signal society's abhorrence of killing in the course of 
a battering relationship.  Although gender neutral on its face, research shows murder in the context 
of a pattern of violence by the killer against the victim is an almost uniquely male phenomenon. 
The statute should be drafted to avoid its operation in circumstances where the battered woman has 
killed her abuser. This is not to assert that women are not responsible, moral actors, but to highlight 
concerns raised by this and previous research regarding problems in the criminal justice system 
with identifying primary abusers, and earlier research indicating a tendency to placate violent men 
by granting mutual protection orders.225  
 
B   Killings in Breach of the Deceased's Victim's Protection Order 
Minnesota has enacted a separate statute which classifies the violation of a protection order 
resulting in death, as second degree murder. 226  Raeder notes this statute, together with the 
domestic murder legislation, can be influential in transforming legal theory and cultural attitudes.  
 
The only cautionary gender note accompanying their adoption is that judges must be careful not to 
routinely grant mutual protection orders to avoid incorrectly identifying a battered woman who kills 
her abuser as a previous batterer and thus subject to the domestic homicide law.227 
 
Judicial distrust of affidavits sworn by women in support of custody applications and protection 
orders228 may underpin the present reluctance to accept that a protection order constitutes evidence 
                                                                                                                                                                 
slur on 'the normal man'.  'We [men] are belittled by it.  It stands for a form of maleness that I don't want to be a party 
to', he said.    
224  Martin Wasik, 'Sentencing in Homicide' in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds), Rethinking English 
Homicide Law (2000) 167, 172. 
225  Raeder, above n 1, 1487.  Busch, Robertson and Lapsley, above n 118, criticised the practice of granting mutual 
non-molestation orders as a means of placating violent respondents.   In response, s 18 Domestic Violence Act 1995 
prohibits this approach.  
226   Raeder, above n 1, 1487, citing Minn.Stat.Ann. 609.19(3) (West 1995).  
227   Ibid. 
228   See, eg, R v B (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Randerson J, 24 March 1998) 10, noting the need 'to take into 
account the possibility of exaggeration or embellishment bearing in mind that the affidavit was sworn in support of an 
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of previous violence by the offender toward the victim.229  Indeed, the research found a deceased 
woman's conduct in seeking a temporary protection order may be utilised in support of her killer's 
provocation defence.230   In a case from the sub-lethal assault sample, the victim's action in 
obtaining a protection order was described by defence counsel as 'escalating matters'.231  As a 
result of these analyses, there may be no reference to the protection order as either aggravating the 
offending, or warranting consideration of a minimum term of imprisonment at sentencing.232 
 
Heightened awareness of harm to children living in violent relationships and the prosecution of 
mothers for failing to protect their children from a male partner's violence demands a reciprocal 
commitment to ensuring effective protection for women who turn to the system for help.  
Sentencing legislation should specify killing in breach of a protection order as an aggravating 
feature of offending warranting a minimum term of imprisonment in excess of the 10-year period.  
The existence of a protection order should also be recognised as an aggravating feature of the 
offending in cases of sub-lethal assaults.  
 
XII   ADDRESSING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
AND INTIMATE FEMICIDE 
PART II:  EXCLUSIONARY RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Domestic homicides form the largest category of homicide in New Zealand.233  However, the Law 
Commission Report on reform of the law of evidence does not address the operation of evidentiary 
rules in domestic homicide cases, or the purpose for which an accused's history of abusive 
behaviour may presently be considered by the jury.234  By contrast, the Victorian Law Reform 
Commission observes that where there is a history of violence between the accused and the 
deceased, existing rules of evidence may, perhaps in this context more than any other, 'unfairly 
                                                                                                                                                                 
application for a protection order.'  See, also, R v H (Unreported, High Court, Auckland, Fisher J, 15 November 2000) 
[15]. 
229   See, eg, Case Study W/00/11(S) discussed above at p 253.  In Case Study S/06/8(S), the offender who attacked his 
ex-wife with two knives in breach of her protection order was reportedly credited at sentencing for his lack of previous 
convictions. 
230    See, discussion above, at p 164.  
231    Case Study B/97/15(S). 
232    R v G (Unreported, High Court, Wellington, Young J, 24 October 2001). 
233  See, eg, Ian Miller and Nestar Russell, Homicide in New Zealand 1988-94: Patterns and Relationships (Paper 
presented at the 11th Annual Conference of the Australian and New Zealand Society of Criminology, Victoria 
University of Wellington, 29 January-1 February 1996); Ruth Busch, '"Was Mrs Masina Really 'Lost'?": An Analysis 
of New Zealand Judges' Attitudes Towards Domestic Violence' (1993) 8 OLR 17, 36, citing Janet Fanslow, The OASIS 
Protocol: Guidelines for Identifying, Treating and Referring Abused Women, Injury Prevention Research Centre, 
Department of Community Health: University of Auckland, (1993) 13.  
234    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 116. 
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limit the use of evidence and prevent evidence that may have a high degree of probative value from 
being considered.235   
 
In circumstances in which prior statements made by the deceased are admitted as 'relationship 
evidence' but prevented from being considered as evidence of the truth of what the deceased asserted, 
the accused's version of the truth may remain largely uncontested.  This is because the deceased is 
not available to give his or her side of the story; to borrow a phrase from Professor Jenny Morgan, 
'dead women tell no tales, tales are told about them'.  This may not only affect the jury's assessment 
of the accused's actions, but may also misrepresent what has occurred and be deeply upsetting for 
friends and family members of the victim.236 
 
Given that strong evidence of motive, intention, and premeditation may be ruled inadmissible at 
trial, it is perhaps unsurprising that prosecutors complain they find it difficult to obtain murder 
convictions in intimate femicide cases.  'By forbidding the use of evidence concerning the ongoing 
nature of abuse within the relationship, the law denies reality and asks the jury to do the same.  
There is no justice in this formula.'237  
 
A   Admissibility of Propensity Evidence in Domestic Violence Cases 
It is generally accepted that exceptions to existing evidentiary rules are particularly apt in cases 
'where it is especially difficult to secure other evidence'.238  The private nature of domestic 
violence makes it difficult to ascertain the truth through direct evidence.  Defence counsel may also 
manipulate common myths and misperceptions about the dynamics of domestic abuse239 which 
incline juries to regard women victims as inherently less credible.240  These tactics can serve as 
secondary victimisation of abused women.241   
                                                 
235   Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, [4.8]. 
236    Ibid [4.46]. 
237   Raeder, above n 1, 1504-1505, citing Stuart Baggish and Christopher Frey, 'Domestic Physical Abuse: A Proposed 
Use for Evidence of Specific Similar Acts in Criminal Prosecutions to Corroborate Victim Testimony' (1994)  Fla.B.J. 
59. 
238    Donald Mathieson (ed), Cross on Evidence (7th New Zealand ed, 2001) 599. 
239   For a discussion of these myths see, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, 161-169; Lisa Sanctis, 
'Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence' (1996) 8 Yale J.L. & 
Feminism 359, 373. 
240  Linelle Letendre, 'Beating Again and Again and Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence 
Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence' (2000) 75 Wash.L.Rev. 973, 981, cites one juror study which found 57 per 
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experienced the alleged violence. 
241   Carolyn Copps Hartley, '"He Said, She Said": The Defense Attack of Credibility in Domestic Violence Felony 
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A history of prior abuse by the killer toward the victim and often toward previous women partners 
is a persistent, recurring theme of intimate femicide.  However, Raeder points out that gender 
biases may be buried so deeply in evidentiary policy that even those who might be open to re-
evaluating present approaches do not realise the absence of neutrality in the rules.242  
Consequently, while the orthodoxy presently asserts that 'no one should be able to escape a 
conviction for murder because he had a more violent temper and lost control of himself more easily 
than the ordinary person',243 it is difficult to understand how jurors are to assess the defendant's 
violent temperament and propensity for violence when evidence of his violence toward the 
deceased and other female partners may be strictly limited or excluded from the inquiry altogether.   
 
Section 43 Evidence Act 2006 restates the probative value versus prejudicial effect test for 
admission of propensity evidence and sets out prerequisites for allowing this evidence.  When 
assessing the prejudicial effect of propensity evidence judges are required to consider whether the 
evidence is likely to unfairly predispose the fact-finder against the defendant; and whether the fact-
finder will tend to give disproportionate weight to this evidence.  This reflects the traditional view 
that juries, unlike judges, are unable to properly gauge the probative value of propensity evidence 
and may be influenced by personal bias.  However, the notion that judges are immune from 
prevailing cultural norms has been thoroughly debunked by feminists, and by discerning judges.244  
'Every decisionmaker who walks into a courtroom to hear a case is armed not only with the 
relevant legal texts, but with a set of values, experiences and assumptions that are thoroughly 
embedded.245    
 
Although legal commentary on propensity evidence generally focuses on potential prejudice to the 
defendant, David Karp notes that this is only half the story.  Inferences of probability are a distinct 
and important rationale supporting its admissibility.246  The illegitimate prejudice that may arise 
from admitting propensity evidence in non-domestic cases is arguably far less relevant in domestic 
                                                 
242    Raeder, above n 1, 1498. 
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violence cases since no crime has a higher rate of repeat victimisation.247  Many intimate femicide 
victims are prior victims of sub lethal violence.248  Studies also suggest that once violence occurs 
in a relationship, it may reoccur in as many as 63 per cent of these relationships.249  There is also 
evidence to suggest that men who are motivated by jealousy and possessiveness to commit crimes 
against current or former partners constitute a particular category of recidivist offenders.250   
 
As Raeder observes, it is a great deal easier to recognise that the final act of control is murder when 
courts examine the behaviour of the batterer, as opposed to that of his victim.  Research shows acts 
of violence ranging from physical and sexual assaults through to property damage are 'not simply 
unconnected episodes of rage, loss of control, or an inability to manage anger (as batterers would 
like us to believe), but rather…the violence is a calculated, purposeful way to control the life of an 
intimate partner'.251  Lacking this insight, victim blaming has camouflaged a pattern of control as 
the theme which links the various acts of abuse.252  It is this theme of control and instrumental use 
of violence which provides a compelling reason for admitting propensity evidence in domestic 
violence cases.   
 
Misunderstandings about the dynamics of violent relationships can also result in the drawing of 
artificial distinctions between various types of domestic abuse.253  Threats and violence by the 
accused against members of the deceased's family are likely to be excluded under current rules,254 
although they also form part of a pattern of controlling behaviours.  While evidence of a 
                                                 
247  Nicole Hunter, 'Protecting Survivors, Holding Perpetrators Accountable' (Paper presented at the Women's Legal 
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U.Haw.L.Rev. 221, 255, citing research finding two-thirds of women who suffered death as a result of domestic 
violence were previously abused in an incident prior to the one causing their death.  See, also, Jacquelyn Campbell, et 
al, 'Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite Case Control Study' (2003) 93 
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to Gender Bias in the Law?' in Julie Stubbs (ed), Women, Male Violence and the Law (1994) 192, 206, note the 
batterer's violence toward family members limits the extent of physical protection the family can offer the battered 
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defendant's history of violence toward previous partners may presently be deemed irrelevant and/or 
unduly prejudicial,255 evidence that the offender has not only perpetrated serious violence against 
his current partner, but has also abused a former partner, can assist jurors to properly evaluate 
conflicting statements from the victim and defendant.256  Prior victims, for whom issues of power 
and control are no longer as acute, may also be more willing to testify.  As a result, 'an additional 
victim may force jurors to reevaluate their biases and to give proper weight to the current victim's 
testimony.'257   
 
Lisa Sanctis notes that evidence of the accused's violence toward previous partners may be 
especially reliable and probative.  Extremely low reporting rates for domestic violence render the 
likelihood that any man would twice be the victim of false domestic violence allegations 
exceedingly unlikely.  Thus rather than focusing upon the risk of fabrication and prejudice to the 
accused, the much more reasonable inference is that allegations of domestic violence by different 
victims flow from the defendant's actions.  Indeed, since domestic violence is so under-reported, 
'even one prior act of domestic violence, charged or uncharged, is quite probative of a defendant's 
guilt'.258  Without this evidence, the jury 'will be greatly uninformed concerning the circumstances 
surrounding the crime and society will be left unarmed against the consequences of domestic 
violence'.259   
 
Jenny McEwan points to increasing public dissatisfaction over cases in which defendants are 
acquitted following exclusion of evidence that the accused was a serial offender.  McEwan argues 
that 'there is reason to regard serial and sadistic offenders as abnormal, and the exclusion of 
evidence where the abnormal disposition is itself probative is dangerously unwise'.260  Similarly, 
Karp points out that a 'common sense' ground for admitting propensity evidence is the reasonable 
inference that an offender's past physical and sexual assaults provide evidence that he has the 
combination of aggressive impulses 'that motivates the commission of such crimes, that he lacks 
                                                 
255    See, eg, Case Studies H/02/11; F/01/6; P/98/3; M/02/8. 
256   Sanctis, above n 239, 367-374 provides a comprehensive discussion of the difficulties with prosecuting domestic 
violence including: victim withdrawal; racial and gay and lesbian discrimination; lack of witnesses; juror belief in a 
'just world'; domestic violence myths; the appearance and coherence of battered witnesses; and sexism.  
257    Letendre, above n 240, 995-996. 
258   Sanctis, above n 239, 390-391. 
259   Lee, above n 248, 255. 
260  Jenny McEwan, 'Law Commission Dodges the Nettles in Consultation Paper No. 141' [1997] Crim.L.R. 93, 96, 
citing a case in which the defendant was acquitted of causing grievous bodily harm through 'stalking' the complainant.  
Evidence that the accused had a previous conviction for offending against her was excluded at trial. 
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effective inhibitions against acting on these impulses, and that the risks involved do not deter 
him.'261  Nor is it unreasonable to suggest that a defendant's prior experience of violence would 
enhance his awareness of risk.262      
 
Since 'people have different subjective interpretations of the probative value of evidence',263 the 
probative value versus prejudicial effect test creates opportunities for inconsistent evaluations of 
the probity of domestic violence evidence.  A presumption of admissibility would therefore avoid 
inconsistency in decision making, as well as distortions in the law which may occur when courts 
bow to public pressure by stretching rules of evidence in some cases, which may be detrimental to 
defendants in non-domestic violence cases, where policy concerns are not the same.264  Allowing 
the prosecution to introduce this evidence in its case-in-chief would also facilitate a coherent theme 
for the jury to follow.265   
 
Various US jurisdictions have recognised the probative value of domestic violence evidence and 
enacted specific rules regarding its admissibility.  The California legislature has authorised 
admission of evidence of prior domestic violence against the same or other victims to show 
propensity and disposition.  The legislation creates a presumption that domestic violence evidence 
is probative, thereby circumventing the rationale normally forbidding propensity evidence.  The 
presumption is balanced by a judicial discretion to exclude unduly prejudicial evidence and a ten-
year time limit on admissibility.266  The section is modelled on Federal Rules of Evidence 413-414 
given effect in California Evidence Code 1108 which provides for the admission of propensity 
evidence in sexual assault cases.  The policy arguments which persuaded Congress to deliberately 
bypass the strong opposition of the Judicial Conference (the body authorised by Congress to 
promulgate new rules of evidence) were the difficulty in successfully prosecuting rape cases, and 
the perception that current law disproportionately favours defendants in sexual assault 
prosecutions.  These difficulties led to too many rape prosecutions which resulted in acquittals or 
reversals on appeal.267    
                                                 
261    Karp, above n 246, 20.  
262    McEwan, above n 260, 99. 
263    Ibid 93. 
264    See, eg, Karp, above n 246, 35, Letendre, above n 240, 1000. 
265    Letendre, above n 240, 1002. 
266  Louise Ellison, 'Prosecuting Domestic Violence without Victim Participation' (2002) 65 MLR 834, 843, citing s 
1109 California Evidence Code which became effective in January 1997.  See, also, Letendre, above n 240, 992.   
267   Neal Hudders, 'The Problem of Using Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases: Is A New Exception the Answer? ' 
(2000) 49 Duke L.J. 1041, 106.  See, also, Karp, above n 246. 
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The California exception recognises that policy considerations which render propensity evidence 
especially probative in sexual assault cases are also relevant to domestic violence cases.  Both 
crimes are overwhelming perpetrated by men against women; both have high rates of recidivism; 
and jurors routinely face inconsistencies between the victim's and defendant's testimonies in both 
types of cases.  Offending in both categories is saturated with myths and stereotypes; and at trial, 
both unfairly fixate on the credibility of the victim.268   
 
Opponents of such exception269 may point to 'the presumption of innocence, the asymmetry of 
wrongful convictions and acquittals, the defendant's right to be tried for what the indictment alleges 
he did, not for leading the life he appears to have led or for being the person he appears to be'.270  
However, as Aileen McColgan observes, 'the position is somewhat different when bias is structured 
into the system with the effect that wrongful acquittals are returned in respect of defendants 
charged with a particular type of offence, which offence is committed against a particular sector of 
society'.271   
 
Sanctis points out that 'the high recidivism rate of domestic violence, coupled with the systematic, 
continual, escalatory nature of domestic violence, all occurring within the contours of a sexist 
criminal justice system, makes domestic violence an excellent candidate for a categorical exception 
to the general prohibition on the admissibility of propensity evidence'.272  The point of this 
evidence is not to show the defendant's general criminal or violent propensity, but to focus on the 
domestic context and the unique nature of domestic violence, including its repetition, secrecy, the 
vulnerability of the victim and the perpetrator's attempts at control.   
 
                                                 
268   Letendre, above n 240, 998, noting 'the American Medical Association found that 47% of batterers who beat their 
intimate partners do so at least three times a year, while the recidivism rate for sexual offenders is only 7.7% within 
three years' (citations omitted). 
269   See, eg, Roderick Munday, 'Handling the Evidential Exception' [1988] Crim.L.R. 345, 354, suggesting that the 
'adverse influence' of the propensity exception in the Theft Act 1968 (UK) was 'only contained by bold judicial 
contrivance'.   See, also, Roderick Munday, 'The Admissibility of Evidence of Criminal Propensity in Common Law 
Jurisdictions' (1989) 19 VUWLR 223, 234. 
270    Paul Roberts, 'The Law Commission's Consultation Paper on Previous Misconduct (1) All the Usual Suspects: A 
Critical Appraisal of Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 141' [1997] Crim.L.R. 75, 79.  See, also, Roderick 
Munday, 'The Admissibility of Evidence of Criminal Propensity in Common Law Jurisdictions' (1989) 19 VUWLR 
223, 248; Stephen Silber, 'The Law Commission's Work on Hearsay and Previous Misconduct' (1997) 37 Med.Sci.Law 
125, 131, rejecting the US approach which permits evidence of the defendant's previous misconduct in sexual offence 
cases.   
271    Aileen McColgan, 'Common Law and the Relevance of Sexual History Evidence' (1996) 16 OJLS 275, 297. 
272    Sanctis, above n 239, 390. 
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Two final observations are necessary.  First, it is important to recognise that allowing the 
defendant's history of serial or sadistic offending to be admitted in chief, does not entail an 
automatic conviction.  Policy considerations resulted in the creation of an exception to the 
exclusion of bad character evidence in New Zealand receiving cases273 and the operation of this 
section appears uncontroversial.274  Second, in the absence of intervention, a batterer's propensity 
for continued violence against current and future partners remains high.275  Therefore, putting 
abusers on notice that their charged and uncharged acts of domestic violence may be used in 
evidence may also act as a deterrent to future domestic abuse.   
 
B   Hearsay in Domestic Violence Cases 
The Law Commission cites lack of opportunity to cross-examine the declarant as the most 
compelling reason for limiting the admissibility of hearsay evidence.276  However, there is a cruel 
irony apparent in the exclusion of a woman's hearsay statements on the basis that the batterer who 
killed her will be unduly prejudiced by his victim's inability to appear in court and be subjected to 
cross-examination.  Significant benefits accrue to batterers from policies which treat the out of 
court statements of battered victims as unreliable when prosecuting alleged offenders, while such 
statements are accorded a high degree of credibility when they express forgiveness of the batterer 
and appeals for judicial leniency at sentencing.    
 
The introduction of a domestic murder statute would eliminate a number of the problems presently 
associated with the hearsay rule in intimate femicide cases.  Since the statute requires a pattern of 
prior violence and the victim's state of mind is automatically relevant, evidence of her pre-death 
premonitions and the underlying facts which constituted the basis for those fears is admissible.  
However, there will be intimate femicide cases which fall outside the statute.  Given the limited 
focus of the present research, it is recommended that the proposed Domestic Violence Advisory 
Panel investigate the introduction of a hearsay exception for domestic violence evidence.  The 
following discussion is restricted to issues that appear relevant to the operation of the rule in 
relation to battered homicide victims.  
 
                                                 
273    Section 258(2) Crimes Act 1961.  This exception has not been dispensed with despite scholarly criticism.  See, eg, 
Munday, above n 269. 
274    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 116, [176]. 
275    Letendre, above n 240, 978. 
276    New Zealand Law Commission, above n 116, [50]. 
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A number of US legislatures have enacted hearsay exceptions for domestic violence crimes.277 
Some commentators argue that the need to use hearsay statements in domestic violence cases is the 
same whether the victim is killed or injured.  Thus a single exception is preferable to separate 
exceptions for homicide and non-homicide situations. 278  However, Raeder proposes a hearsay 
exception to admit a decedent's hearsay statements concerning the declarant's relationship with the 
victim where the circumstances surrounding the making of the statement indicate its 
trustworthiness, and on at least three occasions prior to the declarant's death, the defendant was the 
primary aggressor in one or more designated acts of domestic violence directed at the declarant.  
The requirement that the accused be the 'primary aggressor' in the previous three acts of domestic 
violence is designed 'to eliminate the use of statements against female defendants who kill their 
batterers in situations where the prosecution might argue that the battered woman's verbal conduct 
provoked the decedent's physical response'.279  This principled response would be in line with the 
domestic homicide statute requirement of a pattern of abuse.  However, the strategy might be 
undermined by a general tendency to distrust the hearsay statements of deceased battered victims.   
 
Although murder by itself has not traditionally been perceived as grounds to lower the bar to 
decedent hearsay, the fact that the defendant procured the death of his partner or estranged partner 
might be sufficient to support the waiver of hearsay objections in intimate femicide cases.  
However, where identity is in issue, this would usurp the jury's function in determining the extent 
and nature of the accused's culpability.  Another solution would be to specify the type of hearsay 
evidence concerning the declarant's relationship with the defendant that may be admitted at trial as 
proof of the facts asserted.  Thus legislation could stipulate structural risk factors for femicide, 
including victims' fears for their safety as expressed through their pre-death premonitions, which 
have been well established by domestic homicide research.  These red flags for intimate femicide 
would be consistent with the corporate risk assessment instrument which is recommended as a 
means to establish and manage risk in sub-lethal domestic assault cases.   
 
There are a number of advantages to this approach.  First, it would provide statutory recognition of 
the interrelationship between domestic violence and domestic homicide.  Second, the legislation 
would allow common, reoccurring patterns of behaviour in intimate femicide cases, which are 
                                                 
277  See, eg, Karleen Murphy, 'A Hearsay Exception for Physical Abuse' (1997) 27 Golden Gate U.L.Rev. 497; 
Hudders, above n 267, 1072-1073. 
278    See, eg, Hudders, above n 267, 1072-1073. 
279    Raeder, above n 1, 1517. 
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presently concealed by a focus on individual cases in isolation, to be widely revealed.  Public and 
legal attention would thereby be deflected from a focus on victim blaming to a focus on the 
batterer, and on battering as a pattern of behaviours designed to maintain or regain control over the 
victim.  Media reporting of the cases would ensure risk factors for intimate femicide remained at 
the forefront of public consciousness.  Emphasising risk factors for intimate femicide, and shifting 
public and professional attention to the batterer's quest for power and control, would also give 
effect to the twin domestic violence intervention goals of victim safety and batterer 
accountability.280  
 
In the interim, there is a need for reform to address a previously identified and potentially 
dangerous situation which arguably constitutes a further example of 'the cultural facilitation of 
violence'.281  The decision in R v Goldberg,282 that batterers imprisoned for domestic violence 
offences who harass their victims from prison in breach of their protection orders may use the 
criminal justice system to further victimise estranged partners lacks cognisance of the dangers of 
separation violence, and the power and control tactics at the heart of domestic abuse.  Therefore, a 
statutory response to this decision is recommended. 
 
XIII   THE PROVOCATION DEFENCE AND A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE ADVISORY 
PANEL 
The case for abolition of the provocation defence appears overwhelming.  The defence has been 
rightly criticised for encouraging killers to defame the deceased person's character,283 and for 
promoting a victim-blaming culture.284  Contemporary understandings that responsibility for male 
violence may be sheeted home to women victims simply replaces old myths that 'women who are 
beaten are invariably drunken nags, incompetent housekeepers and spendthrifts',285 with slightly 
less overt theories of victim blaming.  As noted by the Victorian Law Reform Commission, the 
implication of the provocation defence that women are somehow responsible for their own deaths, 
                                                 
280   See, eg, Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 2. 
281  Busch and Robertson, above n 52, 116, citing Ellen Pence, The Justice System's Response to Domestic Assault 
Cases: A Guide for Policy Development (1986) 1-8. 
282   (Unreported, High Court, Rotorua, Baragwanath J, 30 May 2003). 
283  See, eg, Celia Wells, 'Provocation: The Case for Abolition' in Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell (eds), 
Rethinking English Homicide Law 85, 101. 
284    See, eg, Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, [2.29]. 
285  Martin Schwartz and Walter De Keseredy, 'The Return of the "Battered Husband Syndrome" Through the 
Typification of Women as Violent' (1993) 20 Crime, Law and Social Change 248, 249. 
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and men's violent loss of self-control is partly excusable, is a position which the community should 
no longer tolerate.286   
 
It is counter-productive to government attempts to reduce society's tolerance of domestic violence 
and protect women and children287 for the state to reinforce, at an institutional level, the 
perspective of many batterers that women incite the violence committed against them.  Since the 
right of the state to punish women who respond to battering with lethal force is inseparable from 
the duty of the state to ensure that alternatives such as departure are not more hypothetical than 
real288 the state can no longer condone the provision of a partial excuse for men who pursue and 
kill estranged partners.289    
 
A number of legal commentators have expressed concern that following abolition of the defence, 
the outdated norms of relationship that it endorses may simply be eliminated from the trial and 
transposed to the realm of sentencing.  Accordingly, the less publicly available sentencing process 
may become 'the new vehicle for the playing out of "gender politics"'.290  The Victorian Law 
Reform Commission's recommendation to abolish the provocation defence was therefore 
accompanied by recommendations that the newly established Sentencing Advisory Council 
monitor sentencing trends; establish processes for ensuring the availability of up to date sentencing 
information to judges; provide judicial education, in consultation with the Judicial College on 
sentencing in homicide cases; and provide public education on sentencing.291  The New Zealand 
Law Commission's recent recommendation that a Sentencing Council should be established with a 
mandate to draft sentencing guidelines is therefore timely.292   
 
The New Zealand Commission acknowledges that guideline sentencing judgments by higher courts 
have significant limitations, including their dependence upon the quality and nature of the 
                                                 
286    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, xxviii. 
287    See, eg, Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 16. 
288    See, eg, Cato, above n 156, 39. 
289   Wendy Chan, 'A Feminist Critique of Self-Defense and Provocation in Battered Women's Cases in England and 
Wales' (1994) 6 Women and Criminal Justice 39, 45, citing C Boyle, A Feminist Review of Criminal Law (1985) 
Ministry of Supply and Services, Canada, noting that 'the moral right to punish a woman for responding violently to 
violence is premised upon the provision of the protection of the law in reality as well as on paper.  To do otherwise is 
to impose the standards of a "civilised" society on someone who is literally living in a lawless world'. 
290    Jenny Morgan, 'Provocation Law and Facts: Dead Women Tell No Tales, Tales Are Told About Them' (1997) 21 
MULR 237, 275-276. 
291    Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, xlii-xliii. 
292    New Zealand Law Commission, Sentencing Guidelines and Parole Reform, Report 94 (2006). 
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information provided by counsel in individual cases.293  This method of formulating sentencing 
policy is idiosyncratic and unrepresentative.  In particular, it has impeded recognition of structural 
patterns of offending and the development of principled sentencing policy and guidelines in 
domestic violence cases.  Although the establishment of a Sentencing Council may be criticised for 
allowing a 'politically charged body' to wrest control over sentencing from judges,294 the English 
experience has shown a specialist public body can operate as a useful buffer between the courts, 
the government and the public which helps to alleviate public criticism of judges.295   
 
The New Zealand Commission proposes a Council consisting of ten members, which in order to be 
more representative and thus more democratic would not be dominated by judges.  The Committee 
would be comprised of four judges (two from the District Court, one from the High Court, and one 
from the Court of Appeal).  Since the functions of the Council would include drafting parole 
guidelines, the Chair of the Parole Board, who is also a judge, would be included.  The remaining 
five non-judicial members would have expertise in several designated areas, including the impact 
of the criminal justice system on Maori and minorities.  However, gender issues are not designated 
by the Commission as an area of expertise.  This is a grave oversight. 
 
It is essential that sentencing and parole guidelines reflect knowledge and understanding of the 
dynamics of domestic violence, structural patterns of offending, and the interrelationship between 
domestic violence and domestic homicide.  Thus a specialist Domestic Violence Advisory Panel 
should be appointed to provide advice and guidance to the Council.  The Advisory Panel should be 
represented on the Sentencing Council to ensure gender issues are acknowledged and addressed.  
By serving as a comprehensive repository of sentencing data, the sentencing council could provide 
invaluable information to the Advisory Panel to assist the Panel to formulate recommendations.  As 
discussed below, a Court Watch programme would also provide invaluable information.  This 
cooperative exchange of information will help bridge philosophical and political differences in 
approaches to domestic violence and ensure policy recommendations are well grounded. The Panel 
should report to Parliament and, where appropriate, the Law Commission.   
 
                                                 
293    Ibid [39]. 
294   Sentencing Council on the Cards, New Zealand Press Association, 15 June 2006, citing Richard Worth, National 
Member of Parliament. 
295    Ian Caplin, Making Sense of Sentencing, New Zealand Herald, 3 July 2006.   
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Since the Panel would have the necessary expertise to ensure fatality reviews do not focus 
disproportionately on the victim and evaluation of her choices, it would appear best placed to take 
a leadership role in refining the recommendations of proposed review panels296 and reporting the 
findings to Parliament.  The Advisory Panel would also have the expertise necessary to address 
present inconsistent and incoherent responses to domestic violence.  The Panel should make policy 
recommendations and develop sentencing guidelines which address the following issues identified 
from the present research: 
 
• Achievement of accurate recording and reporting of intimate partner homicide and sub-
lethal domestic violence assaults.297  This includes consideration of a separate offence of 
intimate partner violence (as opposed to the s 194 offence of male assaults female)298 to 
better monitor sub-lethal assaults on intimate partners;  
 
• Assess whether the seriousness of offending is trivialised by over-use of s 194 Crimes Act 
1961 assault by a male on a female.  (See case studies, including Case Study S/01/2(S)299 in 
which the judge described the violence as one of the worst cases of a male assaulting a 
woman he had seen for many years); 
 
• Establishment of a domestic violence data base to assist researchers and legal professionals 
operating in this area.  The Panel to also consider the effect on transparency and 
accountability of the recent judicial decision to suppress the name of a habitual batterer 
whose violence escalated to lethality so as to protect the couple's children;      
 
• Monitoring to assess patterns of violence and evaluate safety issues;  
        
• Policy recommendations and sentencing guidelines which delineate the parameters of the 
present rehabilitative response.  This includes consideration of policy in relation to abusers 
who are not amenable to, or appropriate for, batterer treatment;   
 
                                                 
296    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 18. 
297    At least one US state (Missouri) has legislation mandating domestic violence homicide reporting. 
298   As previously discussed, the offence category of male assaults female under s 194 Crimes Act 1961 operates as a 
proxy for violence against female intimate partners. 
299    See, discussion of this case above, at p 251.  See, also, Case Study M/02/8 above, at p 303. 
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• Whether s 8(f) Sentencing Act 2002 which requires the court to take into account the effect 
of the offending on the victim should be interpreted as requiring courts to mitigate 
offending according to the wishes of domestic violence victims.  Whether different 
approaches should apply according to the severity of violence; the presence of children in 
the family; the circumstance of repeat victimisation;   
 
• How to give effect to domestic violence risk assessment tools in sentencing, probation and 
parole decisions.  This includes monitoring to ensure judicial typologies of batterers 
conform to social science risk assessment research;  
 
• Whether the assumption that male violence against women is inherently less dangerous if 
body force as opposed to a weapon is used; together with the nomination under s 9(1)(a) 
Sentencing Act 2000 of actual or threatened use of a weapon as an aggravating factor at 
sentencing, constitute gender discrimination 
   
• Whether assumptions in domestic violence cases that the red flag of attempted suicide is: 
(a) indicative of the offender's remorse and (b) evidence from which an offender's intention 
may be inferred at trial, constitute gender discrimination;   
 
• Whether remorse as a mitigating feature of offending under s 9(2)(f) Sentencing Act 2002 is 
appropriate in domestic violence cases.  Given the centrality of remorse to the cycle of 
violence, this includes the element of remorse in judicial typologies of batterers; and 
whether the statutory provision constitutes a form of gender discrimination; 
 
• Whether requiring women to pay the state for protection from male violence constitutes a 
form of gender discrimination.  (A number of women in the present study were gravely 
injured while trying to serve trespass notices on estranged partners); 
  
• Whether a domestic violence offence should be created in relation to violence and threats of 
violence aimed at deterring victims from testifying, persuading victims to withdraw 
complaints, or retaliating for criminal justice intervention.  (The research found little 
recognition of this offending as a risk factor for dangerousness/lethality and an impediment 
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to successful prosecution of domestic violence offending.   Indeed, in one case the victim's 
conduct in reporting the violence to police was accepted as supporting a provocation 
defence for her killer; 
 
• Consideration of the policy, sentencing tariffs and principles that should apply: 
(a)  to a structured system of sanctions to reflect patterns of repeat offending and escalation;         
  (b)  to the proposed 'estrangement murder' legislation; 
  (c)  to habitual batterers convicted under the proposed domestic murder legislation; 
  (d)  to offenders who have been convicted of separation assault and aggravated separation  
             assault;  
  (e)   when sentencing an offender who has been subjected to abuse by the deceased;   
 (f)  when sentencing an offender who has been convicted of an offence in the nature of  
                   'mercy' killing of an intimate partner; 
 (g)  when sentencing an offender who has perpetrated an assault in breach of the victim's  
       protection order;300 including whether the sentence for breach of the order should  
      run cumulatively with the sentence for the act which constituted the breach; 
 
• Promotion of research examining patterns of homicide/suicide and homicide/attempted 
suicide; suicide in the context of domestic violence; and unexplained deaths which may 
presently be hidden within the official category of 'deaths where no finding could be made 
whether injuries were accidentally or purposefully inflicted'.  Such research should 
encompass charged and uncharged incidents of so-called mercy killings and suicide pacts 
involving intimate partners.  These homicides have been identified in Australian research 
and in the present study as a structural pattern of offending and fatality reviews should 
investigate deaths in this context.  This research is urgently required to guide substantive 
law and sentencing policy;     
 
• Introduction of social framework evidence in domestic homicide cases when the battered 
woman is victim and defendant; 
 
                                                 
300  The Domestic Violence, Crimes and Victims Act 2004 (UK) makes breach of a non-molestation order a criminal 
offence punishable by up to five years' imprisonment. 
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• Whether s 9(2)(c) Sentencing Act 2002 which stipulates that 'the  conduct of the victim' is a 
mitigating feature of offending is appropriate in domestic violence cases.  The type of 
conduct which should be excluded (see following point); 
 
• Legal scholars suggest that whether or not provocation is abolished, 'there must be 
legislative guidelines to judges spelling out that certain instances of "provoked" killings 
must not be considered in mitigation of sentence'.301  Thus the Panel should consider the 
principles that should apply when sentencing an offender who has perpetrated a lethal or 
sub-lethal act of violence against a person with whom the offender has a past or present 
domestic relationship302 in the following circumstances: 
 
(a)   the victim had left, attempted to leave or threatened to leave the relationship; 
  (b)   the offender suspected, discovered, or the victim confessed infidelity; 
  (c)   the offender alleges the conduct was precipitated by a non-violent sexual advance (a  
              past or present domestic relationship is not required); 
 (e)   the offender alleges the victim taunted him about his or her sexual prowess or   
             attributes; 
  (f)   the conduct relied on by the offender as mitigating the offending consisted of a   
             challenge to the offender's authority; 
  and how these circumstances should be taken into account at sentencing. 303 
 
• How the 'significant overlaps between male violence against female partners and child 
abuse and neglect'304 should be reflected in sentencing policy and guidelines.  This 
includes how to give effect to the principle in New Zealand domestic violence legislation 
that violence in the presence or in the hearing of a child constitutes violence against the 
child.305  The sentencing tariffs and principles that should apply in the following situations: 
 
                                                 
301     Graeme Coss, 'Provocation, Law Reform and the Medea Syndrome' (2004) 18 Crim LJ 133, 139. 
302     See, eg, s 4 Domestic Violence Act 1995.  
303   Graeme Coss, above n 301, 137-38 credits Helen Brown, 'Provocation as a Defence to Murder: to Abolish or 
Reform?' (1999) 12 A Fem LJ 137, 140 for articulating the first three circumstances; and attributes the fourth to Adrian 
Howe, "Submission to Law Commission Consultation Paper No 173: Partial Defences to Murder" (2004) 6; and the 
fifth to himself. 
304    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6.  
305    Section 3 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
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  (a) when intimate partner violence takes place in the presence of a child; 
  (b)    when children are secondary victims of assaults directed at an intimate partner; 
  (c) when the victim is pregnant; 
  (d) when sentencing an offender who has been convicted of an offence involving  
                  violence toward a child, where the offender has also been the victim of violence;  
  
 Given the well established association of child and woman abuse, the Panel should also  
 consider the extent, if any, of the courts' duty when put on notice of the co-occurrence of   
 child and mother abuse. 
    
XIV   PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION PROGRAMMES 
Values clarification is a common practice in many professions306 and the present research 
illustrates its importance for legal professionals.307  Earlier New Zealand research noted the need to 
redefine paradigms about domestic violence shared by some judges, police, psychologists, and 
members of the public.  Beliefs that one can be a killer yet remain a good father, beliefs that 
women 'provoke' further understandable violence by seeking protection from the legal system, and 
the notion that one is less of a murderer if one limits one's homicides to family members were of 
particular concern.308  The present study confirms the on-going relevance of these observations.   
Sexist attitudes, victim blaming and failure to recognise power and control issues may dissuade 
women who encounter these responses from further attempts to seek help, thereby jeopardising 
women's safety, and placing lives at risk.  Issues of gender bias should therefore be addressed as an 
integral part of the law school curriculum.309   
 
                                                 
306    Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, 'Community Court Watch II: A Study of Bergen County 
Family Court System and the Enforcement of the State of New Jersey Prevention of Domestic Violence Act' (1995) 17 
Women's Rts.L.Rep. 79, 91. 
307    See, eg, Case Study K/00/21(S) in which the sentencing judge noted defence counsel's depiction of a severely 
battered woman who had experienced repeated episodes of brutality, including attempts by the offender to cause 
permanent damage to her face, as a 'broken-down alcoholic' who felt confident to drink behind the offender's back and 
'give him lip' when she was drunk implied the victim 'deserved what she got'.  In Case Study C/03/1 defence counsel 
described the woman victim who was killed by her jealous boyfriend when she attempted to end the relationship as 
'two-timing' and deceptive and the offender who killed her as 'tender and passionate' whose love for the victim was 
'unconditional'.  This offender also killed the deceased woman's male friend and attempted to kill another male friend 
as they waited for the victim to pick up her clothes from the offender's home. 
308    Ruth Busch and Neville Robertson, 'I Didn't Know Just How Far You Could Fight: Contextualising the Bristol 
Inquiry' (1994) 2 Waikato L.Rev. 41, 42-43. 
309    Donna Martinson, Lavallee v R - The Supreme Court of Canada Addresses Gender Bias in the Courts' (1990) 24 
UBC Law Rev. 381, 395. 
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New Zealand Family Violence Prevention Strategy calls for an integrated, co-ordinated response to 
domestic violence.  However, courtroom constructions of domestic violence are profoundly 
inconsistent with national prevention policy.  Pervasive misunderstandings about the dynamics of 
violent relationships and red flags for dangerousness/lethality have the potential for serious failures 
of risk assessment and consequent harms to victims.310  The Ontario Domestic Violence Death 
Review Committee concluded professional training must deal with two issues.  First, there must be 
training to recognise domestic violence in all its forms, including emotional, psychological and 
physical abuse.  Second, there must be training to identify risk factors for intimate femicide and 
how to respond to them.311  This 'should include examples of appropriate action for varied roles 
(e.g., attorney, judge, commissioner, advocate)'.312   
 
Although the Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families advises that the Law Society will 
provide professional support and training programmes for lawyers working in the area of domestic 
violence,313 it is counterproductive to train lawyers and criminal justice personnel on issues of 
power and control,314 while judges simultaneously reject this analysis,315 or invert it by depicting 
perpetrators of separation violence as 'out-of-control'.  If courts ignore or downplay the risks of 
repeat victimisation and violence in the context of separation, this will impact on the way police 
carry out their duties of protecting persons and property from domestic violence.316   Since judges 
have a strong leadership role to play, there is no justification for exempting the judiciary from 
domestic violence training.317  Training of judges and lawyers should therefore be mandatory.   
 
                                                 
310    Karan and Lazarus, above n 23, detail the actions lawyers should take once a risk assessment has been undertaken.  
The authors note that risk assessment should be reviewed periodically throughout the case, and coupled with 
personalised safety planning, legal advocacy, and appropriate referral to community resources. 
311    Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, above n 58. 
312    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 12, 61. 
313    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 6, 23. 
314    Ibid 4. 
315   See, eg, Calls for Change as Domestic Violence Act turns 10, NZLawyer, 41 2 June 2006 citing one judge's 
criticism that the power and control focus in domestic violence legislation is inapposite in many cases.  However, the 
example chosen to support this argument was that of violence in the context of separation, which reinforces the 
importance of training for legal professionals.  
316   See, eg, Jocelynne Scutt, 'The Battered Woman Reality - Taking Women's Lives Seriously' in Jon Patrick, Helen 
Foster and Brian Tapper (eds) Successful Practice in Family Violence In New Zealand (1997) 67, 72.  The Washington 
State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 71, also points to the potential for the work of prosecution and 
police officers aimed at holding abusers accountable to be undermined by judges who may disregard bail 
recommendations and fail to conduct appropriate risk assessment, or impose significant sanctions on abusers.   
317   Victorian Law Reform Commission, above n 29, [4.154], noted the need for a proper understanding by police, 
legal practitioners and judges of the interrelationship between domestic violence and use of a fatal force and 
recommended ongoing development of domestic violence awareness and education programmes for legal practitioners 
and judges.  See, also, Metropolitan Police Service, above n 59, 12. 
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Education should also be targeted to professionals outside the justice system.318  Since the best way 
to protect children is to protect their mothers,319 staff at supervised visitation centres should receive 
specialised training on domestic violence 'including the potential for abusers to use visitation 
centres to stalk and control their intimate partners, and the risk to children when a parent has a 
history of perpetrating domestic violence'.320  While health professionals also have an important 
role to play in identifying women at high risk of serious violence and lethality, the present research 
found that when commenting publicly upon red flag behaviours such as stalking, obsessive 
jealousy, homicide/suicide threats, health professionals rarely adverted to the specific danger these 
behaviours pose to separating women.  Thus crucial educative opportunities were missed.     
 
Following intimate femicide, it generally transpires that friends, family and neighbours knew about 
the abuse but underestimated the abuser's potential for danger, or were unwilling or unable to 
support the victim and help her obtain safety.  Thus fatality reviews emphasise the importance of 
education strategies aimed at the friends and families of domestic violence victims.  The present 
tendency to equate obsessive jealousy and possessiveness with romantic love may also impede 
recognition by battered women of this red flag for homicide, thereby endangering their safety.  
Education campaigns aimed at increasing public awareness of risk factors for serious violence and 
lethality should also ensure that especially vulnerable groups of women, such as women with 
disabilities have access to this information and know how to report abuse.321  Public and 
professional training must not simply highlight lethality indicators, but also provide information on 
what to do if the lethality risk seems high and examples of appropriate action.322   Such education 
would also help to inure domestic violence law reforms from ill informed attacks by political 
groups.323   
 
 
 
                                                 
318    Domestic Violence Death Review Committee, above n 58.  
319    Websdale, Sheeran and Johnson, above n 63, 27. 
320    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 15. 
321   Miriam Ticoll, Family Violence Prevention Division, Health Canada, Violence and People with Disabilities: A 
Review of the Literature (1994) citing an unacceptably high degree of victimisation of people with disabilities and 
cultural toleration of this violence.  
322     See, eg, Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 6.  
323  See, eg, Davis, above n 28, 309 noting that: '[o]ne of the most striking aspects of fathers' rights groups 
internationally is their success in influencing the direction of family law, despite the almost complete absence of 
empirical data or reliable research to support their family law policies and their claims of Family Court gender bias.' 
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XV   MONITORING JUDICIAL RESPONSES  
'Judges are a critical link in the chain of protection for battered women, yet they are the weakest 
link because they are largely unaccountable for their decisions.'324  Victoria Nourse notes that since 
feminism contests powerful social norms about intimate relationships its insights are often resisted.  
When this resistance is overcome by legal reform, it 'is likely to remain embedded in reform 
efforts, albeit in ways that are difficult to see, helping to perpetuate that which the law openly 
disavows.'325  Since courts are among the most potent reinforcers of dominant ideologies,326 it is 
recommended that New Zealand implement a national court monitoring system. 
 
In the US, court monitoring is a relatively new systems accountability strategy: most court 
monitoring programmes were formed after 1995.   Programmes are present in at least 21 separate 
US states and two provinces in Canada.327   Court monitoring aims to promote the safety of victims 
and children, counter strategies which discredit, blame and re-victimise battered women, ensure 
courts are more consistent, effective and accountable for their handling of domestic violence cases 
and create a more informed and involved public through individual and systemic monitoring and 
public education.  Programmes focus on domestic violence, restraining order and sexual assault 
cases.  After training seminars, volunteers observe in the courtroom and take notes on their 
perceptions which are collated and recorded in annual reports.  Repeat offenders' interactions with 
the criminal justice system are recorded.  Although some judges and defence counsel complained 
that court monitoring to achieve accountability would disrupt courts and intimidate judges, these 
programmes have made significant changes within the court system.  'Advocates, prosecutors and 
judges in Minneapolis routinely say that the presence of WATCH volunteer court monitors makes 
a difference, and that their research and reporting prompts change.'328  
  
The Bergen County Community Court Watch programme evolved out of a desire among those who 
worked with domestic violence to be proactive and was established to: 
 
                                                 
324    Lynn Hecht Schafran, 'There's No Accounting for Judges' (1995) 58 Alb.L.Rev. 1063, 1068-1069. 
325   Nourse, above n 3, 952. 
326    See, eg, Susan Atkins and Brenda Hoggett, Women and the Law (1984) 138.     
327    Suzanne Elwell, Report on 2002 Court Monitoring Survey (2002) www.watchmn.org/PDF/cm-survey.pdf at 4 
December 2006. 
328    Legal Momentum, Legal Resource Kit: A Guide to Court Watching in Domestic Violence and Sexual Assault 
Cases (2005) 8 www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/courtwatching.pdf at 4 December 2006. 
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• compile data on the handling of domestic violence cases which could be used to strengthen 
enforcement of the relevant domestic violence legislation; 
• make those involved in the judicial process aware of the public interest and concern about 
how domestic violence cases are handled; 
• provide feedback to legislators regarding the effectiveness of the statute; 
• report Court Watch findings to the general public.329 
 
Community volunteers were recruited through advertising to participate in the project as monitors.  
By the completion of the training sessions a pool of monitors ranging in age from 20 to 85 was 
activated.   
 
Monitors documented demographics, judicial conduct, the nature of the abuse and case dispositions.   
The monitors also recorded their subjective comments and assessments…Comments from monitors 
ranged from direct quotes to interpretations, from descriptions of outcomes to descriptions of 
process, from observations of values to expressions of values and from positive to negative 
commentary and reflections.330 
 
The Project is reported as having 'a profound effect on the handling of domestic violence cases' 
including 'legislative initiatives which have broadened the application of the law and strengthened 
protection'. 331   Mandatory training was implemented by the judiciary following the first Court 
Watch Report and monitors in the second Court Watch project reported judges were more 
knowledgeable about domestic violence and made a greater effort to protect victims.332  
 
The Washington State Domestic Violence Fatality Review recommends that domestic violence 
advocacy programmes seek resources to set up domestic violence Court Watch Programmes.333  
Lynn Hecht Schafran, the Director of the National Judicial Education Program to Promote Equality 
in the Courts observes that  
  
                                                 
329    Bergen County Commission on the Status of Women, above n 306, 83. 
330    Ibid. 
331    Ibid 92. 
332    Ibid 90. 
333    Washington State Coalition Against Domestic Violence, above n 80, 13. 
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 every community needs trained court watchers who can monitor the trial process in spousal abuse 
and murder cases to ensure fairness….Advocates from domestic violence shelters are the obvious 
candidates for this task, but there are too few of them and they are needed in many places.334 
 
The state should provide funding to ensure effective, independent, court watch programmes can be 
established nation wide.  These programmes are essential to increase understanding of the local 
judiciary's approach to domestic violence offending, identify problems in the system, and evaluate 
the impact of legal reforms.   Monitoring should include the following issues: 
 
• Issues relevant to the abolition of spousal non-compellability, including:   
(a)   Whether police are pursuing domestic violence prosecutions in the absence of victim  
        cooperation;   
(b)   Whether uncooperative testifying witnesses are frequently declared hostile; 
(c)   Whether there is a tendency to dismiss charges in these cases. 
 
• Judicial responses to victims' views of the appropriate sentence. To promote public 
awareness and enhance accountability, the nature of the violence, charges and sentencing 
should be monitored.  
 
• Judicial approaches when violence involves children and pregnant women. 
 
• Judicial responses to violence aimed at dissuading victims from testifying or in retaliation 
for criminal justice involvement. 
 
• Patterns of repeat victimisation. 
 
• Victim blaming during the substantive hearing and at sentencing; 
 
The present research found suspended sentences were used in high risk cases.  The Justice and 
Electoral Committee report on the Sentencing and Parole Reform Bill noted that suspended 
sentences were relied on to deter offenders from further offending and to reduce the growth in the 
                                                 
334    Schafran, above n 324, 1079. 
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prison population, thus producing savings.  However, subsequent research found deterrence had 
not been achieved and the prison population had increased due to the number of suspended 
sentences which were subsequently activated.335  The Committee drew attention to the alternative 
sentencing options of home detention; community based sentences; order to come up for sentence 
if called on; and adjournment.336  
 
A   Home Detention 
Where the Court sentences the offender to a term of imprisonment of not more than two years, it 
must consider granting the offender leave to apply for home detention.337  When determining 
whether or not to grant leave, the court must consider: (a) the nature and seriousness of the offence; 
(b) the circumstances and background of the offender; (c) relevant matters in the victim impact 
statement; (d) any other factors that the court considers relevant.338  Since victim forgiveness is a 
not uncommon feature of domestic violence prosecutions, and offending in the context of 'domestic 
difficulties', or a 'domestic crisis' has traditionally been viewed sympathetically,339 courts may 
perceive home detention as especially relevant in domestic violence cases.    
 
Although it was originally believed that the two year threshold for home detention 'clearly' 
signalled seriously violent offenders would not be eligible for home detention,340 the research 
found home detention was available to offenders who perpetrated serious violence in red flag 
contexts.  Since this sentencing option has the potential to provide extended opportunities to 
offenders to re-assault and harass current or estranged partners, and may also convey the message 
that 'domestic' assaults are not taken seriously, its use should be carefully monitored. 
 
B   Order to Come Up for Sentence if Called On341 
The Select Committee envisaged this sentencing option would be used in cases involving 
'comparatively minor offences, or where implementation of a restorative justice programme cannot 
                                                 
335  Geoffrey Hall and Stephen O'Driscoll, The New Sentencing and Parole Acts (2002) 6.  The extent to which 
domestic violence offending featured in this pattern of activating suspended sentences is unknown.  
336    Ibid 7. 
337    Section 97 Sentencing Act 2002. 
338    Section 97(3) Sentencing Act 2002. 
339    Geoff Hall, 'Sentencing (II): Matters of Aggravation and Mitigation' [1985] NZLJ 184, 184, 188. 
340   High Tech Ball and Chain, The Dominion, 6 February 1999; Safety First, The Press, 20 October 2000, stating: 
'The idea that dangerous offenders might be sentenced to stay at home would be offensive.  Yet for those at the lighter 
end of the offending scale the scheme makes good sense'. 
341    Section 110 Sentencing Act 2002. 
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take place through a community-based sentence'.342  Given that intimate partner violence which is 
subject to criminal justice intervention is generally of a serious nature, this sentencing option may 
be inappropriate.  Monitoring of this sentencing option in domestic violence cases is therefore 
necessary. 
 
XVI   CONCLUSION 
Contemporary legal responses to domestic violence lack awareness of structural patterns of 
offending, the relationship between various categories of abuse, and the interrelationship between 
domestic assaults and domestic homicide.  The extensive tax payer resources committed to 
domestic violence education campaigns may amount to little more than window-dressing if courts 
continue to operate without reference to national domestic violence policy and red flags for 
dangerousness/lethality.   
 
Valerie Bryson points out that the traditional model of heterosexual relations in which men are 
dominant and women are submissive has little meaning in contemporary society.  'Some men have 
reacted to these changes with a "backlash" against feminism and a reassertion of misogyny and 
violence.'  Others have changed in positive ways, 'with the result that a "diversity of masculinities" 
jostle to present themselves as the acceptable face of the new male order'.343  In this social context, 
the legal system plays a pivotal role in reflecting to society an egalitarian, non-violent model of 
heterosexual relationships.  However, the tenacity of old legal norms to withstand decades of law 
reform and feminist activity illustrates the importance of Safety Audits344 and systematic 
monitoring to ensure that the legal system is held accountable for its responses to domestic 
violence.  As demonstrated by the present research, unambiguous condemnation of habitual 
batterers and offenders who perpetrate separation violence would not only save the lives of battered 
women, but also those of their male abusers.345   
                                                 
342    Hall and O'Driscoll, above n 335, 7. 
343    Valerie Bryson, Feminist Debates: Issues of Theory and Political Practice (1999) 209. 
344     See, eg, Ellen Pence and Dorothy Smith, 'The Safety and Accountability Audit' 5, prepared for the National 
Institute of Justice and Office on Violence Against Women 26 October 2004.  
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nij/wawprog/safety_audit_background.pdf at 6 December 2006. 
345   See, eg, Case Study S/01/1/F discussed above, at p 132.  See also, Aileen McColgan, 'In Defence of Battered 
Women who Kill' (1993) 13 OJLS 508, 529. 
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CHAPTER TWELVE:  RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
!  RECOMMENDATION(S)  
 1.   The proposed government campaign to change attitudes and behaviour1 should aim to 
achieve public and professional consensus on the principles of domestic violence intervention, 
including: 
       (a)  domestic violence is both an issue of women's individual and women's collective 
rights; 
       (b) the state has a responsibility to improve women and children's ability to safely exit 
abusive relationships.  Safe exit requires state resourcing of financial support; safe, decent, long 
and short term housing for battered women; supervised access centres;2 court advocacy; and a fully 
resourced domestic violence witness programme; 
        (c)  Victim safety and batterer accountability as the twin pillars of principled domestic 
violence intervention should not be undermined by a competing focus on protecting the violent 
relationship. 
        (d)  The Domestic Violence Advisory Panel (see below) to develop national sentencing 
guidelines for domestic violence offences and consult with the Sentencing Council (when 
established) on this issue. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
 2. A risk assessment tool based on a thorough understanding of domestic violence fatality 
reviews, domestic homicide research and research on sub-lethal domestic violence offending 
should be utilised by all agencies in the criminal justice sector including police, the probation 
service, lawyers, judges, and court staff.   
To ensure consistency, this instrument should also structure and inform mental health and other 
state and community agency responses in domestic violence cases.  
 
 3.     Risk assessment should not be carried out in close proximity to the alleged perpetrator.    
 
 
 
                                                 
1    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, The First Report (2006) 16. 
2    See, eg, Alison Chetwin, Trish Knaggs and Patricia Te Wairere Ahiahi Young, The Domestic Violence Legislation 
and Child Access in New Zealand (1999) xii. 
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!   RECOMMENDATION  
 4.     Domestic violence victims to be provided with court/witness advocacy by trained 
domestic violence advocates.  Support should include risk assessment, safety planning, assistance 
with support needs, access to witness protection, and pro-active follow up. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION  
 5.    The system of independent monitoring of agency and practitioner interventions 
implemented by HAIP should be reinstated and made standard national practice.   
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
 6.    Domestic violence intervention should be offender-oriented.  Victims should not be 
responsible for arrest/prosecution of offenders.  Responses should prioritise victim safety and be 
highly proactive in implementing a process that brings the offender into the criminal justice 
system.        
 7.    Police should be trained in the use of enhanced evidence gathering techniques and funding 
made available for purchase of the equipment necessary to conduct high quality investigations.   
 8.    Risk assessment and safety planning protocols to be built into police policy.   
 9.    Police must conduct separate interviews with alleged perpetrators and victims at domestic 
violence scenes. 
10.   Victims of domestic violence must be eligible for witness protection programmes when it 
becomes apparent that their lives may be in danger. 
11.   Police should receive training on the dynamics of violent relationships, and the heightened 
risk to women and children at, or following, separation.  
12.   Police training should include criteria for identifying the primary aggressor. 
13.   Police practice and interventions should be externally monitored.  
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
14.    A person charged with an offence in relation to a person with whom that person is, or has 
been, in a domestic relationship,3 who has been convicted within the previous five years of 
assaulting or threatening the same complainant, must not be released on bail by a member of the 
police during the 24 hours immediately following the arrest. 
                                                 
3     See, s 4 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
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!   RECOMMENDATION  
15.    The creation of new offences of: 
        (a)  Aggravated Breach of a Protection Order; 
        (b)  Aggravated Assault on a Female or Child; 
        (c)   Terroristic Threats. 
(As recommended in the Victims Task Force research 1992, the definition of Terroristic threats 
should follow the wording of the Minnesota Domestic Abuse Act) 4 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION  
16.     Amend the Sentencing Act 2002 to prohibit the practice of crediting domestic violence 
offenders on the basis of absence of prior domestic violence convictions.  
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S) 
17.  (a)   Amend the Evidence Act 2006  to provide that persons in a domestic relationship with 
the defendant may be excused by the Judge from giving evidence for the prosecution in that 
proceeding where the giving of that evidence would endanger the safety of the witness. 
          (b)  Any person excused from giving evidence under (a) above, must be treated as 
unavailable as a witness.5    
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
18.    When domestic violence offenders are ordered to attend stopping violence treatment, 
victims must be provided with accurate information about the limitations of treatment and the 
optimum conditions for success.  This information should include citations to research literature. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
19.    Probation personnel should receive training on established risk markers for 
dangerousness/lethality.  An appropriate risk assessment tool should be adopted for use when 
taking action on domestic violence cases. 
 
                                                 
4    Ruth Busch, Neville Robertson and Hilary Lapsley, Domestic Violence and the Justice System: A Study of Breaches 
of Protection Orders (1992) 271. 
5    The New Zealand Law Commission, Evidence, Report 55 Vol 1 (1999) [344], notes that battered women should not 
be required to argue in front of the abuser that giving evidence would expose her to further violence.  Such prohibition 
on questioning the woman in the presence of the abuser is equally applicable to completion by the victim of risk 
assessment protocols. 
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!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
20.    A person imprisoned for an offence in relation to a person with whom that person is, or 
has been, in a domestic relationship,6 who has been convicted within the previous five years of an 
offence against the same victim should not be paroled to the victim's place of residence. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
21.    Training for Child, Youth and Family staff who work with victims, offenders and their 
families should incorporate identification of red flags for dangerousness/lethality, including 
separation, and how to respond.  Training should also emphasise that the safety of the abused 
parent is an integral component of the welfare and best interests of the child.   
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
22.   Where there is evidence of domestic violence, judges must craft access arrangements so as 
to protect the child and the abused adult from further harm.  To assist police to determine what 
behaviour constitutes a breach of the order, contact arrangements must be unambiguous and leave 
no room for negotiation.   
 
RECOMMENDATION(S)  
23.    Women's Refuge should receive top priority funding commensurate with its double role of 
crime prevention and crisis intervention. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
24.    Domestic violence fatality reviews should be placed on a statutory footing; 
25.    The definition of a domestic violence fatality should be based on control, and not on 
degrees of relationship between victim and offender; 
26.    Review panels should include an advocate from each Women's Refuge in the area in 
which the fatality occurred, with a minimum of three Refuge advocates on the Panel;  
27.     Reviews should be undertaken upon receipt of a written request by family members or 
persons closely associated with the deceased; or persons with particular knowledge of the victim 
and/or the circumstances of the fatality; 
                                                 
6    See, s 4 Domestic Violence Act 1995. 
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28.     Deaths for which no finding can be made whether accidentally or deliberately inflicted 
should be investigated to determine any domestic violence connection.  
29 Deaths following an assault in relation to which only assault charges are laid require 
further investigation and reporting. 
30.    Protocols should be established to assist Coroners to ascertain any domestic violence 
connection to the deceased. 
 
RECOMMENDATION(S)  
31.    The government must take immediate action to implement the CEDAW recommendation 
that it devise a structure for systematic collection of data on all forms of violence against women.   
32.    Collection of data on intimate partner homicides should be on a detailed case-based 
analysis to provide information on trends and patterns of offending.  Such mechanism for 
collecting information is feasible given the relatively small number of cases involved.  This 
information should be accessible to the public. 
 
!  RECOMMENDATION(S)  
33.     (a)  A separate offence of separation assault with sanctions commensurate with the gravity 
of this offending;  
         (b)  A separate offence of aggravated separation assault where: 
               i) the offence takes place in breach of the victim's protection order; or 
              ii) in the context of home invasion; or 
       iii) where the defendant has previously been convicted of separation assault aimed at the 
present victim. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
34.     Amend the Sentencing Act 2002 to provide that when sentencing an offender for murder, 
the court must make an order imposing a minimum period of imprisonment where the killing 
occurs in the context of the victim's decision to end a domestic relationship with the offender.  
 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S) 
35. Creation of an 'estrangement murder' offence where the killing occurs in the context of 
separation; and  
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        (a) involves home invasion; or  
        (b) breach of the victim's protection order; 
                    and;  
       the offender means to cause serious injury, whether or not he means death to ensue, or 
knows or does not know that death is likely to ensue. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
36.   (a)   Domestic violence fatality reviews should investigate homicides of elderly women 
designated as 'mercy killings' or 'suicide pacts'.   
 (b) The development of legal and social policy on euthanasia in the context of an 
intimate relationship must be informed by the gender implications of these killings. 
        (c)  Further research should be undertaken on charged and uncharged incidents of so-
called mercy killings and suicide pacts involving intimate partners. 
        (d) The Domestic Violence Advisory Panel to develop policy and provide guidance to 
Parliament and the Sentencing Council on this issue. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
37.    A domestic homicide statute creating an offence of murder where the killing occurs in the 
context of a violent relationship, which has led the victim to fear serious bodily injury, and either; 
 (a) the homicide occurred in circumstances manifesting an extreme indifference to human 
life, or; 
 (b) in the course of committing the final act of domestic abuse, the offender intended to  
cause the victim serious bodily harm.     
 
!  RECOMMENDATION(S)  
38.     Amend the Sentencing Act 2002 to provide that: 
          (a)   when sentencing an offender who has been convicted of murder, the court must make 
an order imposing a minimum period of imprisonment where the killing occurs in breach of the 
victim's protection order;  
          (b)  when sentencing offenders for sub-lethal domestic assaults, the fact the assault 
occurred in breach of the victim's protection order is an aggravating feature of the offending. 
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!   RECOMMENDATION  
39.   In any criminal case in which the defendant is accused of a crime of domestic violence, 
evidence of the defendant's commission of another act of domestic violence against the same or 
another victim shall be deemed admissible as relevant to propensity.   
 Domestic violence includes sexual and physical assault, threats of sexual or physical 
assault, stalking, property damage and other harassment committed upon any of the following 
persons, their family members, or their property:  
        (a)  a spouse or former spouse; 
       (b)  a cohabitant or former cohabitant; 
        (c)  a person  with whom the defendant is having or has had a dating or engagement   
                     relationship, irrespective of that person's age, sex, or sexual orientation; 
        (d)  a person with whom the defendant has engaged in sexually intimate activity; 
        (e)  a person with whom the defendant has a child in common. 
 
To ensure the probative value of the propensity evidence, admissibility should be limited to acts 
occurring within a period of ten years' prior to the current alleged offence unless the court 
determines, in the interests of justice, that the probative value of the evidence outweighs its 
prejudicial effect.7 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
40.    (a) In any proceeding before a Visiting Justice in respect of an alleged disciplinary 
offence which relates to breach of a protection order or other misconduct directed by a prison 
inmate at a person against whom the inmate has been charged with, or convicted of, a domestic 
violence offence, the complainant shall be excused from giving evidence at that proceeding. 
         (b)  Any person excused from giving evidence under (a) above, must be treated as 
unavailable as a witness.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7    See, eg, Lisa Sanctis, 'Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic 
Violence' (1996) 8 Yale J.L. & Feminism 359, 401-402; Myrna Raeder, 'The Admissibility of Prior Acts of Domestic 
Violence: Simpson and Beyond' (1996) 69 S.Cal.L.Rev. 1463, 1505; Linelle Letendre, Beating Again and Again and 
Again: Why Washington Needs a New Rule of Evidence Admitting Prior Acts of Domestic Violence' (2000) 75 
Wash.L.Rev. 973, 997. 
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!  RECOMMENDATION  
41.    The Sentencing Council (when established) should consult with, and take advice from, a 
specialist Domestic Violence Advisory Panel on sentencing policy and guidelines in domestic 
violence cases.   
    
!  RECOMMENDATION(S)  
42.    Establishment of a Domestic Violence Advisory Panel which will: 
(a)  develop consistent, coherent, domestic violence intervention policy, monitor trends and    
       institute a data base to track legal responses to domestic violence; 
       (b)  provide guidance to Parliament, the Law Commission and the Sentencing Council;  
            (c)  formulate recommendations following fatality reviews and ensure lessons learned 
       from  lethal assaults feed back into and inform responses to sub-lethal domestic 
       violence;   
(d)   provide advice where required to the community-based Court Watch programme (see  
       below); 
      (e)   provide public and judicial education on sentencing in domestic violence cases in  
                   consultation with the Sentencing Council; 
            (f)   provide judicial and public education on legal responses to domestic violence. 
 (g)  promote domestic violence research, including research on the interrelationship  
                   between domestic violence and suicide. 
 
!  RECOMMENDATION(S) 
43.    The proposed domestic violence education campaign8 should include resources to educate 
professionals and the public about red flag situations for dangerousness and potential lethality and 
the interrelationship between domestic violence and domestic homicide 
44.     This knowledge should be incorporated in school curricula. 
 
!  RECOMMENDATION(S) 
45.    Training on domestic violence and gender bias in the law should be incorporated in the law 
school curriculum. 
 
                                                 
8    Taskforce for Action on Violence within Families, above n 1, 16. 
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!  RECOMMENDATION(S)  
46.    Mandatory training of judges and legal practitioners dealing with domestic violence should 
aim to provide: 
          (a)  better understanding of the dynamics of domestic violence and  
       (b)  its interrelationship with domestic homicide;  
       (c)  training on assessing danger and lethality;  
 (d) understanding the effects of domestic violence on children; the correlation between  
                     child and partner abuse; and the need to provide protection against violence to the  
                     custodial parent. 
 
!   RECOMMENDATION(S)  
47.   The establishment in selected areas in New Zealand of Court Watch Projects to monitor and 
report on criminal justice responses to domestic violence. 
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APPENDIX I 
 
HOMICIDES:  OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS 
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APPENDIX II:   METHOD OF KILLING AND LEGAL OUTCOME 
 
 
            
METHOD OF KILLING BY MALES IN SPOUSAL* HOMICIDE AND LEGAL OUTCOME 1995-2002, NEW ZEALAND  
                        
Method Murder M/Slaughter Homicide Insanity Sub Total % Murder Acquitted Suspect Outcome Prosec. Grand 
     Lesser      Committed Unknown Stayed Total 
      Offence         Suicide       
Weapons                  
Sharp ins. 18 2   4 24 75%   6     30 
Blunt ins. 4 1     5 80%      1 6 
Shooting 6     6 100%  4     10 
Sub total 28 3   4 35 80%   10   1 46 
                   
Body Force                       
Hit/Kicking 4 9    13 31%    2   15 
Strangulation 5       5 100%   2     7 
Drowning   1     1 0%         1 
Sub total 9 10    19 47%  2 2   23 
                        
Other methods                       
Suffocation   1    1 0%     1 2 
Burning 3 1     4 75%   2     6 
Poison/drugs 1 2 1  4 25%       4 
Motor vehicle 2 1 1   4 50%         4 
Unknown 1     1         1 
Sub total 7 5 2   14 50%   2   1 17 
Grand Total 44 18 2 4 68 65%   14 2 2 86 
* includes heterosexual spouses, ex-spouses, partners and ex-partners      
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METHOD OF KILLING BY FEMALES IN SPOUSAL* HOMICIDE AND LEGAL OUTCOME 1995-2002, NEW 
ZEALAND   
                        
Method Murder M/Slaughter Homicide Insanity Sub Total % Murder Acquitted Suspect Outcome Prosec. Grand  
     Lesser       Committed Unknown Stayed Total  
      Offence         Suicide        
Weapons                   
Sharp ins. 1 3     4 25% 4       8  
Blunt ins n/a n/a n/a n/a 0         0  
Shooting     1   1 0%         1  
Sub total 1 3 1   5 20% 4      9  
                         
Body Force                   
Hit/kicking n/a n/a n/a n/a 0           0  
Strangulation n/a n/a n/a n/a 0         0  
Drowning   1       0%         1  
Sub total  1    1 0%       1  
                         
Other methods                   
Suffocation 1       1 100%         1  
Burning n/a n/a n/a n/a 0         0  
Poison/drugs n/a n/a n/a n/a 0           0  
Motor Vehicle  1    1 0%       1  
Unknown n/a n/a n/a n/a 0           0  
Sub total 1 1     2 50%         2  
Grand Total 2 5 1   8 25% 4       12  
* includes heterosexual spouses, ex-spouses, partners and ex-partners       
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APPENDIX III 
 
CASE STUDIES:  SUB-LETHAL ASSAULTS 
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APPENDIX IV 
 
RISK ASSESSMENT INSTRUMENTS 
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APPENDIX V  
 
PERSONALISED SAFETY PLAN 
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APPENDIX VI 
 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE SUPPLEMENTAL SHEET 
 
 
 


